


946.06
M16

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01068129 4

DC
231
N3
1900
v.4



Presented to the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

by the
ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY

1980



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

IN SIX VOLUMES

WITH FIFTY-SEVEN MAPS AND PLANS

VOL. IV


LONDON

FREDERICK WARNE AND CO.


AND NEW YORK

HISTORICAL

LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



72328



HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE

58137

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.
COLONEL 27TH REGIMENT




IN SIX VOLUMES

WITH FIFTY-FIVE MAPS AND PLANS



VOL. IV.

LONDON
FREDERICK WARNE AND CO.
AND NEW YORK



DC
231
N3
1900
V. 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

NOTICE xix

BOOK THE FIFTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war in Spain—Northern provinces—State of Galicia—Attempt to introduce English officers into the Spanish service—Trafficked for by the Spanish government—Repelled by the Spanish military—The English government encourage the partidas—Lord Wellington sends the chiefs presents—His after opinion of them—Sir H. Douglas succeeds general Walker—Miserable state of Galicia described—Disputes between the civil and military—Anomalous proceedings of the English government—Gross abuses in the Spanish army—Expedition against America fitted out in Galicia with the English supplies intended for the defence of the province—Sir H. Douglas's policy towards the partidas examined—Events in the Asturias—Santander surprised by Porlier—Reille and Caffarelli scour Biscay and the Rioja—Bonnet invades the Asturias—Defeats Moscoso, San Pol Lozada, and Mendizabel, and occupies Oviedo—In Galicia the people prefer the French to their own armies—In Estremadura, Drouet joins Girard and menaces Hill—These movements parts of a great plan to be conducted by Napoleon in person p. 1

CHAPTER II.

Conquest of Valencia—Suchet's preparations described—Napoleon's system eminently methodical—State of Valencia—Suchet invades that province—Blake concentrates his force to fight—His advanced guard put to flight by the French cavalry—He retires to the city of Valencia—Siege of Saguntum—The French repulsed in an assault—Palombini defeats Obispo near Segorbe—Harispe defeats C. O'Donnel at Beneguazil—Oropesa taken—The French batteries open against Saguntum—Two assaults repulsed—Suchet's embarrassments—Operations on his rear in Catalonia—Medas islands taken—Lacy proposes to form a general depôt at Palamos—Discouraged by sir E. Pellew—The Spaniards blow up the works of Berga, and fix their chief depôt at Busa—Description of that place—Lacy surprises the French in the town of Igualada—Eroles takes a convoy near Jorbas—The French quit the castle of Igualada and join the garrison of Montserrat—That

place abandoned—Eroles takes Cervera and Belpuig—Beats the French national guards in Cerdana—Invades and ravages the French frontier—Returns by Ripol and takes post in the pass of Garriga—Milans occupies Mataro—Sarsfield embarks and sails to the coast of the Ampurdan—These measures prevent the march of the French convoy to Barcelona—State of Aragon—The Empecinado and Duran invade it on one side—Mina invades it on the other—Calatayud taken—Severoli's division reinforces Musnier, and the partidas are pursued to Daroca and Molino—Mina enters the Cinco Villas—Defeats eleven hundred Italians at Ayerbé—Carries his prisoners to Motrico in Biscay—Mazzuchelli defeats the Empecinado at Cubiliejos—Blake calls in all his troops and prepares for a battle—Suchet's position described—Blake's dispositions—Battle of Saguntum—Observations . . . p. 9

CHAPTER III.

Suchet resolves to invest the city of Valencia—Blake reverts to his former system of acting on the French rear—Napoleon orders general Reille to reinforce Suchet with two divisions—Lacy disarms the Catalan somatenes—Their ardour diminishes—The French destroy several bands, blockade the Medas islands and occupy Mataro—Several towns affected to the French interest—Bad conduct of the privateers—Lacy encourages assassination—Suchet advances to the Guadalaviar—Spanish defences described—The French force the passage of the river—Battle of Valencia—Mahy flies to Alcira—Suchet invests the Spanish camp—Blake attempts to break out, is repulsed—The camp abandoned—The city is bombarded—Commotion within the walls—Blake surrenders with his whole army—Suchet created duke of Albufera—Shameful conduct of the junta of the province—Montbrun arrives with three divisions—Summons Alicante and returns to Toledo—Villa Campa marches from Carthagena to Albaracin—Gandia and Denia taken by the French—They besiege Peniscola—Lacy menaces Taragona—Defeats a French battalion at Villa Seca—Battle of Altafulla—Siege of Peniscola—The French army in Valencia weakened by draughts—Suchet's conquests cease—Observations 25

CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Description of Soult's position—Events in Estremadura—Ballesteros arrives at Algesiras—Advances to Alcala de Gazules—Is driven back—Soult designs to besiege Tarifa—Concludes a convention with the emperor of Morocco—It is frustrated by England—Ballesteros cooped up under the guns of Gibraltar by Semélé and Godinot—Colonel Skerrett sails for Tarifa—The French march against Tarifa—Are stopped in the pass of La Peña by the fire of the British ships—They retire from San Roque—General Godinot shoots himself—General Hill surprises general Girard at Aroyo Molino, and returns to the Alentejo—French reinforced in Estremadura—Their movements checked by insubordination amongst the troops—Hill again advances—Endeavours to surprise the French at Merida—Fine conduct of captain Neveux—Hill marches to Almedralejos to fight Drouet—The latter retires—Phillipon sends a party from Badajos to forage the banks of the Guadiana—Abercrombie defeats a squadron of cavalry at Fuente del Maestro—Hill returns to the Alentejo 4

CHAPTER V.

Soult resolves to besiege Tarifa—Ballesteros is driven a second time under the guns of Gibraltar—Laval invests Tarifa—Siege of Tarifa—The assault repulsed—Siege is raised—The true history of the siege exposed—Colonel Skerrett not the author of the success . . . p. 51

BOOK THE SIXTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Political situation of king Joseph—Political state of Spain—Political state of Portugal—Military operations—Julian Sanchez captures the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo—General Thiebault introduces a convoy and a new governor into that fortress—Difficulty of military operations on the Agueda—The allied army being pressed for provisions takes wide cantonments, and preparations are secretly made for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 62

CHAPTER II.

Review of the different changes of the war—Enormous efforts of Napoleon—Lord Wellington's situation described—His great plans explained—His firmness and resolution under difficulties—Distressed state of his army—The prudence and ability of lord Fitzroy Somerset—Dissemination of the French army—Lord Wellington seizes the opportunity to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo 74

CHAPTER III.

Means collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Major Sturgeon throws a bridge over the Agueda—Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Colonel Colborne storms fort Francisco—The scarcity of transport balks lord Wellington's calculations—Marmont collects troops—Plan of the attack changed—Two breaches are made and the city is stormed—Observations 83

CHAPTER IV.

Execution of the French partisans and English deserters found in Ciudad Rodrigo—The works are repaired—Marmont collects his army at Salamanca—Bonnet abandons the Asturias—Souham advances to Matilla—Hill arrives at Castello Branco—The French army harassed by winter marches and by the partidas—Marmont again spreads his divisions—The Agueda overflows and all communication with Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off—Lord Wellington prepares to besiege Badajos—Preliminary measures—Impeded by bad weather—Difficulties and embarrassments arise—The allied army marches in an unmilitary manner towards the

Alemtejo—Lord Wellington proposes some financial measures—Gives up Ciudad to the Spaniards—The fifth division is left in Beira—Carlos d'España and general Victor Alten are posted on the Yeltes—The Portuguese militia march for the Coa—Lord Wellington reaches Elvas—He is beset with difficulties—Falls sick, but recovers rapidly . p. 94

CHAPTER V.

The allies cross the Guadiana—Beresford invests Badajos—Generals Graham and Hill command the covering army—Drouet retires to Hornaches in the Llerena—Third English siege of Badajos—Sally of the garrison repulsed—Works impeded by the rain—The besieged rake the trenches from the right bank of the Guadiana—The fifth division is called up to the siege—The river rises and carries away the bridge, and the siege is upon the point of being raised—Two flying-bridges are established—The fifth division invest St. Christoval and the bridge-head—The Picurina is stormed—The batteries open against the San Roque and the body of the place—The covering army drive general Drouet from Llerena into the Morena on the side of Cordova—Marmont collects his forces in Leon—The Spanish officers and the Portuguese government neglect the supplies of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Soult advances from Cordova towards Llerena—The fifth division is brought over the Guadiana—The works of the siege are pressed—An attempt to blow up the dam of the inundation fails—The two breaches become practicable—Soult effects his junction with Drouet and advances to the succour of the place—Graham and Hill fall back—The bridge of Merida is destroyed—The assault is ordered but countermanded—A third breach is formed—The fortress is stormed with a dreadful slaughter and the city is sacked by the allies . 100

CHAPTER VI.

The state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida obliges lord Wellington to relinquish his design of invading Andalusia—Soult's operations described—He reaches Villa Franca—Hears of the fall of Badajos and retires—Penne-Villemur and Morillo move from the Niebla against Seville—Ballesteros having defeated Maransin at Cartama comes from the Ronda against Seville—A French convoy is stopped in the Morena, and the whole of Andalusia is in commotion—Seville is saved by the subtlety of a Spaniard in the French interest—Ballesteros retires—Assaults Zahara and is repulsed—Sends a division against Ossuna, which is also repulsed by the *Escopeteros*—Drives general Rey from Allora to Malaga—Soult marches from Llerena towards Seville, and general Conroux brings a brigade up from the Guadalete to attack Ballesteros—Sir S. Cotton defeats general Peyreymont's cavalry near Usagre—Soult concentrates his army near Seville to fight the allies—Lord Wellington marches to Beira—Marmont's operations—He marches against Ciudad Rodrigo—Carlos d'España retires towards Almeida and Victor Alten towards Penamacor—The French appear before Almeida—General Trant arrives on the Cabeça Negro—The French retire and Trant unites with J. Wilson at Guarda—Marmont advances to Sabugal—Victor Alten abandons Penamacor and Castello Branco, and crosses the Tagus—The Portuguese general Lecor opposes the enemy with skill and courage—Marmont drives Trant from Guarda and defeats his militia on the Mondego—Lord

Wellington crosses the Tagus and enters Castello Branco—Marmont's position perilous—Lord Wellington advances to attack him—He retreats over the Agueda—The allied army is spread in wide cantonments and the fortresses are victualled p. 124

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—The campaign considered—The justice of Napoleon's views vindicated, and Marmont's operations censured as the cause of the French misfortunes—The operations of the army of the centre and of the south examined—Lord Wellington's operations eulogized—Extraordinary adventures of Captain Colquhoun Grant—The operations of the siege of Badajos examined—Lord Wellington's conduct vindicated 134

BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Summary of the political state of affairs—Lord Wellesley resigns—Mr. Perceval killed—New administration—Story of the war resumed—Wellington's precautionary measures described—He relinquishes the design of invading Andalusia and resolves to operate in the north—Reasons why—Surprise of Almaraz by general Hill—False alarm given by sir William Erskine prevents Hill from taking the fort of Mirabete—Wellington's discontent—Difficult moral position of English generals 154

CHAPTER II.

Progress of the war in different parts of Spain—State of Galicia—French precautions and successes against the partidas of the north—Marmont's arrangements in Castille—Maritime expedition suggested by sir Howard Douglas—He stimulates the activity of the northern partidas—The curate Merino defeats some French near Aranda de Duero—His cruelty to the prisoners—Mina's activity—Harasses the enemy in Aragon—Is surprised at Robres by general Pannetier—Escapes with difficulty—Re-appears in the Rioja—Gains the defiles of Navas Tolosa—Captures two great convoys—Is chased by general Abbé and nearly crushed, whereby the partidas in the north are discouraged—Those in other parts become more enterprising—The course of the Ebro from Tudela to Tortosa so infested by them that the army of the Ebro is formed by drafts from Suchet's forces and placed under general Reille to repress them—Operations of Palombini against the partidas—He moves towards Madrid—Returns to the Ebro—Is ordered to join the king's army—Operations in Aragon and Catalonia—The Catalonians are cut off from the coast line—Eroles raises a new division in Talarn—Advances into Aragon—Defeats general Bourke at Rhoda—Is driven into Catalonia by Severoli—Decaen defeats Sarsfield and goes to Lerida—Lacy concentrates in the mountains of Olot—Descends upon Mattaro—Flies from thence disgracefully—Lamarque defeats Sarsfield—Lacy's bad conduct—Miserable state of Catalonia 168

CHAPTER III.

Operations in Valencia and Murcia—Suchet's able government of Valencia—O'Donnel organizes a new army in Murcia—Origin of the Sicilian expedition to Spain—Secret intrigues against Napoleon in Italy and other parts—Lord William Bentinck proposes to invade Italy—Lord Wellington opposes it—The Russian admiral Tchitchagoff projects a descent upon Italy—Vacillating conduct of the English ministers productive of great mischief—Lord William Bentinck sweeps the money-markets, to the injury of lord Wellington's operations—Sir John Moore's plan for Sicily rejected—His ability and foresight proved by the ultimate result—Evil effects of bad government shown by examples p. 182

CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Advantage of lord Wellington's position shown—Soult's plans vast but well-considered—He designs to besiege Tarifa, Alicant, and Carthage, and march upon Lisbon—Restores the French interest at the court of Morocco—English embassy to the Moorish emperor fails—Soult bombards Cadiz, and menaces a serious attack—Ballesteros, his rash conduct—He is defeated at Bornos—Effect of his defeat upon the allies in Estremadura—Foy succours the fort of Mirabete—Hill is reinforced—Drouet falls back to Azagua—Followed by Hill—General Slade defeated by Lallemande in a cavalry combat at Macquilla—Exploit of cornet Strenowitz—General Barrois marches to reinforce Drouet by the road of St. Ollala—Hill falls back to Albuera—His disinterested conduct 189

CHAPTER V.

Political situation of France—Secret policy of the European courts—Causes of the Russian war—Napoleon's grandeur and power—Scene on the Niemen—Design attributed to Napoleon of concentrating the French armies behind the Ebro—No traces of such an intention to be discovered—His proposals for peace considered—Political state of England—Effects of the continental system—Extravagance, harshness, and improvident conduct of the English ministers—Dispute with America—Political state of Spain—Intrigues of Carlotta—New scheme of mediation with the colonies—Mr. Sydenham's opinion of it—New constitution adopted—Succession to the crown fixed—Abolition of the Inquisition agitated—Discontent of the clergy and absolute-monarchy-men—Neglect of the military affairs—Dangerous state of the country—Plot to deliver up Ceuta—Foreign policy of Spain—Negotiations of Bardaxi at Stockholm—Fresh English subsidy—Plan of enlisting Spanish soldiers in British regiments fails—The councillor of state, Sobral, offers to carry off Ferdinand from Valençay, but Ferdinand rejects his offer—Joseph talks of assembling a Cortes at Madrid, but secretly negotiates with that in the Isla 195

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal—Internal condition not improved—Government weak—Lord Strangford's conduct condemned—Lord Wellesley resolves to recal him and send lord Louvaine to Rio Janeiro—Reasons why this did not take place—Lord Strangford's mischievous career checked by the fear of being removed—Lord Wellington obtains full powers from the Brazils—Lord Castlereagh's vigorous interference—Death of Linhares at Rio Janeiro—Domingo Souza succeeds him as chief minister, but remains in London—Lord Wellington's moderation towards the Portuguese regency—His embarrassing situation described—His opinion of the Spanish and Portuguese public men—His great diligence and foresight, aided by the industry and vigour of Mr. Stuart, supports the war—His administrative views and plans described—Opposed by the regency—He desires the prince regent's return to Portugal without his wife—Carlotta prepares to come without the prince—Is stopped—Mr. Stuart proposes a military government, but lord Wellington will not consent—Great desertion from the Portuguese army, in consequence of their distressed state, from the negligence of the government—Severe examples do not check it—The character of the Portuguese troops declines—Difficulty of procuring specie—Wellington's resources impaired by the shameful cupidity of English merchants at Lisbon and Oporto—Proposal for a Portuguese bank made by Domingo Souza, Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Villiers—Lord Wellington ridicules it—He permits a contraband trade to be carried on with Lisbon by Soult, for the sake of the resources it furnishes p. 207

BOOK THE EIGHTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Numbers of the French in the Peninsula shown—Joseph commander-in-chief—His dissensions with the French generals—His plans—Opposed by Soult, who recommends different operations and refuses to obey the king—Lord Wellington's plans described—His numbers—Colonel Sturgeon skilfully repairs the bridge of Alcantara—The advantage of this measure—The navigation of the Tagus and the Douro improved and extended—Rash conduct of a commissary on the Douro—Remarkable letter of lord Wellington to lord Liverpool—Arrangements for securing the allies' flanks and operating against the enemy's flanks described—Marmont's plans—His military character—He restores discipline to the army of Portugal—His measures for that purpose, and the state of the French army described and compared with the state of the British army and Wellington's measures 219

CHAPTER II.

Campaign of 1812—Wellington advances to the Tormes—Marmont retires—The allies besiege the forts of Salamanca—General aspect of affairs changes and becomes gloomy—The king concentrates the army of the centre—Marmont returns to the Tormes and cannonades the allies on the position of San Christoval—Various skirmishes—Adventure of Mr. Mackay—Marmont retires to Monte Rubia—Crosses the Tormes with a part of his army—Fine conduct of general Bock's German cavalry—Graham crosses the Tormes and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia—Observations on this movement—Assault on San Vincente fails—Heroic death of general Bowes—Siege suspended for want of ammunition—It is renewed—Cajetano is stormed—San Vincente being on fire surrenders—Marmont retires to the Duero, followed by Wellington—The French rear-guard suffers some loss between Rueda and Tordesillas—Positions of the armies described—State of affairs in other parts described—Procrastination of the Galician army—General Bonnet abandons the Asturias—Coincidence of Wellington's and Napoleon's views upon that subject—Sir Home Popham arrives with his squadron on the coast of Biscay—His operations—Powerful effect of them upon the campaign—Wellington and Marmont alike cautious of bringing on a battle—Extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington's situation p. 235

CHAPTER III.

Bonnet arrives in the French camp—Marmont passes the Duero—Combat of Castrejon—Allies retire across the Guarena—Combat on that river—Observations on the movements—Marmont turns Wellington's flank—Retreat to San Christoval—Marmont passes the Tormes—Battle of Salamanca—Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac 252

CHAPTER IV.

Clausel passes the Tormes at Alba—Cavalry combat at La Serna—Chauvel's cavalry joins the French army—The king reaches Blasco Sancho—Retires to Espinar on hearing of the battle—Receives letters from Clausel which induce him to march on Segovia—Wellington drives Clausel across the Duero—Takes Valladolid—Brings Santocildes over the Duero—Marches upon Cuellar—The king abandons Segovia and recrosses the Guadarama—State of affairs in other parts of Spain—General Long defeats Lallemande in Estremadura—Caffarelli is drawn to the coast by Popham's expedition—Wellington leaves Clinton at Cuellar and passes the Guadarama—Cavalry combat at Majadahonda—The king unites his army at Valdemoro—Miserable state of the French convoy—Joseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at Alicante—Retreats upon Valencia instead of Andalusia—Maupoint's brigade succours the garrison of Cuenca, is beaten at Utiel by Villa Campa—Wellington enters Madrid—The Retiro surrenders—Empecinado takes Guadalaxara—Extraordinary journey of colonel Fabvier—Napoleon hears of Marmont's defeat—His generous conduct towards that marshal—Receives the king's report against Soult—His magnanimity—Observations 277

BOOK THE NINETEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy's bad conduct—French army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy's secret agents blow up the magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniates Sarsfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas surrendered to Decaen by colonel Green—The French general burns the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida—General Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for Alicante—Reflections on this event—Operations in Murcia—O'Donnel defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicante—Suchet concentrates his forces at Xativa—Entrenches a camp there—Maitland advances to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicante—The king's army arrives at Almanza—The remnant of Maupoint's brigade arrives at Cuenca—Suchet re-occupies Alcoy—O'Donnel comes up to Yecla—Maitland is reinforced from Sicily and entrenches a camp under the walls of Alicante p. 300

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Andalusia—The king orders Soult to abandon that province—Soult urges the king to join him with the other armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult sends a letter to the minister of war expressing his suspicions that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The king intercepts this letter, and sends colonel Désprez to Moscow to represent Soult's conduct to the emperor—Napoleon's magnanimity—Wellington anxiously watches Soult's movements—Orders Hill to fight Drouet, and directs general Cooke to attack the French lines in front of the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued by Leval and Villatte, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult's preparations to abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned—Soult marches towards Grenada—Colonel Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at Seville—Drouet marches upon Huescar—Soult moving by the mountains reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the king and Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents him—Wellington's general plans considered—State of affairs in Castille—Clausel comes down to Valladolid with the French army—Santocildes retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora and drives Silveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is recalled by Clausel—The partidas get possession of the French posts on the Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille abandons several posts in Aragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection 315

CHAPTER III.

Wellington's combinations described—Foolish arrangements of the English ministers relative to the Spanish clothing—Want of money—

Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that city—Character of the Madrileños—Wellington marches against Clausel—Device of the Portuguese regency to avoid supplying their troops—Wellington enters Valladolid—Waits for Castaños—His opinion of the Spaniards—Clausel retreats to Burgos—His able generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of destruction from the partidas—Reflections upon the movements of the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos p. 330

CHAPTER IV.

State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph's distress for money—Massena declines the command of the army of Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from France—Mischiefs occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham takes the command—Operations of the partidas—Hill reaches Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in artillery—Negligence of the British government on that head—The relative situation of the belligerents—Wellington offered the chief command of the Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros—He is arrested and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soult reduces Chinchilla—The king communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Drunkenness at Torquemada—Combat on the Carrion—Wellington retires behind the Pisuerga—Disorders at the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes at the bridge of Cabeçon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and Simancas—The French captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprises the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington retires behind the Duero—Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of Tordesillas and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the march of the French 349

CHAPTER V.

The king and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus—General Hill takes a position of battle—The French pass the Tagus—Skirmish at the Puente Largo—Hill blows up the Retiro and abandons Madrid—Riot in that city—Attachment of the Madrileños towards the British troops—The hostile armies pass the Guadarama—Souham restores the bridge of Toro—Wellington retreats towards Salamanca and orders Hill to retreat upon Alba de Tormes—The allies take a position of battle behind the Tormes—The Spaniards at Salamanca display a hatred of the British—Instances of their ferocity—Soult cannonades the castle of Alba—The king re-organizes the French armies—Soult and Jourdan propose different plans—Soult's plan adopted—French pass the Tormes—Wellington by a remarkable movement gains the Valmusa river and retreats—Misconduct of the troops—Sir Edward Paget taken prisoner—Combat on the Huebra—Anecdote—Retreat from thence to Ciudad Rodrigo—The armies on both sides take winter cantonments 368

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the partisan warfare—General Lameth made governor of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal—Drouet, count d'Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina's operations in Aragon—Villa Campa's operations—Empecinado and others enter Madrid—The duke Del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The king enters Madrid—Soult's cavalry scour La Mancha—Suchet's operations—General Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army—Suchet intrenches a camp at Xativa—The Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes the command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in that province—Eroles and Codrington menace Taragona—Eroles surprises a French detachment at Arbeca—Lacy threatens Mataro and Hostalrich—Returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalonian army and penetrates to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villamil attempts to surprise San Felipe de Balaguer—Attacks it a second time in concert with Codrington—The place succoured by the garrison of Tortosa—Lacy suffers a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia ceases—The partisan warfare continues—England the real support of the war p. 391

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of Jomini and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations analysed—Sir John Moore's retreat compared with lord Wellington's . . . 403

APPENDIX.

No.	PAGE
1. Conduct of the English government, and extracts from Mr. Canning's and lord Wellesley's instructions to Mr. Stuart	419
2. Marmont and Dorsenne's operations	425
3. Siege of Tarifa, with anonymous extracts from memoirs and letters of different officers employed in the siege	437
4. Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, with anonymous extracts from memoirs and letters of officers engaged in, or eye-witness of the action described	444
5. English papers relating to Soult's and Marmont's operations, and French papers relating to the same	450

No.	PAGE
6. Summary of the force of the Anglo-Portuguese army at different periods, exclusive of drummers and fifers, with summary of the French force at different periods, extracted from the imperial muster-rolls	456
7. Mr. Tupper's Report to sir H. Wellesley	462
8. Extracts of letters relating to the battle of Salamanca	463
9. Copies of two despatches from the emperor Napoleon to the minister at war relative to the duke of Ragusa	464
0. Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to king Joseph, August 12, 1812	465
11. Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the minister at war . . .	467
12. Letter from colonel Désprez to king Joseph, Paris, Sept. 22, 1812	469
13A. Confidential letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Paris, Nov. 10, 1812	471
13B. Letter from colonel Désprez to king Joseph, Paris, Jan. 3, 1813, .	472
14. Letter from Napoleon to the duc de Feltre, Ghiart, Sept. 2, 1812, .	475
15A. Extract. General Souham's despatch to the minister at war .	476
15B. Extracts. Two letters from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph. .	477
16. Extract. Letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier . .	478

LIST OF PLATES.

1. Siege and battle of Saguntum	<i>to face page 9</i>
2. Siege and battle of Valencia	27
3. Hill's operations. Aroyo Molino	45
4. Siege of Tarifa	51
5. Siege of Rodrigo	83
6. Siege of Badajos	101
7. Surprise of Almaraz	159
8. Siege of forts round Salamanca, &c.	235
9. Battle of Salamanca	253
10. Siege of Burgos	335
11. Retreats from Burgos and Madrid	357

NOTICE.

In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed in the different operations have been consulted for this volume. Amongst others, the Journal of general Harvey, of the Portuguese service, and some original papers supplied by sir Howard Douglas.

IN my controversy with marshal Beresford, for which see the sixth volume, I expressed a belief that the French army at Albuera was less numerous than I had represented it. The following letter, since procured, decides the question :—

Extrait d'une lettre écrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. le m^{ai} duc de Dalmatie, général-en-chef de l'armée du midi, à S. A. S. le prince de Wagram et de Neufchatel, major-général.

Le général Latour Maubourg a été obligé de se replier sur Constantina et Alamis, Cordove est menacée par un corps Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnol, beaucoup de troupes se concentrent en Estremadure; Badajoz est investie. Le général Blake a réuni sur l'Odiel une armée de quinze à seize mille hommes, et paroît se préparer à marcher sur Seville. Le restant du quatrième corps est en opérations contre les troupes qui ont débauché de Murcie. Si j'énumere bien, je suis en cet instant attaqué sur divers points par plus de soixante mille hommes indépendamment de troupes qui sont restées à Cadiz et à l'isle de Léon, et de celles qu'il y a à Tarrifa, à Algesiras, et à Gibraltar, que je dois contenir, le danger est pressant, je dois faire face de tous côtés assurer de nouveaux triomphes aux armées de S. M. l'empereur, et éviter

les fâcheux événemens, que l'on prépare contre l'armée du midi. J'espère réussir, mais le succès sera complet si les secours que j'attends arrivent apropos; voici mes dispositions. Je pars dans quatre jours avec *vingt mille hommes, trois mille chevaux, et trente pièces de canon*, pour rejeter au delà de la Guadiana les corps ennemis qui se sont répandus en Estremadure, dégager Badajos et faciliter l'arrivée du général comte d'Erlon. Si les troupes que ce général amène peuvent se réunir avec celles que je conduirai et si les troupes qui sont parties des armées du nord et du centre, dont j'ai en partie disposé, arrivent à tems, j'aurai en Estremadure trente-cinq mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux, et quarante pièces de canon de campagne; alors je livre bataille aux ennemis quand bien même toute l'armée Angloise qui est sur le continent y seroit réunie, et ils seront vaincus.

Si une partie des renforts que j'attends manquent je ferai avec ce que j'aurai, tout ce que pourrai vers le but proposé.

Le général-en-chef de l'armée impériale du midi,

(Signée)

MAI DUC DE DALMATIE.

Pour extraits conformes.

Letters to the Author received since the publication of the First Edition.

*Maunsel-house, near Bridgewater,
16th October, 1831.*

SIR,—The well-merited reputation which your work on the Peninsula war already possesses, and the probability there is that from its general correctness, and the deep research displayed in its production, it will be referred to in after times as the most faithful record of the operations of the British army in the Peninsula, induces me to refer you to a passage wherein my name is mentioned as commanding the cavalry on the 8th of October, 1810, when Massena's advanced guard drove the cavalry piquets out of Rio Maior.

The account which you give of that affair is substantially correct with the exception of *my* having the command. I commanded a brigade only; sir S. Cotton was present in Alcoentre, and commanded the whole force upon the occasion, as you may satisfy yourself by referring to the London Gazette,

wherein appears a letter from that officer to lord Wellington of the 9th of October detailing the whole proceeding.

As correctness must ever be the aim of the impartial historian, I trust you will do me the justice of inserting this letter in the forthcoming volume.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c. &c.

JOHN SLADE, *Lt.-General.*

Note by colonel Napier.—My account of the affair of Rio Maior was chiefly taken from the manuscript journal of the late major Somers Cocks, who had a distinguished share in the skirmish; in that account general Slade was mentioned as commanding the rear-guard for the day. Hence my error.

Woolwich, September 7, 1833.

DEAR SIR,—In perusing the third volume of your History of the Peninsula War, I observe in the account of the battle of Albuera, that you ascribe to me exertions on the right of our position, which in reality are due to sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British and German artillery, as I did that of the Portuguese in the battle; the two commands being independent of each other, and both were thanked by lord Beresford in the orders and despatches.

I have to explain that my guns, by lord Beresford's orders, were posted, for a great part of the battle, on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and about 700 yards from the village. Their fire bore *effectually* upon the bridge, and the road from it to Albuera, and I was not ordered to the right till towards the close of the battle.

In conclusion, I can only add that you will oblige me by giving publicity to this statement in a note to your next volume.

I remain, dear sir,

&c. &c. &c.

A. DICKSON.

HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULA WAR.

BOOK THE FIFTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.

DORSENNE's invasion of Galicia was happily prevented when it could not have been resisted, but that province remained as inert as before. Overtures had been made from England to take Spanish troops into British pay, but the Spanish regency, remembering Canning's prodigality, demanded three millions sterling yearly besides arms and clothing, without which the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions ! And the introduction of English officers on any other terms was impossible, because the Spanish military men were indignant at the degrading proposal ! The Perceval faction finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington on a scale commensurate with his capacity, then sought to encourage the partidas as less expensive, and more exemplary for the continental nations in respect to France ; wherefore sir Howard Douglas, successor to general Walker as the Gallician military agent, was directed to increase the supplies to those bodies, and to combine their movements with each other and with the English Biscay squadron. Wellington also, at the desire of the ministers, sent the chiefs military presents, with letters acknowledging their services, and justly, for he had derived great advan-

Sir Howard
Douglas's
MSS.

tages from their efforts, and thought he had derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When he afterwards saw them closely he acknowledged, that however willing to act and however harassing their warfare had been, none of them could fight the French without very superior numbers : if the latter occupied a house or church and only barred the doors, neither regulars nor partidas could force them. In like manner Napoleon, rebuking his generals for suffering the partidas to gather head, observed, that when cut off from the English ships they were nullities.

Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne's retreat enabled Abadia to resume his position on the frontier; but the wet season was setting in upon men destitute of the necessaries of life in a province abounding with cattle and goods easily to be procured; for money, although plentiful, was generally hoarded, and hence commodities were cheap and to be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also offered a valuable resource. That harbour was filled with colonial goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism and baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy's ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war; for the return was iron to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have been had from Castille and Leon. But confusion and corruption everywhere prevailed, the military exigencies were the last things cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses with impunity. The people were oppressed with imposts legal and illegal, and yet the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling arising from the unsettled nature of the times.

The annual charge on the province was 1,300,000*l.*, the actual receipts less than 500,000*l.* The junta met the deficiency by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of day-labourers, which they expected to produce 750,000*l.*, but a corrupt and vexatious collection tormented the people without filling the treasury : the clergy and the

richer classes were favoured as in Portugal, and in six months not even a seventh part was obtained.

From this state of affairs two inferences may be drawn:—

1°. That England not Galicia supported the war here as in other parts of the Peninsula. 2°. That as England had in 1808-9 paid to Galicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other supplies for double the number of troops employed, the deficiency of revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities, and the anomalous nature of the war. The successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were inert in civil administration, corrupt, and incapable of using the English succours justly or wisely. The junta of this period was factious, intriguing; hostile to that of Leon, unfriendly to that of the Asturias, jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders, who abhorred the junta and were tormented with factions of their own. The regular officers hating the partidas endeavoured to get control of the supplies sent for the latter; and as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants; partly from fear lest the latter should resist this licence, partly because the republican and anti-English spirit now influencing the Cortes had also reached this quarter.

All the clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words rather than principles, was inimical to them. A press was established at head-quarters, from whence issued political papers, original or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which the Portuguese were called slaves for submitting to British influence; and it was openly avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England. The guerilla system and the arming of the people were also attacked, and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil press at Coruña and St. Jago. Frequent change of commanders rendered these evils more prominent; for the local government had legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every new commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused to acknowledge Abadia as their president during

the absence of Castaños ; and he, complaining alike of their negligence and of their interference, when they proposed to establish a general depôt at Lugo marched a part of his army there to prevent it.

But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet to uphold national independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression with an ameliorated government. The clergy, powerful with the mass, clung to the English because they supported aristocracy and church domination ; and they were also for the *partidas*, because commanded by men springing directly from the church itself, or from people attached to the church ; while the regular armies officered by the friends of the Cortes disliked the *partidas* as interlopers and political enemies. The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not as the enemy of England but as the champion of equality, cared not for Spain unless her people were enslaved. They were willing to use a liberal Cortes to defeat Napoleon, but also desired to put down that Cortes by the aid of the clergy and bigoted people ; nevertheless as liberty will always have more charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the exigencies of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go to Moscow where the snow destroyed him ; and if the very advocates of liberty in Spain had not in their madness oppressed the South Americans. The Cortes by discovering a rabid love of power in practice rendered their democratic doctrines suspected ; but Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy and in his actions was considerate and just.

In the first conference held at Coruña after Douglas's arrival, the junta as matter of routine demanded more money from England ; he advised instead, a better management of their own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to render the army efficient. He recommended Orense as the line of retreat rather than Lugo and Coruña ; and he endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Aroso on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat. he also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great coats, the hospitals with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the

army to twenty-five thousand. There were however abuses which he could not remedy, and which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot than a European force fighting for independence. Innumerable baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants and cooks, who from custom never did duty, Appendix 7, § 1. Vol. III. were above five thousand ! When the sick men were deducted, scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry remained for service. And so little was there of organization that the troops, although young, robust, patient and docile to the greatest degree, could scarcely be moved even from one quarter to another as a military body : the generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once menaced and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.

Abadia at first appeared to enter loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the province in seven military governments, one for each division of the army : each government was to raise a reserve, and supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier. Soon however he displayed jealousy of the peasantry and of the English, and confined his exertions to the organization of an expedition against South America, which the Cadiz regency had ordered him to equip from the English stores at the moment when Dorsenne was menacing a new invasion of Gallicia ! Douglas vehemently opposed this, the junta were really averse to it, and Abadia pretended to be so ; but he had a personal interest in the colonies and secretly pushed on the armament. To evade Mr. Wellesley's reproaches the regency promised to suspend the embarkations ; yet the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the organization of another thrice as strong, including all the best artillery in the kingdom, was immediately commenced, and would also have sailed a few months later but for the vigorous interference of Douglas on the spot and Wellesley at Cadiz.

Gallicia in the latter end of 1811 was without magazines hospitals or system ; she was torn by faction, her people were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad ; and though

the province supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal, her infantry were famished and too undisciplined to descend into the plains of Leon. Sir Howard Douglas had therefore nothing to work upon save the guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably increased. Augmenting the number of chiefs, he endeavoured to keep the force of each low, lest growing proud of their command they should consider themselves generals and become useless, as had already happened to Campillo Longa and Porlier when their bands were incorporated with the seventh army: this policy may however be questioned, for of all the numerous bands in the north seven only

Mr. Stuart,
MSS.

were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina,

Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate,

whose united forces did not exceed ten thousand

men, were sustained by regular taxes, customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza; but all the rest were bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the formation of the seventh army. They were however stimulated for a time by sir Howard's exertions. In the Asturias, while Bonnet was on the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander; and though general Caucault, a very active officer, soon drove him again to the Liebana, the English cruizers acting in concert destroyed several coast batteries, and the

Sir Howard
Douglas's
MSS.

Iris frigate bringing a supply of arms sought to

establish a permanent intercourse with the chiefs.

Reille and Caffarelli being then in chase of Mina

and Longa, the mission of the Iris was marred; yet Mina contrived to receive arms from that vessel, and being joined by the Valencians and Catalonian deserters and fugitives from Campo Verde, soon returned to Navarre with greater strength than ever.

While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication, Dorsenne having the invasion of Galicia still in view, relieved Bonnet on the Esla and sent him with eight thousand men to re-occupy the Asturias. The Gallicians anticipating this measure had detached Moscoso with three thousand five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who from Pagares watched the passes leading from Leon. Mendizabel


also concentrated five thousand of the bands to the eastward on the Xalon, so that eleven thousand men opposed the entrance of Bonnet; but the passes of Cubillas and Ventana westward of Pagares were left unguarded, and by those roads Bonnet, an excellent officer, turned Moscoso and drove him down the Lena with loss and disgrace: then falling on Mendizabel, he chased him also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana. All the civil authorities fled to Castropol, the Spanish magazines were taken, and Bonnet re-occupying Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified the passes leading to Leon and effectually ruined the military resources of the Asturias: the organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed. The return of Moscoso's division, and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had compelled Abadia to retire to Lugo while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier, had thrown Galicia also into a ferment, which was increased by the imposition of the new contributions. The people openly declared that the exactions of a French army were a relief compared to the depredations of the Spanish troops.

Sir Howard
Douglas's
MSS.

During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at Merida and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more against Lisbon by Massena's route was not promising, unless the northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required the preliminary occupation of Galicia, at least of the interior; and as it was advisable to invade the Alemtejo simultaneously with Beira, the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast, menacing, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal and the invasion of Galicia were openly talked of in Dorsenne's army; Caffarelli was to join in the expedition, and Monthion's reserve, de-

signed to replace Caffarelli, was already six thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole, and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon's arrival. But the Russian war soon balked the project; and Wellington's operations, to be hereafter noticed, compelled Dorsenne again to relinquish the invasion of Galicia, and caused Bonnet once more to abandon the Asturias. Thus with various turns of fortune the war was managed in the northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms, because the English general always remedied the Spanish errors. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion. There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him, had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest.





SIEGE & BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM,

1811.



CHAPTER II.

CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.

IN August and the beginning of September, Suchet while preparing for this great enterprise once more dispersed the bands of Villa Campa and the other chiefs infesting the borders of Aragon, and having received conscripts in return for the weakly soldiers he sent to France, formed large magazines in Morella and Tortosa. Deducting eight thousand men left in Catalonia under general Frere, and a like number under Musnier, destined to protect Aragon, he had twenty-four thousand disposable for the invasion. Deeming this number inadequate, he demanded a reinforcement from the army of reserve then in Navarre; but Napoleon whose system of warfare was eminently methodical refused. He liked better a bold push at a distant point with a few men than to use many, if by so doing he rendered his communications weak; for he judged courage and enterprise fittest in attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet vigorously when the time for a decisive blow arrived; then, not the divisions of the reserve only were to march, but combined movements from nearly all the armies in the Peninsula were to take place, and it will be seen, that if Wellington, by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo saved Gallicia, the French army of the north, by menacing Gallicia, kept the allies on the Agueda and so protected Suchet's invasion of Valencia.

Three roads led to the Guadalaviar: one from Tortosa by the sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, one by Morella and San Mateo. The two former were carriage-roads, but only the first was fit for heavy artillery; and it was blocked, partially by the fortress of Peniscola, entirely by the fort of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could

move on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns from Tortoza could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Suchet, knowing what audacity will effect in war, resolved to mask Peniscola, avoid Oropesa, send his field artillery by Teruel, and near Saguntum offer battle to Blake: if the latter declined he designed to turn upon Oropesa and Saguntum, and trust for subsistence to the '*huerta*,' or garden of Valencia, so called for its fertility, until the arrival of his convoys. His system of supply was however well organized. From Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in the British army, were to carry provisions, and sheep and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in advance. This plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and surely all things requisite for the subsistence and fighting of troops should be organized regimentally, and the functionaries employed should wear the uniform of their different corps. Jealousies between different branches of the service would then be unknown; and the character of all subordinates being under regimental guardianship would be equally praiseworthy, which cannot now be said.

Valencia was a prey to disorder. During the siege of Taragona, Palacios, notwithstanding the high monarchic principles which caused his dismissal from the regency, had been appointed captain-general of Valencia, Murcia and Aragon. He immediately raised a strong party amongst the friars and other opponents of the Cortes; and when Blake, having rallied the Murcians after the rout of Baza, assumed, as

Captain Codrington, MSS. regent, command in Valencia, he was immediately opposed by Palacios' faction. To draw the populace and the soldiers to their side they proposed to inundate the plain around Murviedro, and defend the strong country beyond; but Blake, disregarding this, resolved to harass the French flanks by detachments. He sent C. O'Donnel with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa to Albaracin, and supported him with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria; he gave Mahy five thousand infantry and seven hundred Murcian cavalry, and charged him to surprise a detachment of Joseph's army stationed at Cuenca; Bassecour he posted at

Requeña with two thousand men, and directed Duran and the Empecinado to invade Aragon in concert with Mina.

Exclusive of Mahy's and Bassecour's Murcians, Blake had twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry for the field. Saguntum had a garrison of three thousand five hundred, Peniscola fifteen hundred, and the many partidas made the whole country seem in arms; but these last were capricious of mood, and Blake could not reckon on more than eight thousand. His regular army, composed of the Albuera troops, the veterans of St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa was the most numerous, and far the best Spain had yet produced; and Valencia was rich in all things necessary to supply it; the building was fair enough to look at, but the dry rot was within; the French had numerous secret partisans, faction was busy, Blake, who had collected rather than organized his forces, was incapable of commanding, and was alike unpopular in Valencia and at Cadiz where the regency of which he was a member was tottering. The Cortes indeed quashed Mahy's Murcian command, and recalled Blake; but the order arrived after Suchet had come up and was disregarded; meanwhile the reserve of the Murcian army fell into disorder, eight thousand deserted and the remnant became despondent. Thus all interest concentrated in the city of Valencia, which was in truth the key of the eastern coast, because Carthagenæ, requiring an army to defend it, could only be fed from Valencia, and Alicant was naked.

Roche, MSS.

Tupper, MSS.

Mr. Wellesley, MSS.

Doyle, MSS.

Suchet's columns moved simultaneously by the three roads. The one which marched by Teruel, where a field magazine was established, turned to its left before reaching Segorbe and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to Castellon de la Plana, where all three were united the 20th of September. Peniscola had been masked the 15th, and Oropesa invested the 19th, but the fire of the last place had compelled the column to pass by the rugged bye-road of Cabanes to Villa Franca. Blake then seemed disposed to fight, for he brought Zayas up beyond Murviedro, called in Obispo from Albaracin, and Mahy from Cuenca. But these generals moved slowly and in

Suchet.

Vacani.

Roche, MSS.

disorder, and some French dragoons having put a great body of infantry to flight at Almanzora on the Mingares, the Spanish general became doubtful if his army would stand, and retired behind the Guadalaviar, leaving O'Donnel Tupper, MSS. with a division on the side of Segorbe. Valencia was in consternation, but, Bassecour being at hand, Suchet feared to attack so large a force in an entrenched camp while his direct communication with Tortosa was intercepted by Oropesa: wherefore dispersing the armed peasants on his flank he turned against Murviedro.

SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.

This mountain-rock, four leagues from Valencia, was covered with the ruins of the ancient city and remains of Moorish towers and walls, forming four distinct posts covering the whole summit; but, with the usual Spanish procrastination, the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some Spanish piquets; but the 23rd Habert, having passed the water, invested the rock on the east while Harispe invested it on the west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the army was disposed in villages on the hills to the north-west, and patrols were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the west, where the ascent although practicable was very rough and difficult. It would have been impregnable if the Spaniards had mounted their large guns, for the French had to bring earth from a distance to form parallels and batteries which were not proof against heavy shot.

An ancient tower called San Pedro was first to be attacked, and above it was the fort of San Fernando, unassailable while San Pedro stood, and, from its height, then only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock two ancient breaches had only been stopped with timber, and as a large

tank offered cover for troops close to these breaches Suchet ordered an escalade. Three columns assembled before day-break on the 28th in the tank, a strong reserve was in support, and a false attack was directed against San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged. But in the previous part of the night the Spaniards sallied, and the action having excited a French soldier he fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns rushing forward in disorder planted their ladders, but the garrison thrust them from the walls and drove the stormers back with the loss of three hundred men. After this check Suchet used a part of his army to attack Oropesa, while the rest made a road for the guns to reach the battery raised against the tower of San Pedro. This being done, he turned his attention towards Blake, who, following his first plan of action against the French flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent O'Donnel with Villa Campa's division and St. Juan's cavalry to Betera and Beneguazil, Obispo to Segorbe, thus forming a half circle round the French, and cutting their communication with Teruel, near which place Mahy also arrived: Suchet, however, caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against O'Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless he was beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in disorder over the Guadalaviar. Blake calmly witnessed these defeats, although he had a large body of troops in hand and was within a few miles of the field of battle.

Suchet's battery-train now advanced from Tortoza, and four pieces were placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th he took the direction of the attack in person. The fort, crowning an isolated rock, was breached in a few hours and surrendered; but the garrison of the King's Tower, a separate work on a small promontory commanding the harbour, was carried off under the French fire by the Magnificent. Suchet having thus with a loss of only thirty men opened the road for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege

of that place. It was difficult. To make the road to the batteries was a work of pain; and although the indefatigable troops had formed a breaching-battery on the 12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men.

On the 17th the breaching-battery opened its fire against San Pedro, when the new masonry crumbled away, but the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. Next day the fire recommenced, the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns and the assault was ordered; but the tower overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were early discovered, the Spaniards repaired the breach with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire with loud cries provoked the attack. At five o'clock four hundred men rushed up as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit; but the head was checked, the rear began to fire, the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen without making the slightest impression on the defenders the attempt was abandoned. After this signal failure a second battery of six pieces was erected one hundred and forty yards from the tower, but an attempt made to approach close to the foot of the breach, was by the plunging fire of the besieged baffled. Andriani, the governor, having communication by signal with the ships in the Grao, was encouraged in his gallant defence, and informed he was already promoted; but to understand Suchet's embarrassments from the protracted resistance of Saguntum, Lacy's contemporary operations in Catalonia, and those of the partidas in Aragon, must be noticed.

CATALONIA.

When this principality was relieved from Suchet's warfare
August. the sickness in Macdonald's army nearly extin-
guished the active French power in the field;
because Frere's division, which occupied Montserrat, being
designed finally to join in the Valencian expedition, could not
be employed in any harassing excursions. Lacy was therefore
enabled to re-organize eight thousand men in two divisions

under Eroles and Sarsfield, the junta called forth the tercios of reserve, and arms and stores were supplied for all by the English navy: wherefore the taking of Montserrat was injurious to the French, for if Frere's division had kept the field this reaction could not have taken place. Lacy's first effort was in concert with the English ships against the Medas Islands, which were retaken in the end of August by the Undaunted, the Lavinia and Blossom, aided by a small Spanish detachment, the whole under captain Thomas. The Spanish auxiliaries did little, and the success, obtained more by labour than fighting, was entirely due to the naval men, who were justly indignant that colonel Green Appendix 8, § 2. Vol. III. depreciated their exertions to raise his own reputation with the Catalans.

Lacy then proposed fortifying Palamos as a marine depôt and stronghold in common with the English navy; and with a wondrous folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops in his fleet, would defend the people while employed in the work. This scheme being coldly received he and the junta turned their attention inland, and fixed on Busa as a place of refuge. This remarkable rock, rising between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers, twenty miles from Cardona, could only be reached by one rugged road; and thus cut off from the rest of the world it could not be forced or starved, being fourteen miles in circumference, healthy, full of springs, and fertile of forage and fuel; and when it and Cardona, Solsona and Seu d'Urgel, were garrisoned by the tercios of reserve, Lacy recommenced offensive excursions with the regular army. In September he plundered the French Cerdaña, and on his return uniting Sarsfield and Eroles' troops stormed Igualada and killed two hundred French; then without attacking the fortified convent there returned to Calaf, from whence he detached Eroles to intercept a convoy coming to Igualada. This being effected the French quitted the convent and joined the garrison of Montserrat, but fearful of being invested and starved they abandoned that strong point also and retired to Taragona. Montserrat was immediately re-occupied by the Catalans, who recovered a large store of clothing and cavalry

Memoir
upon Busa,
by Captain
Zeupfinning,
MSS.

equipments which had been hidden in a vault and undiscovered by the French.

Eroles failed in an attack on Moncada, but shortly afterwards compelled five hundred men forming the garrisons of Belpuig and Cervera to surrender, which placed the whole line of communication between Lerida and Barcelona in the power of the Catalans. Then the whole province was in commotion. Sarsfield seized the passes leading to Vich; Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampurdam; and Eroles, entering the French Cerdaña, defeated some national guards sent there after Lacy's expedition. The Catalan chief raised contributions, burned a town in France, and returned to the Garriga pass while Manso occupied Mataro, both lying in wait for a convoy Macdonald was preparing to send to Barcelona. Sarsfield also embarked his division for the Ampurdam to menace Macdonald, and though the weather did not permit him to land, the demonstration sufficed and the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield to aid in a surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting the troops in motion, he shrunk from the attempt. Meanwhile one swarm of the minor partidas menaced the French communications between Mequinenza and Tortosa, and another swarm settled on the plains of Lerida.

Aragon was equally disturbed. Duran and the Empecinado had received Blake's orders to unite for the invasion of that kingdom, but the secret junta of the district were averse to the plan; the Empecinado's men would not move, they even came to blows with the junta's people, and in this confusion general d'Armanac, who had retired from Cuenca, returned and dispersed the whole. The Empecinado however collected them again, and having joined Duran, their united force, being six thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina acting in concert with them, came from the Liebana to Navarre with five thousand men, the minor bands were active, and the whole mass was supplied from Valencia with clothing and ammunition by the English consul Tupper. General Musnier's force was at this time so scattered he could not fight the large partidas without exposing some important point. The Empecinado therefore got possession of the pass at Frasnó, which enabled

Duran to reduce the fortified convent of Calatayud, where the French and Italian soldiers disputed upon the defence and agreed only to surrender. Musnier had collected some troops to succour it but was unable to force the pass of Frasnó; and when he was reinforced with troops from Navarre by Reille the Spaniards disappeared, but re-occupied Calatayud when he retired. This opened a free communication with Mina and a general plan was discussed, yet Mina and Duran could not agree and all acted separately.

At this time however Severoli returned from Italy with eight thousand men, and soon drove the Spaniards in flight from Calatayud to Molino, Daroca, and Medinacelli. But, on the other side of the Ebro, Mina invested Exca, and when the garrison broke through his line he pursued them to the walls of Zaragoza, after which, assailing Ayerbe, he menaced the French communication by Jaca. Meantime an Italian battalion detached from Zaragoza to succour Exca met the garrison at Zuera, and the whole force, amounting to eleven hundred infantry and sixty cavalry, followed Mina to Ayerbe, but he turned and killed or took the whole. Reille and Musnier immediately spread their columns in all directions to intercept Mina, yet he evaded them, and though sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The *Iris* frigate took some off his hands, and the remainder, three hundred in number, were sent to Coruña by the Asturian mountains; only thirty-six arrived, all the rest being shot by the escort under pretence that they made a noise near a French post!

Mazzuchelli's brigade followed the Empecinado, defeated him and brought off the garrison of Molino, but the smaller bands still infested Suchet's communications between Tortosa and Oropesa, and reports were rife that an English force was to land at Peníscola. Blake also sent Obispo against Teruel, which was menaced on all sides, for Mahy still remained in those parts. Thus the partisan war seemed interminable, and Suchet would have been in great danger if a man of ability had been opposed to him; for, with inferior numbers, he was cooped up between the enemy's fortresses and the mountains, his communications were interrupted, he had twice failed in

his assaults at Saguntum, and had a formidable army in his front. Blake soon relieved him from his difficulties. Palacios and the junta had retired to Alcira and in concert with the friars of his faction issued a manifesto to raise a commotion against Blake, but the latter was now popular and the Valencians elated by the resistance of Saguntum called for an action, which the Spanish general, urged partly by his courage, the only military qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on the French rear had not disturbed the siege, was willing to undertake. Mahy and Bassecour's divisions had arrived, and Obispo being called in to Betera, eight thousand irregulars were thrown upon the French communications, and the whole Spanish army, amounting to twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand good cavalry, and thirty-six guns, made ready for battle. Suchet, although expecting this concentration, had detached Palombini to attack Obispo, but the latter after a sharp skirmish marched so rapidly upon Liria, that Blake might have fallen upon the French army with his whole force while Palombini was absent: he neglected this favourable opportunity, and the Italian general rejoined the army in time to fight.

The ground between Murviedro and Valencia is generally low and flat, yet with some isolated hills and much intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts; it is also thickly studded with olive-trees, and near Saguntum is narrowed by the mountains and the sea to three miles, though it afterwards spreads out again. In this narrow part Suchet resolved to fight without relinquishing the siege of Saguntum, where he left a strong detachment in the trenches with orders to open the fire of a new battery the moment the Spanish army appeared in sight.

His left under Habert was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and gun-boats which flanked Blake's march. The centre under Harispe was extended to the foot of the mountains, so as to offer an oblique front crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini's division and the dragoons were placed in second line behind the centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve. This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain,

but the right of the French, and the troops in the trenches, could be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which the roads from Betera led to Gilet directly upon the line of retreat. To prevent that, Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and placed the Neapolitan brigade of reserve at Gilet. In this situation, although his fighting troops did not exceed seventeen thousand men, cooped up between two fortresses and hemmed in by the mountain on one side the sea on the other, with only one narrow line of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very numerous army: he trusted to his superior moral resources, and what would have been madness in other circumstances was here skilful daring.

Blake issuing a fine address to his soldiers on the 25th of October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zayas, composed of the Albuera divisions, marched by a road leading upon the village of Puzzol; Blake followed in person, with a weak reserve commanded by Velasco; the centre under Lardizabal, supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro, moved by the main road; the left consisting of Miranda's and Villa Campa's infantry and St. Juan's cavalry, was supported by Mahy's division and moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo, acting as a flanking corps, entered the mountains by Naquera to menace the right of Chlopiski, but he was met by a brigade under general Robert.

Advancing rapidly and in good order the Spaniards drove the French outposts over a ravine, called the Piccador, which covered Suchet's front; Zayas, Lardizabal, Caro, and Loy, immediately passed this obstacle, the first taking possession of Puzzol, where the coasting flotilla's fire protected his right flank. Blake halted with Velasco's reserve at El Puig, an isolated hill on the sea-coast behind the Piccador, while Lardizabal and the cavalry, forming an oblique line to face the French front, occupied the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa did not pass it, and Mahy took possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the mouth of St. Espiritus. This front of battle, extending from Puzzol to the Germanels, was not less than six

miles, and the division of Obispo was separated from the left by the same distance. The whole was weak and there was no efficient reserve. for Velasco was distant and Mahy actually in the line. The French order of battle, covering less than three miles, was strong, the reserves well-placed, and Chlopiski's division, although a league distant from the main body, was firmly posted and able to take part in the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by impassable heights.

BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.

Villa Campa began the battle by advancing against the pass of Espiritus, but the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew his advanced guard and put his division in disorder; whereupon Chlopiski descended into the plain with his infantry, drove Mahy from the Germanels, and detached a regiment to succour the centre. There the French were hard pressed, for until the Spaniards crossed the Piccador, Suchet had not perceived that an isolated height in front of Harispe would command all the field. To remedy this error he made his infantry advance, and rode forward with an escort of hussars to seize the hill; but the enemy was already in possession, and it was only gained by Harispe after a sharp action, in which general Paris and several superior officers were wounded. At this time also Obispo's guns were heard far on the right in the hills, and Zayas, passing Puzzol, endeavoured to turn the French left. The day was fine, the field of battle distinctly seen by the soldiers in Saguntum, who crowded the ramparts regardless of the besiegers' fire, and uttering loud cries of victory! victory! by their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward.

Suchet seeing the decisive moment was approaching, ordered Palombini's infantry and the French dragoons to support Harispe, and though wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought them also into action, there was no time to lose, for the Spaniards, although driven from the height by Harispe, turned at the Piccador on the pursuing French hussars, and, supported by their second line, were again advancing. The French artillery poured grape-shot into their ranks, but

their march was unchecked, and their horsemen with one charge overthrew the hussars and captured the French battery. The battle would have been lost if Harispe's infantry had not stood firm until Palombini, stealing forward under cover of a slight rise of ground, suddenly opened a fire on the flank of the Spanish cavalry, and at the same time the French hussars rallied and turned. The Spanish horsemen, thus placed between two fires, thought the flight of the hussars had been feigned; they hesitated and the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers overthrew everything. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with his surviving cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were recovered, the Spanish artillery taken, and Lardizabal's infantry laid down their arms, or throwing them away saved themselves as they could: Harispe's division immediately joined Chlopiski's, and both together pursued the beaten troops.

This nearly simultaneous success on the centre and right having cut the Spanish line in two, placed Zayas in a dangerous position. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advanced against his front, and Blake had no reserve to restore the battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco remained inactive at El Puig. However, such had been the vigour of the action and so inferior were Suchet's numbers, that it required two hours to secure his prisoners and rally Palombini's division for another effort. Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some measure by the water-cuts, stoutly maintained the village of Puzzol for a time, and when finally driven out, although he was charged several times by some squadrons attached to Habert's division, effected his retreat across the Piccador and gained El Puig; from thence he fled along the sea coast to the Groa de Valencia, leaving his artillery and eight hundred prisoners behind. Chlopiski and Harispe had meantime pursued Mahy, Miranda, Villa Campa and Lardizabal to the torrent of Caraixet, where many prisoners were taken; yet Obispo, coming in there from the hills, rallied the fugitives, and the French cavalry having outstripped the infantry were unable to prevent the Spaniards reaching the Guadalaviar. The victors had about a thousand killed and wounded, the Spaniards had not more; but two

generals, five thousand prisoners, and twelve guns were taken, and Blake's inability to cope with Suchet being made manifest, his troops were totally dispirited and Saguntum surrendered that night.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Valencia was the object of this campaign. It could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering his army was the problem for Blake to solve. He had twenty-five thousand troops besides the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa and Segorbe; he could command or influence nearly twenty thousand irregulars, whose chiefs were active and intelligent; his line of operations was direct and secure, he had a fleet and several secure harbours. Suchet could not bring twenty thousand men into action, and his line of operation, long and difficult, was intercepted by the Spanish fortresses; Blake therefore could choose whether to fight or protract the war.

2°. If to fight, he should have taken post at Castellon de la Plana, kept a corps of observation at Segorbe and strong detachments towards Villa Franca and Cabanes, holding his army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet's columns as they came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have taught Blake, that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain, and this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked. He should therefore have merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns without engaging in a pitched battle.

3°. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe the troops might have been withdrawn and concentrated near Murviedro in one march, and Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and the numerous water-cuts and power of forming inundations in the plain were so favourable for defence that it would have been nearly impos-

sible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp. In this strong position, with his retreat secure upon the Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile parts from the French foragers, and held their army at bay while the irregulars operated upon the communication. He might then have safely detached a division to his left to assist the partidas, or by sea to land at Peniscola, and as his forces would soon have been increased the invasion must have been frustrated.

4°. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare, consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and from behind the Guadalaviar sent unconnected detachments on a half circle round the French army, which, being concentrated and nearer to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia, could and did defeat them in detail.

5°. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military conceptions beyond his means, and generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and connecting Mina's operations with Lacy's in Catalonia, was gigantic in design but without any chance of success. For Severoli's division added to Musnier's secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the reinforcements, then marching through Navarre to different parts of Spain, rendered the time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. The chief objection was, however, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion of protracting the war about Saguntum, and the operations against Valencia were sure to be brought to a crisis before the affairs of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing to recal the French general. The true way of using the guerilla forces, was to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet, especially on the side of Teruel where his magazine was; a safe thing to do, because those partidas had an open retreat if attacked, and if followed would still have effected their object of weakening and distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a different operation from that which Blake adopted when he posted Obispo and

O'Donnel at Benaguazil and Segorbe; their lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were then entirely within the power of the French, and this error alone proves that Blake was an ignorant commander.

6°. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched battles, knew so little of his art, that with twice as many men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he made three simultaneous attacks on an extended front without any connexion or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regard to the strength or fierceness of his prey was Blake's only notion, and the result was his own destruction.

7°. Suchet's operations, especially his advance against Saguntum leaving Oropesa behind him were able and rapid; he saw the errors of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum was no fault; he acted with a just confidence in his genius and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by the battle, yet acknowledged that it could not have been taken by siege and that a blockade would have required two months: but could he have blockaded Saguntum if Blake had been with twenty thousand men on the neighbouring hills?

CHAPTER III.

WHEN Saguntum fell, Suchet boldly decided to enclose the whole of Blake's force together with the city of Valencia, round which it was encamped; nor was he deterred by the desultory operations of the partidas in Aragon, nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake, reverting to his former system, called up to Valencia all the garrisons and depôts of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to move upon Cuenca with the Murcian army to support the Montijo and the other partida chiefs who remained near Aragon after the defeat of the Empecinado. The many small bands and armed peasants immediately about Valencia he made no use of, neither harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to action, and in Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazzuchelli entirely defeated Duran near Almunia on the 7th of November; the 23rd Campillo was defeated at Añadon; and a partida having appeared at Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally Napoleon, seeing the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered Reille to reinforce Suchet, not only with Severoli's Italians but with his own French division, in all fifteen thousand good troops.

Meanwhile Lacy's activity had greatly diminished in Catalonia. He had, including the tercios, sixteen thousand troops, twelve thousand being armed; and in conjunction with the junta he had classed the whole population in reserves. But he was jealous of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had before done in the Ronda, deprived them of arms which they had purchased in obedience to his own proclamation. He also discountenanced the popular insurrection, not without plausible reasons but in act

faithlessly and oppressively. He said they always lost their arms and ammunition, were turbulent expensive and bad soldiers, and his object was to incorporate them gradually with the army where they could be of service; but he made no good use of the latter and thus impeded the irregular without helping the regular warfare. The Catalans had always possessed a certain freedom and loved it; they had been treated despotically and unjustly by all the commanders placed over them since the commencement of the war; and now finding Lacy worse even than his predecessors their ardour sensibly diminished: many went over to the French, and the discouragement was increased by some unfortunate events.

Henriod, governor of Lerida, had on the 25th of October surprised and destroyed in Balaguer a swarm of partidas settled on the fertile plain of Urgel; those on the left bank of the Ebro had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys, and an entrenched French post, opposite the Medas islands, had nullified others by hindering communication with the land; Maurice Mathieu surprised Mattaro, and the war had how fatigued so many persons that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as friends. Villa

Appendix 7,
§ 8. Vol. III.

Nueva de Sitjes and other places held constant communication with Barcelona; the people of Cadaques refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, saying they had paid the French and meant to side with the strongest. One Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the enemy; counter guerillas, or rather freebooting bands, made their appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast, and those pirates, the disgrace of civilized warfare, generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless flags without distinction. Now also the disputes between Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with Lacy, who was besides on bad terms with captain Codrington, affected the patriotic ardour of the people and relieved the French from the alarm which the first operations had created.


In Catalonia the generals-in-chief were never natives, nor identified in feeling with the natives. Lacy, unfitted for



**SIEGE & BATTLE OF
VALENCIA,
1812.**



The Contreras



open warfare, had recourse to assassination. Campo Verde had countenanced this horrible system. Lacy and his coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of wines and flour, and the firing of powder magazines, regardless of the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the explosion: and if any man shall doubt the truth of this, let him read '*The History of the Conspiracies against the French Armies in Catalonia.*' Printed in 1813 at Barcelona, it contains the military police reports upon different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops; and when allowance for an enemy's tale and the habitual falsifications of police agents is made, ample proof remains that Lacy's warfare was one of assassination. Indeed the facility which the great size of Barcelona offered for those attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison, induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city, preserving only the forts. This has been noted as indicating secret despair of final success in the Peninsula, but the argument is weak in opposition to facts. He had just augmented his immense forces, which were invading Valencia and menacing Galicia after having relieved Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo; he was himself preparing to lead four hundred thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe; and Maurice Mathieu continued to hold Barcelona and even to take an important part in the field operations.

Such was the state of affairs when Suchet advanced to the Guadalaviar. His losses and the escorts for his numerous prisoners had diminished his force to eighteen thousand men, while Blake's army including Freire's division was above twenty-five thousand, of which near three thousand were cavalry. Having summoned the city to ascertain the public spirit, he was answered in lofty terms; but secret communications taught him that the enthusiasm was not fervent, and he seized the Grao and the suburb of Serranos on the left bank of the Guadalaviar. There were five stone bridges over that river, and Blake, having protected three with regular works, broke down the two in the Serranos and occupied some houses and convents on the enemy's side to cover them.

Suchet immediately carried these irregular defences and fortified his position there and at the Grao; he thus blocked the Spaniards on that side with a small force and prepared to pass the river higher up.

The Spanish defences comprised three distinct posts. 1°. The city, which had a wet ditch, earthen works in front of the gates, and a circular wall thirty feet high and ten thick; but the areas of the bastions were only upheld by timber-work within the wall. 2°. An entrenched camp five miles in extent, enclosing the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and Ruzafa; the profile of this camp was so steep as to require scaling-ladders for an assault, and there was a ditch twelve feet deep. 3°. Entrenched lines along the bank of the river reaching to the sea below and to the valleys of Quarte and Manisses above the city: wherefore, including the circuits of the camp and walls there were eight miles of works to defend. The ground behind was intersected with deep canals for irrigation, which branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte. The Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya in rear of the left wing to observe the open country, and Suchet, who could not force the passage of the river until Reille joined him, merely sent parties over to skirmish, while he increased his secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed; the French waiting for reinforcements, Blake hoping for a general insurrection to save Valencia; yet he neither harassed the enemy's rear and flanks nor exercised his own men.

In December, Reille, leaving Navarre and Aragon to Caffarelli, marched to Teruel, where Severoli with his Italians had already arrived; but the vicinity of Freire and Montijo, who now appeared near Cuenca, compelled him to halt at Teruel until d'Armanac, leading a detachment from the army of the centre, drove the Spanish generals away. Then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not rejoin Blake, and the latter was ignorant of Reille's arrival, Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly. In this view the Neapolitan division was placed at the Serranos to hold the Spaniards in check; Habert took post at the Grao, Palom-

bini opposite the village of Mislata, which was about half way between Valencia and the village of Quarte. Reille made a forced march by Liria and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night, above the sources of the canals opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th, and formed in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o'clock and Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, designing to drive all the Spaniards within the entrenched camp, feared they would evade the danger if they saw the French divisions in march, and therefore pushed Harispe's infantry and the cavalry to the Albufera salt-lake, beyond Valencia, to cut off Blake's retreat to the Xucar. Robert's brigade halted to secure the bridges until Reille should come up, and the troops on the left bank of the Guadalaviar attacked all the river line of entrenchments.

Suchet marched towards the lake as rapidly as the thick woods would permit. His hussars fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya and were defeated, but the latter's charge was stopped by the infantry until the remainder of the French horsemen came up and overthrew them. Blake instead of falling on Suchet with his reserve was occupied with the defence of the river, especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack to cover the passage at Ribaroya had first given him the alarm. Palombini passed over some skirmishers at this point, and then throwing two bridges attacked the entrenchments; his troops were driven by Zayas back to the river where they rallied, and even effected the passage of the canals, but a Spanish reserve restored the fight and finally drove them quite over the river. At that moment Reille's division, wanting one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and in conjunction with Robert fell upon Mahy and Obispo, who were in the villages of Manisses and Quarte. Those places though fortified with care to the front, were open to the rear and on the side of Aldaya, and made little resistance, whereupon Suchet, who had been delayed by the aspect of affairs at Mislata, continued his march for the Albufera. Palombini having again crossed the river without opposition above Mislata now joined Reille, and their united forces fol-

lowed Blake and Zayas. Those generals retired in good order towards the city, but Mahy and Obispo fled outright; the latter passed between Suchet's column and Blake's camp towards the lake; the former took the road to Alcira, behind Suchet, and was thus entirely cut off from Valencia.

All the Spanish army on the upper Guadalaviar was thus beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the city Habert was equally victorious. He had first opened a cannonade against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao; and this flotilla, although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate and closely supported by the Papillon sloop, fled without returning a shot; the French then passed the water and carried the entrenchment, a feeble breast-work defended by the irregulars. The passage being thus effected Habert fixed his right on the river, and sweeping round with his left drove the Spaniards towards a salient part of the camp called the Olivet, which was occupied by Miranda; but before he could connect his flank with Harispe's troops, who were now on the lake, Obispo's division, flying from Suchet's cavalry, passed over the rice grounds between the lake and the sea and so escaped to Cullera: the remainder of Blake's army, eighteen thousand of all kinds, retired to the camp and was closely invested during the night.

Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry soldier behind him, were then sent by the different roads of Alcira, Cullera, and Cuenca, the two first in pursuit of Mahy and Obispo, the latter to observe Freire. Mahy was found in a position at Alcira, and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened, and at the first shot he fled although the ground was strong and he had three thousand men, while the French were not above a thousand. Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahy, when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow prevented their junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British consul, thinking the Xucar would be defended had landed large stores of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to re-embark them, but the storm drove the ships of war off the coast and for three days fifty cavalry could have captured Denia and all the stores.

In this battle, which cost Suchet less than five hundred men, Zayas alone displayed a proper vigour and spirit, and while retiring upon the city repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road Mahy had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With twenty-three thousand infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could have operated on either side;—with strong entrenchments and a secure camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation in less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted Suchet, whose force, seeing that one of Reille's brigades had not arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him by a march which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than fifteen miles: and he now rejected the only means of saving his army. But Suchet's operations, which were of the nature of a surprise, prove that he must have had a supreme contempt for his adversary's talents, and the peasantry partook of the sentiment; the French parties, spread over the country for provisions as far as Xativa, were everywhere well received, and Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people! They might have retorted.

On the 2nd of December, the Spanish general attempted at the head of ten thousand men to break out by the left bank of the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his advanced guard of five thousand men had made way it was abandoned and the main column returned to the city. Next day many deserters went over to the French, and Reille's absent brigade having arrived reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th repulsed two thousand Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular approaches against the camp and city.

SIEGE OF VALENCIA.

It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city contained one hundred and fifty thousand souls

besides the troops, and there was no means of provisioning them, because Suchet's investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their parks of ammunition were transported across the Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of San Vincente and the Olivet offered two projecting points, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January. The fire killed colonel Henri the chief French engineer, but in the night of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the city; the French perceiving the movement then escalated the works, and seized two of the suburbs so suddenly that they captured eighty pieces of artillery and established themselves within twenty yards of the town wall. Mortar batteries now opened upon the place, and in the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but the bombardment convinced him he might now depend upon both the citizens and the troops.

This answer satisfied Suchet. He judged the place would not make any defence, and continued to throw shells until the 8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte, but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However, the bombardment killed many persons and set fire to the houses in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While debating with them a friar, bearing a flag which he called the Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob and insisted upon fighting to the last; a piquet of soldiers was sent against him, but he routed it and shot the officer, yet his mob soon dispersed. Finally, a convent of Dominicans close to the walls being taken and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to retire to Alicant with arms, baggage, and four guns. These terms were refused, yet a capitulation, guaranteeing property and oblivion of the past and providing that the unfortunate prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an equal number of Blake's army, was negotiated and ratified on the 9th. Then Blake, complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the city. Above eighteen thousand regular troops with eighty stand of

colours, two thousand horses, three hundred and ninety guns, forty thousand muskets, and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war, that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after!

On the 14th of January Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia, having completed a series of campaigns in which the incapacity of his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created him duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say, vigorous and prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars, and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not to offend the citizens by violating their customs or shocking their religious feelings, and endeavoured as much as possible to govern through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy aided him, and the submission of the people was secured.

Spanish faction aided the prudent vigilance of Suchet. The city was lost, but the kingdom of Valencia might have recovered under the guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches, the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours remained unsubdued; the partidas in the hills were still numerous, the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the British fleets were ready to aid and supply arms and stores. The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul Tupper proposed to establish a commission of government, having at its head the padre Rico, Valencia's first defender against Moncey and the most able and energetic man in those parts, Mahy evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power and showed every disposition to impede

Appendix 7.

useful exertion. Then the leading people either openly submitted or secretly entered into connexion with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to France, and the horrors of Cabrera were prolonged.

During the siege of Valencia, Freire and his Murcians, including a body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district and retired across the Xucar to Almanza, Mahy occupied Alcoy, and Villa Campa marched to Carthage. Suchet wished to leave them undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicant itself. But to ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold ten thousand men in the Despeñas Peros, to march if necessary to Suchet's assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon. These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and Alicant before the battle of the 26th, but they only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered: Freire retreated before them, and Mahy, who was preparing to advance again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicant. Montbrun knew that Valencia had fallen and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but wishing to share in the glory of the hour he marched against Alicant threw some shells and summoned it to surrender. The municipal authorities, the governor, and many of the leading people, were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state of defence. The consul Tupper, and Roche the military agent, then distributed clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers, restored their courage, drew many more to Alicant, and stopped the desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire's division alone lost two thousand men. Montbrun's attempt therefore hurt the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful manner.

Villa Campa now abandoned Carthage and returned to the mountains of Albarazin and Suchet, embarrassed by the

failure at Alicant and dreading the fever at Carthagena, posted Harispe's division on the Xucar to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after the stores were removed; for the castle had sixty guns mounted, many vessels were in the port, and as a post it was important, and might easily have been held until a Spanish garrison could be thrown in. When these points were secured a brigade was detached on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuenca, and Musnier was ordered to form the siege of Peniscola: but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that Taragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy, wherefore Severoli moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter marched to Tortoza in aid of Taragona. Previous to his arrival, Lafosse, governor of Tortoza, had advanced with some cavalry and a battalion of infantry to the fort of Belaguer to observe Lacy, and being falsely told the Spaniards were in retreat, entered Cambril on the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to Taragona: the Spaniard was nearer than he imagined.

It will be remembered that Eroles and Sarsfield were posted in the valley of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to Barcelona; but in December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Decaen, who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long expected convoy, and the Spaniards thus placed between two fires, after a slight action opened the road. When Decaen returned to Gerona they resumed their position, but Lacy after proposing several new projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution, at last decided to fall on Taragona and afterwards invade Aragon. With this view, he drew off Eroles' division and some cavalry, in all about six thousand men, from the Congosta, and took post about the 18th of January at Reus; stores from Cadiz were then landed from the English vessels at Cape Salou, and Codrington repaired to the Spanish quarters to concert a combined operation with the fleet; it was at that moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse had

entered Taragona with the cavalry; and that the French infantry, eight hundred in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the vicinity of the Spanish army.

Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and Codrington would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners and brought them to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks and closing upon their rear killed and wounded two hundred, whereupon the remainder surrendered. When this well managed and happy exploit had terminated the released naval officers immediately regained their ships, and the squadron was that night before Taragona; but a gale of wind off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the land-side, and next day the increasing gale compelled the ships to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had however abandoned the project against Taragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles' division, reinforced by a considerable body of armed peasantry, at Altafulla behind the Gaya. A bridge in front was broken, the position was strong, and Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of Sarsfield's division, awaited the attack of three thousand men who were coming from Barcelona. He was however ignorant that Decaen, finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the side of Vich, had sent general Lamarque with five thousand men to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu had thus eight thousand good troops.

BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA.

Being anxious to surprise Eroles, the French generals took pains to conceal their numbers and marched all night; but at daybreak, having forded the river, they defeated the Spaniards with a loss of a thousand killed and wounded. The pursuit was baffled by the total dispersion of the Catalans, and the French in returning suffered from the fire of the naval squadron. Eroles then complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a design to sacrifice him. If so he gained nothing, for Decaen

having scoured the higher country about Olot descended into the valley of Vich and defeated him also; he was at one time even a prisoner but was rescued by a soldier. From Centella Decaen marched by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, and Musnier re-victualled Taragona.

In this manner the Catalans were again reduced to great straits, and the French, expecting reinforcements, occupied all the coast, made new roads beyond the reach of the ships' fire, and established fresh posts at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques; they also placed detachments in the higher valleys and compelled the Spaniards once more to resort to the irregular warfare, now a very feeble resource, because Lacy had disarmed the somatenes and they were very discontented. Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield, and Rovira were continually disputing, yet being still supplied with arms and stores from the British navy, sustained themselves until new combinations were produced by the English efforts. But Lacy's intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and the foundations of strength were shaken; for though the patriots still possessed the mountains and even violated the French frontier, their enemies held all the towns, all the ports, and most of the lines of communication, and their moveable columns gathered the harvests of the valleys and chased the most daring of the partisans. Wherefore Suchet, seeing Taragona was secure, renewed his operations by the siege of Peniscola.

This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was nearly impregnable; the communication with the shore was by a neck of land sixty yards wide and two hundred and fifty long. In the middle of the town was a strong castle well furnished with guns and provisions, British ships of war were at hand to aid the defence, the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been taken during the siege of Tortosa and had escaped, was the governor, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous.

On the 20th ground was broken, and mortar-batteries,

established twelve hundred yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th. Three nights after, a parallel of five hundred yards was built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either flank. In the night of the 2nd the breaching batteries being finished and armed were going to open, when a privateer captured a despatch from the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress, the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found sixty guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place, which secured their line of communication, produced a general disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet's account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary to give to a transaction full of shame and dishonour to Navarro, can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do their duty to their country.

Six thousand Poles were now recalled from Suchet by Napoleon, who required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition; they marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of Blake's army. Reille's two French divisions were then ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the lower Ebro, and Palombini's Italian division was sent towards Soria and Calatayud to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa and Bassecour, who were again in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards Aragon, and Severoli's division took his place on the lower Ebro; for the partidas of Duran, Empecinado, and those numerous bands from the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed Navarre and Aragon and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina also surprised Huesca in January, and when attacked during his retreat at Lumbar repulsed the enemy and carried off his prisoners.

Suchet's field force in Valencia was thus reduced by twenty thousand men, he had only fifteen thousand left, and conse-

quently could not push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor's lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet's army to Cuenca, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid. Thus Valencia was made a mere head of cantonments, in front of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicant became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who had neglected his wound, received at the battle of Saguntum, fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power was suddenly extinguished.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia were but a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely, the neglect of all good military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad troops.

2°. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar; he might have defended that river without risking his whole army, and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have capitulated. Eighteen thousand men well conducted, could always have broken through the thin circle of investment drawn by Suchet, especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks of the river. The campaign was one huge error throughout, and was pithily summed up in one sentence by Wellington. Being accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe, by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—'The misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake's ignorance of his profession, and to Mahy's cowardice and treachery!'

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

THE affairs of these provinces cannot be treated separately. Wherefore, taking Soult's position at Seville as the centre of a vast system, it shall be shown how from thence he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled even as a consuming fire which none could smother though many tried. Seville the base of his movements, the storehouse of his army, was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From thence he maintained a line of communication with the army of Portugal through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha; from thence also he sustained the most diversified operations on all parts of a circle which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Cadiz, Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura. The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth of the Guadiana were as we have seen frequent. Nevertheless, when Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte in July and August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception of the castle of Paymago, and Soult, dreading the autumnal pestilence, did not keep more than twelve hundred men on that side.

Victor always maintained the blockade of the Isla. His position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de Barameda on the right to Conil on the left, running through Xeres, Arcos, Medina-Sidonia, and Chiclana. But

while thus posted he was in a manner blockaded himself; for in the Isla, including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less than sixteen thousand troops, having the command of the sea and able at any moment to land on his flanks. The partidas, although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse with Seville; the serranos of Ronda and the regular forces of Algeiras, supported by Gibraltar, cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held by the allies, for general Campbell would never relinquish that important point, the fresh supplies of cattle drawn from the great plain called the Campiña de Tarifa were straitened. The expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part of the army of the south; hence Victor's corps, scarcely strong enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army insured the safety of Cadiz, wherefore part of the British garrison joined Wellington, and Blake, as we have seen, carried off the Albuera divisions to lose them at Valencia.

In Grenada the fourth corps, now commanded by Laval, had two distinct tasks to fulfil. 1°. To defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army; 2°. to maintain the coast line beyond the Alpuxaras against the efforts of the partidas of those mountains, against the serranos of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and from Algeiras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of Mahy, Freire and Montijo, to aid the Valencian operations secured the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a small force, having pushed his partisan excursions rashly was killed in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered. Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand men, ready to operate on the side of Estremadura and Murcia, or to chase the partidas, more numerous there than in other parts and also connected with those of La Mancha.

Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos was to be supplied and defended from the most formidable army in the Peninsula,—there the communications

with Madrid and the army of Portugal were to be maintained by the way of Truxillo,—there the fifth French corps, under Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country, —to preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville,—to protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos, to observe Hill, and to oppose Morillo's troops, now becoming numerous and bold. Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the Guadiana below the fortress; but Morillo incommoded his foraging parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. Drouet, therefore, was compelled to keep a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana, which exposed his troops to Hill's enterprises; and that bold and vigilant commander, well instructed and having ten thousand excellent troops, was a very dangerous neighbour. Marmont's position in the valley of the Tagus, and the construction of the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division at Truxillo and connected him with the army of the south, tended indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position in Estremadura; nevertheless Drouet generally remained near Zafra with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as occasion required.

Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the circle round Seville at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo. Soult,

if his share of the reinforcements which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would

Appendix C.
§ 2.

have had about a hundred thousand troops, of which ninety thousand men and fourteen thousand horses were French: but the reinforcements were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of French present with the eagles was not more than sixty-seven thousand. Victor had twenty thousand; Laval and Drouet eleven thousand each; the garrison of Badajos was five thousand; twenty thousand formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the

force consisted of '*escopeteros*' and civic guards, chiefly employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions Soult could however take the field at any point with twenty-four or twenty-five thousand men, and in Estremadura with even a greater number of excellent troops well and powerfully organized; but the manner in which his great force was paralysed in the latter part of 1811, shall now be shown.



In October, Drouet being then in the Morena and Girard's division at Merida watching Morillo, who was at Caceres, the duke of Dalmatia, coming from his Murcian expedition, sent three thousand men to Fregenal seemingly to menace the Alemtejo: whereupon Hill recalled his brigades from the Ponçul, and concentrated his whole corps behind Campo Maior the 9th. The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to Caza de Cantellaña, and everything indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult's attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballesteros in the Ronda and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a division and some cavalry near Caceres.

Ballesteros had disembarked at Algesiras on the 11th of September, and immediately marched with his own and Beguine's troops, in all four thousand men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the serranos of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th he endeavoured to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, but a French detachment from Chiclana had already reduced that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one to Chiclana the other to Ximena. At this time six thousand French were collected at Ubrique, in furtherance of a project Soult was then meditating to effect the entire subjection of Andalusia and the destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design, which shall be hereafter explained, required preliminary operations, the most important being the capture of Tarifa; for that place, situated in the narrowest part of the straits, furnished either a protection or a dangerous point of offence to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations of its possessor with England. It affected the supplies of the French before

the Isla,—it was from its nearness and the run of the current the customary point for trading with Morocco,—it menaced the security of Ceuta: and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal superiority over the smaller towns and ports along the coast, which would give the French a moral influence of some consequence.

A confidential officer sent from Conil had secretly negotiated with the barbaric emperor a convention by which he engaged to exclude British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes while carrying to the French supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided Soult would occupy Tarifa as a depôt. This important convention was on the point of being ratified when the opportune arrival of some unusually magnificent presents from England turned the scale against the French and their agent was dismissed; the English supplies were increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of horses to remount the allied cavalry. Calculating on the capricious nature of barbarians the duke resolved however to fulfil his part by the capture of Tarifa; hence it was, that he had, when Ballesteros appeared at Ximena, arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent troops from Seville by Ubrique to dislodge him from a position extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth corps, and likely to affect the taking of Tarifa. Ballesteros, if reinforced, might also have menaced the blockade of Cadiz by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and still more by menacing Victor's communications with Seville along the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the 14th, eight thousand men under generals Godinot and Semélé advanced upon St. Roque and Algesiras. The inhabitants of those places fled to the green island, and Ballesteros took refuge under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and thus cooped up he perforce lived upon the resources of the place. Efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their flanks; and though the naval means did not suffice to remove





GENL HILL'S OPERATIONS.

1811.

his whole army seven hundred were transported to Manilba, where the serranos and some partidas had assembled on the left of the enemy. At the same time twelve hundred British troops with four guns under colonel Skerrett, and two thousand Spaniards under Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right. Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, Skerrett arrived the 17th, and the next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the sea-road by which it marched was so swept by the guns of the Tuscan frigate, aided by the boats of the Stately, that after losing some men it returned. Then Godinot and Semélé, disputing and without provisions, retreated and were followed by Ballesteros' cavalry as far as Ximena where they separated in great anger, and Godinot after reaching Seville shot himself: this failure in the south unsettled Soult's plans and was followed by a heavier disaster in Estremadura.

SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO.

When Drouet retired to Zafra Hill was directed to drive Girard from Caceres that Morillo might forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his troops at Albuquerque the 23rd, and Morillo came to Aliseda on the Salor. Girard had an advanced guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill occupied Aliseda and Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th at daybreak Hill entered Malpartida de Caceres and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy: Girard then abandoned Caceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill, having no certain knowledge of the enemy's movements, halted for the night at Malpartida.

On the morning of the 27th Morillo entered Caceres, the enemy was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida, and Hill, hoping to intercept their march, pursued by a cross road through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this movement intelligence came that Girard had halted at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala on the main road to Caceres, thus indicating that he knew not of the new direction taken by the allies and only looked to a

pursuit from Caceres; wherefore Hill instantly made a forced march to Alcuesca within a league of Aroyo de Molinos. This last village was in a plain, and behind it a ridge of rocks rose in the form of a crescent about two miles wide on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right; the most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the extremity of the sierra, the nearest was the Merida road, and between them was that of Medellin.

During the night the weather was dreadful, but no fires were permitted in the allied camp, and at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th the troops moved to a low ridge half a mile from Aroyo, under cover of which they formed three bodies, the infantry on the wings, the cavalry in the centre. The left column marched straight upon the village, the right towards the extreme point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of the crescent, the cavalry kept its due place between both. One brigade of Girard's division having marched at four o'clock by the road of Medellin was already safe, but Dombrowski's brigade and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place, the horses of the rear-guard, unbridled and tied to olive-trees, while the infantry were gathering to form on the Medellin road outside the village. Girard was in a house waiting for his horse when two British officers galloped down the street and in an instant all was confusion; the cavalry bridled up hastily, the infantry run to their alarm posts, but a tempest raged, a thick mist rolled down the craggy mountain, a terrific shout was heard amidst the clatter of the elements, and with the driving storm came the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments charging down the street.

The French rear-guard of horsemen, fighting and struggling hard, were driven to the end of the village, while the infantry, hurriedly forming squares, endeavoured to cover the main body of the cavalry which was gathered on the left. Then the seventy-first, lining the garden-walls, opened a galling fire on the nearest square, the ninety-second filed out upon the French right, the fiftieth regiment secured the prisoners in the village, and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish

cavalry, skirted the outside of the houses and endeavoured to intercept the retreat. Soon the guns opened on the French squares, and the thirteenth dragoons captured their artillery while the ninth dragoons and German hussars charged and dispersed their cavalry.

Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded still kept his infantry together and continued his retreat by the Truxillo road; but the right column of the allies was in possession of that line, their cavalry and artillery were close upon the French flank, and the left column was again coming up fast. In this desperate situation, his men falling by fifties, Girard would not surrender, but sought to escape in dispersion by scaling the almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers not less obstinate also divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at an easier part beyond his left, the thirty-ninth regiment and Ashworth's Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road, and the twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth, led by general Howard, followed the French step by step up the rocks, taking prisoners every moment, until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue this trial of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, Dombrowski, and Briche escaped at first to San Hernando and Zorita in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at Orellano, on the 9th of November they rejoined Drouet with about six hundred men, the remains of three thousand. They were said to be the finest troops then in Spain, and indeed their resolution not to surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their excellence.

Twelve or thirteen hundred prisoners, including general Bron and the prince of Aremberg, all the French artillery baggage and commissariat, together with a contribution just raised fell to the victors; and during the fight, a Portuguese brigade united to Penne Villamur's cavalry was sent to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was seventy killed and wounded, and lieutenant Strenowitz was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian who had abandoned the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez' partida and was

liable to death by the laws of war. Originally forced into the French service he was in reality no deserter, and Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to Drouet, who was so gentle of temper that while smarting under this disaster he released his prisoner. Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to general Barois, although in a military point of view his offence was unpardonable. He knew two or three days before that Hill was near him; he knew there was a good road from Malpartida to Alcuesca because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres; and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without sending out even a patrol upon his flank, thus sacrificing two thousand brave men. Napoleon's clemency was great but not misplaced, for Girard afterwards repaid it by his devotion at the battle of Lutzen when the emperor's star was on the wane. Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage escape, and to good arrangements added celerity of movement firmness and vigour. His troops seconded him as he merited; and here was manifested the advantage of possessing the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instinct of revenge as the Peninsulars. For during the night of the 27th every Spaniard in Aroyo, as well as in Alcuesca, knew that the allies were at hand, and not one was found so base or indiscreet as to betray the fact.

This blow struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, the
November. Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, and

the report of Girard's disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet re-occupied Caceres with a thousand men,—Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 15th, and moved on Truxillo,—a convoy entered Badajos from Zafra on the 12th, a second on the 20th; and Soult, while collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the ground under the guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Everything seemed to indicate a powerful attack on Hill, when a serious disturbance amongst the Polish troops at Ronquillo

Mr. Stuart's
Papers, MSS.

December.

compelled Soult to detach men from Seville to quell it. That effected, a division of four thousand men entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose corps was thus raised to fourteen thousand infantry



and three thousand cavalry, on the 5th of December advanced to Almendralejos, and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Merida. At the same time Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia, and Soult with the same view sent ten thousand men to the Despeños Peros.

Drouet's movements were however again stopped by some insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now well known that Soult's chief object was to destroy Ballesteros and take Tarifa, Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in favour of Ballesteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia. He entered Estremadura by Albuquerque the 27th, and having received information that the French untaught by their former misfortunes were not vigilant, made a forced march in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th he passed Villar del Rey and San Vincente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with three hundred French infantry and a few hussars, part of a foraging party the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant. A patrol gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Merida and were closely followed by four hundred of the allied cavalry, who had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the words of general Hill, 'the intrepid and admirable manner in which the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting anything against him.' Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded on this occasion, reached Merida with a loss of only forty men, all killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at Merida immediately abandoned their unfinished works and evacuated that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of wheat.

From Merida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st to Almendralejos where he captured another field store; but the French general fell back towards Zafra, and the weather was so bad and the roads so deep that Hill halted the main body while

1812.
January.

colonel Abercrombie with a detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry followed the enemy's rear-guard. Meanwhile, Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajos or some Polish troops, with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese frontier on the right of the Guadiana by Moura, Mourão and Serpe, with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the Sierra Morena. Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro the evening of the 3rd, where he met a stout squadron of the enemy and a stiff charge took place, but the French, out-numbered and flanked on both sides, were overthrown with a loss of thirty men. Drouet was now in full retreat for Monasterio, Morillo, moving upon Medellin, took post at San Benito, and the allies remained masters of Estremadura until the 13th of January. Marmont's divisions from the valley of the Tagus then menaced the eastern frontier of Portugal, whereupon Hill returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena, and his cavalry supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo; for that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, made a sudden incursion to La Mancha and was attacking the castle of Almagro, where he was completely defeated by general Treillard and fled to Horcajo in the Guadalupe mountains reaching it the 18th; yet his fugitives were still coming in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest disorder.



CHAPTER V.

WHILE Hill was engaged in Estremadura, important events passed in the south of Andalusia. Soult, resolute to take Tarifa, organized a battering-train and directed Laval upon San Roque with a strong division. Skerrett was then on the side of Vejer de Frontera menacing Semélé, but finding Copons, who had promised an aid of four thousand men, only brought up seven hundred, he returned to Tarifa on the approach of some French from Conil. Semélé then drove Ballesteros under the guns of Gibraltar, where he arrived just in time to escape Laval's columns. As Semélé did not follow close, a combined attack was projected by Ballesteros, Copons and Skerrett against Laval, and it was in progress of execution when Semélé came in sight, whereupon Copons and Skerrett instantly returned to Tarifa.

Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burthen upon that fortress, and as his troops were without shelter from the rain general Campbell proposed to send them in British vessels to renew that attempt against Malaga which had before failed under lord Blayney. They were embarking when the French retired by the Puerto de Ojen, January. a grand pass, connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the valleys of the Guadaranque with the great and rich plain called the Campiña de Tarifa, and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering-train was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and Los Barrios, where Ballesteros had now taken post. The combination was too wide. Ballesteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen,

and Skerrett and Copons received orders from general Campbell to take advantage of this diversion ; but the former, seeing his own plan was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards after a skirmish of six hours retired. Laval then left fifteen hundred men to observe Ballesteros, and placing a detachment at Vejer to cover his right flank threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced against Tarifa.

The French expected little opposition. The town was encircled with towers connected by an archery wall irregular in form, without a ditch, and too thin to resist even field artillery. To the east and north some high ridges flanked and seemed entirely to command the weak rampart ; but the English engineer had observed, that the nearest ridges formed at half pistol-shot a natural glacis, the plane of which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with great nicety ; and on that side were more towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior defence. Judging then that the seemingly favourable nature of the ridges, combined with other circumstances, would tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side, to render the delusion unavoidable he strengthened the western front of the place, and rendered the access to it uneasy by demolishing the main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the north west. He also made an out-work of a convent which was situated about a hundred yards from the place, and eastward of the suburb prepared an internal defence which rendered the storming of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered. But to appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described.

Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent which entering at the east passes out at the opposite point. This stream was barred at its entrance by a tower with a portcullis, in front of which palisades were planted across the bed of the water. The houses within the walls were strongly built and occupied inclined planes rising from each side of the torrent ; but at the exit of the latter there were two massive structures forming part of the walls called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked up the

hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land and then a causeway, the whole about eight hundred yards long, joined the town to an island or rather promontory two thousand yards in circumference and with perpendicular sides, which forbade entrance save by the causeway, at the island end of which there was an unfinished entrenchment and battery. On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest called the Catalina being scarped and crowned with a slight field work containing a twelve-pounder; it covered the causeway and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the western front and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The gun in the tower of the Gusmans shot clear over the town on to the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised; and the Stately ship of the line, the *Druid* frigate and several gun and mortar-boats, were anchored in the most favourable situation for flanking the enemy's approaches.

Reverting then to the head of the defence, the ridges on the eastern fronts and the hollow bed of the torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault, deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side, while the flanking fire of the convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the western side, and forcibly urged them towards the eastern ridge where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had marked their ground and indicated the situation of the breach; that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the walls far greater than the outer depth, where he had loop-holed the houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes, exposed on each side to musketry from loop-holes and windows, and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which raked the bed of the torrent; the garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the Gusmans, which

being high and massive were fitted for a rear-guard, and provided with ladders for the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the Catalina.

Besides the ships of war and the Catalina guns, there were in the island four twenty-four pounders, two ten-inch mortars, and six smaller pieces; in the town six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front; an eighteen-pounder on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-pieces kept in reserve for sallies. But most of the artillery in the island was mounted after the investment, so that two twenty-four pounders and two mortars only could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls and towers of the latter could not sustain heavy guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to the enemy's fire.

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

Including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred horse of that nation the garrison was two thousand five hundred strong, posted in the following manner. Seven hundred in the island, one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the convent, fifteen hundred in the town.

On the 19th the enemy drove in the advanced posts, but during a sharp skirmish was designedly led towards the eastern front. The 20th the place was invested, and on the 21st a piquet having incautiously advanced towards the western front, captain Wren of the eleventh suddenly descending from the Catalina carried it clear off. In the night the enemy approached close to the walls, but the next morning Wren again came down from the Catalina, and the troops from the convent sallied to recognise the position of the French advanced posts. So daring was this sally that lieutenant Welstead of the eighty-second captured a field-piece in their camp; he was unable to bring it off in face of the French reserves, but the latter being drawn under the fire of the ships the island and the town suffered severely, and could scarcely recover the captured piece from under the guns of the north-east tower.

In the night of the 22nd the anticipations of the British engineer were realized. The enemy broke ground in two

places five hundred yards from the eastern front, and the approaches were assiduously worked until the 26th under a destructive fire, to which the French replied principally with wall-pieces, and would have done much mischief if the garrison had not been amply supplied with sand-bags.

On the 23rd the ships were driven off in a gale. The 27th the French battering-train arrived, and the 29th their sixteen pounders opened against the town, and their howitzers against the island. The piece on the tower of the Gusmans was quickly dismounted by this fire, but it was as quickly re-established; yet the heavy guns brought the old wall down in flakes, and a wide breach was shortly made a little to the French left of the portcullis tower. Appendix 3,
§ 5.

Skerrett then held a council of war and proposed to abandon the place. He was strenuously opposed by major King who commanded the troops which came from Gibraltar, and by the chief engineer captain Smith; but he would have done it if general Campbell, hearing of his design from King, had not called the transports away. The place was indeed open to assault and escalade, but behind the breach the depth to the street was above fourteen feet, and Smith had covered the ground below with iron gratings having every second bar turned up; the houses there and behind all the points liable to escalade were also pre-prepared and garrisoned, and each regiment had its own quarter of defence assigned. The breach was in charge of the eighty-seventh under colonel Gough; on his left were the riflemen, and on his right some Spaniards ought to have been, but were not, and still further on the right were two companies of the forty-seventh.

In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on the breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the discharges. The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for sixty feet and the whole offered an easy ascent; yet the besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night they were augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain augmented the river to a torrent, which, bringing down from the French camp a mass of planks fascines gabions and dead bodies broke the palisades with a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the waters even injured the defences behind the breach: a

new passage was thus opened in the wall, yet with great vigour the besieged repaired the damage before the morning, and calmly and confidently awaited the attack.

ASSAULT OF TARIFA.

In the night the waters subsided as quickly as they had risen, but at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers gliding swiftly down the bed of the river reached without shout or tumult the foot of the walls, but there, instead of quitting the hollow to assail the breach, they dashed like the torrent of the night against the portcullis. The eighty-seventh regiment, hitherto silent and observant as if at a spectacle, then arose and with a loud shout and crashing volley smote the head of the French column! The leading officer covered with wounds fell against the portcullis grate and gave up his sword through the bars to Gough; the French drummer, a gallant boy, dropped lifeless while beating the charge at his officer's side, and the dead and wounded filled the hollow. The survivors breaking out to the right and left spread along the slopes of ground under the ramparts and opened a quick irregular musketry, and at the same time a number of men leaped from the trenches into pits digged in front and shot fast at the garrison; but no escalade or diversion at the other points was made. The storming column was terribly shattered, the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly for the occasion, sent a tempest of grape whistling through the French masses, which were swept away until they could no longer endure the destruction, and plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while a shout of victory mingled with the sound of musical instruments passed round the wall of the town.

In this combat five officers and thirty-one men fell on the side of the allies: the French dead covered all the slopes, and choked the bed of the river. Ten wounded officers were taken in by the breach, only one survived, and Skerrett, compassionating the sufferings of the remainder, permitted Laval to fetch them off. The siege was then suspended by bad weather. For the rain partially ruined the French batteries.

and stopped their supplies, the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockade and injured the allies' retrenchments, and some vessels coming from Gibraltar with ammunition were wrecked. Skerrett was however expecting another assault until the night of the 4th, when the sound of cannon in the camp without any bullets coming indicated that the enemy was destroying his guns previous to retreating. At daylight troops from the convent drove the French out of their batteries, yet a heavy storm impeded the attack and the retreat was skilfully conducted. Sickness followed the hardships of the trenches, many men deserted and the expedition did not cost the French less than a thousand men. The allies lost only one hundred and fifty men and one officer, lieutenant Longley of the engineers, who was killed.

General
Campbell,
MSS.

Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living becomes a crime. Skerrett has obtained the credit yet he was not the author of the success at Tarifa; he, and lord Proby the second in command, thought the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned; all their proceedings tended to that end, and they would even have given up the island. At Skerrett's express desire general Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say the day before the siege commenced; and during its progress he evinced no hope of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some instances he took measures tending directly towards failure. To whom then was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The merit of the conception is due to general Campbell, lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta to secure the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade; and he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally, it was his imperious and even menacing orders which prevented Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced.

Appendix 3,
§ 3.

General Campbell's resolution is the more to be admired,

because Tarifa was not within his command, which did not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also to contend against general Cooke who claimed the control of a garrison chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted also contrary to the opinion of lord Wellington, who, always averse to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards well knowing the latter would inevitably fail and throw the burthen on the British in the hour of need, was here more strongly influenced, because the reports of Cooke, founded

Appendix 3,
§ 5.

on Skerrett's and lord Proby's representations, reprobated the defence of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources and having no local knowledge of the place, lord Wellington judged that the island only could be held—that Skerrett's detachment was not wanting for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both he thought they could not retain them while Ballesteros was in strength and succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in those parts: the defence of the island was also, he said, the least costly and most certain. However, with that prudence which always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion he would not interfere from a distance in a matter which could only be accurately judged of on the spot.

But the island had not a single house and was defenceless, the rain alone would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates and barracks and storehouses for provisions and ammunition would have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was an outwork to the island, and so strong that a much more

Intercepted
Despatches,
17th April,
1812.

powerful attack had been expected and a more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer: a defence not resting on the valour of the troops alone but on a skilful calculation of all the real resources and all the chances.

That the object was worth the risk may be gathered from this, that Soult three months after the siege thus expressed himself, 'The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English and to the defenders of Cadiz than the taking of

Alicant or even Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking Tarifa.' And besides the advantages already noticed, this place was close to Ceuta where there were a few British soldiers and many French prisoners, and above two thousand discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves: Ceuta, which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that the French general, D'Alvimar, then a prisoner, actually urged the governor to give it up to Soult as the only means of avoiding starvation. Neither would the marshal have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of Ballesteros. It would have given him the supplies of the Campiña, and those from Barbary, which could only be brought to that port or to Conil; but the latter was seldom frequented by the Moors because the run was long and precarious whereas a favourable current always brought their craft well to Tarifa: swarms of French gun-boats would then have commanded the coasting trade if not the entire straits.

General
Campbell.
MSS.

Appendix 3.

Tarifa was worth the efforts made for its defence, and, setting aside the courage and devotion of the troops without which nothing could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to sir Charles Smith the captain of engineers. That officer's vigour and capacity overmatched the enemy's strength without and the weakness and cajolment of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded to Smith's energy he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed his acquiescence with some wild actions for which it is difficult to assign a motive, because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man as his death at Bergen-op-Zoom proved; but his military capacity was naught, and his mind did not easily catch another's enthusiasm: Tarifa was the commentary upon Taragona. During the siege the engineer's works were constantly impeded by him; he would call off the labourers to prepare posts of retreat, and Smith's desire to open the north-gate, which had been built up that the troops might have egress in case of escalade, was opposed by him, although there was no other point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was near the castle. Again, a shell from the Gusmans tower, having burst too soon,

killed or wounded one of the inhabitants; a deputation of citizens came to complain, and Skerrett, although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun and a thirty-two pound carronade which at four hundred yards looked into the French batteries, to be dis-
Appendix 3, § 8. mounted and spiked! and it was done. He also assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spaniards, and if Smith had not insisted upon posting British troops alongside of them this alone would have ruined the defence; because hunger nakedness and neglect had so broken the spirit of those poor men that few appeared during the combat and Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.

To the British engineer therefore belongs the praise of this splendid action. He perceived all the resources of the place and with equal firmness and talent developed them notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors; he induced the enemy, whose attack should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle of the place, to open his trenches on the east, where under the appearance of weakness was concentrated all strength; finally he repressed despondency where he failed to infuse confidence. Next in merit was captain Michell of the artillery. In the management of that arm his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially during the assault, when his guns swept away the French stormers. Nor can the result of that attack be taken as the measure of either officer's merits. A prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected by them; and in the enemy's camp was found an engineer's sketch for an extensive system of mines and breaches, yet nothing was there laid down that had not been anticipated and provided against by his British opponents. If then the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can doubt that it was, those who conceived planned and executed it should have all the glory. Amongst those persons Skerrett has no right to be placed: yet, such is the caprice of power, that he was highly applauded for what he did not do, and general Campbell was severely rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his majesty's troops!

On the French part there was courage but no skill. For two days their heavy howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the town and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people had gone from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east tower, the importance of which the French knew; but throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them. General Campbell, expecting a more powerful attack in the spring, directed casemates and splinter proofs to be made in the island, but Skerrett's troops were recalled to Cadiz which now contained nearly eight thousand British, exclusive of fifteen hundred destined for Carthagená and Alicant. This arrangement was soon changed, the events of the war put Carthagená out of the French line of operations, and the pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither was Tarifa again attacked. Wellington had predicted that it would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a series of operations calculated to change the whole direction of the war.

BOOK THE SIXTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

UP to this period the invasion, although diversified by occasional disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The tide, sometimes flowing sometimes ebbing, still gained upon the land, and if the Spaniards partially arrested its progress it was because England urged their labour and renovated their strength; but no firm barrier no solid dike had been opposed save by the British general in Portugal; and even there the foundation of his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was sliding away. By what surprising efforts of courage and judgment he secured it shall now be shown; but as the field operations were always more influenced by political considerations than military principles it is necessary again to show the state of all parties to the war.

Political situation of king Joseph.—France, abounding in riches and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the Vistula; but Napoleon, pursuing his system of continental exclusion was hurrying on to a new war so vast that even his power was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, and many able French officers were recalled; it was known that the Poles and imperial guards were to be withdrawn, and hence the scale of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were now to be expected; and in the French army there was an oppressive sense of the enormous exertions required to bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. The Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so

powerful a monarch as the czar rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general's anticipations of a northern war, which was the great basis of his calculations, were realized. He had not indeed been strong enough hitherto to meet eighty thousand French in battle and there were more than three hundred thousand in Spain; but hope rose when he saw the great warrior of the age turn personally from the contest in the Peninsula, to carry to another point four hundred thousand veterans whose might seemed sufficient to subdue the world.

One immediate beneficial effect of this impending war was to restore Joseph's authority over the French armies in Spain; for when the emperor was distant the supreme control could only be given to the king, though it revived, and with greater virulence, former jealousies and bickering. And as Joseph was obstinate in his policy, and the pride of the French generals was not lessened, pretexts for disputes were never wanting, and their mischievous nature may be gathered from one example. In November the king, pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn collected near Toledo for the army of Portugal and without which the latter could not exist; Marmont, regardless of the political scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch!

Political state of Spain.—All the intrigues and corruptions and conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. Negotiations for England's mediation with the colonies were not over; Carlotta still pressed her claims; the division between the liberals and serviles as they were called became daily wider and Cadiz was in 1811 the focus of all disorder. The government, weak and dishonest, used many pitiful arts to extract money from England: no subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going to Estremadura, previous to the battle of Albuera, Bardaxi entreated the British envoy to grant a loan or a gift, without which Blake he said could not move; Mr. Wellesley refused because a large debt was already due to the legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America landed a million and a half of dollars! In July the regency and the Cortes were without

influence, the former was held in universal merited contempt; and notwithstanding the vast sums received every service was furnished while the treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and all things tended so evidently towards anarchy that Mr. Wellesley declared 'Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any previous period of the war.'

At first the Cortes had been swayed by priests and lawyers who cherished the inquisition and opposed all free institutions; now it was chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party averse to the British influence, and in August a new constitution opposed to the aristocratic principle was promulgated. With the excellences and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased by it; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many and bitter enemies, and the time and attention which should have been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers' condition were occupied in factious disputes and corrupt intrigues. That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and vigorously laid down in the scheme of the constitution cannot be denied, the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept away with a bold and just hand; but of what avail, as regarded the war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to be reduced to practice? What encouragement was it to the soldier to be told he was a free man fighting for a constitution as well as for national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution corruptly revelling in wealth which should have

Appendix 7. clothed and armed and fed him? What was
Vol. III. nominal equality to him when he saw incapacity

rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the poor and patriotic oppressed? He laughed to scorn those who could find time to form the constitution of a great empire but could not find time or honesty to cherish the men who were to defend it!

Many grievous reports of misfortune and treachery, some true some false, were soon spread by the enemies of democracy; and at the most critical period of the war in Valencia they excited a popular commotion to sweep away the Cortes. There was withal a strong disposition in the great to submit to the invader, because the remaining estates of the nobility being chiefly in Valencia they were willing to save their last resources at the cost of national independence. The monks and friars, furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief plotters everywhere; and the proceedings of Palacios in concert with them were only part of a general church league to resist the new doctrines. In October, Lardizabal, also a deposed regent, published at Alicant a manifesto, in which he accused the Cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine of passive obedience, and said the regents took the oath to the Cortes because they could not count on the army or the people at Cadiz; otherwise they would have caused the king's authority to be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives. This manifesto being declared treasonable a vessel was despatched to bring the offender to Cadiz; but the following day it was discovered that the old council of Castille had also drawn up a manifesto similar in principle, and the persons sent by the Cortes to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were selected from the Cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal.

In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter was deferred upon divers pretexts, the democratic party gained strength in the Cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared more widely diffused than it really was, because some time elapsed before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret policy of England was the same as their own. It was so however, even to the upholding of the inquisition which it was ridiculously asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if the frame-work of tyranny existing there could ever be wanting the will to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put

on a smooth countenance towards the Cortes; and the negotiation for mediation was used by the Spaniards merely as a ground for demanding loans subsidies and succours in kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the revolted colonists, the complaints of the British legation being quite disregarded. At this time also Lapeña was acquitted of misconduct at Barosa, and would have been immediately re-employed if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz and advised general Cook to do the same.

Mr. Wellesley seeing fatal consequences to the war must ensue if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, sent Mr. Vaughan, secretary of legation, to acquaint the British cabinet with the facts and solicit a more firm and decided course of policy. He desired to have the subsidies settled by treaty that the people of Spain might really know what England had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms clothing ammunition loans provisions guns stores, and even workmen and funds to form founderies, were obtained wasted and embezzled; the people knew nothing of this extravagant generosity, and the receivers and wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors. When the regency question was at last seriously discussed in the Cortes, the deputy Capmany, said by the partisans of Joseph to be anti-English

King Joseph,
MSS.

in his heart, argued the necessity of this change on the ground of pleasing the British. This excited great discontent as he probably intended, and many deputies declared at first they would not be dictated to by any foreign power; but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission, formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision of the question when Blake's disaster at Valencia completed the work. Carlotta's agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent and honest Augustino Arguelles was opposed to him; and the Cortes, recognising her claim to the succession, denied her the regency because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from that office.

On the 21st of January, 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four hours a new regency of five members, two being Americans, was proclaimed. They were the duke of Infan-

tado then in England, Henry O'Donnel, admiral Villarvicencio, Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas. Each was to have the presidency by rotation for six months, and they commenced beneficially. O'Donnel being friendly to the British alliance proposed a military feast to restore harmony between the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the department of war and finances, consulted the British generals, disbanded several bad regiments and incorporated the men with other battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels, and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent officers they were found to be five thousand in number! Ballesteros, appointed captain-general of Andalusia, received command of the fourth army, head-quarters being prudently removed to Algesiras and the troops increased by drafts from Cadiz to ten or twelve thousand men. A new army was set on foot in Murcia, and to check trading with the French a general blockade of all the coast in their possession from Rosas to St. Sebastian was declared.

But all this activity was simply to obtain an English loan! Failing of that the old disputes broke out, the democratic spirit gained strength in the Cortes, the anti-English party augmented, the press abounded in libels impugning the good faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta, for which however there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to lord Liverpool. The new regency, as violent as their predecessors with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having secretly organized in Gallicia an expedition against the colonies supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British minister to forward this iniquitous folly.

Political state of Portugal.—In October, 1811, all evils were aggravated. The return of the royal family was put off, and the military reform which Beresford was at Lisbon to effect thwarted or retarded by the regency. Mr. Stuart indeed forced a repair of the bridges and roads in Beira, and the partial supply of the fortresses; and though opposed by

Redondo, for the first time, he made the regency substitute a military chest and commissariat instead of the old 'Junta de Viveres.' Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that the intent being to separate the money of the army from that of the civil departments his claims were incompatible with such an object; and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already more than he could manage, both were offended. This new source of disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until they yielded.

Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan to enforce an impartial exaction of the 'decima,' which was drawn up by Nogueira at the desire of Wellington, was so ill-received by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the principle, would not recede from the first plan a permanent dispute and a permanent evil were thus established by that pernicious faction. In fine, not the Souzas only but the whole regency, thinking the war was virtually decided in their favour, were intent to drive the British away by disgusting the general. A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been created conde de Vimiero, Beresford conde de Trancoso, Silveira conde d'Amarante; and other minor honours had been conferred on subordinate officers. They had however been delayed in a marked manner, and lord Strangford, who appears to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction and was therefore opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge made against the latter at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed the official returns of the officers who were thus to be rewarded. Against this unfounded accusation, for the report had been made and Forjas was not the person to whose department it belonged, lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested, because of the injustice and of its being designed to cause the removal of Forjas. The English general was however placed in a strange position, for while his letters to Forjas

were menacing rebukes to him and his coadjutors for their neglect of public affairs, and his formal complaints of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was thus compelled to send other letters in support of the persons whom he was charging with misconduct.

In the midst of these embarrassments an accidental event was like to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines, one d'Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis the Spanish minister there a plan for burning the British fleet in the Tagus, which he pretended to have received orders from the French government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils many persons named by d'Amblemont as implicated were arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to this man by Onis and the court of Rio Janeiro induced him to make further trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and the French government; he even produced letters from the French ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon and the French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese intendant of police. Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons whom this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed lord Wellesley to interfere; but the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims, and amongst others, without assigning cause and without communication with the English general, the regency seized one Borel a clerk to the British paymaster-general. This act, contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance and insulting, raised Wellington's indignation. He notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage, to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves in security under the protection of the army until the further pleasure of the British prince regent should be made known. Then the long-gathering political storm seemed ready to break but suddenly the horizon cleared.

Lord Wellington's letter to the prince, backed by lord Wellesley's vigorous diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in the very crisis of Borel's case came letters from the prince regent approving all the changes proposed by the English general. The contradiction given by Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction was taken as the ground for retracting Linhare's insulting note relative to that gentleman's conduct. Principal Souza was not dismissed, nor was Forjas' resignation noticed, but the prince declared he would overlook that minister's disobedience and retain him in office; thus proving that fear, not conviction or justice, for Forjas had not been disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly relations with the British. Mr. Stuart, considering the submission of the prince to be a mere nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real authority, looked for further difficulties and he was not mistaken. He however made it a point of honour to defend Forjas and Nogueira from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. This submission of the court however, gave the British an imposing influence which rendered the Souzas' opposition nugatory for the moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest,—the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour,—the paper money was raised in value,—the revenue was somewhat increased and Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the army. But the prince directed the regency to revive his claim to Olivenza immediately, and it was with difficulty Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil administration of the army rather increased, as will be shown in the narration of military operations which are now to be treated of.

After the combats about Guinaldo the allied army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than two hundred oxen from under the guns of the place and captured Renaud the governor who had imprudently ventured out with a weak escort. At this time Marmont had a division

in Placensia, and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid; but his cavalry was at Peneranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and his line of communication was organized on the road of the Puerto de Pico. Dorsenne's army stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls of which and those of Zamora and other towns in Leon were being restored that the flat country might be held with a few troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the enemy which had enabled Wellington to send Hill against Girard at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforcements from France reached the army of Portugal the army of the north was again concentrated, and would have invaded Galicia while Bonnet attacked the Asturias if Julian Sanchez's exploit had not rendered it necessary first to re-victual Ciudad Rodrigo.

In this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca by general Thiebault, who spread a report that a force was to assemble towards Tamames and the convoy was for its support. This rumour did not deceive Wellington; but he believed the whole army of the north and one division of the army of Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. Heavy rains rendered the fords of that river impracticable, Thiebault seized the occasion to introduce his convoy, and leaving a new governor returned on the 2nd of November before the waters had subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the Vaddillo, yet it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed; scarcely can an army ever pass it in winter, because of the narrow roads the depth of the fords and ruggedness of the banks; it will suddenly rise from rain in the hills without any previous indication in the plains, and the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any temporary bridge and render it impossible to pass except by the stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy's possession.

Early in November Dorsenne marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad as if to conduct another

convoy; but the allied troops passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d'España and Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions they had raised. But now the country between the Coa and the Agueda was exhausted; and as the Portuguese government still neglected to supply transport it was impossible to bring up the field supply from the points of water carriage to the army. Wellington was therefore, contrary to all military rules, compelled to separate his divisions in the face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry, even to the Mondego and the valley of the Douro or see them starved.

To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads coupled with the distance of the enemy in some measure protected him. Hill's second expedition into Estremadura was then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter; and Marmont being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia, had withdrawn Foy's division from Placencia and concentrated the greatest part of his army at Toledo; all this rendered the scattering of the allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil consequences ensued. The war of positions had therefore turned entirely to the advantage of the allies, Wellington by taking post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos had in a manner paralysed three powerful armies. For Soult, harassed by Hill in Estremadura and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed in both quarters; and although Marmont in conjunction with Dorsenne had succoured Ciudad Rodrigo, the invasion of Galicia had been again stopped short and his enterprises confined to the re-occupation of the Asturias.

Almeida was now repaired so far as to resist a sudden attack, and while the recent movement across the Agueda occupied the enemy's attention, the battering-train and siege stores were introduced without notice as an armament for the new works. A trestle-bridge to throw over the Agueda was also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by major

Sturgeon of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent upon defending his own positions.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING now brought the story of the war to that period, when, after many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal and the fate of the Peninsula thrown between the contending powers, a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would, ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader's recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. How, when the first or insurrectional epoch of the war had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently broke and dispersed their armies and drove the British auxiliaries to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria and the inactivity of Joseph rendered the emperor's victories unavailing and revived the confidence of the Spaniards. How sir A. Wellesley, victorious on the Douro, marched into Spain, and though compelled by the great force of the enemy combined with Spanish bad faith to retreat, as Moore from the same causes had retreated, his advance had freed Galicia, as Moore's advance had previously saved Andalusia. How the Peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still possessed the Asturias, Galicia, Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona, Barcelona, and St. Sebastian.

How Wellington, appreciating the advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of operation, counselled the Spaniards and forced the Portuguese to adopt a defensive war; and with the more reason that England, abounding beyond all nations in military resources and invincible as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to employ her armies as well as her squadrons

in the struggle. How the Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles and in a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and helpless before the enemy. How the victorious French armies moving onwards in swelling pride dashed against the rocks of Lisbon, and then receded, broken and reflux, until the English general once more stood a conqueror on the frontier of Spain. Had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of the war; but being baffled partly by skill partly by fortune, factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by the follies of all three, he was reduced to seeming inactivity while the French added Taragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia to their conquests.

On these things the reader should reflect. They are the proofs that English steel, English gold, English genius, English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish independence; and this is not said as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious! but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that strength which could at once fight England and Austria and aim at the conquest of the Peninsula and the reduction of Russia at the same moment of time, and all with good hope of success, creates amazement! Let it not be said the emperor's efforts in the war of Spain were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch which was unexpected and accidental be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809 the French army was gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian war from three hundred and thirty-five thousand to two hundred and twenty-six thousand. But in 1810 it was again raised to three hundred and sixty-nine thousand, and fluctuated between that number and three hundred and thirty thousand until August, 1811, when it was again raised to three hundred and seventy-two thousand men with fifty-two thousand horses! And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war

in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power, backed by the four hundred thousand men who marched to Russia, would scarcely have sufficed to subdue it. But weak in fight and steeped in folly the Spaniards would have been trampled in the dust but for the man whose great combinations are now to be related.

The nicety, quickness, prudence and audacity of Wellington's operations cannot however be justly estimated without an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His political difficulties have been described, his moral situation was simply that of a man who felt that all depended upon himself, and that he must by rapid and unexpected strokes effect in the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet while the power of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England.

To understand his local or military position the conformation of the country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered.

Dorsenne's principal magazine was at Valladolid, his advanced posts were on the Tormes, from whence to Ciudad Rodrigo was four long marches through a wild forest country. Wellington's line was supplied from Lisbon to Raiva on the Mondego by water, after which the land carriage was more than a hundred miles through wild mountains and devastated valleys: it required fifteen days to bring a convoy from Lisbon to the Agueda. His flank communication with Oporto run through eighty miles of rugged country before the first point of water carriage on the Douro could be reached. His communication with Hill was likewise through a country of strong passes, offering no resources for supply, and his field magazines there were filled from Abrantes, the highest navigable point on the Tagus; Vilha Velha on this line has been before noticed as furnishing the only sure military passage over the Tagus between Almaraz and Abrantes. In these relative positions the advantages were with respect to the siege and succour of Ciudad Rodrigo balanced; for the country on both sides of the Agueda being

exhausted, and beyond that capricious river no covering position, the greater distance of the French from the fortress was thus compensated to them. This consideration had prevented the attack of Rodrigo in May and turned Wellington's attention towards Badajos. But the aspect of affairs soon changed. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence of Marmont, the generalship of Soult in stopping at Llerena after Albuera, rescued Badajos; and though Wellington's still greater generalship in stopping on the Caya prevented further mischief, the misconduct of the Portuguese government combined with Marmont's new position in the valley of the Tagus precluded a renewal of the siege. The fallacious hope of finding Ciudad Rodrigo unprovided brought the English general hastily back to the Coa, but though he thereby stopped the invasion of Gallicia he could undertake no offensive operations, being bridled by the positions of Dorsenne and Marmont. For if he advanced against Salamanca his communications with Hill and even with Lisbon would be exposed to Marmont; and if he turned against that marshal Dorsenne and Soult would have closed on his flanks. These things being overlooked, some able officers at the period of the Elbodon combat censured the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of Celorico and exposed the battering-train then at Villa Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, was better than giving up the communication with Hill which was threatened by Foy's advance to Zarza Maior.

After the allies came to Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont being reinforced became separately equal to Wellington, and together too strong. Soult, master of Andalusia, had a moveable reserve of twenty thousand men, Suchet gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were re-occupied by Bonnet, and the army of the centre was re-organized. To besiege Ciudad or Badajos in form was hopeless; and the rumour of Napoleon's arrival made the English general look once more to the lines of Torres Vedras: but when the certainty of a Russian war removed this fear the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became possible. There was then a good battering-train in Almeida,

and the works of that place were restored, the line of communication with Oporto was completely organized and shortened by improving the navigation of the Douro; Rodrigo itself was weakly garrisoned and the French ignorance as to the state of the allies' preparations gave hope of a surprise. It was however only from surprise success could be expected, and it was not the least of Wellington's merits that he so well concealed his preparations for so long a period. No other operation was open, and yet he could not remain inactive because around him the whole fabric of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war the Peninsula would be lost.

To surprise a third-rate fortress with a weak garrison seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but in reality it was the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula, when nothing else could have saved it. Wellington knew the valley of the Tagus could not long support the army of Portugal and the army of the centre,—he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and the king were at open war upon the subject, and he judged, if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would for the sake of provisions and to protect Leon, uncovered by the departure of the imperial guards, concentrate in that province. This first step would therefore break the bar Napoleon had raised to offensive operations. For to keep magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding meanwhile as they could upon the country, was the French manner, and hence want of provisions never obstructed their moving upon important occasions; yet Wellington thought the tempestuous season would render it difficult for Marmont when thus forced into Leon to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed if Rodrigo fell to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura and suddenly besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be secretly made in Elvas, under protection of Hill's corps. This was the second step, and one of promise, because of the jealousies of the marshals the wet season and his own combinations, which would impede the concentration of the French armies and prevent

them from keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that Ballesteros' corps, now augmented, would vex Soult's posts on the coast while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and if Badajos fell, he designed to leave a force to cover it against the army of the centre and fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not in default of provisions pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided by a small regular corps and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, would be sufficient to prevent any serious impression on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.

This plan, subtle and vigorous, was the more daring because his own troops were not in good plight. He had indeed received reinforcements, but the infantry had served at Walcheren and exposure to night air or even slight hardships threw them by hundreds into the hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced and not acclimated, were found, men and horses, so unfit for duty that he sent them to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in arrear, the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very scanty,—half and quarter rations were often served, sometimes the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and their clothing was so patched that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was very scarce, the regimental animals were dying of hunger, corn was rarely distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of the artillery and the old cavalry suffered;—the very mules of the commissariat were pinched and the muleteers eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments about the Coa and Agueda were unhealthy from the rains, twenty thousand men were in hospital, and, deduction made for other drains, only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture, a sulky apathy in the Portuguese regency, produced by the prince's letter, was becoming more hurtful than the former active opposition. Yet these distresses Wellington with surprising subtlety turned to the

advantage of his present designs; for the enemy were aware of the misery in the army and their imagination magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered for relief from the Gata mountains to the Douro, from the Agueda to the Mondego immediately after the battering-train entered Almeida, both armies concluded that the guns were to arm that fortress as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity had forced upon the British general. Not even the engineers employed in the preparations knew more than that a siege or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew;—even the quarter-master general Murray was suffered to go home on leave with the full persuasion that no operation would take place before spring.

In the new cantonments abundance of provisions and dry weather, for in Beira the first rains generally subside during December, stopped the sickness and restored three thousand men to the ranks; and the privations had in no manner weakened the moral courage of the troops. The old regiments were incredibly hardy and experienced in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the staff was well practised; and lord Fitzroy Somerset, military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the head-quarters and the battalion chiefs, that the latter had, so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon all the business of their regiments, a privilege which stimulated the enthusiasm and zeal of all. For the regimental commanders being generally very young men, the distinctions of rank were not rigidly enforced, and the merit of each officer was consequently better known and more earnestly supported when promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method lord Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the moral state of each regiment, rendered his own office important and gracious with the army, and with such discretion and judgment that the military hierarchy was in no manner weakened: all the daring young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political difficulties of their general anticipated noble triumphs which were happily realized.

The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington came at last. An imperial decree had again remodelled the French armies. That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a new corps under Reille, called the '*army of the Ebro*,' its head-quarters to be at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, exclusive of the garrison of Badajos. Marshal Victor returned to France discontented, for he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war, and his divisions were given to Conroux Barrois, Villatte, Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult. The reserve of Monthion was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the great communications with France and to reduce the partidas on that line, was ordered to occupy the districts round St. Ander, Sebastian, Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new army of the Ebro; it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers, for the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, being required for the Russian war marched in December to France. All the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks of the old guard were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand of the best soldiers were withdrawn, and the maimed and worn-out men being sent to France at the same time, the force in the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand men.


The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from the Montaña de St. Ander. But as this arrangement weakened the grand line of communication with France Marmont was ordered to abandon the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham and Bonnet's division, forming together about eighteen thousand men, were added to his army, but the former general returned to France. These two divisions were however extended for the sake of supplies from the Asturias to Toledo, and as Montbrun was then near Valencia and Soult's attention

distracted between Tarifa and Hill's pursuit of Drouet, the French were employed over an immense tract of country. Marmont also, deceived by the seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies left Rodrigo unprotected and Wellington instantly jumped with both feet on the devoted fortress.



SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO

1812



CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THIRTY-FIVE thousand men, cavalry included, were disposable for this enterprise. The materials for the siege were placed at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those places the hired carts and mules were to bring up the stores to the parc; seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected, but from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found amidst the ruins of Almeida. A bridge was commenced the 1st of January at Marialva near the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, six miles below Ciudad, and to secure it piles were driven into the bed of the river above and below, to which the trestles were tied. The fortress was to have been invested the 6th, but the native carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent road with empty carts, and it was dangerous to find fault because they deserted on the slightest offence.

When the place was closely examined, it was found that two convents which flanked and strengthened the bad Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs had been fortified; and on the greater Teson an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt, called Francisco, was constructed and supported by two guns and a howitzer placed on the flat roof of a convent having the same name. All the ground was rocky except on the Tesons, and though the ramparts were there better covered by out works and could fire more heavily on the trenches, it was, following the English general's views, most assailable, because elsewhere the batteries must have been placed on the edge of

the counterscarp before they could see low enough to breach: this would have been a tedious process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gulley offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to storm fort Francisco, form a lodgment there, open the first parallel along the greater Teson, place thirty-three pieces in counter-batteries to ruin the defences, and drive the besieged from the convent of Francisco. Afterwards, working forward by the sap, it was proposed to construct breaching-batteries on the lesser Teson and blow in the counterscarp, while seven guns, battering a weak turret on the left, opened a second breach with a view to turn any retrenchment behind the principal breach.

Carlos d'España and Julian Sanchez were pushed to the Tormes in observation while four British divisions and Pack's Portuguese laboured in the siege; but on the right bank of the Agueda there was neither fuel nor cover and the troops therefore kept their quarters on the hither bank, having, although a severe frost and fall of snow had set in, to ford the river each day by divisions in succession, carrying their provisions cooked. To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport the English general had previously constructed eight hundred carts drawn by horses, which were now his surest dependence for bringing up ammunition; and so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity of the native carters and muleteers and the chances of weather, that he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days. Yet he hoped to steal this time from his adversaries, sure, even if he failed, that the clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that quarter as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.

On the 8th the light division and Pack's Portuguese forded the Agueda three miles above the fortress, and making a circuit took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment the enemy did not think the siege was commenced. But in the evening the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Colborne, now commanding the fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British regiments of the light

division stormed the redoubt of Francisco; this he did with so much fury that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open. Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder, forty in number, were made prisoners. When the post was thus taken with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, Elder's caçadores were set to labour on the right of it because the fort itself was instantly covered with shot and shells from the town; this tempest continued through the night, but at daybreak the parallel, six hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, the communication over the Teson was completed, and the siege advanced several days by this well-managed assault.

The 9th the first division took the trenches in hand, the place was encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries for eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before daylight the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk in the front to provide earth for the batteries, which were made eighteen feet thick at top to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.

On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches and a thousand men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a superabundance of ammunition and did not spare it. In the night the communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on the 11th the third division undertook the siege. That day the magazines in the batteries were excavated and the approaches widened; but the enemy's fire was destructive, and the shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries that the troops were withdrawn and the earth raised from the inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells with long fuzees, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner; and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the garden of the convent of Francisco with which they killed many men and wounded others.

On the 12th the light division resumed work, the riflemen, profiting from a thick fog, covered themselves in pits which they dugged in front of the trenches and from thence picked off the enemy's gunners; yet the weather was so cold and the besieged shot so briskly that little progress was made. The 13th the same causes impeded the labourers of the first division. Scarcity of transport also balked the operations. One-third only of the native carts had arrived and the drivers of those present were very indolent; much of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to succour the place. In this difficulty it was resolved to hasten the siege by opening a breach with the counter-batteries, which were not quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp: in other words to overstep the rules of science and sacrifice life rather than time, for the capricious Agueda might in one night flood and enable a small French force to relieve the place. The whole army was therefore brought up from the distant quarters and posted in the villages on the Coa ready to cross the Agueda and give battle.

Hill also, in returning from Merida, sent a division across the Tagus, lest Marmont, despairing to unite his forces time enough to relieve the place, should move against Castello Branco and Vilha Velha.

In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches. The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief, made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the batteries when a few of the workmen getting together checked them until a support arrived and the guns were saved. This affair, coupled with the death of the engineer on duty and the heavy fire from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching-batteries; yet at half-past four in the

evening twenty-five heavy guns battered the '*fausse braye*' and rampart, and two pieces were directed against the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants' fire with more than fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of the place or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the distant mountains faintly returning the sound appeared to mourn over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil the quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after a peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment then carried the convent of Francisco by storm and established itself in the suburb.

Next day the ramparts were again battered and fell so fast it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret, wherefore in the night five more guns were mounted. At daylight the besiegers' batteries recommenced, but at eight o'clock a thick fog compelled them to desist; nevertheless the small breach had been opened and the place was summoned but without effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended and a sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach; the breaching-battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the riflemen of the light division continued from their pits to pick off the enemy's gunners.

On the 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy, and though the wall of the place was beaten down in large cantles several of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, many men killed, general Borthwick commandant of artillery wounded, the sap entirely ruined, and the riflemen in the pits overpowered with grape; yet towards evening the latter recovered the upper hand and the French could only fire from the more distant embrasures. In the night the battery intended for the lesser breach was armed and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford cover in the day-time.

On the 18th the besiegers' fire was resumed with great

violence, the turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it. The sap made no progress, the superintending engineer was badly wounded, and a twenty-four pounder having bursted in the batteries killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed there kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the French retrenchments. On the 19th both breaches became practicable, major Sturgeon closely examined the place and a plan of attack was formed on his report; the assault was then ordered and the battering-guns were turned against the artillery of the ramparts.

ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This operation, confided to the third and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese, was organized in four parts.

1°. *Right attack.* A company of the eighty-third and the second caçadores, posted in some houses near the bridge, were to cross the river and escalade an outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch but where two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments, posted behind the convent of Santa Cruz and having the seventy-seventh in reserve, were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp, to escalade the '*fausse braye*,' and scour it on their left as far as the great breach.

2°. *Assault of the great breach.* One hundred and eighty men, protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of the second parallel and be followed by a storming party, which was again to be supported by Mackinnon's brigade of the third division.

3°. *Left attack.* The light division, posted behind the convent of Francisco, was to send three rifle companies to scour the *fausse braye* to the right, and so connect the left and centre attacks. At the same time a storming party, preceded by the third caçadores with hay-sacks and followed by Vandeleur's and Andrew Barnard's brigades, was to make for the

small breach, and when the *fausse braye* was carried to detach to their right in aid of the main assault, to their left to force a passage at the Salamanca gate.

4°. *False attack.* This was an escalade to be made by Pack's Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.

Colonel O'Toole of the *caçadores* commanded the right attack. Five hundred volunteers under major Manners of the seventy-fourth, the forlorn hope under lieutenant Mackie of the eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division. Three hundred volunteers led by major George Napier of the fifty-second, with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under lieutenant Gurwood of the same regiment, formed the storming party of the light division.

All the troops reached their posts without seeming to attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given, and while Wellington, who in Appendix 4.
§ 2. person had been pointing out the lesser breach to major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco, the attack on the right commenced and was instantly taken up along the whole line. Then the space between the troops and the ditch was at once covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell, with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the *fausse braye*, and were pushing up the great breach amidst the bursting of shells the whistling of grape and muskets and the shrill cries of the French, who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses made hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers falling in heaps choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was raked with grape from two guns flanking the top of the breach at the distance of a few yards: thus striving, and trampling alike upon the dead and the wounded these brave men maintained the combat.

On the left the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis jumped down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the *fausse braye* under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The ditch was dark and intricate, the forlorn hope inclined towards the left, the stormers went straight to the breach which was so narrow at the top that a gun placed across nearly barred the opening; there they were rejoined by the forlorn hope and the whole body rushed up, but the head of the mass, crushed together as the ascent narrowed, staggered under the fire, and with the instinct of self-preservation snapped their own muskets though they had not been allowed to load. Major Napier struck by a grape-shot fell at this moment with a shattered arm, but he called aloud on his men to use their bayonets, and all the unwounded officers simultaneously sprung to the front, thus the required impulse was given and with a furious shout the breach was carried. Then the supporting regiments coming up in sections abreast gained the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the forty-third to the right, and the place was won.

During this contest, which lasted only a few minutes on the breach, the fighting at the great breach had continued with unabated violence: but when the stormers and the forty-third came pouring along the rampart towards that quarter the French wavered, three of their expense magazines exploded at the same moment, and then the third division with a mighty effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison fought indeed for a moment in the streets, yet finally fled to the castle, where lieutenant Gurwood, who though severely wounded in the head had entered amongst the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor's sword.

Now into the streets plunged the assailants from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful, and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese and the reserves meeting no resistance had entered. Throwing off the restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses; the town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers

menaced their officers and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place, intoxication soon increased the tumult, and at last, the fury rising to absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, by which the town would have been blown to atoms but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses. Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and the immense stores of ammunition, with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, including the battering-train of Marmont's army, were captured. The allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety officers in the siege, of which six hundred and fifty and sixty officers were slain or hurt at the breaches. Generals Craufurd and Mackinnon, the former a person of great ability, were killed, and with them died many gallant men; amongst others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it has been felicitously said, that 'three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman.' General Vandaleur, leading the light division after Craufurd fell, was badly wounded, so was colonel Colborne and a crowd of inferior rank; and unhappily the slaughter did not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by the breach an accidental explosion took place and numbers of both were blown into air.

Cooke's
Memoirs,
Vol. I.

To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously finished lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the prince regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. This siege lasted only twelve days, half the time originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the inexperience of the engineer and soldier, and the heavy fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed

than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the labourers, but with a less severe frost the trenches would have been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises everywhere to within six inches of the surface. The worst obstacle was the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished from the storekeeper-general's office in England, the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected: the engineers eagerly sought for French implements because the English tools were useless!

2°. Wellington's audacity in storming the redoubt of Francisco and breaking ground on the first night of the investment; his greater audacity in storming before the fire of the defence had been even abated or the counterscarp blown in, were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Military and political reasons alike warranted this neglect of rules. Success depended more upon the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when the general terminated his order for the assault with this sentence, '*Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening,*' he knew well that it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were bayoneted.

3°. A perpendicular descent of sixteen feet cut off the great breach from the town, and the bottom was planted with sharp spikes and strewn with live shells. The houses behind were loop-holed and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not very deep or wide, and the French had left the temporary bridges over them; but they had parapets so powerfully defended it was said the third division could never have carried them had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.

4°. This rapid siege has been contrasted with the slow attack of Massena in 1810, and the defence of Herrasti compared with that of Barrié. But Massena was not pressed for time, and would have been blameable to spare labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti had a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms, and with additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of the

lesser breach was a great error. Narrow and high, a slight addition to its defences would have rendered it impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th the light division was come up out of its turn he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. Moreover the small breach was flanked at a short distance by a demi-bastion with a parapet, which though little injured was abandoned the moment the head of the storming party forced its way on to the rampart. But the real defence of Ciudad was outside; when it fell, Marmont's errors at Elbodon became manifest. Neither can that marshal be justified for having left so few men in Ciudad Rodrigo; with a garrison of five thousand the place could not have been taken.

5°. Disgraceful were the excesses of the allied troops: the Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed, helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. 'The soldiers were not to be controlled.' That excuse will not suffice. Colonel Macleod, of the forty-third, a young man of a most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and constrained his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.

CHAPTER IV.

IN Ciudad Rodrigo papers were found showing that many inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy. All these people Carlos d'España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters who were taken some were pardoned, and the rigour of the Spanish general was thought overstrained. When order had been restored, workmen were set to repair the breaches and level the trenches, and arrangements made to provision the town quickly; for Marmont was gathering his forces at Valladolid, being still ignorant the place had fallen. In the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating fact, had spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and Montbrun's expedition to Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away and Montbrun recommenced his march. But though the bridge was really cast on the 1st and the siege commenced on the 8th nothing was known on the 12th at Salamanca. On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid, and on the 15th he first heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to concentrate at Salamanca. Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment in aid, and on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad was only four marches.

On the 23rd Souham advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate of the fortress, but five thousand of Hill's troops had then reached Castello Branco and the allies were therefore strong enough to fight beyond the Agueda; hence if the siege had lasted the twenty-four days expected the place might still have been taken. Marmont knew on the 26th that the fortress was lost, and, unable to comprehend his adversary's success, retired to Valladolid. His troops were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for Montbrun had already

reached Avila on his return from Valencia. Bonnet in repassing the Asturian mountains suffered from cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier, and sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money and arms to the Asturians. Morillo, who had remained at Horcajo, south of the Tagus, in great peril after his flight from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo, and Saornil's band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo; other losses were sustained from the partidas on the Tietar, and the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castille were renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement. Abadia and Cabrera advancing from Galicia menaced Astorga and La Baneza, but the arrival of Bonnet at Benevente soon compelled them to retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca: then Silveira who had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them also fell back to Portugal.

Marmont's operations were here again ill-judged. Had he taken post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above Rodrigo, he would have recovered the place. His troops might have been concentrated at that point the 28th, on which day rain set in so heavily that the trestle-bridge would not stand, and the waters rose two feet over the stone bridge; the allied army on the left bank could not communicate with the fortress, which was thus isolated for several days with the trenches not quite repaired. But the greatest warriors are the very slaves of fortune!

Wellington's eyes were now turned towards Badajos. He designed to invest it during the second week of March, because the flooding of the Beira rivers would not only permit a concentration of troops in the Alemtejo without risk to Portugal in the north, but impede a junction of the French forces in Estremadura. Green forage was to be had earlier in Estremadura than on the Agueda, and his subsequent operations against Andalusia would depend upon forerunning the harvest which ripening sooner there than in Leon would be the enemy's resource. Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen had been ordered from

Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Rodrigo stores and tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to Alcaçer do Sal: and a company of the military artificers, then at Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte for Elvas where an engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, the suburbs were strengthened, but heavy storms impeded these works and stopping all communication with the south delayed the ulterior operations; when the weather cleared other obstacles were not wanting.

Sinking from want the draft bullocks were unable to drag the whole battering-train by Vilha Velha, and only sixteen twenty-four pounders and twenty spare carriages could be moved on that line; wherefore sixteen twenty-four pounders, then in vessels on the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and the admiral was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none of that calibre and offered eighteen pounders; but the artillery major Dickson found these were Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the admiral refused to give guns from his own ship, the *Barfleur*, in their place; this capricious proceeding produced difficulty and delay, and the artillerymen had to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient supply. Dickson's energy overcame every obstacle, and in the beginning of March fifty-two battering-guns, the pontoons from Abrantes and most of the stores from Alcaçer do Sal were parked at Elvas, where gabions and fascines were piled in great numbers.

Marmont, who had lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and was unable to measure his adversary's talent and energy, had again spread his troops the more easily to feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry returned to Talavera and Toledo,—Souham occupied the country from Zamora and Toro to the banks of the Tormes,—Bonnet after driving the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca remained about Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal seemed to expect no further operations on the part of the allies; yet from some secret misgiving, Marmont caused Foy to

march through the Guadalupe by the pass of St. Vincente, to ascertain whether an army could march by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana. This scattering of the French relieved Wellington from a serious embarrassment. The want of land-transport had delayed the arrival of clothing for the army, and to receive it the regiments were necessarily sent to the navigable points on the Mondego, Douro and Tagus; hence the march to the Alemtejo was long and unmilitary; and it would have been too dangerous if Marmont had kept his troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather proved extremely favourable, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the troops well without those exactions and oppressions which had hitherto attended the native movements: the scarcity was however still so great that rations of cassava root were served to them instead of bread.

Wellington's character always rose with his difficulties, but the want of specie crippled every operation. The intended campaign in Andalusia could not, when there was no harvest on the ground, be conducted unless by paying ready money for supplies, seeing that the Spaniards would never diminish their secret resources on promises. The English general and Mr. Stuart, therefore endeavoured to get British bank notes accepted as cash by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto. Wellington also, reflecting on the enormous sums spent in Portugal and judging many persons had secret hoards which they would invest if they could do it safely, asked for English Exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner, intending to pay the interest punctually and faithfully however inconvenient it might prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese paper because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency, but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce that in the midst of victory the war was more than once like to stop altogether.

On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo, Wellington, who had maintained his headquarters on the Coa to the last moment to blind the enemy

as to his real designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also personally explained to the governor Vives the plan and intention of the new works, supplied him with money, furnished him with six weeks' provision remaining from the field stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved stores at St. Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d'España undertook to transport them to the fortress. Marmont was then at Salamanca and ignorant of the allies' march, wherefore Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry was posted on the Yeltes to screen the movement as long as possible, and he was instructed to retire on Beira if Marmont advanced, but to cover the magazines at Castello Branco by disputing the rivers and defiles with the enemy's parties. Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto,—the militia under Trant and J. Wilson were to concentrate about Guarda,—those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under colonel Lecor. The orders of all were the same, namely, to dispute the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those of the Estrella, Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town Victor Alten's cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont's efforts were not much to be dreaded in that season, seeing that he had lost his battering-train in Ciudad.

Wellington reached Elvas the 11th, and resolved to invest Badajos immediately though the troops and stores had not all arrived; for he was then ten days behind the time he had contemplated, and the delay had thrown him into the equinoctial rains by which his difficulties were augmented. The cause of this was again the ever-recurring vexatious conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in the country, but as the government would not compel the magistrates to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for the army or forced the poorer classes to supply them, which oppression the peasants naturally avoided by flight. Thus, Badajos would have been invested the 6th if the rich town of Evora, which had not seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, had not refused to supply

any carriages, which necessarily postponed it to the 17th. It was in vain Wellington threatened and remonstrated,—in vain he wasted time and mental power in devising new laws or remedies for bad ones,—in vain Mr. Stuart worked with equal vigour to give energy to this extraordinary government,—whether in matters of small or vital importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and stolid indifference on the part of all the civil functionaries met them at every turn. The responsibility even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers,—the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details of the service himself, and his iron strength of body and mind were strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he did fall sick but recovered after a few days. The critical nature of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have supplied his place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive Wellington from the contest.




CHAPTER V.

On the 15th pontoons were laid over the Guadiana four miles from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, and two large Spanish boats were arranged as flying bridges. The 16th Beresford, who had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy's posts and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton's Portuguese, in all fifteen thousand men. Soult was then before the Isla, but Drouet's division, five thousand strong, was at Villa Franca and Daricau with a like force was at Zaiamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore Graham passing the Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, moved by Valverde and Santa Martha upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty thousand strong, five thousand, including the heavy Germans who were at Estremos, being

Appendix 6,
§ 1.

cavalry; and as the fifth division was on the march from Beira, the whole army presented fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were Portuguese: Castaños went to Galicia, but the fifth Spanish army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, four thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the lower Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour of Badajos.

As the allies advanced Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo; Hill then halted at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade's cavalry at Villa Franca. Marmont had meanwhile drawn his sixth division from Talavera towards Castille through the Puerto de Pico, and the



SIEGE OF
BADAJOS
1812



four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal would not act in conjunction with that of the south.

THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This fortress was garrisoned by a mixed force of French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, five thousand in all including sick. Phillipon making himself felt in every direction, had scoured the vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off cattle almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his spies were abroad from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, from Lisbon to Ayamonte. He had made an interior retrenchment in the castle and augmented the number of its guns; the rear of fort Christoval was also better secured, and a covered communication from the fort itself to the work at the bridge-head was nearly completed. Two ravelins were constructed on the south side of the town, a third was commenced, and likewise counter-guards for the bastions; but the eastern front next the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A '*cunette*' or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of the Pardaleras was enclosed, and the work connected with the body of the place from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The three western fronts were mined, and on the east the San Roque bridge was built up to form an inundation two hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the place could be approached. All the inhabitants had been ordered on pain of expulsion to lay up food for three months, and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place on the 10th and 16th of February: the stores of powder and supply of shells were however inadequate.

Wellington finding the old attack against Christoval and the castle now impracticable, desired to assail one of the western fronts which would have been scientific; but the engineer said he had not mortars miners or guns, nor the means of bringing

up sufficient stores for such an attack. Indeed the want of transport had again forced the allies to draw stores from Elvas to the manifest hazard of that fortress, and hence, here as at Ciudad Rodrigo time was necessarily paid for by the loss of life: or rather the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.

It was finally resolved to attack the bastion of Trinidad, because the counter-guard there being unfinished that bastion could be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first parallel was to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and the eastern front, in such a manner that counter batteries might destroy all the armament of the southern fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were to be breached. All the guns were then to be turned to open a third breach in the connecting curtain which was known to be of weak masonry, and thus a storming party could turn any retrenchment behind the great breaches. In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there eighteen feet deep, such was the general's confidence in his troops and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.

Dickson's battering-train of fifty-two pieces included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers for throwing shrapnel shells; but this missile, much talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency save as a common shell or when used with very heavy metal; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this nor in any siege did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up, for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry and even the ordenança employed to move the battering-train from Alcacer do Sal, although well paid, deserted.

Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest Portuguese, and there were one hundred and fifty sappers, volunteers from the third division, not skilful but of signal

bravery. The engineer's parc was behind the heights of St. Michael. Picton had direction of the siege,—Colville, Kempt, and Bowes alternately commanded in the trenches,—the engineer officers, Burgoyne and Squire, conducted the attack, and in the night of the 17th eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of the pickaxes, and though the work was commenced late a communication four thousand feet in length was formed, and a parallel six hundred yards long, three feet deep and three feet six inches wide, was opened. When day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.

In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel was prolonged right and left, and the previous works were improved. The garrison raised the parapets of the Picurina, lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, and planted musketeers to gall the men in the trenches, who replied in a like manner.

The 19th Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was intended ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one o'clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen hundred infantry under general Vielland, second in command, filed unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San Roquel,—one hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself, and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before them and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak the French cavalry had divided and commenced a sham fight on the right of the parallel, the smaller party, pretending to fly and answering Portuguese to the challenge of the piquets, were allowed to pass, and, elated by the success of this stratagem, galloped to the engineer's parc, a thousand yards behind the trenches, where they cut down some men not many, for succour soon came. Meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied upon the relief which had just arrived beat the enemy's infantry back even to the castle. In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and officers, the

besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but colonel Fletcher, chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, as the soldiers neglected the fight to gather tools. After the action a reserved squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were always stationed behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy's motions.

Wet and boisterous weather harassed the workmen, flooded the trenches, and retarded progress, but on the 19th the parallel was entirely opened and on the 20th enlarged; next night it was extended across the Seville road and three counter-batteries were commenced; but they were traced in rear of the parallel because the ground was too soft in front to bear moving guns: moreover, the trench being a mile long with only a guard of fourteen hundred men, a rush from San Roque, which was scarcely three hundred yards distant, would have carried the batteries.

On the 20th a slight sally had been repulsed, and the 21st Phillipon placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana to rake the trenches, but a shoulder of earth raised the night before baffled this design and the riflemen's fire sent the guns away. Indications of repeating this operation against the left from the Pardaleras being observed, three hundred men with two guns were posted on some broken ground in opposition.

In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and the battery against the Picurina was finished; yet heavy rain again retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to drain the lower parts of the parallel by cuts made an artificial bottom of sand-bags. The besieged thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack threw up an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was also commenced; and as the labour of digging was great it was completed by hanging up brown

cloth which appeared to be earth, an ingenious expedient enabling the garrison to pass unseen between those points.

Vauban's maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labour. The great master's art was however soon vindicated by his countryman. Phillipon finding the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for three field-pieces and at daylight raked the trenches: the shots pitching into the parallel swept it in the most destructive manner for the whole day, there was no remedy, and the loss would have been terrible if the soft nature of the ground had not prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on that side, but these troops were distant and misfortunes accumulated. In the evening rain filled the trenches, the flood of the Guadiana run the fixed bridge under water sunk twelve of the pontoons and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of the army could not then be brought over, the guns and ammunition were on the right bank and the siege was on the point of being raised. In a few days however the river subsided, some Portuguese craft were brought up to form a flying bridge, the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and the communication was thus secured for the rest of the siege without accident.

On the 23rd the besieged were working on their intrenchment covering the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing platforms, when at three o'clock sudden rain filled the trenches, the saturated earth fell away, the works crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended. Next day the place was invested beyond the Guadiana by the fifth division, and the weather being fine the batteries were armed with ten twenty-four pounders, eleven eighteen pounders, and seven five-and-a-half inch howitzers, all of which opened on the 25th; they were vigorously answered, and a howitzer was dismounted and several artillery and engineer officers were killed. Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, and the Picurina garrison so galled by the marksmen that none dared look over the parapet; and as the external appearance of that fort did not indicate great strength general Kempt was ordered to

assault. The outward seeming was however very fallacious, the fronts were well covered by the glacis, the flanks deep, the rampart at fourteen feet from the bottom of the ditch was protected with thick slanting palings, and above them there was an earthen slope of sixteen feet. A few palings had been knocked off the covered way and the parapet was slightly damaged, but it was repaired with sand-bags and the ditch was profound, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates. Seven guns were mounted, the entrance by the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, and the garrison was two hundred strong, every man having two muskets. The top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and small mines and a loopholed gallery under the counterscarp, intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.

Five hundred men of the third division assembled for the attack. Kempt ordered two hundred under major Rudd of the seventy-seventh to turn the fort on the left,—an equal force under major Shaw of the seventy-fourth to turn the fort by the right,—and one hundred from each of these bodies were to enter the communication with San Roque and intercept succours coming from the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the fort, and the hundred men remaining formed a reserve under captain Powis of the eighty-third. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and Gips, having twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these columns, and fifty of the light division provided with axes were to move out of the trenches at the moment of attack.

ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

At nine o'clock, the night being fine and the arrangements skilfully made, the two flanking bodies moved forward. The distance was short and the troops quick, but the fort black and silent before now seemed a mass of fire. The assailants running to the palisades in the rear with undaunted courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive musketry and the thick pales rendered their efforts nugatory,

they strove to get in by the faces of the work, yet the depth of the ditch and the slanting stakes again baffled them. The enemy also shot fast and fatally, and the crisis being imminent Kempt sent the reserve headlong against the front; then the fight and the carnage became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the succour of the fort was encountered and beaten by the party on the communication. The guns of Badajos and of the castle now opened, the guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells mixed with the shouts of the combatants increased the tumult. Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire by the light of which dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis had escalated where the artillery had beaten down the pales, and the other assailants throwing ladders in the manner of bridges from the brink of the ditch to the slanting stakes also mounted, and all were fighting hand to hand. The axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, soon discovered the gate and hewing it down broke in by the rear, yet the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and Oates of the eighty-eighth, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart,—Nixon of the fifty-second was shot two yards within the gate,—Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside,—and it was not until half the garrison were killed that Gaspar Thierry, the commandant, surrendered with eighty-six men: the others rushing out of the gate endeavoured to cross the inundation and were drowned.

Phillipon thought the Picurina would have delayed the siege five or six days, and had the assault been a day later this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the counter-scarp and the mines would then have been completed, and the body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly ruined by fire. He was baffled by this heroic assault, which lasted an hour and cost four officers and fifty men killed, fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty wounded; and so vehement was the fighting the garrison forgot or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the

danger accruing from the loss of the Picurina, but he recalled to his soldiers' recollection, how worse than death it was to be the inmate of an English hulk! an appeal deeply felt, for the annals of civilized nations furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war than the prison-ships of England.

When the Picurina was taken three battalions advanced to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the town continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works and communication with the first parallel were established, and the second parallel was commenced; yet at daylight the redoubt was so overwhelmed with fire from the town no troops could remain and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second parallel was then opened in its whole length, and next day the counter-batteries on the right of the Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire with the town, by which one of the besiegers' guns was dismounted and the inexperienced Portuguese gunners did not damage the defences much.

In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel to the Picurina was made, and three breaching-batteries were traced out; one for twelve twenty-four pounders occupied the space between the Picurina and the inundation, to breach the right face of the Trinidad bastion,—a second for eight eighteen pounders was on the site of the Picurina, to breach the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion,—a third, on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three shrapnel howitzers to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison working in it—for Phillipon having now discovered the true line of attack, set strong parties in the night to raise the counter-guard of the Trinidad and an imperfect ravelin covering the menaced front.

At daybreak these works, furnished with gabions and sand-bags, were lined with musketeers who galled the workmen employed on the breaching batteries, and the cannonade was brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, the gabions placed in front of the batteries to protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musketry became so destructive that the men were withdrawn from the front and threw up earth from the inside.

In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the right, with the view of raising batteries to ruin San Roque, destroy the dam that held up the inundation, and breach the curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved hard, and the moon shone so brightly that the labourers were quite exposed and the work was relinquished. On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored, and the workmen resumed their labours outside, the parallel was then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque; yet their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one of the counter-batteries which was therefore dismantled. The enemy had also during the night observed the tracing string which marked the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow, creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line of the castle fire whereby some loss was sustained ere the false direction was discovered.

In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed with twenty-four pounders to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching-battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina against the flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was dugged for riflemen in front of the batteries. The 29th a slight sally made on the right bank of the river was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at San Roque was ruined by the enemy's fire, and the besieged continued to raise the counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad and strengthen the front attacked. The besiegers armed two breaching-batteries with eighteen pounders which the next day opened against the flank of Santa Maria, yet with little effect, and the explosion of an expense magazine killed and hurt many men.

During the siege Soult, having little fear for the town yet expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals had occupied the district of La Serena to keep open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but Graham and Hill forced them into the Morena, while Morillo and

Penne Villemur, lying close on the lower Guadiana, waited their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should advance: and there were other combinations to embarrass the French marshal. In February, general Montes, detached by Ballesteros from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga, and the whole of the Spanish army then assembled in the Ronda hills, with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while Morillo assailed it on the right of that river: this compelled Soult to send troops towards Malaga and fatally delayed his march to Estremadura.

Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca country, and it was rumoured he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington was disturbed by this information. The flooding of the rivers would prevent a blockade and he knew Marmont had not obtained a battering-train; but the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up and the fortress had only thirty days' supply: Almeida was in as bad a state, and the project of invading Andalusia was likely to be stopped by these embarrassments.

On the 30th it became known that Soult was coming from Cordova. Then the fifth division was brought over the Guadiana, Power's Portuguese brigade and some cavalry only being left to maintain the investment on the right bank, and the siege was urged vehemently. Forty-eight pieces were in constant play and the sap against San Roque advanced; yet the enemy was equally diligent, his fire was destructive and his ravelin and counter-guard on the menaced front visibly advanced. The 1st of April the sap was close to San Roque, the Trinidad crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2nd the face of the Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates being laid open the bullets were lost in the cavities, and the garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the attacked front from the town.

In the night a new battery against the San Roque being

armed, two officers and some sappers glided behind that outwork, gagged the sentinel, placed powder barrels and a match against the dam of the inundation, and retired undiscovered; yet the explosion did not destroy the dam and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen set against them slew many, they were reinforced by means of a raft with parapets which crossed the inundation, and men also passed by the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate.

On the 3rd guns were turned against the curtain behind the San Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, a breach there would have been useless while the inundation remained and the fire was soon discontinued. The breaches in the bastion were now greatly enlarged and the besieged assiduously laboured at the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was commenced on the castle hill outside the wall; the besiegers therefore traced a counter-battery of fourteen sharp-nosed howitzers to play upon that point during the assault, and the crisis was fast approaching. The breaches were nearly practicable, but Soult having joined Drouet and Daricau, was advancing, and as the allies were not in sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches and fight at Albuera: Graham therefore fell back towards that place, and Hill, destroying the bridge at Merida, marched from the upper Guadiana to Talavera Real.

Gain of time being now, as in war it generally is, the essential ingredient of success the anxiety on both sides redoubled, yet Soult was still at Llerena on the morning of the 5th when the breaches were declared practicable. The assault was therefore ordered; but though Leith's division was brought up to assist, a very careful personal examination caused such doubts in Wellington's mind that he delayed until a third breach should, as he originally designed, be opened between the Trinidad and Maria bastions: this could not be

commenced before morning, and in the night the enemy laboured assiduously behind the openings, regardless of the showers of grape with which the batteries scoured the ditch and breaches. Next morning the guns were turned against the Trinidad curtain, and the bad masonry crumbled so fast that in two hours a yawning break was seen, and Wellington having again recognised the points of attack renewed his orders for the assault. Then the soldiers eagerly made ready for a combat, so fiercely fought so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances that posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale: but many are still alive who know that it is true.

So sensible was the English general of Phillipon's firmness and the courage of his garrison that he spared them the affront of a summons, yet, seeing the breach strongly entrenched and the enemy's flank fire still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis trust his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers burned for the signal, and he, unwilling to lose the service of one, gave to each division a task such as few generals would have the hardihood even to contemplate. For on the right Picton was to file out of the trenches, cross the Rivillas river, and scale the castle walls, eighteen to twenty-four feet in height, furnished with all means of destruction and so narrow at top the defenders could easily reach and overturn the ladders. On the left Leith was to make a false attack on the Pardaleras, but a real assault on the distant bastion of San Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp thirty feet high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops provided each with three loaded muskets that the first fire might be quick and deadly.

In the centre, the fourth and light divisions under Colville and Andrew Barnard were to march against the breaches. They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders and axes, and preceded by storming parties of five hundred men each with their respective forlorn hopes: the light division was to assault the bastion of Santa Maria,—the fourth division to assault the Trinidad and the curtain,—and the columns were divided into storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch the latter to keep the crest of the glacis.

At first only one brigade of the third division was destined to attack the castle, but just before the hour of assault a sergeant of sappers deserted from the French and reported that there was but one communication from the castle into the town, wherefore the whole division was directed to assail in mass. To aid these great attacks general Power's Portuguese were to make a feint from the other side of the Guadiana, and major Wilson of the forty-eighth was to storm the San Roque with the guards of the trenches; this general outline was filled up with many nice arrangements, some of which were followed, others disregarded, for it is seldom all things are attended to in a desperate fight. Nor was the enemy idle. While it was yet twilight some French cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who endeavoured to look into the trenches with a view to ascertain if an assault was intended; but the piquet on that side jumped up, and firing as it run drove him and his escort back into the works: then darkness fell and silently the troops awaited the signal.

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

Dry but clouded was the night, the air thick with watery exhalations from the rivers, the ramparts and the trenches unusually still; yet a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former lights were seen to flit here and there while the deep voices of the sentinels at times proclaimed that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding in Phillipon's direful skill, watched from their lofty station the approach of enemies whom they had twice before baffled, and now hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls. The British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery destruction as the others were to pour it down, and both were alike terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions awakened in their resolute hearts. Former failures there were to avenge, and on both sides leaders who furnished no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial. The possession of Badajos had become a point of personal honour with the soldiers of each nation, but the desire for glory with the British was dashed by a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge; and recent toil and hardship with much spilling of blood had made

many incredibly savage; for these things render the noble-minded indeed averse to cruelty but harden the vulgar spirit: numbers also, like Cæsar's centurion who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, and in the pride of arms none doubted their might to bear down every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.

At ten o'clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head on the other side of the Guadiana were to have been simultaneously assailed, and it was hoped the strength of the enemy would shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division, and a lighted carcass thrown from the castle, falling close to the third division discovered their array and compelled them to anticipate the signal by half an hour. Then, everything being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against the breaches, and the guard of the trenches rushing forward with a shout encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently that scarcely any resistance was made. But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated the commencement of a more vehement combat at the castle. There general Kempt, for Picton hurt by a fall in the camp and expecting no change in the hour was not present, there Kempt, I say, led the third division. Having passed the Rivillas in single files by a narrow bridge under a terrible musketry he had re-formed and running up a rugged hill reached the foot of the castle where he fell severely wounded, and as he was carried back to the trenches met Picton who was hastening to take the command. Meanwhile the troops, spreading along the front, had reared their heavy ladders, some against the lofty castle some against the adjoining front on the left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with fearful rapidity, and in front

with pikes and bayonets stabbed the leading assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls: and all this was attended with deafening shouts and the crash of breaking ladders, and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of the falling weights.

Still swarming round the remaining ladders those undaunted veterans strove who should first climb, until all being overturned the French shouted victory, and the British, baffled but untamed, fell back a few paces and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. There the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed, and the heroic Ridge springing forward seized a ladder and calling with stentorian voice on his men to follow once more raised it against the castle, yet to the right of the former attack where the wall was lower and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was soon placed alongside of the first by the grenadier officer Canch, and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed and in a manner surprised were driven fighting through the double gate into the town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement from the French reserve then came up, a sharp action followed, both sides fired through the gate and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much glory.

All this time the tumult at the breaches was such as if the very earth had been rent asunder and its central fires bursting upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis just as the firing at the castle commenced, and the flash of a single musket discharged from the covered way as a signal showed them that the French were ready: yet no stir was heard and darkness covered the breaches. Some hay-packs were thrown, some ladders placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light division, five hundred in all, descended into the ditch without opposition; but then a bright flame shooting upwards displayed all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark figures and glittering arms were on one side, on the other the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming on like streams of burning lava; it was the touch of the magician's wand, for a crash of thunder

followed and with incredible violence the storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds of shells and powder-barrels.

For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch amazed at the terrific sight, but then with a shout that matched even the sound of the explosion the men flew down the ladders, or disdaining their aid leaped reckless of the depth into the gulf below,—and at the same moment, amidst

Appendix 4, § 2. a blaze of musketry that dazzled the eyes, the fourth division came running in and descended with a like fury. There were only five ladders

for the two columns which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of the ditch as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad was filled with water from the inundation; into that watery snare the head of the fourth division fell, and it is said above a hundred of the fuzileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who followed checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected turned to the left and thus came upon the face of the unfinished ravelin, which being rough and broken was mistaken for the breach and instantly covered with men: yet a wide and deep chasm was still between them and the ramparts, from whence came a deadly fire wasting their ranks. Thus baffled they also commenced a rapid discharge of musketry and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division, whose conducting engineer had been disabled early and whose flank was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth division had been destined to storm. Great was the confusion, for the ravelin was quite crowded with men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire others jumped down and run towards the breach, many also passed between the ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got mixed, the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries, also came pouring in until the ditch was quite filled, the rear still crowding forward and all cheering vehemently. The enemy's shouts also were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and of grenades, the roaring of guns from the flanks,

answered by the iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers and the continual clatter of the muskets made a maddening din.

Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades, sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in ponderous beams chained together and set deep in the ruins; and for ten feet in front the ascent was covered with loose planks studded with sharp iron points, on which feet being set the planks moved and the unhappy soldiers falling forward on the spikes rolled down upon the ranks behind. Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem and leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every man had several muskets, and each musket in addition to its ordinary charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of wooden slugs, which scattered like hail when they were discharged. Once and again the assailants rushed up the breaches, but always the sword-blades, immoveable and impassable, stopped their charge, and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, hundreds more were dropping, still the heroic officers called aloud for new trials, and sometimes followed by many sometimes by a few, ascended the ruins; and so furious were the men themselves that in one of these charges the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades, willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the others frustrated the attempt by dropping down: and men fell so far from the shot, it was hard to know who went down voluntarily who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again. Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades, for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the assailants crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was, would still have been separated from their enemies and the slaughter would have continued.

At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, Andrew Barnard had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the

other and preserved some degree of military array; but now the tumult was such no command could be heard distinctly except by those close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other and the wounded struggling to avoid being trampled upon broke the formations: order was impossible! Officers of all ranks, followed more or less numerous by the men, were seen to start out as if struck by sudden madness and rush into the breach, which yawning and glittering with steel seemed like the mouth of a huge dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man whose feeble body would have been quite unfit for war if it had not been sustained by an unconquerable spirit, was killed; wherever his voice was heard his soldiers had gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him in falling plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not but continuing his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. Yet there was no want of gallant leaders or desperate followers until two hours passed in these vain efforts had convinced the troops the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable; and as the opening in the curtain, although less strong, was retired and the approach to it impeded by deep holes and cuts made in the ditch, the soldiers did not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their muskets they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts and aiming their shots by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked as their victims fell, ‘*Why they did not come into Badajoz?*’

In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get some shelter from the merciless shower above, and withal a sickening stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, captain Nicholas of the engineers; was observed by lieutenant Shaw of the forty-third, making incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa Maria bastion. Shaw immediately collected fifty soldiers of all regiments and joined him, and

Now major-general Shaw Kennedy.

although there was a deep cut along the foot of that breach also, it was instantly passed and these two young officers led their gallant band with a rush up the ruins; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent a concentrated fire of musketry and grape dashed nearly the whole dead to the earth: Nicholas was mortally wounded and the intrepid Shaw stood alone! With inexpressible coolness he looked at his watch, and saying it was too late to carry the breaches rejoined the masses at the other attack. After this no further effort was made at any point, and the troops remained passive but unflinching beneath the enemy's shot which streamed without intermission; for of the riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early into the ditch had joined in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross fire of grape from the distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from the explosions, and too few in number, entirely failed to quell the French musketry.

About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington, who was on a height close to the quarries, ordered the remainder to retire and re-form for a second assault; he had heard the castle was taken, but thinking the enemy would still resist in the town was resolved to assail the breaches again. This retreat from the ditch was not effected without further carnage and confusion, the French fire never slackened, a cry arose that the enemy was making a sally from the distant flanks, and there was a rush towards the ladders. Then the groans and lamentations of the wounded who could not move and expected to be slain increased, and many officers who had not heard of the order, endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back: some would even have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd.

All this time Picton was lying close in the castle, and either from fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side however the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the Parakeras, and on the right of the Guadiana the Portuguese were sharply engaged at the bridge:

thus the town was girdled with fire, for Walker's brigade, having passed on during the feint on the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente. His troops had advanced along the banks of the river and reached the French guard-house at the barrier-gate undiscovered, the ripple of the waters smothering the sound of their footsteps; but just then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, the French sentinels discovering the columns fired and the British soldiers springing forward under a sharp musketry began to hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way. The Portuguese, panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders, the others snatched them up again and forcing the barrier jumped into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, there was a *cunette* which embarrassed the column, and the ladders proved too short for the walls were generally above thirty feet high. The fire of the enemy was deadly, a small mine was sprung beneath the soldiers' feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch, and man after man dropped dead from the ladders.

Fortunately some of the defenders had been called away to aid in recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and the assailants discovering a corner of the bastion where the scarp was only twenty feet high placed three ladders there under an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion. Some men got up with difficulty, for the ladders were still too short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his comrades and drew others after him until many had won the summit; and though the French shot heavily against them from both flanks and from a house in front, their numbers augmented rapidly and half the fourth regiment entered the town itself to dislodge the French from the houses, while the others pushed along the rampart towards the breach and by dint of hard fighting successively won three bastions.

In the last of these combats Walker, leaping forward sword in hand at the moment when one of the enemy's cannoneers was discharging a gun, was covered with so many wounds it

Appendix 4,
§ 2.

was wonderful that he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out a mine! At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops who had not been stopped by the strong barrier, the deep ditch, the high walls and the deadly fire of the enemy, staggered back appalled by a chimera of their own raising; and in this disorder a French reserve under general Veillande drove on them with a firm and rapid charge, pitching some men over the walls, killing others outright, and cleansing the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There however Leith had placed colonel Nugent with a battalion of the thirty-eighth as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and slaying all before them, this battalion, two hundred strong, arose and with one close volley destroyed them; then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order once more charged along the walls towards the breaches: but the French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did not yet yield. Meanwhile the portion of the fourth regiment which had entered the town was strangely situated. For the streets were empty and brilliantly illuminated and no person was seen, yet a low buzz and whispers were heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by the Spaniards, while the troops with bugles sounding advanced towards the great square of the town. In their progress they captured several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; yet the square itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as bright with lamps: a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation, they saw only an illumination and heard only low whispering around them while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing thunder. Plainly however the fight was there raging, and hence, quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other parties entered, desultory combats took place, Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a

few hundred soldiers and entered San Christoval, which was surrendered next morning upon summons to lord Fitzroy Somerset: for that officer had with great readiness pushed through the town to the drawbridge ere the French had time to organize further resistance. But even in the moment of ruin the night before this noble governor had sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune.

Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldier's heroism. All indeed were not alike, hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence, but madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled: the wounded men were then looked to the dead disposed of!

Five thousand men and officers fell in this siege, and of these, including seven hundred Portuguese, three thousand five hundred had been stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more than seven hundred men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, the first four severely; six hundred men and officers fell in the escalade of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two thousand at the breaches, each division there losing twelve hundred! And how deadly the breach strife was may be gathered from this: the forty-third and fifty-second regiments of the light division lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the castle!

Let it be considered that this frightful carnage took place in a space of less than a hundred yards square;—that the slain died not all suddenly nor by one manner of death—that some

perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions;—that for hours this destruction was endured without shrinking and the town was won at last. Let these things be considered and it must be admitted a British army bears with it an awful power. And false would it be to say the French were feeble men, the garrison stood and fought manfully and with good discipline, behaving worthily: shame there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the British soldiers! the noble emulation of the officers! Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, of O'Hare of the ninety-fifth, who perished on the breach at the head of the stormers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service! Who shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier Appendix 4, § 2. who was killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? or the martial fury of that desperate rifleman, who, in his resolution to win thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their muskets! Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canch, or the hardiness of Ferguson of the forty-third, who having in former assaults received two deep wounds was here, his former hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the third time a volunteer the third time wounded! Nor would I be understood to select these as pre-eminent, many and signal were the other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will never be known; for in such a tumult much passes unobserved, and often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to what they saw: but no age no nation ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to lord Wellington the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER VI.

HAVING now achieved the second step in his project, the English general looked to crown this extraordinary winter campaign by fighting a great battle in Andalusia, but the misconduct of others debarred him of that glory. Ciudad Rodrigo and its repairs had been entirely neglected, and Carlos d'España's tyrannical conduct had rendered the garrison dangerously discontented; Almeida also was insecure, and Marmont had passed the Agueda. The projected march on Andalusia could not be attempted until those fortresses were succoured; yet Wellington, knowing Beira could not be immediately hurt by Marmont, lingered awhile in hopes that Soult, stung by the loss of Badajos, would risk a blow in Estremadura before the secondary operations then in activity drew him again over the Morena; Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss, but the circumstances were too grave to let his anger overbear his judgment: he was surrounded by enemies and refrained from an unequal battle. Quitting Seville the 1st he had marched by Constantino upon Llerena with part of his army, while Gazan, to impose on the allies, had moved at first by Monasterio with the remainder and the baggage, but from Santa Guillena by cross roads gained Constantino also, and thus all were concentrated the 6th at Llerena. This circuitous movement was determined by the positions of Drouet and Daricau, who having been driven back by the Cordova roads could not rally on the Monasterio side; but now all advanced to Fuentes de Overjuña, and the allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.

On the 7th Soult reached Villa Franca and his cavalry entered Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th he was in march to fight, when the horsemen sent by Phillipon met him, and at the same time his spies apprised him that Marmont

was in the north. Then he fell back to Llerena, for the allies could bring forty-five thousand men into line, and his army though strongly constituted of the best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand. He had however little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed the lower Guadiana and on the 4th seized San Lucar de Mayor, a place only ten miles from Seville, which was then garrisoned by a Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph's service and by '*escopeteros*' and convalescent men, wherefore the commandant Rignoux, after a skirmish, shut himself up in the fortified posts. The 6th the Spaniards occupied the heights in front of the Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments hoping to raise a popular commotion; but a worse danger was gathering on the other side; for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin at Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.

To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from detaching troops to Seville, Ballesteros had sent Copons with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera on the Malaga side of the Ronda, while he entered Los Barrios himself and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines of Chiclana. All the smaller partidas of the Ronda were also let loose in different directions to cut the communications, seize small magazines, and collect Spanish soldiers who at different periods had quitted their colours. Copons remained at Junquera. Ballesteros having three divisions under Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from Seville. Thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side, and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off: and the French wanted ammunition, because a large convoy, coming from Madrid with an escort of twelve hundred men, was stopped in the Morena by the partidas from the Ronda and from Murcia.

On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville, when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French interest led Ballesteros to believe Soult was close at hand, whereupon he returned to the Ronda, and next

day Penne Villemur, having received notice from Wellington that the French would soon return, also retired to Gibráleon. When Ballesteros discovered the deceit, instead of returning to Seville he assaulted the small castle of Zahara in the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss made a circuit north of Ronda, by Alcala de Pruna to Casarbonela, where he was rejoined by Copons. The marquis of Cuevas then marched against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by '*escopeteros*,' was expected to fall at once; but after two days' combat and the loss of two hundred killed and wounded the three thousand patriots retired, baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for the invaders!

When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns by roads leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora on the Guadaljore river. The centre column engaged without advantage, but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on he retired behind the Guadalmedina river close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two hundred men in passing the Guadaljore. After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was now truly at hand and his horsemen were already in the plains. He had sent Digeon's cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba to chase the partidas, and had ordered Drouet's division to take post at Fuentes Overjuña; now directing Peyreymont's cavalry upon Usagre, he came himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th hoping to surprise the Spaniards. Thus the stratagem which saved Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for Conroux was coming up upon the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very dangerous advanced post on both sides.

Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, received intelligence that Peyreymont's cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and conceived hopes of cutting it off. Anson's brigade, commanded by Frederic Ponsonby, moved therefore during the night from Villa

Franca upon Usagre, and Le Marchant's brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby's advanced guard commenced the action too soon and the French fell back before Le Marchant could intercept them; but as some heights skirting the Llerena road prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road. The numbers were about nineteen hundred sabres on each side, and Cotton, ably seizing an accidental advantage of ground, kept the enemy's attention engaged with Ponsonby's squadrons while Le Marchant, secretly passing at the back of the heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the next moment Ponsonby charged their front. They gave way and being pursued lost several officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were killed in the field; the loss of the British was fifty-six men and officers, forty-five being of the fifth dragoon guards. The French found refuge with Drouet's infantry, which had not then left Llerena but now fell back behind the Guadalquivir.

Soult was preparing to fight the allies at Seville, for he knew of Wellington's intention to invade Andalusia. He knew also the amount and disposition of his forces, and purposed to meet him coming out of the Morena with all the French army united; nor did he doubt of final success, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington's plan was, however, of necessity deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to form a temporary garrison of Badajos until some Spaniards, who had been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then confiding the repairs to Hill, who remained with two divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura, he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with great cruelty.

That marshal had desired to act with Soult in Estremadura, but the emperor's orders were imperative that he should make diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the

14th of March he ascertained that none of Wellington's divisions were on the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonnet, reinforced by Carier's brigade, was then on the Orbijo in observation of the Gallicians, Ferrier's division was at Valladolid, Foy's in the valley of the Tagus; the other five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry had passed the mountains and concentrated on the Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days' provisions, scaling-ladders, and the materials for a bridge. Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were in manifest

Appendix 5,
§ 1.

peril. Almeida, containing part of the battering-train, was very incompletely fortified, and on the first rumour of Marmont's movement Wellington

had thrown in two militia regiments with a strong detachment of British artillerymen: the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the governor Le Mesurier laboured to complete the defences.

Of the northern militia which had been called out before the allies quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred were under Lecor. But as persons liable to serve could only be enrolled by classes in rotation, the present men, with exception of Silveira's, were peasants unskilled in arms. All these officers, save Lecor whose post was at Castello Branco, had been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22nd at Lamego, where Bacellar, commanding the province, fixed his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination but his march was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen, for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an independent general.

When Trant knew Marmont's direction would be on Rodrigo, not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego, followed by Wilson, intending to take post on the lower Coa; but on the march he received Le Mesurier's despatches, which induced him to push hastily with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that structure and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel where there was a magazine; and

his movement was well-timed, for two French divisions were then driving Carlos d'Espana over the plain beyond the Coa. Marmont had come close to Rodrigo the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alten fell back from the Yeltes before him, and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending the spirit of his orders nor the real situation of affairs retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from Rodrigo, leaving all the country open to the enemy's marauding parties. Carlos d'Espana, who had eight hundred infantry, retreated to Fort Conception but the French laying a bridge at Caridad passed the Agueda and drove him from thence: he reached the Cabeça Negro with only two hundred men at the moment Trant arrived. The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, threw skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond the bridge, and escorted by some guides dressed in red uniform galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with the governor, and drawing off a few English cavalry convalescents who happened to be in the place returned at dusk. He immediately covered the Cabeça Negro with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le Mesurier sallied from the fortress and drove back the enemy's light troops. Two divisions of infantry had come to storm Almeida, but these vigorous actions stopped them and their general excused himself on the ground that Trant's presence indicated the vicinity of British troops; in this error he marched next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with two other divisions and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one division to blockade Rodrigo.

Trant now sent back the horsemen to Almeida, and to cover the magazines of Celorico marched upon Guarda where he was joined by Wilson. Silveira should also have been there, but instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th and marching to Guarda, he only crossed it on the 14th and halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry who had seen some service there were scarcely six thousand raw peasants in a position, strong if the force had been sufficient to hold the ridge of Porcas and other heights behind it, but dangerous for a small force,

because it could be turned by the right and left and the line of retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any horsemen to scout, for Baccellar, a weak old man who had never seen an enemy, was at Celorico and retained the only squadron of dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.

Trant and Wilson held their ground however with six thousand militia and six guns from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy's marauders in check. They were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the Estrella to Abrantes if the French should menace that fortress; which was not unlikely, for Marmont had moved on Sabugal, and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco when the French were at Memoa fifty miles distant, had crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and it is said was going to burn the bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every direction, ravaging the country in such a shameful manner that the whole population fled before them. The Portuguese general Lecor however, being a good soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco. He checked the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry destroyed the rest of the magazines and fell back to Sarnadas one short march on the road to Vilha Velha: next day when the French retired he followed and harassed their rear.

Trant seeing Marmont's divisions spread in search of supplies, formed the daring design of seizing him in his quarters at Sabugal, but Baccellar's procrastination fortunately delayed the execution of this enterprise which was too hardy for such troops. The distance was twenty miles, and Wellington, when Trant adverted to the magnitude of the object, keenly replied, '*In war nothing is so bad as failure and defeat;*' which would have been the case here, for in the night of the 13th when Trant would have made the attempt, Marmont having a counter design of surprising Trant was leading two brigades of infantry

and four hundred cavalry up the mountain. He cut off the outposts and was entering the streets at daybreak with his horsemen when the alarm was beaten by one drummer; and this being taken

up at hazard by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the French marshal to fall back when a brisk charge would have placed everything at his mercy; for the beating of the first drum was accidental and no troops were under arms. Trant got out of Guarda, but he had only one day's provisions and the French cavalry could gain Celorico while their infantry attacked him; wherefore he retreated, and in good order for three or four miles, but there was a wooded declivity leading to the Mondego, and while he was passing the river forty dragoons sent up by Baccellar the evening before were pressed by the French and galloped down through the rear-guard, whereupon these last seeing the enemy dismount to fire and finding the wet had damaged their own powder fled also and the French followed with hue and cry. All the officers behaved firmly and the Mondego was finally passed, yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners. Marmont might then have crossed the river on the flank of the militia and galloped into Celorico where there was nothing to defend the magazines, but he halted and permitted the disorderly rabble to gain that place. He was compassionate however, for when he found they were but poor undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them down, and no man was killed during the whole action although the horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives.

Trant's
Papers,
MSS.

Baccellar destroyed a quantity of powder at Celorico and retreated with Trant's people towards Lamego; Wilson remained at Celorico, and when the enemy drove in his outposts ordered the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia re-occupied Guarda. These secondary operations of the militia produced an undue effect at the time, and show how trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations. The English general's arrangements for the protection of Beira had been utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on one side, the rapid retreat of Alten on the other; and the French, deceived by some red uniforms and bivouac fires on the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after a few thousand undisciplined militia-men who were

yet saved by the accidental beating of a drum: it is as curious also to find a marshal of France acting personally as a partisan to surprise some undisciplined militia and yet effecting nothing. However the affair spread consternation as far as Coimbra, and alarming reports reached Wellington, whose operations it is now time to notice.

When Soult's retreat was ascertained the allied army marched towards the Tagus, and on the 11th Alten's flight becoming known he was ordered to recross that river and go back upon Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army reached that town, and the same day a militia officer, flying from Coimbra in the general panic, came to headquarters and said the enemy was master of that town; but the next hour brought Wilson's report from Guarda, and Beresford caused the unfortunate wretch whose fears led him to give the false information to be shot. At this time Brennier's division was near Rodrigo, but the remainder of the French army was concentrated, in number twenty-eight thousand, on the neighbouring ridge overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight rather than relinquish the seizure of a convoy intended for Rodrigo which he designed to cut off; but when he heard that it had taken refuge in Almeida he changed his mind, for his own situation was becoming dangerous. Almeida and the militia at Guarda were on his right flank, Rodrigo was on his rear, the Coa and Agueda behind him were swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and the flood had broken his bridge near Caridad. There remained only the Puente de Villar on the upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames was circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who could move on the chord through Rodrigo, and then his retreat could only be through the pass of Perales upon Coria. Wellington, hoping to fall on him before he could cross the Coa was moving on Pedrogoa; but the allies were not all over the Tagus and a sufficient force could not be collected before the 31st: on that day however the Agueda subsided, the French restored their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and Marmont thus terminated his operations with-

out loss. His troops were then again spread over the plains of Leon, where some of his smaller posts had been harassed by Julian Sanchez but where the Gallician army had done nothing.

Beresford now disbanded the Portuguese militia, and Wellington made great exertions to re-victual Almeida and Rodrigo, intending to leave Picton with a corps upon the Agueda and march himself against Andalusia, following his original design. The first division therefore returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy had meanwhile re-occupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had destroyed all the intermediate magazines and dispersed the means of transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government would not remedy the inconvenience either there or on the other frontier; and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as Ciudad and Almeida. In this dilemma, complying with necessity, an unmilitary and dangerous remedy was adopted. Telling the Portuguese government that on it he would throw the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas if both fortresses were not immediately re-victualled, he used the carriages and mules of the army to bring up stores to Almeida and Rodrigo, and quartered his troops at the points of water carriage. His army was therefore spread from the Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to the Mondego, on a line four hundred miles long in face of three hostile armies, the most distant only a few marches from his outposts. It was indeed scarcely possible for the French to re-assemble in masses before the ripening of the harvest; still the allied troops were dangerously disseminated, and the invasion of Andalusia which would have been such a glorious termination of the campaign was perforce abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

IN this campaign the French were too much scattered, and occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered territory than a field of operations. The armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have presented a hundred thousand men on a field of battle; yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it were of them all, and was never disturbed. This was caused partly by jealousies, partly by Napoleon's orders, which the generals could not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore neglected or executed them without vigour. Yet French writers have sought to fasten all the failures on him: it is easy to spurn the dead lion! Thus Montbrun's expedition to aid Suchet has been urged as the cause why Ciudad Rodrigo was lost. Napoleon however did not desire that his march should be held in abeyance for a week on some vague rumours, and he finally sent at precisely the wrong period; neither did he contemplate that general's idle display at Alicant after Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful as this expedition doubtless was the loss of Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the 9th of January, and the 19th Rodrigo was stormed. If he had not been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo or Talavera, eight marches from Salamanca; and as the commencement of the siege was not known until the 15th even at Valladolid, he could not have been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at this crisis of the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should have reached that city in December, whereas he did not

arrive until the middle of January. Had he been a week earlier, that is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy could not have escaped, Alicant would have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been acknowledged.

Valencia was then the most important point in the Peninsula and there was no apparent reason why Rodrigo should be in danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the errors of his own generals. Montbrun was not detached on a false principle, his march was conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating on the important point at the decisive moment: errors extraneous to the original design brought it within the principle of dissemination. The loss of Rodrigo may be directly traced to Marmont's want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison, and the Russian war which compelled the emperor to weaken the army of the north: finally to the extravagance of Joseph. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid three thousand men devoured and wasted daily the rations of twenty-two thousand; the stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Rodrigo: and if the army of the centre had been efficient Hill would have incurred great danger and Soult's power been vastly augmented. But it is not Napoleon's skill only that has been assailed by these writers. Wellington is blamed for not crushing Souham's division at Tamames between the 23rd and the 26th of January; but Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames except with cavalry scouts; he remained at Matilla, whence one forced march would have placed him behind the Tormes in safety. In such a shallow manner have the important operations of this period been treated: nor will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear examination.

'Marmont instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a phantom in Beira.' *'It was his vanity and jealousy of the duke of Dalmatia that lost Badajos.'* Such are the assertions of French and English writers. Nevertheless Marmont never anticipated success from his movement into Beira, and far from avoiding Soult he earnestly desired to co-

operate with him. Moreover this invasion of Beira was the conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains; and it is not difficult to show that the design was capacious and solid. Suppose Marmont had aided Soult, and the army of the centre had also done so. If they made any error in their combinations Wellington would have defeated them separately; if they effected their junction he would have retreated, and Badajos would have been succoured: but eighty thousand French would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains to the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and, unless they came prepared to take Elvas without any adequate object. For Wellington, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo could have repeated this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character of weakness on the French arms.

Napoleon judged better. He disliked timid operations, he desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the defensive and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo had called Hill across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad, by compelling the allies to defend it gave the French choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea. It was for Marmont to seize the occasion, but not by joining Soult who had eighty thousand excellent troops; he at the worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid, whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain. Marmont's business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position at Salamanca as a base of operations, and then keep the allies constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a general battle; meanwhile Soult could take the fortresses of the Alemtejo or draw off Hill from Wellington, who would then be inferior to Marmont and yet Hill himself would be unequal to fight Soult.

'Fix your quarters,' said the emperor, 'at Salamanca, work day and night to fortify that place—organize a new battering-

train—form magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and Almeida—harass the allies' outposts, even daily—threaten the frontier of Portugal in all directions and send parties to ravage the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and keep the bulk of your army at Toro, Zamora, Benevente and Avila, which are fertile districts, and from whence in four days you can concentrate the whole upon Salamanca:—you will thus keep the allies in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose while you prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south. Announce the approach of your new battering-train, and if Wellington marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions Soult will be able to relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your army, march straight upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun the country in various directions and be assured he will return. Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.'

If Marmont had thus conceived the war he would have commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter, written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence. Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor's orders he did nothing; had he, as this despatch recommended, commenced his operations in twenty-four hours, his advanced posts would have been near Rodrigo early in March, when the allies were, as has been shown, disseminated all over Portugal, and when only the fifth division was left upon the Coa to oppose him. The works of Almeida were then indefensible and the movement upon Badajos must have necessarily been suspended. Thus the winter season would have passed away uselessly for the allies, unless Wellington turned to attack Marmont, a difficult operation and dangerous to the Alemtejo while Soult held Badajos, for that marshal had received orders to attack Hill with twenty thousand men. Here then the errors were in the execution, the emperor's combination was evidently solid. It remains to test his second combination designed to baffle the siege of Badajos.

Marmont was so to dispose his army that he could concentrate in four days,—he was to invade Beira when Wellington crossed the Tagus,—he was to menace Oporto,—to attack Almeida,—and Coimbra was to be occupied. These operations would have brought the allies back, because the fall of Badajos could not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader; but Marmont did not reach the Agueda until the 31st March when the siege of Badajos was near its conclusion,—he did not storm Almeida nor attack Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra nor menace Oporto,—yet his feeble operations forced lord Wellington to relinquish the invasion of Andalusia and return to Beira. Again therefore the error was in the execution. And how inferior in hardihood the French general was to his adversary! Wellington with eighteen thousand men escaladed Badajos, a powerful fortress defended by an excellent governor and five thousand French veterans,—Marmont with twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm Rodrigo, although its breaches were scarcely healed and its garrison disaffected. Nor did he assail Almeida, which, hardly meriting the name of a fortress, was only occupied by three thousand militia scarcely able to handle their arms; yet in Almeida he would have found a battering-train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo and thus have balanced the campaign.

Marmont like Bessières wished to be employed in the Russian expedition, and had asked to be recalled, or that the whole northern district from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be placed under his orders. Unless that were done he said he could only calculate the operations of his own troops; the other generals would make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king's court was in open hostility to the French interest. The army of the north had in retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away everything that could be useful to him in the way of bridge or battering equipages, or of ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things. Then showing how discord was ruining the French armies he pretended that his own force, the posts of communication and watching of the Gallician

army being provided for, would not furnish more than thirty-four thousand men; but the imperial muster-rolls on the 1st of March show sixty thousand fighting men present with the eagles. He also stated the allies as sixty thousand strong, well provided and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of that army give but fifty-two thousand men including Hill's corps; thirty-five thousand only could have passed the Agueda, and their penury of means prevented them from even holding together on the northern frontier: in like manner he assumed that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda when the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than six hundred cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont from dislike to the war or natural want of vigour was not equal to his task, and his diversion begun too late and executed without energy could have little effect upon the siege of Badajos: his first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult and retaining the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo would have been better.

It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of: the secret of its inactivity is to be found in Marmont's letter. Everything at Madrid was confusion intrigue waste and want of discipline: the union of court and army was ruinous. Not so at Seville where the hand of an able general, an indefatigable administrator, may be traced, and the unravelling of those intricate combinations which produced a seeming want of vigour in Soult will furnish at once his apology and the eulogium of Wellington. The army of the south, powerful on paper, did not furnish a just proportion for the field, because most of the reinforcements though borne on the rolls were retained by the generals in the northern military governments. Soult had sixty-seven thousand French and six thousand 'escopeteros' present under arms in September; but then followed the surprise of Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the operations of Hill in December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the number of men and occasioned fresh arrangements on different points. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia as in all other parts; the inhabitants

fed on herbs, the soldiers had only half rations of bread; and neither reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor clothes, had come from France or from Madrid for a long period. It was in this state Soult received orders to send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. But his Polish troops, the skeletons of regiments, and the picked men for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand, after halting at Despeñas Peros while Suchet was before Valencia were then marching to France: Ballesteros also came with twelve thousand men to the Ronda and his detachments defeated Maransin at Cartama, which occasioned another change in the French dispositions. Moreover Suchet's successes increased Soult's difficulties. The fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army, and hence fifteen thousand men, including the garrisons of Carthage and Alicant, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada where during the expedition to Estremadura the French had only three battalions and some cavalry.

By these drains the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be excluded, reduced to forty-eight thousand French sabres and bayonets when its enemies were augmented by twenty-five thousand fresh men. Soult had indeed, besides this force, five thousand artillerymen and other attendant troops, and six thousand *escopeteros* capable of taking the field, while thirty thousand civic guards held his fortified posts; but he was compelled to reduce his garrisons and even the camp before the Isla to the lowest numbers consistent with safety, ere he could bring twenty-four thousand French into the field for the succour of Badajos, and even then he nearly lost Seville. These difficulties kept him from the Alemtejo in March when his presence would have delayed the siege until a battle was fought; but he had then no fear for the fortress because Marmont on the 22nd of February and Foy on the 28th had announced, that if Badajos were menaced, three divisions of the army of Portugal then in the valley of the Tagus would enter Estremadura,—and these divisions united to Daricau's and Drouet's troops would have formed an army of thirty thousand men, sufficient to delay the siege. But Marmont, having subsequently received orders to move into Beira passed

the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were intercepted or carelessly delayed it was not until the 8th of April Soult knew of his departure for Salamanca.

Wellington's operations were however so very rapidly pushed that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No general could suspect the Picurina would be taken by storm without being battered; still less that Badajos with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, its celebrated governor, could be carried before the counterscarp was blown in or the fire of the place ruined. In fine, the surpassing resolution and surpassing fortune of the British general and his troops could not be divined; moreover as the French use no iron ordnance in a siege Soult's calculations were based on the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively slow: with brass guns the breaches would have required three days more. The fall of Badajos may therefore be traced to the Russian war which drew fifteen thousand men from the army of the south,—to the irresolution of Marmont, who followed neither the emperor's plan nor his own,—to the too great extent of country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed,—principally to the prompt vigour of the English general and his overstepping the rules of art: the siege therefore was not, as has been said, a great slaughter for a small affair, it was not the fate of Badajos but that of the Peninsula which was decided on that night of blood. Here the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down in his letter to Joseph just before the battle of Talavera, should not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine, of everything save Seville and the camp before the Isla. If beaten from Andalusia he could have fallen back on Suchet and thus presented a head of invasion stronger than before, while Marmont renewed the fight in Estremadura. Such a chequered game, Wellington's political situation in England and Portugal considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the British troops remaining in the latter country.

That fortune aided the English general is true, but it was in the manner she favours the pilot, who watching every

changing wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose. Ascertaining with great pains the situation of each adversary, he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare and with a nice hand adapted his measures to the successive exigencies of the moment. The army of the centre where disorder was paramount he disregarded; Marmont whose temperament was hasty he deceived by affected slowness; Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice he induced the duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant quarters when they should have been concentrated, and each time he gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo; again when to obviate the difficulties raised by the Portuguese government he spread his own troops that he might feed and clothe them on their march to the Alemtejo: this he could not have done if the French had been concentrated, neither could he have so well concealed that march from the enemy. In Estremadura he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult, from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition hard to resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes and therefore furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time. And then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege that even his enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been censured for over-caution was now dreaded as over-daring!

His daring was however in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions multiplied as his enterprises augmented. Marmont's divisions in the valley of the Tagus could by moving on Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; but Wellington, with forecast of such an event, designed that Hill should make a forced march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have compelled the French to move by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura. This skilful stroke was balked by the never-ceasing misconduct of the Portuguese government with respect to transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill's enterprise were thus stopped at Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced, because Marmont was still ignorant of the allies' march and had made no change in his extended quarters

indicating a design to aid Soult: Hill also drove Drouet back towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida intercepted the line of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in the enemy's papers: 'So calculated,' said Soult, 'was this siege, that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of operations and the irresolution of Marmont.'

Soult, 1812,
intercepted,
MSS.

Nor when the latter was in Beira and Almeida and Rodrigo were endangered did the delay in Estremadura spring from rashness, there was good ground for believing Rodrigo would not be attacked. For Wellington had sent Colquhoun Grant a celebrated scouting officer to watch Marmont, and that gentleman in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius and both so tempered by discretion it is hard to say which quality predominated, very rapidly executed his mission. Attended by Leon a Spanish peasant of fidelity and quickness of apprehension who had been his companion on many occasions of the same nature, he arrived in the Salamancan district, passed the Tormes in the night, and remained in uniform, for he never assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp. He obtained exact information of Marmont's object and more especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling-ladders, notes of which he sent to head-quarters from hour to hour by Spanish agents. On the third night some peasants brought him a general order addressed to the French regiments, saying the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments the soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army. Nothing daunted, he consulted with the peasants and before daylight next morning entered the village of Huerta close to a ford on the Tormes and six miles from Salamanca. A battalion was in Huerta, and beyond the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of which constantly patrolled backward and forward for the space of three hundred yards meeting always at the ford. When day broke the French assembled on their alarm-post,

and at that moment Grant was secretly brought opposite the ford, he and his horse being hidden by the gable of a house from the infantry while the peasants standing on loose stones and spreading their large cloaks covered him from the cavalry. There he calmly waited until the videttes were separated the full extent of their beat, when he dashed through the ford between them and receiving their fire without damage reached a wood where the pursuit was baffled: Leon being in his native dress met with no interruption and soon rejoined him.

He had before this ascertained that means to storm Rodrigo were prepared, and the French officers openly talked of that operation; but to test that project, to ascertain Marmont's real force, and to discover if he was not really going by Perales to the Tagus, Grant now placed himself on a wooded hill near Tamames where the road branched off to Perales and to Rodrigo. There lying perdue until the French passed by in march he noted every battalion and gun, and finding all moved towards Rodrigo he entered Tamames and discovered they had left the greatest part of their scaling-ladders behind, thus showing the intention to storm was not real: this it was which allayed Wellington's fears for that fortress.

When Marmont passed the Coa in this expedition, Grant preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high ridge or rather succession of ridges, by a pass at the lower mouth of which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass this persevering officer placed himself, thinking the dwarf oaks with which the hills were covered would effectually secure him from discovery; but from the higher ridge the French detected his movements with their glasses: and Leon, whose lynx-eyes were always on the watch, soon called out, '*the French! the French!*' and pointed to the rear whence some dragoons came galloping up. Grant and his follower darted into the wood for a little space and then suddenly wheeling rode off in a different direction, but at every turn new enemies appeared, and at last the hunted men dismounting fled on foot through the thickest of the low oaks until they were

again met by infantry detached in small parties down the sides of the pass and directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers' hats on the ridge above.

Leon fell exhausted and the barbarians who first came up killed him in despite of his companion's entreaties. Grant they carried without injury to Marmont, who with apparent kindness invited him to dinner. The conversation turned upon the prisoner's exploits, and the French marshal said that he had been long on the watch, knew all his haunts, his disguises, and that only the night before he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other adventures which had not happened, for this Grant never used any disguise. But there was another Grant, also remarkable in his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters using all manner of disguises, and the similarity of names caused the actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative for Marmont's subsequent conduct. Treating his prisoner with apparent kindness, he exacted from him an especial parole that he would not consent to be released by the partidas while on his journey through Spain to France: this secured his captive, for Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief who should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole was a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont sent a letter with the escort to the governor of Bayonne, in which, still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he designated his captive as a dangerous spy who had done infinite mischief to the French army, and whom he had not executed on the spot out of respect to something resembling an uniform which he wore: but he desired that at Bayonne he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris.

This proceeding was too little in accord with French honour to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was passed, Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne in ordinary cases was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities and receive a passport to travel to Verdun, which was duly accomplished; the delivery of the fatal letter being by certain means delayed. Grant then with sagacious boldness resolved

not to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking he would naturally be pursued in that direction; he thought if the governor of Bayonne did not recapture him at once, he would for his own security suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought of; wherefore on the instant he inquired at the hotels if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding that Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he boldly introduced himself and asked permission to join his party. The other readily assented, and while traveling, he very often rallied his companion about his adventures, little thinking he was then an instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and adroit of them all.

In passing through Orleans, Grant by a species of intuition discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation to another secret agent in Paris whose assistance would be necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont's double dealing and the expressed design to take away his life as equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom he obtained money, and by his advice avoided appearing before the police to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a very public street, frequented the coffee-houses and visited the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been long established and was intimately connected with the police, had ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot.

When some weeks had elapsed, the agent told him a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck, an American who had died suddenly on the day it was to have been claimed. Boldly demanding this passport he departed for the mouth of the Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to expect more assistance there than at any other port. There however new difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his surprising talent which fortune seemed to delight in aiding. He took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its departure being unexpectedly delayed he frankly explained his true situation to the captain.

who desired him to assume the character of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor's dress and forty dollars sent him to lodge the money in the American consul's hands as a pledge that he would prosecute the captain for ill-usage when he reached the United States. This being the custom on such occasions the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship. Thus provided he prevailed upon a boatman by a promise of ten Napoleons, to row him in the night towards a small island, where English vessels watered unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and traffic without interruption. The boat sailed, the masts of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman from fear or malice suddenly returned to port. Some men would then have striven in desperation to force fortune and so have perished,—the spirits of others would have sunk in despair, for the money promised was all he had, and the boatman notwithstanding his breach of contract demanded the whole: with inexpressible coolness and resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon and a rebuke for his misconduct—he threatened reference to the police but was no match in subtlety for his opponent, who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the escape of a prisoner of war and would adduce the great price of his boat as a proof of his guilt!

A few days after Grant engaged an old fisherman who faithfully performed his bargain, but there were no English vessels near the island; however the fisherman cast his nets and caught some fish with which he sailed towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her and were steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to and a boat with soldiers put off to board them. The fisherman called Grant his son, and the soldiers were only sent to warn them not to pass the battery because the English vessel they were in search of was on the coast. The old man, expecting this, bribed the soldiers with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could

always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed, he was desired to wait under the battery till night and then depart; but under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel he made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when darkness fell he run her straight on board and the intrepid Grant stood in safety on the quarter-deck.

When he reached England he obtained permission to choose a French officer of equal rank with himself to send to France, that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape. Great was his astonishment to find in the first prison he visited the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services; but Grant's generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities of his understanding; he soon obtained their release, sent them with a sum of money to France, returned to the Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont's army! Other strange incidents of his life could be told, were it not more fitting to quit a digression already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass unnoticed this adventure of that generous, spirited, and gentle-minded man, who having served his country nobly and ably in every climate died not long since exhausted by the continual hardships he had endured.

Having shown the prudence of Wellington with respect to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence that not skill but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone. A scientific examination would be misplaced in a general history, but to notice leading points involving the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the line of attack, justified by the English engineers as that requiring least expenditure of means and time, has by the French engineers been censured. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because it had neither ravelin nor

ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks, and offered no facility of retrenching behind it: a view confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak points, did for many days think it was the true object of the allies' approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more interesting question, when he says Badajos might have been taken by escalade and storm the first night of the siege with less difficulty than on the 7th of April. Then, he says, the defences were not so complete, the garrison was less prepared, and surprise would have availed somewhat,—whereas at the second period the breaches were the strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained by the besiegers the chances were in favour of the first period.

This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs not to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable has indeed been denied by some of the English engineers. Colonel Jones says the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment, and the sword-blades in the Trinidad might have been overturned by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is at variance with that of the officers and men engaged, and it is certain that all the breaches were protected by sword-blades; if the centre breach was not retrenched

Appendix 4,
§ 2.

it was rendered very difficult of approach by the deep holes dug in front, and it was more powerfully swept by flank-fire than the others were. It is also a mistake to suppose no dense rush was made at the great breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless where the bullet strikes the man will fall; the sword-blades were fitted into ponderous beams, and these last, chained together, were let deep into the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag or push them from their places, when behind them stood resolute combatants whose fire swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear, because from the slope of the breach they could only see their own comrades in the front; and then the dead bodies, and

the struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks rendered a simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable!

And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter when the application of a just science would have rendered the operation comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. Expatiating in their schools and colleges upon Roman discipline and Roman valour they are heedless of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient republic to be free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their military system as a thing incompatible with a constitution which they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war England has to seek in blood the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like the fiend's progress toward Eden her conquering course is through chaos followed by death! But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for Wellington's merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the works, the choice of the points of attack, are matters within the province of the engineer. The value and importance of the place to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation of the resources from whence the means of attack are to be drawn, these are in the province of the general. With him rests the choice of shortening the scientific process, the judging how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to valour and discipline, how much to his own genius for seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time, or of conjuncture, to accelerate the gain of his object.

All armies come to a siege with great advantages. For first the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants,

they are few against a many, are on the defensive, are an excised portion of their own army, and are without news which damps the fiery spirit: they are compelled to await their adversary's time and attack, their losses seem more numerous in proportion to their forces, because they are more concentrated, and the wounded are not safe even in the hospitals,—and as none can hope to maintain a fortress eventually without the aid of a succouring army their ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel more assured of their object, have hope of profit and a secure retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their own sufferings. The number of guns and quantity of ammunition in a fortress are daily diminished; the besiegers' means, originally calculated to overpower the other, may be increased: time and materials are therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the defence depends on the attack, which may be varied while the other is fixed. Finally the firmness and skill of the defence generally depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers amongst the besiegers are capable of conducting the attack; and the general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely as the chief of an army to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a simple governor. It follows then that fortresses must fall if the besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art; and when no succouring army is nigh the time necessary to reduce any place may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules cannot be attended to, when everything is irregular and doubtful, when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the greatness of the exigency and the energy with which he acts.

Wellington's object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete. A few hours' delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would again have been foiled! ay! but this is war, always dangerous and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel

and armed with scythes. Was the object worth the risk—did its gain compensate the loss of men—was it boldly, greatly acquired? These are the true questions and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to Portugal; he was forming such great establishments, and contriving such plans as would if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him to hold the Peninsula alone should the French armies fail in all other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of the patriots whom discontent or weakness of mind or corruption might induce to seek a plausible excuse for joining the invaders; and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the important points of Leon and Old Castille. The great army which the emperor was carrying to Russia might or might not be successful, but this was the only moment when an offensive war against his army in Spain could have been carried on with success: and how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted while Badajos remained in the enemy's possession? If Wellington had advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would also have acted on his left flank or have retaken Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult it must have been by the lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal coming down to Badajos could have either operated against the rear of the allies or against Lisbon.

Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take it? By regular or by irregular operations? For the first a certain time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it was not to be expected the enemy would allow. What then would have been the result if thus year after year the allies showed they were unable even to

give battle to their enemies, much less to chase them from the Peninsula. How was it to be expected that England would bear the expense of a protracted warfare affording no hope of final success? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in Parliament? How were the secret-hopes of the continental governments to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then was Wellington's only resource. To strike without regard to rules, trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general who had undertaken on his own judgment to fight the battle of the Peninsula? Was he to give force to the light declamation of the hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British further into Spain! Was he to place the probable loss of a few thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and by declining the chance offered show that he despaired of success himself? What if he failed? he would not have been, save the loss of a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked: in either case he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of England!

BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE English cabinet neither understood nor duly appreciated the importance of Wellington's winter campaign; but the French saw with anxiety that he had snapped the chain binding him to Lisbon and acquired new military bases on the Guadiana and the Agueda; that he could choose his field of battle and Spain would soon feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers seeing only the enemy desired to be led forward, but their general had still to encounter political obstacles. In Spain the leading men, occupied with personal intrigues pernicious projects for the reduction of their revolted colonies and their new constitution, neglected the war at home. In Portugal and the Brazils a jealous opposition to the English general kept pace with his successes. In England, the cabinet, swayed by Perceval's narrow policy, vacillated between a desire to conquer and a fear of expense. The Whigs, greedy of office and dexterous in parliamentary politics, deafened the country with their clamour; the public, deceived as to the nature of the contest wondered how the French kept the field, and with the ministers still doubted whether their general was a great man or an impostor. Lord Wellesley's resignation and the consequent predominance of the Perceval faction left small hope of a successful termination to the war; but Wellington had studiously avoided political intrigue and his brother's retirement did not affect his personal position: he was still the general of England, undegraded by factious ties, responsible to his country only for his actions. The ministers might, he said, relinquish or continue the struggle, supply his wants, or defraud the hopes of the nation by timorous economy, his efforts must be proportioned

to his means; if they were great so would be his enterprises; but he felt assured the people of England would not endure to forego triumph for a niggard parsimony. It was in this temper he had besieged Badajos, and soon afterwards political affairs in England assumed a new form.

Lord Wellesley openly denounced Perceval's mismanagement of the war, the public mind was unsettled, and the prince regent, his year of restrictions having expired, invited the Whigs to join in a new administration. But the heads of that faction would not share place with Perceval, and he, master of the secrets relating to the detestable persecution of the princess of Wales, could not be removed. On the 11th of May he was however killed in the House of Commons, and that horrible crime was politically no misfortune to England or the Peninsula. Fresh negotiations upon a more enlarged scheme of policy were then commenced, but personal interests again prevailed. Lord Liverpool would not unite with lord Wellesley; the Grey and Grenville faction would not serve their country without having the disposal of all the household offices; lord Moira, judging a discourtesy to the prince regent too high a price to pay for their adhesion refused that condition, and the materials of a new cabinet being drawn from the dregs of the Tory faction lord Liverpool became prime minister. It was unfortunate that lord Wellesley's vigorous talent should have been rejected for lord Liverpool's mediocrity, but this remnant of a party, too weak to domineer, proved less mischievous with respect to the Peninsula than the preceding governments. There was no personal interest opposed to Wellington, and the military policy of the cabinet yielding by degrees to the attraction of his ascending genius was finally absorbed in its meridian splendour. Many practical improvements had also been growing up in the official departments, especially in that of war and colonies, where sir Henry Bunbury, the under-secretary, an able officer experienced in the wants of an army on service, had reformed the incredible disorders which pervaded that department during the first years of the contest. The result of the political crisis was therefore comparatively favourable to the Peninsula contest, the story of which shall now be resumed

If Wellington, pursuing his own views, had overthrown Soult on the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have ranked amongst the most hardy and glorious that ever graced a general; and it is no slight proof of the uncertainty of war, that combinations so extensive and judicious should have been marred by the negligence of a few secondary authorities at points distant from the immediate scenes of action. He had indeed under-estimated the force opposed to him both in the north and south; but the bravery of his troops and the moral power of recent success would have borne that error. And his profound judgment was manifested in the foresight with which he examined and provided for every contingency, although his calculations, embracing the whole system in the Peninsula, were necessarily dependent upon the ill-judged operations and the negligent concert of men over whom he had little influence: all his successes were snatched from the midst of conflicting political difficulties, as gems brought up from the turbulence of a whirlpool. Thus when Castaños, captain-general of Galicia as well as of Estremadura, went to the latter province after the recapture of Rodrigo, Wellington advised him on all the probable movements of the enemy during the siege of Badajos. Marmont, he told him might march into Estremadura with or without the divisions of Souham and Bonnet. In either case Abadia should enter Leon, and according to his means attack Astorga, Benevente, Zamora, and the other posts fortified by the enemy there; and Carlos d'España, Sanchez, Saornil, in fine all the partidas of Castille and the Asturias, even Mendizabel, who was then in the Montaña St. Ander, should come to Abadia's assistance. He promised that the Portuguese cavalry under Silveira and Baccellar should pass the Spanish frontier, and showed that twenty-five thousand men could thus be put in motion on Marmont's rear, and a powerful diversion effected in aid of the siege of Badajos and the invasion of Andalusia. Then he considered the case of Galicia being invaded by five divisions of the army of Portugal, while the three other divisions and the cavalry then in the valley of the Tagus and about Bejar acted in concert with Soult. To help Abadia against that attack, Baccellar and

Silveira had orders to harass the left flank and rear of the French with infantry and cavalry as much as the nature of the case would admit, regard being had to the safety of their raw militia, and to their connexion with the right flank of the Gallician army, whose retreat was to be by Orense. But the French instead of falling on Galicia might invade Portugal north of the Douro. Abadia was then to harass their right flank and rear while the Portuguese opposed them in front: and whether they fell on Galicia, Portugal or Estremadura, Carlos d'España and the partidas and Mendizabel would have an open field in Leon and Castille.

Lastly, the operation which really happened was considered, and to meet it Wellington's arrangements were, as we have seen, calculated to cover the magazines on the Douro and the Mondego; and to force the enemy on to the barren difficult line of country leading toward Castello Branco, while Abadia and the guerilla chiefs entered Castille and Leon on his rear. Carlos d'España had also been ordered to break down the bridges on the Yeltes and the Huebra in front of Rodrigo, and that of Barba de Puerco on the Agueda. Marmont would thus have been delayed two days, and the magazines both at Castello Branco and Celorico saved by the near approach of the allied army, but España did none of these things, neither did Abadia nor Mendizabel operate so as to be felt; and their remissness, coupled with the other faults noticed, marred Wellington's defensive arrangements and brought him back to fight Marmont. When that general passed the Agueda in retreat, the allies in default of the provisions so foolishly sacrificed at Castello Branco could not follow, and the distant magazines on the Douro and Mondego were the only resources. Then also Rodrigo and Almeida were found unprovided, and ere they could be furnished and the intermediate magazines on the communications restored it was too late to invade Andalusia. For as the harvest ripens there early in June, and a fortnight later in Estremadura, Marmont could have followed march by march; and Napoleon had repeatedly told him that he had only to watch Wellington, because a temporary absence from Castille was of little consequence while the army of the north guarded the com-

munication with France. Thus the greater means and better arrangements for supply would have been lost for the allies, and the discontent of the Rodrigo garrison and the approach of a new battering-train from France made it dangerous to move far from that fortress. Moreover Castaños like his predecessors failed to bring the Gallician army into activity, and again painfully proved that no aid would come from that quarter.

Wellington, yielding to necessity, then revolved other projects. The harvest north of the Gredos and Gata mountains being much later than in Estremadura and Andalusia, would preserve his commissariat superiority in the field longest there; and a decisive blow given to Marmont would certainly relieve Andalusia, because Madrid would then fall, and Soult, cut off from the great communication with France, would fear to remain. Hence to force a battle upon Marmont became the object of the moment, and it might be effected by a vigorous invasion of Castille; but a happy result depended on the relative skill of the generals and the numbers and goodness of the troops. Marmont's reputation was great, yet hitherto the essays had been in favour of the Englishman's talents. The British infantry was excellent, the cavalry well horsed and more numerous than it had ever been; the French cavalry had been greatly reduced by drafts for the Russian contest, by the separation of the army of the north from that of Portugal, and by frequent and harassing marches. Marmont could indeed obtain horsemen from the army of the centre and the army of the north; but his own were weak and his artillery badly horsed, whereas the allies' guns were powerfully equipped. Every man in the British army expected victory, and this was the time to seek it, because, without pitched battles the French could never be dispossessed of Spain, and they were now comparatively weaker than they had yet been or were expected to be; for such was the influence of Napoleon's stupendous genius, that his complete success in Russia and return to the Peninsula with overwhelming forces was not doubted even by the British commander. The time and chances were therefore propitious, and it was only necessary to combine the primary and secondary operations so as to isolate Marmont





SURPRISE
of
ALMARAZ,
May, 1812.

Action Enlarged, see

long enough to force a battle. If that result was not obtained, there would still be a gain, because the march of the other generals to his aid would relieve many places and give the Spaniards opportunities to act, which was always the basis of Wellington's plans: in fine, while he had Portugal as a stronghold for retreat any offensive movement beyond her frontier could not fail to hurt the French.

To effect this isolation of Marmont's army the first condition was to be early in the field as the rainy season would permit, and before the coming harvest enabled the other French armies to move. But Marmont could avail himself in succession of the Tormes and the Douro to protract the campaign until the ripening of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join him; and hence the security of the allies' flanks and rear during the operations, and of their retreat if overpowered, was to be previously looked to. Soult might attack Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across the Tagus, which in conjunction with the army of the centre, now directed by Jourdan, could advance upon Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Boats and magazines supplied from Toledo and Madrid were already being collected at the fort of Lugar Nueva near Almaraz, and from thence as from a place of arms the French could move upon Coria, Plasencia, and Castello Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, while detachments from the army of the north reinforced the army of Portugal. But to obviate this last danger Wellington planned one of those enterprises which are regarded with astonishment when achieved, and attributed to madness when they fail.

SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ.

It has been before stated that the left bank of the Tagus from Toledo to Almaraz is lined with rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable for an army, are difficult even for small divisions;—that from Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal the country is more open, yet still difficult, and the Tagus only to be crossed at certain points to which bad roads leading through mountains descended. But from

Almaraz to Alcantara all the bridges had been long ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value because of the mountains. Soult's pontoon equipage had been taken in Badajos, and the French had therefore no passage over the Tagus from Toledo to Portugal save by Marmont's boat-bridge at Almaraz, which was protected by three forts and a bridge-head. One of those forts, called Ragusa, was a magazine, and though not finished was very strong, being flanked with a field work and having within it a loopholed stone tower twenty-five feet high. On the south side of the Tagus the bridge had a fortified head of masonry, flanked by a redoubt called Fort Napoleon, placed on a height in advance. This fort, imperfectly constructed inasmuch as a wide berm in the middle of the scarp enabled escalading troops to land and refix their ladders, was strong, having a second interior defence with a loopholed stone tower, ditch, drawbridge, and palisades.

These works, armed with eighteen guns and garrisoned with a thousand men, insured command of the river; but the mountains on the left bank precluded the passage of an army towards lower Estremadura save by the royal road to Truxillo, which, five miles from the river, passed over the rugged Mirabete ridge, on the summit of which other works were drawn across the throat of the pass. There was also a large fortified house connected by smaller posts with the ancient watch-tower of Mirabete, which itself contained eight guns and was surrounded by a rampart twelve feet high. If all these fortifications and the Roman road of the Puerto de Pico, which was being repaired, had been completed, the communication between Soult and Marmont although circuitous would have been secure. Wellington fearing this, had as before related, arranged a fine enterprise, with design to surprise them previous to the siege of Badajos: he was then thwarted by the Portuguese government, but now directed Hill to attempt it with a force of six thousand men, including four hundred cavalry, two field batteries, six iron twenty-four pound howitzers, and a pontoon train. The affair was now however one of extreme delicacy. When the army was round

Badajos the resistance of the forts only was to be cared for. At this time Foy's division was in the valley of the Tagus—D'Armagnac occupied Talavera with troops from the army of the centre—Drouet had eight thousand infantry at Hinojosa de Cordoba, and his cavalry was on the road to Medellin; he was consequently nearer to Merida than Hill was to Almaraz and might easily intercept his retreat. Soult also could detach a force from Seville, by St. Ollala, against sir William Erskine, who was with the cavalry and the remainder of Hill's infantry near Almendralejos.

Joseph's Correspondence,
MSS.

Wellington having considered these points sent Graham to Portalegre with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton's cavalry, and thus, including Erskine's corps, twenty thousand men were ready to protect Hill; but Drouet might still interpose between him and Erskine and beat them in detail before Graham could come up, wherefore other combinations were made. First: The moment for action was chosen when Soult, having sent detachments in various directions to restore his communications in Andalusia, had marched himself with a division to Cadiz. Secondly: Rumours adroitly spread, and demonstrations with the Portuguese militia of the Alemtejo, caused the French to believe ten thousand men were moving down the Guadiana towards the Niebla, preparatory to the invasion of Andalusia, a notion upheld by the force under Graham,—by cavalry parties being pushed towards the Morena,—by restoring the bridge at Merida, with the avowed intention of sending Hill's battering and pontoon train to Almendralejos,—and by covering the Cordoba roads with exploring officers, who made ostentatious inquiries as to the French posts on that side of Andalusia.

An unexpected difficulty occurred at Merida. Two arches of the bridge had been broken, the opening was sixty feet and large timber was scarce; Hill's march was thus dangerously delayed a fortnight. On the 12th of May however he crossed the Guadiana and received his pontoons and heavy howitzers, which came from Elvas by the Montijo road, and it was a large convoy; for fifty country carts besides the guns and limber carriages were used for the pontoons, ladders,

and ammunition. The 15th he reached Truxillo. Meanwhile to mislead the French the partidas of the Guadalupe mountains came down to different points between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if seeking for a place to cast a bridge that Hill might unite with Wellington in the north. Foy's spies gave him timely and true notice that Hill had crossed the Guadiana, but they also told him, and he believed

Foy's Report,
MSS.

them, that general had fifteen thousand men, and that two brigades of cavalry followed: one report even raised his force to thirty thousand.

On the 16th, Hill having reached Jaraicejo formed three columns and made a night march, intending to surprise simultaneously the tower of Mirabete, the fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of Almaraz. His left column directed against the tower was under general Chowne,—the centre, having the dragoons and artillery, moved by the royal road under general Long,—the right, composed of the fiftieth, seventy-first, and ninety-second regiments under Hill in person, was to penetrate by the narrow and difficult way of La Cueva and Roman Gordo to the bridge. Day broke before the columns reached their destination and all hopes of surprise were extinguished. This untoward beginning was unavoidable on the part of the right and centre column, but if Chowne had not been negligent he might have carried the castle of Mirabete before daylight.

An attentive examination convinced Hill that to reduce all the Mirabete works he must incur more loss than was justifiable, and finish in such plight that he could not afterwards take the forts at the bridge, the chief objects of his expedition: yet it was only through the pass of Mirabete that the artillery could move against the bridge. In this dilemma, after losing the 17th and part of the 18th in fruitless attempts to discover some opening through which to reach the valley of Almaraz with his guns, he resolved to leave them on the sierra with the centre column, make a false attack on the tower with Chowne's force, and secretly march himself by Roman Gordo to storm the other forts defended by eighteen guns and powerful garrisons! This resolution was more hardy than it would appear without reference to the general state

of affairs. For his march had been secret and amidst various divisions of the enemy, and he was four days' journey from Merida, his first point of retreat,—he expected Drouet would be reinforced and advance towards Medellin, and hence, defeated or victorious at Almaraz, his own retreat would be difficult,—exceedingly so if defeated, because his British troops could not be repulsed with a small loss, and he should have to fall back through a difficult country, with soldiers dispirited by failure and burthened with wounded men. Then harassed in flank by Drouet, pursued by Foy and D'Armagnac, he would have been exposed to misfortunes, and every slanderous tongue would have been let loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable forts: a military career hitherto so glorious might thus have terminated in shame, but totally devoid of interested ambition Hill was unshaken.

The troops remained concealed in their position until the evening of the 18th, and then the general, reinforcing his own column with the sixth Portuguese regiment a company of the sixtieth rifles and the artillerymen of the centre column, commenced the difficult descent of the valley. He designed to storm Fort Napoleon before daylight and the march was less than six miles, but the leading troops only arrived a little before daylight and it was doubtful if the scaling-ladders, which had been cut in halves to thread the short narrow turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an assault. Fortunately some small hills concealed the head of the column, and at that moment Chowne commenced the false attack on the castle of Mirabete. Pillars of white smoke rose on the lofty brow of the sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came rolling over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon crowding on the ramparts were anxiously gazing at these portentous signs of war, when, quick and loud, a British shout broke on their ears and the fiftieth regiment, aided by a wing of the seventy-first, came bounding over the nearest hills.

Surprised the French were to see an enemy so close while the Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepared, for a patrol of English cavalry had been seen from the fort on the 17th in the pass of Roman Gordo; and in the evening

of the 18th a woman of that village had carried exact information of Hill's numbers and intentions to Lugar Nueva. This intelligence had caused the commandant Aubert to march in the night with reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore defended by six companies, including the thirty-ninth French and the voltigeurs of a foreign regiment. Being ready to fight, when the first shout was heard they turned their heads and with a heavy fire of musketry and artillery smote the assailants in front, while the guns of Fort Ragusa took them in flank from the opposite side of the river; yet a rise of ground only twenty yards from the ramparts soon covered the British from the front fire and general Howard leading the foremost troops into the ditch commenced the escalade. The great breadth of the berm kept off the ends of the shortened ladders from the parapet, but the soldiers who first ascended jumped on to the berm itself and drawing up the ladders planted them there, then with a second escalade they forced their way over the rampart, when, closely fighting, friends and enemies went together into the retrenchment round the stone tower. Aubert was wounded and taken, the tower was not defended and the garrison fled towards the bridge-head, but the victorious troops would not be shaken off, they entered that work also in one confused mass with the fugitives who continued their flight over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their headlong charge slaying the hindmost, and they would have passed the river if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from the forts which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the English artillerymen had turned the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa.

Many of the French leaped into the water and were drowned, the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors the panic spread to the other side of the river; the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that fort also and fled with the others along the road to Naval Moral. Some grenadiers of the ninety-second, swimming over, brought back several boats with which the bridge was restored and Fort Ragusa also was won. The towers and other works were destroyed, the stores,

ammunition, provisions, and boats burned, and in the night the troops returned to the sierra above, carrying with them the colours of the foreign regiment and two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen other officers. The victors lost one hundred and eighty men, an officer of artillery was killed by his own mine after the action, and captain Candler, a brave man, fell at the head of the fiftieth grenadiers on the rampart of Fort Napoleon. Hill's first intention was to have directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, assailing both works together; but when the difficulties of the road marred that project he fell on the nearest work with the leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This promptness was an essential cause of success, for Foy, hearing on the 17th that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered D'Armagnac to reinforce Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at Naval Moral the 18th might have entered Fort Ragusa Foy's Report, MSS. early in the morning of the 19th; it did not however move until eleven o'clock, and then meeting the fugitives on the road caught the panic and returned.

Mirabete being now cut off from the right bank of the Tagus Hill was preparing to reduce it with his heavy artillery, when a report from Erskine caused him in conformity with his instructions to commence a retreat on Merida, leaving Mirabete blockaded by the partidas of the neighbourhood. Soult while at Chielana had heard of the expedition the 19th, yet only desired Drouet to make a diversion in Estremadura without losing his communication with Andalusia; for the object of the enterprise escaped him, and thinking he had only to check a movement which the king told him was made for the purpose of joining Wellington resolved to enforce Hill's stay in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his detachments from the Niebla where they had just dispersed a body of Spaniards at Castillejos, and then forming a large division at Seville purposed to strengthen Drouet and enable him to fight a battle. But that general anticipating his orders had pushed an advanced guard of four thousand men to Don Benito the 17th, and his cavalry patrols passing the Guadiana on the 18th had scoured the

roads to Miajadas and Merida, while Lallemand's dragoons drove back the British outposts on the side of Zafra.

Confused by these demonstrations Erskine reported to Graham and to Hill that Soult was in Estremadura with his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to Badajos and Hill retired from Mirabete. On the 26th he reached Merida unmolested, and then Drouet withdrew his advanced guards and Graham returned to Castello de Vide. Notwithstanding this error Wellington's precautions had succeeded, for if Drouet had known Hill's real object he would with the whole of his troops, more than ten thousand, have marched rapidly from Medellin to fall upon him as he came out of the passes of Truxillo, and before Erskine or Graham could come to his aid; whereas, supposing he meant to cross the Tagus his demonstrations merely hastened the retreat and saved Mirabete. To strike Hill in the right place would however have required nice arrangements and great activity, as he could have made his retreat by the road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida.

Wellington although very discontented that Erskine's false alarm had rendered the success incomplete, avoided any public expression of displeasure, lest the enemy who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their operations should require a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers however he complained that his generals, stout in action personally as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with fear of responsibility when left to themselves that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. Instead of expressing his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this weakness. Every British general knew that without powerful interest his future prospects and reputation for past services would wither together under the first blight of misfortune; that a selfish government would offer him up a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press with whom success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of their blood to gain reputation, but they are

necessarily timid in command when a single failure even without a fault consigns them in age to shame and misery: it is however undeniable that Erskine was not an able officer. The king was equally discontented with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet had, he said, caused the loss of Almaraz; and he affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the depôt of Almaraz, for he thought that general had brought up his whole force instead of six thousand men.

CHAPTER II.

WHILE the Anglo-Portuguese army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal the war in other parts had not been favourable. It has been shown how Galicia suffered from discord poverty and ill-success in the field; that an extraordinary impost had been resisted by all classes, especially at Coruña, and that the army torn by faction was become hateful to the people. In this state of affairs the seat of government was removed to St. Jago, the troops in the Bierzo being placed under Portazgo. The prudent conduct and personal influence of Castaños who directed these changes soothed indeed the bitterness of faction, and the regency then assigned sixty thousand men for the quota of the province: but the revenues were insufficient to put the troops already under arms in motion, and Castaños could not while Marmont was on the Agueda bring even one division into the field. As usual, application was made for English succours, yet it was admitted Castaños and the junta this time made unusual exertions to ameliorate the soldiers' condition. Sir Howard Douglas however still relied more on the warfare of the partidas, and his policy, already described, was beneficial; yet it was so offensive to the regular officers and the predominant faction in the Cortes, always jealous of the priestly influence, that he was offered the command of six thousand regulars to detach him from the guerilla system. Indeed the partidas would now have been entirely suppressed by the supreme government if lord Wellington and sir Henry Wellesley had not strenuously supported the views of Douglas.

From Salamanca to Irun the French communication was continually menaced by the Gallician and Asturian forces, by the English squadrons, by the partidas of the Montaña de

Santander, of Biscay, of the Rioja, and those from Burgos, and the Liebana. The occupation of the Asturias, a division constantly in the Montaña, a corps threatening Galicia, and the great strength of the army of the north were all consequences of this state of affairs, and the military communication was thus laboriously maintained; but the lines of correspondence, on which all concert of movements depended, were very insecure, and Napoleon continually excited his generals to seize every lull in Wellington's warfare to put down the bands. Without English succour he said they could not exist, and as the secret of their strength was on the coast all points favouring their intercourse with English vessels should be fortified: he even directed at this time, that the whole army of the north should be employed merely to scour the lines of correspondence. With a view to this plan of operations he had caused Santona to be made a very strong post in the summer of 1811; and then Castro, Portagalete, Berneo, Lesquito, and Guetaria were likewise fortified, and between those sea-ports all churches, convents, and large houses near the mouths of creeks and rivers were entrenched. The partidas were thus debarred the coast and nearly effaced in the latter end of that year; but when the siege of Rodrigo caused Bonnet to evacuate the Asturias, the Montaña was again open to the seventh army which was immediately succoured by Douglas, and being composed principally of partidas was twenty-three thousand strong. In March, 1812, Napoleon directed Bonnet to re-occupy the Asturias, but the pass of Pajares was then choked with snow and he waited for finer weather.

In May, Marmont having returned from Portugal, the order was reiterated, and the French troops on the Orbijo, augmented to fifteen thousand, drew the attention of the Gallicians to that quarter while Bonnet passing the mountains of Leon with eight thousand men re-occupied Oviedo, Grado, and Gihon, and established small posts communicating through the town of Leon with the army of Portugal. Thus a new military line was established which interrupted the Gallicians' communication with the partidas; the chain of sea-port defences was then continued to Gihon, a constant inter-

course with France was maintained, and those convoys came safely by water which otherwise would have had to travel by land escorted by many troops and in constant danger. Marmont at the same time spread his troops in the province of Leon, and, though harassed at first by the bands, fortified Toro and Zamora on the Douro and converted three convents at Salamanca into forts capable of sustaining a regular siege: the works of Astorga and Leon were also improved, and posts entrenched at Benevente, La Baneza, Castro Contrigo and other points. The lines of the Tormes and Douro were thus strengthened against the British general, and four thousand men sufficed to hold the Gallicians in the Bierzo and Puebla de Senabria in check. Then the vast fertile plains of Leon called the *Tierras de Campos* belonged to the French and their detachments soon chased away the bands.

Sir Howard Douglas observing these things, and considering also, if Wellington should make progress in the coming campaign that new lines of communication with the sea would be desirable, proposed that a powerful squadron with a battalion of marines and a battery of artillery should be secretly prepared for a littoral warfare on the Biscay coast. On this suggestion sir Home Popham was sent from England in May with a squadron, having on board scaling-ladders, arms, clothing, and ammunition for the partidas, and all means to effect sudden disembarkations. But the ministers, never able to see the war in a true point of view, were always desponding or elated and sanguine beyond what reason warranted. Popham was ordered to seize some point and hold it permanently as an entrance into Biscay by which the French might be turned, if, as in 1808, they were forced to adopt the line of the Ebro! Now at this period more than three hundred thousand French soldiers were in the Peninsula, one hundred and twenty thousand were in the northern provinces, and without reckoning the army of the centre which could also be turned in that direction, nearly fifty thousand were expressly appropriated to the protection of this very line on which a thousand marines were to be permanently established, in expectation of the enemy being driven over the Ebro by a campaign which was not yet commenced!

While Marmont was yet in Beira, the seventh army and the partidas of the Montaña were excited to activity with supplies transmitted through the Asturian ports by Douglas, but the ferocity of the leaders was atrocious. Mina's conduct was said to be revolting, and Merino having taken some hundred prisoners in April near Aranda hanged them all, sixty in retaliation for three members of the local junta put to death by the French; the others in the proportion of ten for each soldier of his who had been shot by the enemy! The ignorance and the excited passions of the guerilla chiefs may be pleaded in mitigation; but to the disgrace of England Merino's murders were recorded with complacency in the London newspapers and met with no public reprobation. There are occasions when retaliations may stop barbarity, yet the necessity should be clearly shown and the exercise restricted to the narrowest limits. Here sixty innocent persons were butchered to revenge the death of three, and no proof offered that those three were slain contrary to the laws of war; but though the French committed many atrocities, some in wantonness some in revenge, such savage deeds as the curate's are inexcusable. What if Washington had hanged twenty English gentlemen of family in return for the death of captain Handy? or sir Henry Clinton had caused twenty American officers to die for the execution of André? These atrocities are inevitable in a guerilla system not subordinate to the regular government of armies, and they recoil upon the helpless people of the country who cannot fly from their enemies. When the French occupied a district famine often ensued, because, to avoid distant forages, they collected large stores of provision from a small extent of country, and thus the guerilla system while it harassed the French without starving them harassed and starved the people. And many chiefs who dared not otherwise revenge affronts or private feuds would slay prisoners or stragglers so as to draw down French vengeance on an obnoxious village or district, and this produced associations of the people for self defence, by which the enemy profited.

After this inhuman act Merino, finding a large convoy had marched from Burgos towards France endeavoured to intercept

it; and Mendizabel, who, notwithstanding his defeat by Bonnet, had again gathered twelve hundred cavalry, came from the Liebana and occupied the heights above Burgos. The French immediately placed their baggage and followers in the castle and recalled the convoy, whereupon the Spaniards, dispersing in bands, destroyed the fortified posts of correspondence at Sasamon and Gamonal and then returned to the Liebana. But Bonnet had now re-occupied the Asturias, the remnant of the Spanish force in that quarter fled to Mendizabel and the whole shifted as they could in the hills. Mina then displayed great energy. In February he repulsed an attack near Lodosa, and having conveyed the prisoners taken at Huesca to the coast returned to Aragon and maintained a distant blockade of Zaragoza itself. In March he advanced with a detachment to Pina, captured one of Suchet's convoys going to Mequinenza, and retired with his booty to Robres, a village on the eastern slopes of the Sierra de Alcubierre. He was there betrayed to Pannetier, who came with a brigade of the army of the Ebro so suddenly upon him that he escaped death with difficulty. He re-appeared in the Rioja, and though chased by troops from the army of the north escaped without much loss and secretly gained the defiles of Navas Tolosa behind Vitoria, where, on the 7th of April, having still five thousand men, he defeated a Polish regiment which was escorting the enormous convoy that had escaped the curate and Mendizabel at Burgos. The booty consisted of treasure, Spanish prisoners, baggage, followers of the army, and officers retiring to France; all the Spanish prisoners, four hundred in number, were released and joined Mina, and it is said that one million of francs fell into his hands, besides the equipages, arms, stores, and a quantity of church plate.

On the 28th he captured another convoy going from Valencia to France, but Abbé, recently made governor of Navarre, now directed combined movements from Pampeluna, Jaca, and Sangüesa, against him. And so vigorously did this general, declared by Mina to be the most formidable of all his opponents, urge on the operations, that after a series of actions on the 25th, 26th, and 28th of May, the Spanish chief, in bad plight and with the utmost difficulty, escaped by

Los Arcos to Guardia in the Rioja: marshal Victor seized the opportunity to pass into France with the remains of the convoy shattered on the 7th, and all the bands in the north were discouraged; but Wellington's successes, and the confusion attending the departure of so many French troops for the Russian war, gave a powerful stimulus to the partisan chiefs in other directions. The Empeinado, ranging the mountains of Cuenca and Guadalaxara, pushed his parties close to Madrid,—Duran entered Soria and raised a contribution in the lower town,—Villa Campa, Bassecour, and Montijo, coming from the mountains of Albarracin, occupied Molino and Oreguella, and invested Daroca,—Gayan, taking post in the vicinity of Belchite, made excursions to the very gates of Zaragoza,—the Frayle, haunting the mountains of Alcanitz and the Sierra de Gudar, interrupted Suchet's lines of communication by Morella and Teruel, and along the right bank of the Ebro towards Tortosa. Finally, Gay and Miralles infested the Garriga on the left bank.

Plan 1, Vol.V.

It was to repress these bands that the army of the Ebro, containing twenty thousand men of whom sixteen thousand were under arms, was formed by drafts from Suchet's army and given to Reille. That general repaired to Lerida, occupied Upper Aragon with his own division, placed Severoli's between Lerida and Zaragoza, and Frere's between Lerida, Barcelona, and Taragona; but his fourth division under Palombini entered the districts of Soria and Calatayud to connect Suchet with Caffarelli, who now commanded the army of the north. The imperial guards, one division excepted, having quitted Spain, this army, including the governments and the reserve of Monthion, was thus reduced to forty-eight thousand under arms; the reserve at Bayonne was therefore increased to five thousand men, and Palombini was destined finally to reinforce Caffarelli and even to march if required to the aid of Marmont. Events however soon caused Reille to repair to Navarre and broke up the army of the Ebro; wherefore it will be clearer to trace the operations of his divisions separately in the order of the provinces towards which they were at first directed.

Palombini relieved Daroca on the 23rd of February, and finding that Villa Campa, Montijo, and Bassecour, waited for

him about the passes of Toralva he turned them by the Xiloca, reached Calatayud and fortified the convent of La Peña, a rocky eminence commanding that city and forming a part of it. But on the 4th of March, having placed his baggage and artillery in this post under a guard of three hundred men, he dispersed his troops to scour the country and collect provisions; whereupon the partidas recommenced operations, and Villa Campa, cutting off two companies at Campillo the 8th, made a fruitless attempt to destroy the Italian colonel Pisa at Ateca. Five hundred men were sent against him, but he drawing them towards the mountains of Albarracin destroyed them at Pozonhonda on the 28th, and soon after drove the Italians from their posts of communication as far as the town of Albarracin on the road to Teruel; nor did he return to the mountains until Palombini coming up killed some of his men. The Italian general then changing his plan concentrated his division on the plains of Hused, where he suffered some privations but remained unmolested until the 14th of April, when he again marched to co-operate with Suchet in a combined attempt to destroy Villa Campa. The Spanish chief evaded both by passing over to the southern slopes of the Albarracin mountains, and before the Italians could return to Hused, Gayan, in concert with the alcalde of Calatayud, had exploded a plot against the convent of La Peña.

Some of the Italian officers, including the commandant, rashly accepted an invitation to a feast. While sitting at table Gayan appeared on a neighbouring height, the guests were seized, many armed citizens ran up to surprise the convent and sixty soldiers were made prisoners or killed in the tumult below; but the historian Vacani, who had declined to attend the feast, made a vigorous defence, and general St. Pol and colonel Schiazzetti coming from Hused and Daroca raised the siege. Schiazzetti marched in pursuit, and as his advanced guard was surprised at Mochales by a subtle deceit of the alcalde, he slew him, whereupon the Spaniards killed the officers taken at the feast of Calatayud. Gayan baffled his pursuers and then moved by Medina Celi and Soria to Navarre, thinking to surprise a money convoy going to Burgos for the army

of Portugal, but being followed on one side by a detachment from Hused and met on the other by Caffarelli he was driven again to the hills above Daroca. Here he renewed his operations in concert with Villa Campa and the Empecinado, who came up to Medina Celi while Duran descended from the Moncayo hills. This menacing union of bands induced Reille to detach general Paris with a French regiment and a troop of hussars to the aid of Palombini; whereupon Duran and Villa Campa were driven, the one towards Albarracin the other towards Soria. In June, after various marches, the two French generals united dislodged the Empecinado from Siguenza, chasing him so sharply that his band dispersed and fled to the Somosierra.

During these operations Mina was pressed by Abbé, but Duran entering Tudela by surprise destroyed the artillery parc and carried off a battering-train of six guns. Palombini was then only a few marches from Madrid, and the king, alarmed by Wellington's preparations for opening the campaign, ordered him to join the army of the centre; these orders being intercepted the Italian general unwittingly retraced his steps to pursue Duran, and quickly recovering all the guns taken at Tudela drove the Spanish chief through the Rioja into the mountains beyond the sources of the Duero. Caffarelli was then on the Arga with a division of the army of the north, and a brigade had been sent by Reille to the Aragon river with the view of destroying Mina, who was placed by Abbé in great danger. Palombini was collecting boats to pass the Ebro and join them when duplicates of the king's orders reached him, which saved Mina. Caffarelli returned to Vitoria, and the Italians reaching Madrid in July became part of the army of the centre, having marched one hundred and fifty miles in seven days without a halt. Returning now to the other divisions of the army of the Ebro, it is to be observed, that their movements being chiefly directed against the Catalans belong to the relation of that warfare.

OPERATIONS IN ARAGON AND CATALONIA.

After the battle of Altafulla in Catalonia, the fall of Peniscola in Valencia, and the arrival of Reille's first division on the Ebro, Decaen, who had succeeded Macdonald in Upper Catalonia, spread his troops along the coast with a view to cut off the communication between the British navy and the interior, where the Catalan army still held certain positions. Lamarque having a division of five thousand men seized and fortified Mataro in February, drove Milans from Blanes and occupied the intermediate space, while detachments from Barcelona fortified Moncada, Mongat, and Molino del Rey, to secure the plain of Barcelona. The line from Blanes to Caldagues, including Canets, St. Filieu, Palamos, and other ports, was strengthened and placed under general Bearman. General Clement was posted in the vicinity of Gerona to guard the interior French line of march from Hostalrich to Figueras. Tortosa, Mequinenza, and Taragona were garrisoned by detachments from Severoli's division, which, quartered between Zaragoza and Lerida, was in communication with Bourke's and Pannetier's brigades of the first division of the army of reserve. Frere's division was on the communication between Aragon and Catalonia, and a division under Quesnel, composed partly of national guards, was in the Cerdaña. Finally a moveable reserve of eight thousand men enabled Decaen to march from place to place as occasion required: but the supreme command of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia was with Suchet.

Cardona, Busa, Sceu d'Urgel, and the Medas islands still belonged to the Catalans, and they had ten thousand men in the field. Lacy was at Cardona with Sarsfield's division and some irregular forces,—Green was organizing an experimental corps at Montserrat, near which place Eroles was also quartered,—Rovira continued about the mountains of Olot—Juan Claros was now about the mountains of Hostalrich,—Milans, Manso and the brigand Gros, driven from the coast line, kept the hills near Manresa,—Gay and Miralles were on the Ebro. But the communication with the coast being cut off all these chiefs were in want of provisions and stores, and the French

were forming new roads along the sea line beyond the reach of the English ship guns. Lacy, thus debarred the coast, led his troops with difficulty and had a great number of prisoners and deserters to maintain in Cardona and Busa, because Coupigny refused to receive them in the Balearic isles. In constant dispute with the junta and the generals he was abhorred by the people, and in his spleen desired Codrington to cannonade all the sea-coast towns in the possession of the French, saying he would give the inhabitants timely notice: but he did not do so, and when Codrington reluctantly opened his broadsides upon Mataro, many of the people were slain. The Catalans, complaining of this cruel injudicious operation, affected Eroles more than ever, and Codrington,
MSS. Lacy therefore sent him with a few men to his native district of Talarn, ostensibly to raise recruits and make a diversion in Aragon, really to deprive him of his division and reduce his power.

In the Catalan army however the distress became so great, that Sarsfield was about to force his way to the coast and embark his division to commence a littoral war-March.fare, when Eroles having quickly raised and armed a new division entered Aragon, and Sarsfield followed him. After reaching Garus in the valley of Venasque, Eroles menaced the district between Fraga and Huesca, but those places were occupied by detachments from Bourke's brigade of the army of the Ebro; Severoli also arrived from Valencia, whereupon the Spaniard retired up the valley of the Isabena to some heights above Roda, a village on the confines of Aragon. He had only a thousand regular infantry, three guns and two hundred cavalry, having left five hundred men in the valley of Venasque. Bourke knew this, and encouraged by the vicinity of Severoli followed hastily from Benavarre with two thousand men of all arms. Eroles finding he must lose his men in the Venasque or fight a battle, and expecting aid from Sarsfield, took a position rough in front and secured on both flanks by precipices beyond which the neighbouring partidas immediately gathered. Bourke keeping two battalions in reserve attacked with the third, but after a long skirmish, in which he lost a hundred and fifty men and Eroles a hundred,

was beaten, was wounded, and retreated to Monza in great confusion. This combat, really honourable, was exposed to doubt and ridicule at the time by the extravagance of Eroles' despatch, wherein he affirmed that his soldiers finding their muskets too hot had made use of stones, and by this mode of action destroyed a thousand of the enemy!

Severoli now advanced and Eroles retired to Talarn, whereupon the Italian general returned to Aragon. Meanwhile Lacy who had increased his forces approached Cervera, and Sarsfield, accused by Eroles of having treacherously abandoned him, joined Gay and Miralles on the hills about Taragona to straiten that place for provisions. Milans and Manso, also uniting, captured a convoy at Arenis de Mar, and the English squadron intercepted several vessels going to Barcelona. To meet this new commotion Decaen relieved Taragona on the 28th of April, and then marched with three thousand men towards Lerida, but, on the way, hearing Sarsfield was near Villa Franca, he took the road of Braffin and Santa Coloma instead of Momblanch, and suddenly turning to the right defeated him, and then continued his own march by Cervera towards Lerida. Lacy immediately abandoned Lower Catalonia and concentrated Manso's, Milans', Green's, and Sarsfield's divisions in the mountains of Olot; they were reduced in numbers but he reinforced them with select somatenes, called the preference companies, and seeing Decaen remained near Lerida, he marched rapidly against the convent of Mataro with five thousand men, and with good hope, for the garrison was only five hundred, the works not strong, and Codrington, who had anchored off Mataro at Lacy's desire, lent some ship guns,—yet his sailors were forced to drag them to the point of attack, because Lacy and Green had, in breach of their promise, neglected to provide means of transport.

Codrington,
MSS.

A few hours' firing broke the wall of the convent, but Lacy, hearing Decaen was coming, raised the siege and buried the English guns without Codrington's knowledge; the French found these guns and carried them into the convent, yet to cover his misconduct the Spanish general said in the official gazette they were safely re-embarked! After this disreput-

able transaction, Manso, who alone had behaved well, retired with Milans to Vich, Lacy went to Cardona, the French re-victualled Barcelona, and Eroles' ancient division was to his great discontent turned over to Sarsfield, who took post near Molina del Rey and remained there until the 5th of June when a detachment from Barcelona drove him to the Campo de Taragona. On the 14th Milans was defeated near Vich by a detachment from the Ampurdam, and Lamarque following Sarsfield into the Campo defeated him again on the 24th near Villa Nueva de Sitjes: the Spanish general was wounded, yet made his way by Santa Colomo de Querault and Calaf to Cardona where he rejoined Lacy. Lamarque then joined Decaen in the plains of Lerida, where all the French moveable forces were now assembled with a view to gather the harvest: a vital object to both parties but attained by the French.

Lacy's flight from Mataro, the several defeats of Milans and Sarsfield, and the discontent of Eroles, disturbed the whole principality; and the general disquietude was augmented by the increase of all the frauds and oppressions which the civil and military authorities under Lacy practised with impunity. Everywhere there was a disinclination to serve in the regular army. The somatene argued, that while he should be an ill-used soldier under a bad general, his family would become victims of French revenge or starve, because the pay of the regular troops was too scanty, were it even fairly issued, for his own subsistence; whereas by remaining at home he could nourish his family, defend it from straggling plunderers, and be ready to join the troops on great occasions. In some districts the people, seeing the army could not protect them, refused to supply the partidas with food, unless upon contract not to molest the French in their vicinity; and the spirit of resistance would have entirely failed, if Wellington's successes at Ciudad and Badajos, and the rumour that an English army was coming to Catalonia, had not sustained hope.

Codrington,
MSS.

In the north, the partidas aided by Popham's expedition had compelled Reille to remove to Navarre that Caffarelli might turn his whole attention to the

July.

side of Biscay and the Montaña. Decaen then received charge of the Lower as well as Upper Catalonia, which weakened his position; and confusion was produced by the arrival of French prefects and councillors of state to organize a civil administration. This measure, ostensibly to restrain military licentiousness, had probably the ultimate object of preparing Catalonia for an union with France, because the Catalans who have peculiar customs and a dialect of their own scarcely call themselves Spaniards. These events embarrassed the French army, but their general progress was visible in the altered feelings of the people, whose enthusiasm was stifled by the folly and corruption of their leaders. Reduced in number, distressed for provisions, the Catalan soldiers deserted to the enemy, a thing till then unheard of in that province; and the junta were like to have been delivered up as a peace-offering

Codrington,
MSS.

to the French, who passed even singly from one part to the other. The people of the sea-coast towns readily trafficked with the people of Barcelona, when neither money nor threats could prevail on them to supply the British squadron; and Claros and Milans were charged with conniving at this traffic, and of exacting money for the landing of corn when their own people and soldiers were starving. But to such a degree was patriotism overlaid by the love of gain, that English colonial produce seized in Barcelona and other parts was sold by the enemy to French merchants, who undertook to carry it off and pay with provisions on the spot, which they successfully executed by means of Spanish vessels corruptly licensed for the occasion by Catalan authorities. Lacy was accused of treachery and tyranny. He had quarrelled with the British naval officers, was the avowed enemy of Eroles, the secret calumniator of Sarsfield, and was of no courage or enterprise in the field. Nor was the story of his previous life calculated to check unfavourable opinions. It was said he had been banished for an intrigue to the Canaries, from whence he deserted to the French, and again deserted to his own countrymen when the war of independence broke out.

Under this man the frauds which affect the civil departments of all armies in the field became destructive, and their

extent may be gathered from a single fact. Notwithstanding the enormous supplies granted by England the Catalans paid nearly three millions sterling for the expense of the war, besides contributions in kind, yet their soldiers were always distressed for clothing, food, arms, and ammunition. This amount of specie might excite doubt, were it not that here as in Portugal the quantity of coin accumulated from the expenditure of the armies and navies was immense. Gold however is not always the synonyme of power in war or happiness in peace. Nothing could be more wretched than Catalonia. Singly the people were exposed to all the licentiousness of war; collectively to the robberies and revenge of friends and enemies. When they attempted to supply the British vessels the French menaced them with death; when they yielded to such threats the English ships menaced them with bombardment and plunder. All the roads were infested with brigands, and in the hills large bands of people, whose families and property had been destroyed, watched for straggling Frenchmen and small escorts, not to make war but to live on the booty: when this resource failed they plundered their own countrymen. While the land was thus harassed, the sea swarmed with privateers of all nations differing from pirates only in name; and that no link in the chain of infamy might be wanting, the merchants of Gibraltar forced their smuggling trade at the ports with a shameless disregard for the rights of the Spanish government. Catalonia seemed like some huge carcass on which all manner of ravenous beasts all obscene birds and all reptiles had gathered to feed.

Codrington,
MSS.

CHAPTER III.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

SUCHET having recovered his health was again at the head of the troops, but the king's military authority was so irksome to him that he despatched an officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the emperor, previous to that monarch's departure for Russia. In reply, he was desired to hold his troops concentrated and move them in the manner most conducive to the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph, designing to act against Wellington in Estremadura, demanded the aid of one division, Suchet replied that he must then evacuate Valencia; and as the natural line of retreat for the French armies would, during the contemplated operations, be by the eastern provinces it would be better to abandon Andalusia first! This must have convinced Joseph that his authority was but a name, and Suchet, from a natural disposition towards order and because his revenue from the fishery of the Albufera depended on the tranquillity of the province, took infinite pains to confirm his own powers. His mode of proceeding, prudent and firm, was wonderfully successful, Valencia, although one of the smallest provinces in Spain and not naturally fertile, was from the industry of the inhabitants one of the richest; combining manufactures with agriculture, it possessed great resources which had been injured by the war without supplying its exigencies. The people expected a bloody vengeance for Calvo's murder of the French residents at the commencement of the contest, but their fears were soon allayed; discipline was strictly preserved, and Suchet, having suppressed the taxes imposed by the Spanish government, substituted others which were more equal and less onerous. To bar oppression in the collection he published his demands.

authorizing resistance to contributions not named and demanded by proper officers; and he employed the native authorities as he had done in Aragon. All impolitic restrictions upon industry and traffic were removed, and the government of the invaders was thus found less oppressive than that of the Spaniards.

Napoleon had, to punish the murder of the French residents, imposed a contribution too heavy as Suchet imagined ever to be paid; the emperor, however, calculating the resources of Valencia by a comparison with Aragon, would not abate the demand, and so exact was his judgment, that when Suchet, accepted part in kind and gave discount for prompt payment, this impost was satisfied with little pressure in one year. The current expenses of the troops were also provided, and yet the people did not suffer as in other provinces, nor was their industry cramped, their property so injured, as under their own government. Valencia therefore remained tranquil, and the mischief of negligence and disorder was made manifest by contrast. Aragon partook of the advantages of this conquest, so did Joseph's court: the contributions were diminished in the former, and large sums were remitted to the latter to meet Napoleon's grant of one-fifth of the war contributions in favour of the intrusive government. This prosperous state was established also in the face of an enemy daily increasing in strength. For the regent, O'Donnel, had given Blake's command to his own brother Joseph, who collected the remains of the armies of Murcia and Valencia, raised new levies, and during Suchet's illness had formed a fresh army of twelve or fourteen thousand men in the neighbourhood of Alicant. In the Balearic isles also, Roche and Whittingham's experimental divisions were declared ready to take the field, and fifteen hundred British troops commanded by general Ross arrived at Carthagen. To avoid the fever there these last remained on shipboard, and were thus more menacing to the enemy than on shore, because they seemed to be only awaiting the arrival of a new army which the French knew to be coming from Sicily to the eastern coast of Spain. And as the descent of this army commenced a remarkable episode in the history of the war it is proper to relate its origin and progress.

Sir John Stuart had been succeeded in Sicily by lord William Bentinck, a man of resolution capacity and spirit, just in his actions and abhorring oppression, but of a sanguine impetuous disposition. Determined to ameliorate the condition of the Sicilian people, he, after surmounting many difficulties, removed the queen from power, vested the direction of affairs in the crown prince, obtained from the barons a renunciation of their feudal privileges, and caused a representative constitution to be proclaimed. Believing the court submissive because it was silent, and that the barons would adhere to his system because it gave them the useful power of legislation in lieu of feudal privileges alloyed by ruinous expenses and the degradation of courtiers,—the dignity of independence at the cost only of maintaining the rights of the people and restoring the honour of their country:—believing thus, he judged the large British force hitherto kept in Sicily as much to overawe the court as to oppose the enemy might be dispensed with. He thought the expected improvement of the Sicilian army and the attachment of the people to the new political system, would permit ten thousand men to be employed in aid of the Peninsula, or in Italy; and in January wrote of these projects to the English ministers, and sent his brother to Portugal to consult upon the best mode of acting.

Such an opportune offer to create a diversion on the left flank of the French armies was eagerly accepted by Wellington, who immediately sent engineers, artificers, and a battering-train complete, to aid the expected expedition. But lord William Bentinck was soon made sensible, that in large communities working constitutions are the offspring not the generators of national feelings and habits. They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor cast as breakwaters into the sea of public corruption; gradually and as insect rocks come up from the depths of the ocean they must arise if they are to bear the storms of human passions. Lord William was soon opposed by the Sicilian court with falsehood and intrigue, the constitution was secretly thwarted by the barons, the Neapolitan army, composed of foreigners of all nations, was diligently augmented with a view to overawe both the English and the the people, the revenues and subsidy were alike misapplied,

and the native Sicilian army, despised and neglected, was incapable of service. Finally, instead of going to Spain with ten thousand good troops, he could only send a subordinate general with six thousand—British, Germans, Calabrese, Swiss, and Sicilians,—the British and Germans only being either morally or militarily well organized. To these however, Roche's and Whittingham's levies, represented to be twelve or fourteen thousand strong, were added, the Spanish government having placed them at the disposition of general Maitland the commander of the expedition. Thus, in May, twenty thousand men were supposed ready for a descent on Catalonia, to which quarter Wellington advised them to proceed.

But now other objects were presented to lord William's sanguine mind. The Austrian government, while treating with Napoleon was secretly encouraging insurrections in Italy, Croatia, Dalmatia, the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and Switzerland. English as well as Austrian agents were active to organize a vast conspiracy against the French emperor, and there was a desire, especially on the part of England, to create a kingdom for one of the Austrian archdukes. Murat was discontented with France, the Montenegrins were in arms on the Adriatic coast, and the prospect of a descent upon Italy in unison with the wishes of the people, appeared so promising to lord William that he stopped the expedition to Catalonia, reasoning thus:

‘In Spain, only six thousand middling troops can be employed on a secondary operation and for a limited period, whereas twelve thousand British soldiers, and six thousand men composing the Neapolitan army of Sicily, can land in Italy, a grand theatre where success will most efficaciously assist Spain. The obnoxious Neapolitan force being thus removed, the native Sicilian army can be organized, and the new constitution established with more certainty.’ The time, also he thought critical for Italy, not so for Spain, which would suffer but a temporary deprivation, seeing that failure in Italy would not preclude after aid to Spain.

Impressed with these notions he sent the expedition to Palma in Sardinia and Mahon in Minorca, because, from those places, he could easily direct them against Italy, and mean-

while they menaced the French in Spain. But the conception of vast and daring enterprises, even the execution of them up to a certain point, is not very uncommon, they fail only by a little! that little is however the essence of genius, the phial of wit which held to Orlando's nostril changed him from a frantic giant to a perfect commander. Neither the greatness of this project nor the apparent facility of execution weighed with Wellington. The recovery of Italy would he said be a glorious and might be a feasible exploit, but it was only in prospect. Spain was the better field, the war in the Peninsula existed; years had been devoted to the establishment of a solid base there, and experience showed the chance of victory was not imaginary. England could not support two armies. The principle of concentrating power on an important point was as applicable here as on a field of battle; Italy might be the more vital point, yet it would be advisable to continue the war already established in Spain: it would even be better to give up Spain and direct the whole power of England against Italy, rather than undertake double operations on such an extensive scale when the means necessary to sustain one were so scanty.

Apparently convinced, the ministers forbade lord William to proceed and expressed discontent at his conduct. Their former instructions had however given him a discretionary power to act in Italy, and had so misled him that, besides delaying the expedition to Spain, he had placed twelve hundred men under admiral Fremantle to assist the Montenegrins. He was also entangled in a negotiation with the Russian admiral Greig relative to the march of a Russian army; a march planned as it afterwards appeared without the knowledge of the Russian court, and which, from the wildness of its conception and the mischief it would probably have effected, deserves notice.

While the Russian war was still uncertain, admiral Tschichagof, having sixty thousand men on the Danube, proposed to march through Bosnia and the ancient Epirus to the mouths of the Cattaro, and there embarking commence the impending contest with France in Italy. He was however without resources, and expecting to arrive in a starving and miserable

condition on the Adriatic demanded through admiral Greig, commanding a squadron in the Mediterranean, that lord William should supply him with fresh arms, ammunition, and provisions, and aid him with an auxiliary force. That nobleman saw the absurdity of this scheme, but he was falsely informed that Tschichagof trusting to his good will had commenced the march, he had thus only to choose between aiding an ally whose force if it arrived at all and was supplied by England would help his own project, or permit it to ravage Italy and so change the people of that country from secret friends into deadly enemies. It would be foreign to this history to consider what effect the absence of Tschichagof's army during the Russian campaign would have had upon Napoleon's operations, but this was the force whose march to the Beresina afterwards compelled the emperor to abandon Smolensko and continue the retreat to Warsaw.

In the midst of these affairs the minister's imperative orders to look only to the coast of Spain arrived. The negotiation with the Russians was immediately stopped, the project of landing in Italy was relinquished, the minor expedition in the Adriatic was recalled; but the descent on Catalonia had been delayed, its destination made known to Suchet by the French minister of war, and all his preparations were matured. Nor was this the only mischief produced by the English cabinet's vacillating policy. Lord William was empowered to raise money on bills for his own exigencies, and being desirous to form a military chest for his Italian enterprise, invaded Wellington's money markets. With infinite trouble and difficulty that general had just opened a source of supply at from five shillings and four-pence to five shillings and eight-pence the dollar,—lord William's agents offered six shillings and eight-pence, swept four millions from the markets and seriously embarrassed the great operations. This unhappy commencement of the Sicilian expedition led to other errors, and its arrival on the coast of Spain did not take place until after the campaign in Castille had commenced; but as its proceedings connected the warfare of Valencia immediately with that of Catalonia, and the whole with Wellington's operations, they cannot be properly treated of in this place. It is how-

ever fit to note here how an illiberal and factious policy inevitably recoils upon its authors.

In 1807 sir John Moore, with that sagacity and manliness which distinguished his career through life, informed the ministers, that no hope of a successful attack on the French in Italy could be entertained while the British army upheld the tyrannical system of the dissolute and treacherous Neapolitan court in Sicily. And as no change for the better could be expected while the queen was allowed to govern, he proposed that the British cabinet should either relinquish Sicily, or, assuming the entire control of the island, seize the queen and send her to her native Austria. This he judged necessary to render the large British army in Sicily available for the field, because the Sicilian people could then be justly governed, and thus only could the organization of an effective native force attached to England and fitted to offer freedom to Italy be effected. He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to the people, and hence his proposal was rejected as a matter of Jacobinism. Drummond the English plenipotentiary even betrayed it to the queen, a woman not without magnanimity yet so capable of bloody deeds, that, in 1810 she secretly proposed to Napoleon a second Sicilian vespers for the English. The emperor, detesting such guilt, threw her agent into prison, yet the traces of the conspiracy were detected by the British authorities in 1811; and in 1812 lord William seized the government as before recommended by Moore, and did finally expel the queen by force. And because these measures were not resorted to in time, he was now, with an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men, sixteen thousand of which were British, only able to detach a mixed force of six thousand to aid lord Wellington. At the same time the oppression of Ireland required that sixty thousand fine soldiers should remain idle at home, while France with a Russian war on hand was able to overmatch the allies in Spain. Bad government is a scourge with a double thong!

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

PREVIOUS to Hill's enterprise against Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda and restoring the communication with Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. Those generals immediately filed along the frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura, they were hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent from Cadiz, and the militia of the Algarves were called out to defend the Portuguese frontier. Soult however remained on the defensive, for he still expected the advance of Wellington, which the approach of so many troops, the seeming reluctance to quit the Niebla, the landing of men from Cadiz at Ayamonte and the rumours set afloat by the British general appeared to render certain. Nor did the surprise of Almaraz, which he thought to be aimed at the army of the south and not against the army of Portugal, alter his views.

Now the advantage gained by the fall of Rodrigo and Badajos was clearly illustrated. Wellington could menace the north the south or the centre, the French generals in each quarter expected him and were anxious that the others should regulate their movements accordingly. None would help the other, and the secret plans of all were paralysed until it was seen on which side the thunderbolt would fall. This was of most consequence in the south, for Soult's plans were vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution. After the fall of Badajos he would not push a head of troops into Estremadura while his rear and flanks could be assailed from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and

Murcia; it was however essential to crush Ballesteros, which could not be effected while Gibraltar and Tarifa offered him refuge. Soult therefore resolved to reduce Tarifa and then lay siege to Carthagená and Alicánt, and only awaited the development of Wellington's designs against Andalusia to commence his own operations. Great and difficult his plan was, yet profoundly calculated to effect the main object of fixing his base so firmly that, maugre the forces in the Isla, he might enter upon and follow up regular offensive operations in Estremadura and against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain expeditions hitherto adopted: In fine, he designed to make Wellington feel that there was a powerful army within a few marches of Lisbon.

Thinking Carthagená and Tarifa and even Alicánt must fall with the aid of Suchet, which he expected; or that the siege of the first would bring down Hill's corps and all the disposable Spanish troops to save it, he desired that Marmont and the king should keep Wellington employed north of the Tagus. He could then enter on the sieges contemplated, and yet leave a force under Drouet on the edge of Estremadura, strong enough to make Hill operate towards Carthagená instead of Seville. If this happened he designed to concentrate all his finely organized and experienced troops, force on a general battle, and if victorious, the preparations being made beforehand, follow up the blow by a rapid march upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or by drawing Wellington in all haste to the defence of that capital, confine the war while Napoleon was in Russia to a corner of the Peninsula. This great project was in the spirit of the emperor's instructions. That great captain had desired his lieutenants to make Wellington feel that his enemies were not passively defensive by pressing him close on each flank; and he endeavoured to make Marmont sensible that if it was useless to enter the north-east of Portugal and fight a general battle on ground favourable to Wellington, it was contrary to all military principles to withdraw several days' march from his outposts and by such a timid defensive give him the power of choosing when and where to strike.

Now the loss of Badajoz and the defensive war against the

increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, rendered it extremely onerous for Soult to press Wellington's flank in Estremadura; it was therefore a profound modification of the emperor's views to urge the king and Marmont to active operation in the north, while he besieged Tarifa and Carthagena with an army in mass, ready for a sudden stroke in the field if fortune brought the occasion, if otherwise, sure of fixing a solid base for future operations against Portugal. He wished to commence the siege of Tarifa in May when Wellington's return to Beira had relieved him from the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia; but the failure of the harvest in 1811 and the continual movements during the winter, had so reduced his magazines of provisions and ammunition he could not move until the new harvest was ripe and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted stores; his soldiers were on short allowance and famine raged amongst the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in Morocco had so firmly re-established the French interests, that the emperor refused supplies to the British and fitted out a squadron to insure his subjects' obedience. To counteract this, Viali, employed in the early part of the war by sir Hew Dalrymple, was sent by sir Henry Wellesley with a mission to the court of Fez; it failed from the intrigues of the notorious Charmilly; then at Tangier and unsuspected because connected by marriage with the English consul there: indeed from a mean hatred to sir John Moore there were not wanting persons in power who endeavoured still to uphold this man.

When Soult's plans were so far advanced, he earnestly demanded that all his detachments and sufficient reinforcements, together with artillery, officers, money, and convoys of ammunition should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagena. Pending their arrival, to divert the attention of the allies, he repaired to Port St. Mary where the French had from the circumstances of the war in Estremadura been a long time inactive. He brought down with him a number of the Villantroy mortars, and having collected about thirty gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious bombardment of Cadiz on the 16th of May. But while thus

engaged a sudden landing from English vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeida was abandoned by the French, the people rose along the sea line, and Freire coming from Murcia entrenched himself in his old position of Venta de Bahul, eastward of Grenada. He was there surprised and beaten with loss, and the insurrection on the coast was soon quelled; yet the march of reinforcements intended for Drouet was thus delayed, and that enabled Hill to take Almaraz. Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted during the winter and spring upon the stores of Gibraltar, then advanced against Conroux's division on the Guadalete.

This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to Wellington, because his proceedings involved one of those intricate knots by which the important parts of both their operations were fastened. The English general judged, that while the Spaniards' large and increasing force, which could be aided by a disembarkation of five or six thousand men from the Isla, menaced the blockade of Cadiz and the communications between Seville and Grenada Soult must keep a considerable body in observation, and consequently Hill would be a match for the French in Estremadura. Yet the efficacy of this diversion depended upon avoiding battles, seeing that if Ballesteros' army was crushed, the French, reinforced in Estremadura, could drive Hill over the Tagus, which must bring Wellington to his succour. Soult was for that reason earnest to fight, and Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, despised both. Having obtained money and supplies from Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his former excursion against Seville, he marched with eight thousand men against Conroux, who induced him by an appearance of fear to attack an entrenched camp at Bornos, and then breaking forth unexpectedly killed or took fifteen hundred Spaniards and drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated to San Roque. How this victory was felt in Estremadura shall now be shown.

Hill's enterprise had put all the French corps in movement. A division of Marmont's army crossed the Gredos mountains to replace Foy, who passed the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo and moved through the mountains of Guadalupe to

succour the garrison of Mirabete. When he returned the partidas of the Guadalupe renewed the blockade, while Hill, now strongly reinforced from the north, advanced to Zafra. Drouet then fell back to Azagua, and Hill detached Penne Villemur to his right and general Slade with the royals and third dragoon guards to his left, to secure the harvest. General Lallemande had in the same view advanced with two French regiments of dragoons, whereupon Hill, seeking to cut him off, directed Slade to enter a wood and await further instructions; but Slade hearing Lallemande was not superior in numbers disobeyed his orders and not only drove the French with loss beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles, but galloped through in pursuit, riding amongst the foremost himself and allowing his supports to join in the tumultuous charge. In the plain beyond stood Lallemande with his reserves well in hand, and soon breaking the disorderly mass thus rushing on him, killed or wounded forty-eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, recovered all his own prisoners and took more than a hundred including two officers from his adversary: and the like bitter results will generally attend what is called '*dashing*' in war, which in other words means courage without prudence. Two days after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have been before noticed, marched with fifty men of the same regiments to fetch off some of the English prisoners who had been left by the French under a slender guard in the village of Maquilla. Eighty of the enemy met him on the march, yet by fine management he overthrew them and losing only one man himself killed many French, then executing his mission, returned with an officer and twenty other prisoners.

In this state of affairs the defeat of Ballesteros enabled Soult to reinforce Drouet with Barois's division of infantry and two divisions of cavalry. They marched across the Morena, but for reasons to be hereafter mentioned by the royal road of St. Ollala, a line of direction which forced Drouet to make a flank march by his left towards Llerena to form his junction, which was effected on the 18th. The allies then fell back gradually towards Albuera, where being joined by four Portuguese regiments from Badajos and by

the fifth Spanish army, they formed a line of battle furnishing twenty thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns. Drouet had only twenty-one thousand men, three thousand being cavalry, with eighteen guns; the allies were therefore most numerous, but the French army was better composed and battle seemed inevitable for both generals had discretionary orders. However the French cavalry did not advance further than Almendralejos, and Hill who had shown himself so daring at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition, refrained from an action which promised him unbounded fame, simply because he was uncertain whether the state of Wellington's operations in Castille, then in full progress, would warrant one. Yet his recent exploits had been so splendid that a great battle gained would, with the assistance of envious malice, have placed his reputation on a level with Wellington's. And his desire to try his fortune was strong, for having received fresh instructions when some French cavalry cut off two hundred Spaniards and a small British post at Almandralejos and Santa Marta, he quickly drove them from both places with loss and forced Drouet to concentrate and retire to La Granja. The transactions which ensued must be reserved for another place, being entirely dependent on the general combinations; and those being of an intricate nature cannot be unravelled until a notion has been given of that political chaos amidst which Wellington's army appeared like the ark amidst the lowering clouds and rising waters of the deluge.



CHAPTER V.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

NAPOLEON'S unmatched power of genius was now being displayed in a wonderful manner. His interest his inclination his expectations were against war with Russia; but Alexander and himself, each hoping a menacing display of strength would reduce the other to negotiation, advanced step by step until blows could no longer be avoided. The French emperor being capable of sincere friendship had relied too much on the existence of a like feeling in the Russian emperor; and misled perhaps by a sense of his own energy, did not sufficiently allow for the daring intrigues of a court where secret combinations of the nobles formed the real governing power. That the cabinet of St. Petersburg should be more than ordinarily subject to such combinations at this period was the necessary consequence of the greatness of the interests involved in the treaties of Tilsit and Erfurth; the continental system had deeply injured the fortunes of the Russian noblemen, and their sovereign's support of it was as nothing. During the Austrian war of 1809, when Alexander was yet warm from Napoleon's society at Erfurth, the aid given to France was a mockery, and the desire to join in a northern confederation was scarcely concealed at St. Petersburg, where the French ambassador was coldly treated. The royal family of Prussia were indeed, at the same time, mortified by a reception which inclined them to side with France against the wishes of their people and their ministers, but in Russia, Romanzow alone was averse to declaring then against Napoleon. Austria, anticipating the explosion, was only doubtful whether the king of Prussia should be punished or his people rewarded, whether she herself should befriend or plunder that monarchy.

At that time also the Russian naval commander in the Adriatic, being ordered to sail to Ancona for the purpose of conveying Marmont's troops from Dalmatia to Italy, said his ships were not sea-worthy; yet secretly he told the governor of Trieste they would be in excellent order to assist an Austrian corps against the French! Tschichagof's project of marching upon Italy was also remarkable in a political view; for it was to be made without Alexander's knowledge and conducted upon principles agreeable to the wishes of the people. At a later period in 1812 admiral Grieg also proposed to place an auxiliary Russian army under either Wellington or lord William Bentinck, and it was accepted; but the Russian ambassador in London unequivocally declared the emperor knew nothing of the matter!

With a court so situated angry negotiations rendered war inevitable, and the Russian cabinet, which had determined on hostilities though undecided as to the time, knew of the secret proceedings of Austria in Italy and of Murat's discontent. The Hollanders also desired independence, and the deep hatred the Prussian people bore towards France was notorious. Bernadotte, resolute to cast down the ladder by which he rose, was the secret adviser of these practices in Italy, and was also in communication with the Spaniards. Thus Napoleon, having a war in Spain which required three hundred thousand men to keep in a balanced state, was forced by resistless circumstances into another and more formidable contest in the distant north, when the whole of Europe was prepared to rise upon his lines of communication and when his extensive sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy of Great Britain. A conqueror's march to Moscow amidst such dangers was a design more vast, more hardy, more astounding than ever before entered the imagination of man; yet it was achieved and solely by the force of genius. With two hundred thousand French soldiers organized as a pretorian guard Napoleon stepped resolutely into the heart of Germany, and monarchs and nations bent submissively before him; secret hostility ceased, and, Bernadotte excepted, all the crowned and anointed plotters quitted their work to follow his chariot-wheels. Dresden saw the ancient story of the King of Kings

renewed in his person, and the two hundred thousand French soldiers arrived on the Niemen in company with two hundred thousand allies.

On that river four hundred thousand troops,—I have seen the imperial returns,—were assembled by this wonderful man, all disciplined warriors and proud of the unmatched genius of their leader. Yet in that hour of dizzy elevation, Napoleon, sensible of the inherent weakness of a throne unhallowed by time, described in one emphatic phrase the delicacy of his political position. For when on the banks of the Niemen he saw twelve thousand cuirassiers, with armour flashing in the sun and cries of salutation pealing in unison with the thunder of the horses' feet, passing like a foaming torrent towards the river, he turned towards Gouvion St. Cyr whose republican principles were notorious and thus addressed him.

‘No monarch ever had such an army?’

‘No, sire.’

‘The French are a fine people they deserve more liberty and they shall have it; but St. Cyr, no liberty of the press! That army mighty as it is could not resist the songs of Paris!’

Such then was the nature of Napoleon's power that success alone could sustain it; success which depended as much upon others' exertions as upon his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far distant from Spain. It is said, upon what authority is unknown, that at one moment he resolved to concentrate all the French troops in the Peninsula behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia, but the capture of Blake's force at Valencia changed his views. Of this design there are no traces in the military movements, nor in Joseph's correspondence captured at Vitoria; and there are indications of a contrary design; for at that period foreign agents were detected examining the lines of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman who killed himself when arrested in the Brazils were found proofs of a mission for the same object. Nor is it easy to discern why three hundred thousand men should be crowded on a narrow slip of ground and fed from France, already overburthened with the expenses of the Russian war, when if rightly handled they could have maintained them-

selves on the resources of Spain and near the Portuguese frontier for a year at least. To have given up the Peninsula west of the Ebro would have been beneficial only from increasing the jealousy of the Spaniards towards their allies; but if the British general had thus been driven away he could have carried his army to Italy, or have formed in Germany the nucleus of a great northern confederation on the emperor's rear. Portugal was therefore the point of all Europe in which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon during the invasion of Russia, and an immediate war with that empire was not a certain event previous to the capture of Valencia. Napoleon was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the Spanish contest continued: yet with a far-reaching European policy in which his English adversaries were deficient, he desired to check the growing strength of that fearful and wicked power which now menaces the civilized world.

His proposal for peace with England before his departure for the Niemen has also been misrepresented. It was called a device to reconcile the French to the Russian war; but they were as eager for that war as he could wish them to be, and it is more probable it sprung from a secret misgiving, a prophetic sentiment of the consequent power of Russia, lifted, as she would be by his failure, towards universal tyranny. The ostensible ground of his quarrel with Alexander was the continental system; but in this proposal for peace he offered to acknowledge the house of Braganza in Portugal, the house of Bourbon in Sicily, and to withdraw his army from the Peninsula if England would join him in guaranteeing the crown of Spain to Joseph, and a constitution to be arranged by a national Cortes. This was a virtual renunciation of the continental system for the sake of peace with England; and a proposal which obviated the charge of aiming at universal dominion, seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugal, and England, would have retained their full strength while the limits of his empire would have been fixed. The offer was made also at a time when he was most powerful, when Portugal was, as Wellington himself acknowledged, far from secure and Spain quite exhausted. At peace with England Napoleon could easily have restored the Polish nation and Russia would have

been repressed. Now Poland has fallen and Russia stalks in the plenitude of her barbarous tyranny.

Political state of England.—The new administration though despised by the country was not the less powerful in parliament, and its domestic policy was therefore characterised by all the corruption and tyranny of Mr. Pitt's system without his redeeming genius. The press was persecuted with malignant ferocity, and the government sought to corrupt all it could not trample upon. Repeated successes had rendered the Peninsula contest popular with the ardent spirits of the nation, and war-prices passed for glory with merchants, land-owners, and tradesmen; but as the price of food augmented faster than the price of labour the poorer people suffered; they rejoiced indeed at their country's triumphs because the sound of victory is always pleasing to warlike ears, but they were discontented. Thinking men, unbiassed by faction and not dazzled by military splendour, perceived in the enormous expenses incurred to repress the democratic principle and in the consequent transfer of property, the sure foundation of future reaction and revolution. The distress of the working classes produced partial insurrections, and the nation at large was beginning to perceive that the governing powers, whether representative or executive, were rapacious usurpers of the people's rights; a perception quickened by malignant prosecutions, by the insolent extravagance with which the public money was lavished on the family of Perceval, and by the general profusion at home while lord Wellesley declared the war languished for want of sustenance abroad.

Napoleon's continental system, although in the nature of a sumptuary law which the desires of men will never suffer to exist long in vigour, was yet so efficient that the British government was driven to encourage and even protect illicit trading, to the detriment of mercantile morality. The island of Heligoland was the chief point of deposit for this commerce, and by trading energy and the connivance of continental governments the emperor's system was continually baffled. Nevertheless its effects will not quickly pass away. It pressed sorely upon the manufacturers at the time, created rival establishments on the continent, and awakened in Germany a

commercial spirit by no means favourable to England's manufacturing superiority. But ultimate consequences were never considered by the British ministers. The immediate object was to procure money, and by virtually making bank-notes a legal tender they secured unlimited means at home through the medium of loans and taxes, which a corrupt parliament insured to them and which by reaction insured the corruption of parliament. This resource failed abroad. They could send from England enormous supplies in kind and did so, contracts being an essential part of their system of corruption, aptly described as bribing one-half of the nation with the money of the other half in order to misgovern both. Specie was however to be had only in comparatively small quantities, and at a premium so exorbitant that the most reckless politician trembled for the ultimate consequences.

The foreign policy of the government was simple, namely, to bribe all powers to war down France. To Russia everything save specie was granted, and amicable relations with Sweden were immediately re-established because she had openly violated the continental system by permitting the entry of British goods at Stralsund. But wherever wisdom or skill was required the English ministers' resources failed altogether. With respect to Sicily, Spain, and Portugal, this truth was notorious; and to preserve the political support of the trading interests at home, a degrading and deceitful policy quite opposed to the spirit of Wellington's counsels was followed in regard to the revolted Spanish colonies. Their short-sighted injustice was however most glaring with regard to the United States of America. Mutual complaints the dregs of the war of independence, had long characterised the intercourse between the British and American governments, and were turned into extreme hatred by the progress of the war with France. The British government in 1806 proclaimed contrary to the law of nations a blockade of the French coast which could not be enforced. Napoleon in return issued the celebrated decrees of Berlin and Milan, which produced the no less celebrated orders in council. The commerce of all neutrals was thus extinguished by the arrogance of the belligerents; yet the latter finding it convenient

to relax their mutual violence granted licences to each other's ships, and by this scandalous evasion of their own policy caused the whole of the evil to fall upon the neutral who was called the friend of both parties.

Unwilling to go to war with two such powerful states, the Americans were yet resolved not to submit to the tyranny of either; but the English injustice was the most direct and extended in its operations, and it was embittered by the violence used towards the seamen of the United States: not less than six thousand sailors, it was said, were taken from merchant vessels on the high seas and forced to serve in the British men-of-war. Wherefore, after first passing retaliatory or rather warning acts called the non-intercourse, non-importation and embargo acts, the Americans finally declared war at the moment when the British government, alarmed at the consequences of their own injustice, had rescinded the orders in council. The immediate effect of these things on the contest in the Peninsula shall be noticed in another place: the ultimate effects on England's prosperity have not yet been unfolded. The struggle prematurely told the secret of American strength and drew the attention of the world to a people, who, notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their general government uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe.

18th June,
1812.

Political state of Spain.—Bad government is more hurtful than direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired and the public mind is often purified and advanced by adversity; the evils springing from the former seem interminable. In the Isla de Leon the unseemly currents of folly, although less raging than before, continued to break open new channels and yet abandoned none of the old. The intrigues of Carlotta were unremitted; and though the danger of provoking the populace of Cadiz restrained and frightened her advocates in the Cortes, she opposed the English diplomacy with reiterated and not quite unfounded accusations, that the revolt of the colonies was being perfidiously fostered by Great Britain.

Hence the scheme of mediation, revived in April by lord Castlereagh, was received by the Spaniards with outward coldness and a secret resolution to reject it altogether: nor were they in want of reasons to justify their proceedings. For the mediation, commenced by lord Wellesley when the quarrel was yet capable of adjustment, was now renewed when it could not succeed. English commissioners were to carry it into execution and Infantado was to join them on the part of Spain. Mr. Stuart was to have been one of the commission Mr. Sydenham being to succeed him at Lisbon, but finally he remained in Portugal and Sydenham joined the commission, which he thus described.

‘I do not understand a word of the Spanish language, I am unacquainted with the Spanish character, I know very little of Old Spain, and I am quite ignorant of the state of the colonies, yet I am part of a commission composed of men of different professions, views, habits, feelings, and opinions. The mediation proposed is at least a year too late, it has been forced upon the government of Old Spain, I have no confidence in the ministers who employ me, and I am fully persuaded they have not the slightest confidence in me.’

It was essential to have Bardaxi’s secret article, which required England to join Old Spain if the mediation failed, withdrawn; but this could not be done without the consent of the Cortes, and publicity would have ruined the credit of the mediation with the colonists. Nor would the distrust of the latter have been unfounded, for though lord Wellesley had offered the guarantee of Great Britain to any arrangement made under her mediation, his successors would not do so! ‘They empower us,’ said Mr. Sydenham, ‘to negotiate and sign a treaty but will not guarantee the execution of it! My opinion is that the formal signature of a treaty by plenipotentiaries is in itself a solemn guarantee, if there is good faith and fair dealing in the transaction; and I believe that this opinion will be confirmed by the authority of every writer on the law of nations. But this is certainly not the doctrine of our present ministers, they make a broad distinction between the ratification of a treaty and the intention of seeing it duly observed.’

Failure was inevitable. The Spaniards wanted the commis-

sioners to go first to the Caraccas, where the revolt being full blown nothing could be effected; the British government insisted they should go to Mexico where the dispute had not been pushed to extremities: and after much useless diplomacy which continued until the end of the year the negotiation as Mr. Sydenham had predicted proved abortive.

In March the new constitution of Spain was solemnly adopted, and a decree settling the succession of the crown was promulgated. The infant Francisco de Paulo, the queen of Etruria, and their respective descendants, were excluded from the succession, which was to fall to the princess Carlotta if the infant Don Carlos failed of heirs, then to the hereditary princess of the Two Sicilies, and so on, the empress of France and her descendants being especially excluded. This exhibition of popular power under the pretext of baffling Napoleon's schemes struck at the principle of legitimacy. And when the extraordinary Cortes, deciding that the ordinary Cortes which ought to assemble every year should not be convoked until October 1813, secured to itself a tenure of power for two years instead of one, discontent increased at Cadiz and in the provinces,—close connexion being kept up between the malcontents and the Portuguese government which was then the stronghold of arbitrary power in the Peninsula. The local junta of Estremadura adopting Carlotta's claims in their whole extent, communicated secretly with the Portuguese regency, and more openly with Mr. Stuart, proposing to replace all acting provincial authorities with persons acknowledging Carlotta's sovereignty, and declaring they would abide by the new constitution only so far as it acknowledged what they called legitimate power: in other words the princess was to be sole regent. Yet this party was not influenced by Carlotta's intrigues, for they would not join her agents in any outcry against the British; they merely resisted democracy, and they desired to know how England would view their proceedings. The Biscayans angrily rejected the new constitution as opposed to their ancient privileges; the other provinces received it coldly; and the abolition of the inquisition, now openly agitated, gave a point around which rallied all the clergy and all the clergy could influence. The Cortes thus assailed was

also weakened by its own factions, yet the republicans gained strength, for lord William Bentinck's new constitution in Sicily encouraged them, alarmed their opponents in Spain, and produced fear and distrust in the government of Portugal. Amidst the varying subjects of interest however, the insane project of reducing the colonies by force remained a favourite with all parties; nor was it in relation to the colonies only, that, while demanding aid from other nations in the names of freedom justice and humanity, they showed themselves devoid of those attributes themselves. 'The humane object of the abolition of the slave-trade has been frustrated,' said lord Castlereagh, 'because not only Spanish subjects but Spanish public officers and governors in various parts of the Spanish colonies are instrumental to and accomplices in the crimes of the contraband slave-traders of Great Britain and America, furnishing them with flags, papers, and solemn documents to entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruisers, and to represent their property as Spanish.'

With respect to the war all manner of mischief was abroad. The regular cavalry had been entirely destroyed, and when with the secret permission of their own government some distinguished Austrian officers proffered their services to the regency to restore that arm they were repelled. Nearly all the field artillery had been lost in action, the arsenals at Cadiz were exhausted, most of the heavy guns on the works of the Isla were unserviceable from constant and useless firing, the stores of shot diminished in an alarming manner, no sums were appropriated to the support of the founderies and the British artillery officers' remonstrances only produced a demand for English money to put the founderies into activity. To crown the whole, Abadia, recalled from Galicia at the express desire of sir Henry Wellesley because of his bad conduct, was now made minister of war. In Ceuta, notwithstanding the presence of a small British force, the Spanish garrison the galley slaves and the prisoners of war, who were allowed to range at large, joined in a plan for delivering that place to the Moors; not from treachery but to avoid starving, a catastrophe only staved off by frequent assistance from the magazines of Gibraltar. Ceuta might then have been acquired by England in exchange

for the debt due by Spain, and general Campbell urged it on lord Liverpool but he rejected the proposal, fearing to awaken jealousy. Yet the notion came originally from the people themselves, and that jealousy which he feared was already in full activity, being only another name for the democratic spirit then rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle upon which England afforded her assistance to the Peninsula.

The foreign policy was not less absurd than the home policy, though necessarily contracted. Castro, the envoy at Lisbon and agreeable both to the Portuguese and British authorities, was replaced by Bardaxi who was opposed to both. This man having been just before sent on a special mission to Stockholm to arrange a treaty with that court was referred to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient was Bernadotte to the czar: one point however was characteristically discussed by the Swedish prince and the Spanish envoy. Bardaxi demanded assistance in troops, Bernadotte wanted a subsidy which was promised without hesitation, but when security for payment was desired the negotiation instantly dropped! A treaty of alliance was however concluded between Spain and Russia in July, and while Bardaxi was thus pretending to subsidize Sweden, his own government by unceasing solicitations extorted from England a million of money with arms and clothing for one hundred thousand men, in return for which five thousand Spaniards were to be enlisted for the British ranks.

To raise Spanish soldiers was a favourite project with many English officers who still believed in Spanish heroism. General Graham had not disdained to offer his services and Joseph was disquieted; for the Catalans had before formally demanded such a policy and a like feeling was expressed in other places; but when the proof of sincerity came only a few hundred half-starved Spaniards of low condition enlisted. Recruited principally by the light division, they were carefully taught and kindly treated, yet they did not make good soldiers. The government however demanded and obtained arms clothing and equipments for ten thousand cavalry, though they had not five hundred regular horsemen to arm, and had just rejected the aid of the Austrian officers. These supplies were like all

others embezzled or wasted, and with exception of a trifling amelioration in Carlos d'España's corps effected by Wellington himself, the subsidy produced no benefit, for every branch of administration was cankered and the public mischief portentous.

Ferdinand living contentedly at Valençay rejected all plans for escape: Kolli and the brothers Sagas had been alike disregarded. The councillor Sobral, who had long lived at Victor's head-quarters and betrayed him, travelled with that marshal to France, and now proposed to carry the prince off, but was likewise baffled: Ferdinand would listen to no proposal save through Escoiquez who lived at some distance, Sobral would not trust him and escaped to Lisbon, fearful of being betrayed by the prince. Joseph was meanwhile advancing towards the political conquest of the country and spoke with ostentation of assembling a Cortes in his own interests; but this was to cover a secret intercourse with the Cortes in the Isla de Leon where his partisans called '*Afrancesados*' were increasing. For many of the democratic party, seeing the gulf separating them from the clergy and from England could never be closed, and that bad government deprived them of the people's support, looked to Joseph as having principles more in unison with their own. He offered to adopt the new constitution with some modifications, and as many of the Cortes were inclined to accept his terms the British policy was on the eve of ruin when Wellington's iron arm again fixed the destiny of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

HERE the internal condition had not improved. The government, composed of civilians, was unable and unwilling to stimulate the administration connected with military affairs, and the complaints of the army reaching the Brazils drew reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws he only increased Beresford's authority which was already sufficiently great. The foreigner's power was augmented while the native authorities were degraded in the eyes of the people, and as their influence to do good dwindled their ill-will increased; yet their power of mischief was not lessened, because they still formed an intermediate link between the military commander and the subordinate authorities: thus the passive patriotism of the people, the abuses of the government and the double-dealing at the Brazils, counterbalanced the extraordinary energy of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. The latter had foreseen that the regent's concessions at the time of Borel's arrest would produce but a momentary effect, and the intrigues of Rio Janeiro revived when lord Wellesley quitted the British cabinet. But previous to that event, Mr. Sydenham represented so strongly the evil of lord Strangford's conduct that lord Wellesley would have immediately dismissed him, if Sydenham, who was offered the situation, had not refused to profit from the effects of his own report. Lord Louvaine was then to be appointed ambassador, and as he was to touch at Lisbon and consult Wellington whether to press for the prince's return or for a change of regency, a confidential agent was sent direct to Rio Janeiro to keep lord Strangford from inter-

mediate mischief. Lord Louvaine was however on bad terms with his uncle the duke of Northumberland, who was zealous for Lord Strangford; and to a government relying on corruption the discontent of a nobleman having parliamentary interest was necessarily more important than success in war. Hence another man was to be sought, and as the Portuguese prince had now acceded to Wellington's demands the effect of this change was awaited. Meanwhile the dissensions in the English cabinet excluded the consideration of other affairs, and lord Strangford pursued his evil career until severe rebukes from Wellington and Stuart convinced him that his tenure of office was not sure.

It was however prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian intrigues that the prince, intimidated by lord Wellesley, had given Beresford despotic power over the military administration, had agreed to the reforms proposed, and empowered Wellington to remove principal Souza from the regency. Lord Castlereagh also, adopting lord Wellesley's policy in this matter, insisted that all the obnoxious members should be displaced; and this blow at the Souza faction was accompanied by the death of Linhares the head of the house, an event which paralysed the court of Rio Janeiro. Nevertheless the family was still so powerful that Domingo Souza, now count of Funchal, succeeded Linhares as prime minister and yet retained the embassy to the English court. And Wellington, whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered him the fittest person possible to deal with the exactions and political cunning of a people who so much resemble Asiatics, now opposed the removal of the obnoxious members from the regency. He would not even dismiss the principal. For with a refined policy he argued, that opposition to his measures arose as much from national as individual character—that some of the authorities being obnoxious to their own court were dependent upon the British power for support,—that among them were persons of great ability, and no beneficial change could be expected, because the influence already gained would be lost with new men—the latter would have the same faults with less talent and less dependence on the British power. the dismissed ministers would become active

enemies, the patriarch would go to Oporto where his power to do mischief would be increased, and principal Souza would then be made patriarch. It was indeed desirable to drive this man, whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion of insanity, from the regency, but he could neither be persuaded nor forced to quit Portugal. His dismissal had been extorted from the prince by the British government, and he would have secret influence over the civil administration and be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which would increase his popularity while his power would be augmented by the sanctity of his character as patriarch. A change would therefore bring small advantage and any reform would be attributed to the English influence, against which the numerous interests involved in the preservation of abuses would instantly combine.

On the other hand the real nature of the war had never been fairly before the people. They had been deceived, flattered, cajoled, their prowess extolled beyond reason, the enemy spoken of contemptuously; but the resources of the nation, which consisted neither in its armies nor in its revenue, nor in its boasting, but in the sacrificing of all interests to the prosecution of the contest, had never been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of the war. The regency had not appealed to the patriotism of the population nor enforced sacrifices, though absolutely necessary, because, as the English general honestly observed, no people would ever voluntarily bear such enormous burthens: strong laws and heavy penalties could alone insure obedience. The Portuguese government relied upon England and her subsidies, and resisted every attempt to draw forth the natural resources. Their subordinates evaded or executed corruptly and vexatiously the military regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief were the principal and his faction.

Thus dragged by opposing forces Wellington took a middle course. That is, he strove by reproaches and redoubled activity to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities, he desired the British ministers at Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro to paint the dangerous state of Portugal in vivid colours, and urge the prince to enforce reform of gross abuses which in the

taxes, the customs, the general expenditure and the execution of orders by inferior magistrates, were withering the strength of the nation. And at the same time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he transmitted memoirs upon the nature of these different evils and the remedies for them which will attest to the latest posterity the greatness and vigour of his capacity. His efforts aided by the suspension of the subsidy produced partial reforms, but the character of the prince prevented general or permanent cure; his weakness made him the tool of court intriguers, and his obstinacy was to be warily dealt with, lest some dogged conduct should compel Wellington to put his often-repeated threat of abandoning the country into execution. This occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; the difficulty might with appliances be lessened but not swept away, and the British general, involved in ceaseless disputes and suffering hourly mortifications the least of which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle as he could to victory.

Viewing the contest as one of life or death to Portugal he desired to make the whole political economy of the state a simple provision for the war, and when thwarted his reproaches were as bitter as they were just; nevertheless the men to whom they were addressed were not devoid of merit. In after times, while complaining that he could find no persons of talent in Spain he admitted that amongst the Portuguese Redondo possessed probity and ability, that Nogueira was a statesman of capacity equal to the discussion of great questions, and that no monarch in Europe had a better public servant than Forjas: even the restless principal disinterestedly prosecuted measures for forcing the clergy to pay their just share of the imposts. But greatness of mind on great occasions is a rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered the sacrifices demanded a sharper ill than submission, and it was impossible to unite entire obedience to the will of the British authorities with an energetic original spirit in the native government. The Souza faction was always violent and foolish; but the milder opposition of the three gentlemen above mentioned was excusable. Wellington, a foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing

his own government, forwarding his own fortune; final success was sure to send him to England resplendent with glory and beyond the reach of Portuguese ill-will. The native authorities had no such prospects. Their exertions brought little of personal fame, they were odious to the prince and his favourites, and they feared to excite the enmity of the people by a vigour unpleasing to their sovereign and sure to draw after-evil upon themselves—from the French if the invasion succeeded, from their own court if the independence of the country should be ultimately obtained.

But thus much conceded for the sake of justice, it may be affirmed with truth that the conduct of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments was always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding the prince's concessions it was scarcely possible to remedy any abuses. The Lisbon government, substituting evasive for active opposition, baffled Wellington and Stuart by proposing inadequate laws and suffering effectual measures to be neglected with impunity, and the treaty of commerce with England always supplied a source of dispute, partly from its natural difficulties partly from their own bad faith. The general's labours were thus multiplied not abated by his new powers, and in measuring these labours it is to be noted, so entirely did Portugal depend upon England, that Wellington instead of drawing provisions for his army from the country, in a manner fed the whole nation and was often forced to keep the army magazines low that the people might live. This is proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, and pork from America, which increased each year of the war in a surprising manner, the price keeping pace with the quantity, while the importation of dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, decreased. In 1808 the supply of flour and wheat from New York was sixty thousand barrels. In 1811 six hundred thousand; in 1813, between seven and eight hundred thousand. Ireland, England, Egypt, Barbary, Sicily, the Brazils, Spain and even France, contributed likewise to the consumption, which greatly exceeded the natural means of Portugal: English treasure therefore either directly or indirectly furnished the nation as well as the armies

Pitkin's
Statistic
Tables.

In Portugal the peace revenue, including the Brazils the

colonies and the islands, even in the most flourishing periods had never exceeded thirty-six millions of cruzada novas; in 1811, although Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this sum added to the British subsidy fell very short of the actual expenditure; yet economy was opposed by the local government, the prince was continually creating useless offices for his favourites and encouraging law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops and fortresses were neglected, although the military branches of expense amounted to more than three-fourths of the whole receipts;—and though Mr. Stuart engaged that England either by treaty or tribute would keep the Algerines quiet he could not obtain the suppression of the Portuguese navy, which always fled from the barbarians. It was not until the middle of the year 1812, when admiral Berkeley whose proceedings had at times produced considerable inconvenience was recalled, that Mr. Stuart with the aid of admiral Martin, who succeeded Berkeley without a seat in the regency, effected this naval reform.

Rather than adopt the measures suggested by Wellington, such as keeping up the credit of the paper-money by regular payments of the interest, the fair and general collection of the '*Decima*,' and the repression of abuses in the custom-house, the arsenal and the militia, always more costly than the line, the government projected the issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured by unworthy stock-jobbing schemes to evade instead of meeting the difficulties of the times. To check their folly the general withheld the subsidy and refused to receive their depreciated paper into the military chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding produce more than a momentary return to honesty. The working people were so cruelly oppressed they would not labour for the public except under the direction of British officers; force alone could overcome their repugnance and force was employed, not to forward the defence of the country but to meet particular interests and support abuses. And so generally base were the *fidalgos*, that even the charitable aid of money received from England was shamefully and greedily claimed by the rich, who insisted that it was a donation to all and to be equally divided.

Wellington's energies were squandered on vexatious details

At one time he was remonstrating against the oppression of the working people, and devising remedies for local abuses; at another superintending the application of the English charities and arranging the measures necessary to revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at all times endeavouring to reform the general administration and in no case supported. Never during the war did he find an appeal to the patriotism of the Portuguese government answered frankly; never did he propose a measure which was accepted without difficulties. This opposition was at times carried to such a ridiculous extent, that when some Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge with the curate Merino and desired from their own government a promise of safety, to which they were really entitled, the regency refused to give that assurance; nor would they publish an amnesty which the English general desired for the sake of justice, and from policy also because valuable information as to the French army could have been thus obtained. The authorities would neither say yes! nor no! and when general Pamplona applied to Wellington personally for some assurance, the latter could only answer that in like cases Mascarheñas had been hanged and Sabugal rewarded!

To force an entire change of government seemed to some the only remedy for the distemperature of the time; but this might have produced anarchy, and would have encouraged a democratic spirit contrary to the general policy of the British cabinet. Wellington desired rather to have the prince regent at Lisbon or the Azores, whence his authority might under the influence of England be more directly used to enforce salutary regulations; he however judged it essential that Carlotta should not be with him, and she on the other hand laboured to come back without the prince, who was prevented from moving by continued disturbances in the Brazils. Then Mr. Stuart, despairing of good, proposed the establishment of a military government at once, but Wellington would not agree although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of the military machine.

A law of king Sebastian which compelled all gentlemen holding land to take arms was now revived, but desertion

which had commenced with the first appointment of British officers increased; and so many persons sailed away in British vessels of war to evade military service in their own country that an edict was published to prevent the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for a moment by condemning deserters to hard labour and offering rewards to the country people to deliver them up; griping want however renewed the evil at the commencement of the campaign, and the terrible severity of condemning nineteen at once to death did not repress it. The cavalry, at all times inefficient, was nearly ruined, the men were faint-hearted, the breed of horses almost extinct, and shameful peculations amongst the officers increased the mischief: one guilty colonel was broken and his uniform stripped from his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon. These examples produced fear and astonishment rather than correction, the misery of the troops continued, and the army, although by the care of Beresford again numbering thirty thousand under arms, declined in moral character and spirit.

To govern armies in the field is a great and difficult matter. But in this contest the operations were so intimately connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the Brazils, and the contest so affected the policy of every nation of the civilised world that unprecedented difficulties sprung up, and the ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon's continental system joined to his financial measures, which were quite opposed to debt and paper money, increased the pernicious effects of the English bank restriction; specie, abundant in France, had nearly disappeared from England and was obtained from abroad at an incredible expense. The few markets left for British manufactures and colonial produce did not always make returns in the articles necessary for the war. Gold, indispensable in certain quantities, was supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the proportion of only one-sixth of what was required by an army which professed to pay for everything. Hence continual efforts on the part of the government to force markets; hence a depreciation of value in goods and bills; hence a continual struggle on the part of the general to sustain a contest

dependent on such a precarious system. Dependent also it was upon the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its colonies to rebellion when the French armies were in possession of four-fifths of the mother country; another was hourly raising up obstacles to its own defence though the enemy had just been driven from the capital; the third was forcing a war with America, its greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the struggle in the Peninsula!

A failure of the preceding year's harvest all over Europe had rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little grain was to be obtained in any country of the north of Europe accessible to the British, and the necessity of paying hard money rendered even that slight resource null. Sicily and Malta were thrown for subsistence upon Africa, where colonial produce was indeed available for commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had there was small and the capricious barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. In December, 1811, there was only two months' consumption of corn in Portugal for the population, although the magazines of the army contained more than three. To America therefore it was necessary to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had given treasury bills to the house of Sampaio for the purchase of American corn; but the disputes between England and the United States, the depreciation of English bills from the quantity in the market, together with the expiration of the American bank charter, prevented Sampaio from completing his commission. Nevertheless, although the increasing bitterness of the dispute discouraged a renewal of this plan, some more bills were given to the English minister at Washington with directions to purchase corn for Sampaio to resell in Portugal as before, to fill the military chest. Other bills were sent to the Brazils to purchase rice, and all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired to encourage the exportation of grain and the importation of colonial produce. In this manner, despite of the ministers' incapacity, Wellington found resources to feed the population, to recover some of the specie expended by the army, and to maintain the war. But as the year advanced the non-intercourse-act of congress, which had

caused a serious drain of specie from Portugal, was followed by an embargo for ninety days, and then famine which already afflicted parts of Spain menaced Portugal.

Mr. Stuart knew of this embargo before the speculators did, and sent his agents orders to buy up with hard cash at a certain price a quantity of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. He could only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost soon rose beyond his means in specie, but the new harvest being nearly ripe this prompt effort sufficed for the occasion: happily so, for the American declaration of war followed and American privateers took the place of American flour ships. Stuart's energy redoubled. Seeking for grain in all parts of the world, he discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient quantity might be obtained in exchange for English manufactures to secure Portugal from absolute famine; and to protect this traffic and preserve that with the United States, he persuaded the regency to declare the neutrality of Portugal and interdict the sale of prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington's desire, besought the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus and keep cruisers at particular stations: finally he pressed financial reform in Portugal with the utmost vigour and some success. His efforts were however strangely counteracted from quarters least expected. The English consul in the Western Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited the islanders to war with America when Mr. Stuart's efforts were directed to prevent such a calamity; the admiralty neglected to station cruisers and the American privateers had thus a free range along the Portuguese and African coasts. Meanwhile English mercantile cupidity broke down the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, which was the chief medium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war.

This paper had arisen from a simple military regulation. Wellington, on assuming the command in 1809, found that all persons gave their own vouchers in payment for provisions, whereupon he proclaimed that none save commissaries should thus act; and that all local accounts should be paid within one month in ready money if it was in the chest, if not, with bills on the commissary-general. These bills became numerous, yet their value did not sink, because they enabled those who

had really furnished supplies to prove their debts without following the head-quarters; and they had an advantage over receipts inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out the person who was to pay; they were also in accord with the customs of the country, for the people were used to receive government bills. The possessors were paid in rotation whenever there was money; the small holders the real furnishers of the army first, the speculators last, a regulation consonant to justice and upholding the credit of the paper.

In 1812 this paper sunk twenty per cent. from the sordid practices of English mercantile houses whose agents secretly depreciated its credit and then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they were aided by some of the commissariat notwithstanding the vigilant probity of the chief commissary. Sums as low as ten-pence made payable in Lisbon were to be seen in the hands of poor country people on the frontiers. By these infamous proceedings the smaller dealers were ruined or forced to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and contracted the markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and there was much danger that the people generally would thus discover the mode of getting cash for bills by submitting to high discounts, which would soon have rendered the contest too costly to continue. But the resources of Wellington and Stuart were not exhausted. They contrived to preserve the neutrality of Portugal, and by means of licences continued to have importations of American flour until the end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for this flour was paid for with English goods and resold at a considerable profit for specie which went to the military chest. They had less success in upholding the Portuguese government paper credit. Bad faith and the necessities of the native commissariat, which now caused an extraordinary issue, had combined to lower its credit. From England the conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart proposed a bank and other schemes, such as a loan of one million and a half from the English treasury, which shall be treated at length in another place. Wellington, ridiculing the fallacy of a government with revenues unequal to its expenditure borrowing from a government which was unable to find specie sufficient to sustain the war, remarked,

that the money could not be realized in the Portuguese treasury, or must be so at the expense of a military chest whose hollow sound already mocked the soldiers' shout of victory. Again therefore he demanded reform, offered to take the responsibility and odium upon himself, explained in detail his views and avowed his conviction that the exigencies of the war could be thus met, and the most vexatious imposts upon the poor abolished. He made as little impression upon Funchal as he had done upon Linhares. Money was nowhere to be had, he had been compelled to trade himself, and he now tolerated for the sake of the resources it furnished a contraband commerce which he discovered Soult to have established with English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the quicksilver of Almaden for colonial produce. But in his own personal resources he was still to find the means of beating the enemy in despite of the matchless follies of the governments he served, and he did so, but complained that it was a hard task.

BOOK THE EIGHTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE political positions of the belligerent power and the chains connecting the war with American as well as European interests having been shown, the minor military events narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle was to be made indicated, nought remains to tell save the strength and peculiar preparation on each side ere the noble armies dashed together in the shock of battle. Nearly three hundred thousand French still trampled upon Spain, and so successful had been the plan of raising native soldiers that forty thousand Spaniards well organized marched under the king's banners. In May this immense army was named and distributed as follows.

Seventy-six thousand, sixty thousand being with the eagles, formed the 'armies of Catalonia and Aragon' under Suchet, and occupied those two provinces and Valencia. Forty-nine thousand, of which thirty-eight thousand were with the eagles, composed the 'army of the north' under Caffarelli. They were distributed on the grand line of communication from St. Sebastian to Burgos, but two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry with artillery were always destined to reinforce Marmont when required. Nineteen thousand, seventeen thousand being with the eagles, formed the 'army of the centre,' which occupied a variety of posts on a circle round Madrid but always had one division in La Mancha. Sixty-three thousand, fifty-six thousand being with the eagles, composing the army of the south under Soult, occupied Andalusia and a part of Estremadura;

Appendix 8
§ 1.

but some were still detained in distant governments. Marmont's army of Portugal was seventy thousand strong, fifty-two thousand being with the eagles, and a reinforcement of twelve thousand was coming from France. He occupied Leon, part of Old Castille and the Asturias, having his front upon the Tormes and a division watching Gallicia. The Spanish *juramentados* were principally employed in Andalusia and with the army of the centre, and the experience of Ocaña, of Badajos, and many other places, proved that for the intrusive monarch they fought with more vigour than their countrymen did against him.

In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief of all the French armies, but the generals as usual resisted his authority. Dorsenne denied it altogether,—Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, disputed even his civil power in the governments of the north,—Suchet evaded his orders,—Marmont neglected them, and Soult firmly opposed his injudicious military plans. The king was distressed for money, and he complained that Marmont's army had consumed or plundered in three months the whole resources of the province of Toledo and the district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army of the centre were famished. Marmont retorted by complaints of the wasteful extravagance of the king's military administration in the capital: thus dissensions were generated when the most absolute union was required. After the fall of Badajos Joseph thought the allies would move against Marmont in Castille, against himself by the valley of the Tagus, or against Soult in Andalusia. In the first case he designed to aid Marmont with the divisions of the north, the army of the centre, and fifteen thousand men from the army of the south. In the second case to draw the army of Portugal and a part of the army of the south into the valley of the Tagus, while the divisions from the army of the north entered Leon. In the third case, half of Marmont's army reinforced by a division of the army of the centre was to pass the Tagus at Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the army of the centre was not ready to take the field and Wellington knew it. Marmont's complaint was just, waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid; and there was so little military vigour

Joseph's Correspondence,
MSS

that the Empecinado and other partida chiefs pushed their excursions to the very gates of that capital.

Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army of the centre, and having as before said called up Palombini from the army of the Ebro, directed Soult to keep one-third of the army of the south under Drouet so far in Estremadura as to communicate directly with Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; and Drouet was to pass that river if Hill passed it. It was necessary, Joseph said, to follow the English army and fight it with advantage of numbers; to do which required a strict co-operation of the three armies, Drouet's corps being the pivot. Marmont and Soult being each convinced that Wellington would invade their separate provinces, desired the king so to view the coming contest and compel the other to regulate his movements thereby; the former complained also that having to observe the Gallicians and occupy the Asturias his forces were disseminated; and he asked for reinforcements to chase the partidas who impeded the gathering of provisions in Castille and Leon. But the king, overrating the importance of Madrid, designed rather to draw more troops round the capital; and he objected to Soult's projects against Tarifa and Carthagera; arguing that if Drouet was not ready to pass the Tagus the whole of the allies could unite on the right bank and penetrate without opposition to the capital, or that Wellington would overwhelm Marmont.

Soult however would not let Drouet stir, and Joseph, jealous of that marshal's power in Andalusia, threatened to deprive him of his command; the inflexible duke replied that the king had already virtually done so by sending orders direct to Drouet, that he was ready to resign but he would not commit a gross military

Joseph's
Correspondence, MSS.

error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help Marmont and would be too weak for the protection of Madrid, and his absence would ruin Andalusia; for the allies whose force in Estremadura was very considerable could in five marches reach Seville and take it on the sixth;—they would then communicate with the fleets at Cadiz, would change their line of operations without loss, and unite with thirty thousand other troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, the Isla,

the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A new army might also come from the ocean, and Drouet once beyond the Tagus could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve days,—Marmont could scarcely come there in a month,—the force under his own command was spread all over Andalusia; if collected it would not furnish thirty thousand sabres and bayonets exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the province would be unavoidable.

All the French misfortunes he said had arisen from not acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal by spreading too much to its right would ruin this campaign as it had ruined the preceding one. ‘Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position on both sides of the pass of Baños, the left near Plasencia the right extending towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without lending his left flank; nor the Tormes without lending his right flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily concentrate and according to the nature of the attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus, or by the province of Avila, while the divisions on the Tormes, reinforced by two others from the army of the north, would act on the allies’ flank.’ For these reasons he would not let Drouet quit Estremadura, yet he would reinforce him and so press Hill that Graham, whom he supposed still at Portalegre, would be compelled to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be compelled to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English general, well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made arrangements to confirm each general in his own peculiar views.

Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese government, Wellington’s most secret despatches to Forjas containing an account of his army and his first designs against the south, were printed, and the invasion of

Andalusia was only relinquished the middle of May. Hill's exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but he adroitly spread a report that his object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and Wellington's demonstrations were all calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton's cavalry; but Hill was reinforced, Graham's march was sudden and secret, and the enemy was thus again deceived in all quarters. Marmont and the king by reckoning the number of the English divisions thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers though his division seemed the same; while Soult, not immediately aware of Graham's departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet and therefore still expected the allies in Andalusia.

Drouet wishing to obey the king rather than Soult had drawn towards Medellin in June, and to force him back, Soult, as before noticed, sent his reinforcements from Seville by the road of Monasterio. Then followed those movements and counter-movements in Estremadura already related, each side being desirous of keeping a great number of their adversaries in that province. Soult's judgment was the soundest. Drouet could not have crossed the Tagus without peril to Andalusia, but in Estremadura he aided Marmont by drawing men from Wellington until the latter's army was less numerous than the army of Portugal, and very inferior to what that army could be raised to by detachments from Caffarelli and the king. But while the French generals disputed Wellington completed his dispositions. He had at last established a general system for giving intelligence, and as his campaign was one which posterity will delight to study the foundations on which it rested shall be exactly shown.

His reasons for seeking a battle have been stated, but he sought it conditionally and at advantage, because to enforce the concentration of the French was sure gain without fighting. Of ninety thousand Anglo-Portuguese under his command six thousand only were in Cadiz; but Walcheren was still to be atoned for, the regiments which had served there

were so sickly that only thirty-two thousand British soldiers were in line. The Portuguese were twenty-four thousand, and so distributed by brigades or regiments, that in speaking of English divisions in battle the Portuguese soldiers are always included, and their fighting was such as to justify the general term. Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry with twenty-four guns were under Hill, who had also the support of four Portuguese garrison battalions and the fifth Spanish army. Twelve hundred Portuguese cavalry under general D'Urban were in the *Tras os Montes*. Three thousand five hundred British cavalry and thirty-six thousand infantry with fifty-four guns were under Wellington's personal command, which was enlarged by three thousand five hundred Spaniards, cavalry and infantry, under Carlos D'España and Julian Sanchez.

To lengthen the French communications Almaraz had been destroyed. To shorten his own Wellington resolved to repair Alcantara, which had been placed within his positions by Hill's recent operations. The breach in that stupendous structure was ninety feet wide and one hundred and fifty feet above the water-line, yet the fertile genius of Sturgeon furnished the means of passing it with heavy artillery, and without the enemy being aware of the preparations made until the moment of execution. In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a network of strong ropes after a fashion which permitted it to be divided and carried with its appurtenances to Alcantara on seventeen carriages. Straining beams were then fixed on each side of the broken arch, cables were stretched across the chasm, the net-work was drawn over, tarpaulin blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat procured a short internal line of communication along good roads, while the enemy, by the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown upon a long external line and very bad roads: thus Hill was suddenly brought fourteen days' march nearer to Wellington than Drouet was to Marmont.

Agriculture in Portugal was seriously embarrassed by the military demand for draught cattle, and yet the subsistence of the troops could only be carried a few marches beyond the

Agueda. Sailors and peasantry were now set to remove the obstructions of the Douro and the Tagus, and the latter, which under Philip the Second had been navigable from Toledo, was opened to Malpica near Alcantara, the Douro to Barca de Alba on the confines of Spain. This relieved the interior of Portugal from the burthen of land carriage, and the magazines were brought up by the Tagus to Alcantara on one flank, and by the Douro to within a short distance of Almeida, Rodrigo and Salamanca on the other. But the last line was supplied from the sea, and American privateers were to be apprehended because the Admiralty neglected the protection of the coast. Suddenly also the navigation of the Douro was suspended by the overheated zeal of a commissary, who being thwarted by the tardiness of the native boatmen issued of his own authority an edict establishing regulations and pronouncing pains and penalties. The river craft instantly disappeared and the government endeavoured to give political importance to the matter, which was the more embarrassing as the boatmen had before been so averse to passing the old points of navigation that severe measures were necessary to compel them.

When this vexation was overcome Wellington had still to dread, if his operations led him far into Spain, that his subsistence would not be sure, for there were objects of absolute necessity, especially meat, which could only be procured with ready money and he had no specie—lord William Bentinck had swept the Mediterranean money markets by his ill-advised competition, and the English ministers chose this period of embarrassment ignorantly and injuriously to interfere with the mode of issuing bills. His resolution to advance was not indeed shaken, but when describing his plan of campaign to lord Liverpool he finished with these remarkable words. ‘I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I undertake this operation. My friends in Castille, and I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that we shall not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped; that there exist concealed granaries which shall be opened to us, and that if we can pay for a part credit will be given to us for the remainder,

and they have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castille upon British securities. In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castille, the general action and its results being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall have at all events our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. *But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed; nor upon the consequences which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.*

All Wellington's difficulties were political and all created by others, but his purely military combinations were never at fault; for though he sometimes underrated his enemy's force his preparations had always an ample margin for miscalculation, and his projected operations were now profoundly considered. His right was secured by Hill's success against Almaraz, because the valley of the Tagus was exhausted of provisions, and full of cross rivers which required a pontoon train to pass if the French should menace Portugal seriously in that line: moreover he had caused the fortress of Monte Santos, which protected the Portuguese frontier between the Tagus and Rodrigo, to be put into a state of defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill the power of quickly interfering. On the other side if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli's divisions, should operate strongly against his left a retreat was open upon Rodrigo, or across the mountains into the valley of the Tagus. And his own flanks being thus secured his combinations to weaken those of his enemy embraced the whole Peninsula.

1°. He directed Silveira and d'Urban to file from the Trasmontes by the Douro along the enemy's right flank and rear, and form a link of connexion with the Gallician army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, when the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile sir Home Popham's expedition was to commence operations in concert with the seventh Spanish army on the coast of Biscay, and so draw Caffarelli's divisions from the succour of Marmont.

2°. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia in concert with the Murcian army.

3°. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill Wellington relied—on the garrison of Gibraltar and the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops in the Isla de Leon;—on insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, where Echevaria going from Cadiz by the way of Ayamonte was to organize the partidas of that district—on Ballesteros's army—but he dreaded the rashness of this general who might be crushed in a moment, which would endanger Hill and render success in the north nugatory. It was this fear which caused him to keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult's resolution to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura even though Hill should cross the Tagus was wise and military. For though Drouet's junction would have given the king and Marmont a vast superiority in Castille, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington; seeing Hill could always, by crossing the Tagus at Alcantara, have misled Drouet to do the same at Arzobispo, which would have led to nothing; and then Hill could have returned, thereby giving Drouet three marches for his one; or he might have joined Wellington by the shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have profited from his absence. Wellington also might retire within Portugal and render Drouet's movement a false one, or moving by Alcantara have gained a fortnight to attack Soult in Andalusia. The king's plan depended on the exact co-operation of persons jealous of each other and far from obedient to himself, and their marches could not be justly timed either, because of the great distances and the long lines of communication: their correspondence also was constantly intercepted and brought to Wellington. The knowledge thus gained on one side and delayed on the other had already caused the timely reinforcing of Hill; and it kept Palombini's division away from Madrid three weeks, which finally proved of vital consequences as it rendered the king's operation to succour Marmont too late.

Hill's exploit at Almaraz and the disorderly state of the

army of the centre, having in a manner isolated Marmont, the importance of Galicia and the Asturias with respect to the projected operations was increased. The Gallicians could act in Castille upon the French rear and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching through the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de Santander and there join the seventh army. This made Wellington judge that Bonnet must continue to hold the Asturias, and that he should not find him in the field; and though Marmont had fortified different parts in Castille his army was still widely spread, and as Soult had observed, extended to its right instead of being concentrated on its left near Baños, which gave additional chances to the English general. Marmont indeed, adopting the lines of the Tormes and Douro, had collected magazines, and the king had formed others for him at Talavera and Segovia, yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding until June. When he heard of Alcantara being restored and of magazines being formed at Caceres, he said that the latter would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object, and though ill-placed for an army acting against himself they were admirably placed for an army which having fought in Castille should afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and be secured by removing the temporary restorations. Hill therefore would, he thought, rejoin Wellington to aid in a battle which with prophetic feeling he said would be fought near the Tormes, and he desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in movement: he prayed the king also to have guns and a pontoon train sent from Madrid, that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by the Puerto Pico.

Joseph then renewed his orders to Soult and to Caffarelli, but only sent two small boats to Almaraz; and Marmont, seeing the allied army suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy from the valley of the Tagus and, contrary to Wellington's expectation, Bonnet from the Asturias. His first design was to assemble his troops at Mediña del Campo, Val-

ladolid, Valdesillas, Toro, Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and a brigade of dragoons at Benevento to observe the Gallicians. Thus the bulk of his force Plan 9, p. 253. would line the Duero, while two divisions formed an advanced guard on the Tormes, and the whole could be concentrated in five days. His plan was to hold the Tormes until Wellington's whole army was on that river, then to concentrate behind the Duero and favour the defence of the Salamanca forts until reinforcements should enable him to drive the allies back to Portugal: and he warned Caffarelli the forts could not of themselves hold out more than fifteen days. Marmont was a man to be feared. Quick of apprehension, courageous and scientific, he had experience in war, moved troops with great facility, was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander such a one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry but finely organized, and he had with successful diligence restored the discipline which had been so shaken by the misfortunes of Massena's campaign, and by unceasing operations from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to his own retreat out of Beira.

It has been often affirmed that the French were encouraged by their leaders to misdeeds unmatched in wickedness and peculiar to the nation. Such assertions springing from morbid national antipathies it is the duty of the historian to correct. All troops will behave ill when ill-governed, and the best commanders cannot at times prevent the perpetration of the most frightful mischief; this truth, so important to the welfare of nations, may be proved with respect to the Peninsula war by the avowals of the generals on either side, and by their endeavours to arrest the evils which they deplored. When Dorsenne returned from his expedition against Galicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached his soldiers in the following terms. 'The fields have been devastated and houses have been burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French soldier; they pierce the hearts of the most devoted and friendly of the Spaniards, they are revolting to honest men and embarrass the provisioning of the army. The general-in-chief sees

Intercepted
Papers,
MSS.

them with sorrow, and orders, that besides a permanent court-martial there shall be at the head-quarters of each division of every arm, a military commission which shall try the following crimes, and on conviction sentence to death without appeal, execution to be done on the spot in presence of the troops.

‘ 1°. Quitting a post to pillage. 2°. Desertion of all kinds. 3°. Disobedience in face of the enemy. 4°. Insubordination of all kinds. 5°. Marauding of all kinds. 6°. Pillage of all kinds.

‘ All persons military or others, shall be considered as pillagers, who quit their post or their ranks to enter houses, &c., or who use violence to obtain from the inhabitants more than they are legally entitled to.

‘ All persons shall be considered deserters who shall be found without a passport beyond the advanced posts, and frequent patrols day and night shall be sent to arrest all persons beyond the outposts.

‘ Before the enemy when in camp or cantonments roll-calls shall take place every hour, and all persons absent without leave twice running, shall be counted deserters and judged as such. The servants and sutlers of the camp are amenable to this as well as the soldier.’

This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops for like excesses, renewed with the following additions.

‘ Considering that the disorders of the army have arrived at the highest degree and require the most vigorous measures of repression, it is ordered,

‘ 1°. All non-commissioned officers and soldiers found a quarter of a league from their quarters, camp, or post, without leave, shall be judged pillagers and tried by the military commission.

‘ 2°. The gens-d’armes shall examine the baggage of all sutlers and followers, and shall seize all effects that appear to be pillaged, and shall burn what will burn and bring the gold and silver to the paymaster-general under a procès verbal; and all persons whose effects have been seized as pillage to the amount of one hundred livres, shall be sent to the military commission and on conviction suffer death.

‘ 3°. All officers who shall not take proper measures to repress

disorders under their command shall be sent in arrest to headquarters there to be judged.'

Then appointing the number of baggage animals to each company upon a scale which coincides in a remarkable manner with the allowances in the British army, Marimont directed the overplus to be seized and delivered under a legal process to the nearest villages, ordering the provost-general to look to the execution each day and report thereon. Finally he clothed the provost-general with all the powers of the military commissions, and proof was soon given that his orders were not mere threats, for two captains were arrested for trial, and a soldier of the twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to death by one of the provisional commissions for stealing church vessels.

Such was the conduct of the French, and touching the conduct of the English, lord Wellington in the same month wrote thus to lord Liverpool.

'The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging to this army have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your lordship's early attention to the subject. I am sensible the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful as that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country.'

'But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances through the country, either as escorts or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c., and notwithstanding that these detachments are never allowed to march excepting under the command of one officer or more in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed, and I am sorry to say with impunity.'

'The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, and

the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice. I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your lordship. I am about to move the army further forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship, that I have not a friend in that country who has not written to me in dread of the consequences which must result to the army and to the cause from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent.'

To this should have been added the insubordination and evil passions awakened by the unchecked plunder of Rodrigo and Badajos. But long had the English general complained of the bad discipline of his army, and the following extracts from a letter dated a few months later show that his distrust was not ill-founded. After observing that the soldiers' constitutions were so shaken from the Walcheren disorder and their own irregularities, that the British army was almost a moving hospital, more than one-third or about twenty thousand men being sick or attending upon the sick, he thus describes their conduct.

'The disorders which these soldiers have are of a very trifling description, they are considered to render them incapable of serving with their regiments but they certainly do not incapacitate them from committing outrages of all descriptions on their passage through the country, and in the last movements of the hospitals the soldiers have not only plundered the inhabitants of their property, but the hospital stores which moved with the hospitals, and have sold the plunder. And all these outrages are committed with impunity, no proof can be brought on oath before a court-martial that any individual has committed an outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming little better than a band of robbers.'—*'I have carried the establishment and authority of the provost-marshal as far as either will go; there are at this moment not less than one provost-marshal and nineteen assistant provost-marshals attached to the several divisions of cavalry and infantry, and to the hospital stations to preserve order, but this establishment is not sufficient and I have not the means of increasing it.'*

For remedies he proposed the admitting less rigorous proof of guilt before courts martial; the forming a military police, *such as the French and other armies possessed*; the enforcing officers' attention to duties; the increasing the pay and responsibility of non-commissioned officers and throwing upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in treating this part of the subject he breached an opinion which can scarcely be sustained even by his authority. Assuming somewhat unjustly, that the officers of his army were from consciousness of like demerit generally too lenient in their sentences on each other for neglect of duty, he says, 'I am inclined to entertain the opinion that in the British army duties of inspection and control over the conduct and habits of the soldiers, the performance of which by somebody is the only effectual check to disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in society and being required to appear as such, have never performed *and which they will never perform*. It is very necessary however that the duties should be performed by somebody, and for this reason and having observed the advantage derived in the guards from the respectable body of non-commissioned officers in those regiments, who perform all the duties required from subalterns in the marching regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency of increasing the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the army.'

Now it is a strange assumption that a gentleman necessarily neglects his duty to his country. When well drilled, which was not always the case, gentlemen by birth generally performed their duties in the Peninsula more conscientiously than any others, and the experience of every commanding officer will bear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned officers could do all the duties of subaltern officers why should the country bear the useless expense of the latter? But in truth the system of the guards produces rather a medium goodness than superior excellence; the system of sir John Moore, founded upon the principle that the officers should thoroughly know and be responsible for the discipline of their soldiers, better bore the test of experience. All the British regiments

of the light division were formed in the camps of Shorn-Cliff by that most accomplished commander; very many of the other acknowledged good regiments of the army had been instructed by him in Sicily; and wherever an officer formed under Moore obtained a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that regiment was distinguished in this war for its discipline and enduring qualities.





Sieges of the Forts and Operations, round SALAMANCA.

1812.



CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

ON the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched towards the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream within six miles of Salamanca and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges, save that of Salamanca which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes. The 17th he passed the river above and below the town by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and general Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth division. Marshal Marmont immediately retired with two divisions and some cavalry to Fuente el Saucó on the road of Toro, being followed by a strong advanced guard of the allies, and Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing: the houses were illuminated, and the people, shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army occupied the mountain of San Christoval five miles in advance of the city.

SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.

Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three twenty-four pound howitzers were furnished by the field artillery, and the battering-train used by Hill at Almaraz had passed the bridge of Alcantara the 11th. The strength of the forts had been underrated; they contained eight hundred men, and

Jones's
Sieges.

Wellington's it was said thirteen convents and twenty-two
Secret colleges had been destroyed for their construc-
Despatch, tion. San Vincente, so called from the large
MSS. convent it enclosed, was the key-fort, and situated on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes. Irregular in form but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the other forts, called St. Cajetano and La Merced; these also stood on high ground, and though smaller than San Vincente and of a square form, had good bomb-proofs and deep ditches with perpendicular scarps and counterscarps.

In the night of the 17th colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery for eight guns at the distance of two hundred and fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente; and as the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance, but the moon was up, the night short, the enemy's musketry heavy, the workmen of the sixth division inexperienced, and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. An attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, and when the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this the attempt was openly made, but a plunging fire from the top of the convent stopped progress.

On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all the enemy's fire save that from loop-holes, and colonel May, directing the artillery service, placed two field-pieces on a neighbouring convent called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort.

In the night the first battery was armed, covering for two field-pieces as a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, and a second battery for two howitzers was constructed on the Cajetano side of the ravine. Next morning seven guns opened, and at nine o'clock had cut away the wall to the level of the counterscarp. The second breaching battery which was lower down the scarp then commenced its fire: but the iron howitzers were unmeet for battering ordnance, and the enemy's musketry knocked down a captain and twenty gunners; ammunition also was scarce, and as the French could easily cut off the breach in the night the fire ceased.

The 20th at mid-day colonel Dickson arrived with more iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery, reinforced with additional pieces, revived its fire against a re-entering angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall was soon broken and a huge cantle of the convent with its roof went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the building: carcases were immediately thrown into the opening to burn the convent, but the enemy maintained the post and extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida.

During the progress of this siege the general aspect of affairs had materially changed on both sides. Wellington had been deceived as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of Soult and Marmont's armies now proved they also were far stronger than he had expected: at the same time he heard of Ballesteros's defeat at Bornos, and of Slade's unfortunate cavalry action at Maguilla. He had calculated on Bonnet holding the Asturias, but that general was in full march for Leon; Caffarelli also was preparing to reinforce Marmont and the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. On the other hand, Bonnet having relinquished the Asturias after six days' occupation three thousand Gallicians were in that province and in communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay. Nor was the king's situation agreeable. The partidas intercepted his despatches so surely that it was the 19th ere Marmont's letter, announcing Wellington's advance and saying Hill also was in march for the north, reached Madrid. Soult had detained Drouet, Suchet would only send one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, angry that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Joseph then seeing he must depend on his own force, gave orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre.

A detachment under colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him and reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini's march was then hastened, and imperative orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced, Marmont was informed of Hill's true position, and the king advised him to give battle to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have only eighteen thousand English troops: but he had twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required. In this state of affairs Marmont united at Fuente el Saucó on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing twenty-five thousand men of all arms, with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach over an open country was descried far off, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately drawn from the siege, the battering-train was sent across the Tormes, and the army formed in order of battle on the top of the Christoval height.

This position was about four miles long and well defined, the ascent in front steep and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures attached to villages; the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the upper Tormes, the left dipped into the country bordering the lower Tormes, for in passing Salamanca that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry heavy cavalry and guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position—the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, nearly in a line, were in front below, but the last was within the allies' ground and the position completely commanded all the country for many miles: the heat was excessive and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor any water nearer than the Tormes.

About five o'clock in the evening the enemy's horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position as if to turn it by the lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial charge took place, but the French opened six guns and the English retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division, which was held in reserve on the summit, immediately closed towards the left of the position, but when the enemy halted returned to its former ground in the centre. Marmont's main body had meanwhile borne in one dark volume against the right and halting at the very foot of the position sent a flight of shells on to the summit, nor did this fire cease until the French general, driving back all the outposts, had obtained possession of Moresco and established himself behind the village and Castellanos within gun-shot of the allies. That night the English general slept on the ground amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms. Soon some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, yet both sides were quiet until evening, when Wellington detached the sixty-eighth regiment to drive the French from Moresco. This attack succeeded, but the troops being recalled just as daylight failed, a body of French, coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer named Mackay being suddenly surrounded refused to surrender, and singly fighting against a multitude received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to show his honourable scars.

On the 22nd three divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who, having now nearly forty thousand men in hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies' right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle and attack their right on even terms. But then Graham with the seventh division dislodged the French by a sharp skirmish before they could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights about

six miles in his rear. It was thought his tempestuous advance to Moresco with such an inferior force on the evening of the 20th should have been his ruin. Wellington saw this error, but argued, that if the French marshal came to fight it was better to defend a very strong position than to descend and combat in the plain, seeing that his superiority was not such as to insure a victory decisive of the campaign; and in case of failure a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that there was at first some confusion amongst the allies before the troops of the different nations could form their order of battle,—that the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means easy, because of the walls and the two villages which covered the French front,—and that Marmont, who had plenty of guns, and troops extremely ready of movement, could also have evaded the action until night. This reasoning, good on the 20th was not so on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted than the French, might then have been poured down by all the roads passing over the position at day-break, and Marmont, turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made his retreat to the Douro through the open country: on the 22nd however when the French general had received his other divisions the chances were no longer the same.

Marmont's new position was skilfully chosen. One flank rested on Cabeza Velloso, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. His right was refused and he abandoned the Toro road, but he covered that of Tordesillas, commanded the ford of Huerta with his left, and could pass the Tormes to operate by the other bank and communicate with his forts. Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient part of his position to Aldea Lengua overhanging a ford, which was however scarcely practicable at this period. Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry under Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta: by this disposition the allies covered Salamanca and could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the French.

On the 23rd the two armies remained tranquil, but at break of day on the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere plainly said the French were over the Tormes. Soon the fog dispersed and the German horsemen were seen in close order, retiring before twelve thousand French infantry who were marching steadily onwards. At intervals twenty guns would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession and peering abroad gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco awaited his adversary's progress. Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy's scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the first time perceived Graham's twelve thousand men and eighteen guns on an order of battle perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also Wellington's heavy columns were to be seen clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. At this apparition Marmont faced about, repassed the Tormes and resumed his former ground.

Wellington's dispositions were very skilful, but it would seem that unwilling to stir before the forts fell he had again refused the advantage of the moment. Refused, not misjudged the occasion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval and he had passed many hours in earnest observation. His faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating

that and other financial schemes in all their bearings with a master hand. Against his deliberate decision therefore the following criticism must be advanced.

Marmont had the best ford to pass the Tormes, the allies had a greater number of fords and a shorter line of operations. Graham by vigorously attacking the French on the left bank, might have driven them upon the single ford of Huerta if not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rubia.

Plan 8,
Page 235.

But the allies could also have been reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this early season; a partial victory would then have been achieved, or a general battle brought on when the French, disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes, would have had no escape if defeated. Nor is it easy to see how they could have avoided a serious defeat, if Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank against the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for their army would have been separated, one part on the hither one on the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege and maintained the line of the Tormes. He could hardly have expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object was to separate the allies' force in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which were now in great danger.

On the night of the 23rd the heavy guns were brought to the right of the Tormes, and a third battery to breach San Cajetano was armed with four pieces, but the line of firing being oblique only beat down the parapet and knocked away the *palisades*. Time however pressed and the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered. It commenced at ten o'clock and in half an hour failed with a loss of one hundred and twenty men and officers: the wounded were brought off next day under truce and the enemy had all the credit of the fight. It is said general Bowes deranged the engineer's plan and caused the assault to fail. It might be so, but he died

nobly. His rank was above the leading of so small a party, he was early wounded, and while having his wound dressed hearing that the troops were yielding, returned to the fight and fell at the foot of the breach.

The siege being now suspended for want of ammunition the guns were sent across the river, but immediately brought back in consequence of Marmont operating on the left bank. Certain works were however pushed forward to cut the communication between the forts, and the miner was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood ; the final success was not however influenced by these operations and they need no further notice. The 26th ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third batteries were re-armed, the field-pieces again placed in the convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The garrison extinguished the flames and this balanced combat continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th, the fire of both batteries being redoubled, San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano improved, and when a fresh storming party was assembled the white flag waved from the latter. A negotiation ensued, but Wellington judging it an artifice to gain time ordered the assault ; then San Cajetano scarcely fired a shot and the flames at San Vincente prevented defence. Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, provisions arms and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture, not the less prized that the breaches were found to be more formidable than those of Rodrigo, and the assault might have failed if the garrison had gained time to extinguish the flames in San Vincente. The allies lost ninety killed, and their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly five hundred, of which one hundred and sixty fell outside, the rest in the siege.

Marmont had allotted fifteen days of resistance, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught fire five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. He would however have fought on the 23rd, when his force was united, had he not heard from Caffarelli that a powerful body of infantry, with twenty-two guns and all the cavalry of the

north, were in march to join. This it was which sent him to the heights of Villa Rubia to avoid a premature action; but on the evening of the 26th signals from the forts indicated that they could still hold out three days, and Marmont, from fresh intelligence, no longer expecting Caffarelli's troops resolved to give battle on the 28th. The fall of the forts, made known the evening of the 27th, again changed this determination, and withdrawing his garrison from the castle of Alba de Tormes he retreated during the night towards the Duero by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.

Wellington immediately destroyed the works at Alba and Salamanca, and following by easy marches encamped on the Guarena the 30th. Next day he reached the Trabancos, his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2nd he passed the Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place the French rear-guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, then filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed, some made prisoners, but there was great confusion and a heavy disaster would have befallen the French, if the English general had not been deceived by false information that they had broken the bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose the enemy already over the Duero, and his troops were not sufficiently concentrated for an attack.

Marmont had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, had broken the bridges at those places at Puente Duero and at Tudela, preserving only that of Tordesillas; he now posted his left at Simancas on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas, very numerous,—his right was on heights opposite Pollos. His position was strong, but the third division, now under general Pakenham, immediately seized the ford of Pollos, which gave a command of the river there, because there was a plain between it and the enemy's heights. This ford was however difficult and insufficient

French Confidential
Official Reports, MSS.

Plan 9, p. 253.

for passing the whole army: wherefore head-quarters were fixed at Rueda, and the troops disposed in a compact form. The head was placed in opposition at the ford of Pollos and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupied Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers, to meet any movement from the Valladolid side. Marmont's line from Valladolid to Zamora was sixty miles, from Simancas to Toro above thirty; but the actual occupation was only twelve; for the bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage was therefore on his side, but to comprehend the true position the secondary coincident operations must be known.

Following their orders, Silveira had filed up the Duero to the Esla river menacing the French communications with Benevente, while d'Urban passed the Duero below Zamora on the 25th and cut off all intercourse between the French army and that place. When Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, d'Urban recrossed at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castramonte, behind the right wing of the enemy's new position; and Wellington designed that Castaños, after investing Astorga, should come down by Benevente and connect himself with Silveira. This operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have placed twelve or fifteen thousand infantry cavalry and artillery behind the Esla, having secure lines of retreat and consequently able to check the enemy's foraging parties and reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty: the following Spanish procrastination marred the able combination.

Castaños, by help of the succours received from England, had assembled fifteen thousand men at Ponteferrada under the command of Santocildes; but he pretended he had no battering guns until sir Howard Douglas pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol, and showed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes moved slowly, and when Bonnet's retreat from the Asturias was known, eleven thousand men invested Astorga, and four thousand marched to Benevente when Marmont had recalled his detachments from that side. The battering-train only reached Villa Franca del

Bierzo on the 1st of July; yet the guerilla chief, Marquinez, appeared about Palencia, and the other partidas of Castille acting on a line from Leon to Segovia intercepted the correspondence with the king, and secured the *Campo de Tierras* for the subsistence of the Gallician army;—and to the surprise of the allies, who had so often heard of the enemy's terrible devastations that they expected to find Castille a desert, those vast plains and undulating hills were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the ravages of war.

It has been before shown that three thousand Gallicians entered the Asturias, and in concert with the seventh army had harassed Bonnet's retreat from that kingdom; and though the French general forced his way by the eastern passes to Aguilar del Campo, and chased the neighbouring bands away, his movement was one of the great errors of the campaign.

Joseph's
Papers,
MSS.
Wellington's
Secret
Despatches,
MSS.

Napoleon and Wellington felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at this period. The one directed they should be retained, the other calculated that such would be the case, and the judgment of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not have dared to quit the Bierzo

if Bonnet had menaced their province by Lugo or by the coast line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted the Asturias. And the partidas of the north, who had been very much depressed by Mina's defeat, recovering courage, moved towards the coast, where Popham's expedition which sailed on the 18th of June from Coruña soon appeared, a formidable spectacle, for there were five sail of the line with fifteen frigates and brigs. Lesquito was immediately attacked on the seaboard by this squadron, on the land side by the Pastor, and when captain Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent the Spanish chief assaulted: he was repulsed, but the garrison, two hundred and fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22nd, and on the two following days Bermeo and Palencia fell. The partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, yet Castro and Portugalete in the Bilbao river were attacked the 6th of July in concert with Longa, and though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The enemy recovered some

of their posts the 10th, and the 19th **Mina** and Pastor coming down to co-operate against Gueteria were beaten, and the British seamen were driven to their vessels with the loss of thirty men and two guns.

It was the opinion of general Carrol who accompanied this expedition that the plan of operations was ill-arranged, but the local successes merit no attention, the great object or distracting the enemy was obtained. Caffarelli heard at the same moment that Palombini's division had been called to Madrid,—that Bonnet had abandoned the Asturias,—that a Gallician division had entered that province,—that a powerful English fleet containing troops was on the coast and acting in concert with all the partidas of the north,—that the seventh army was menacing Burgos and the whole country was in commotion. Trembling for his own districts he instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the king, who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar with a view to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed obedience until the 13th of July, and then sent but eighteen hundred cavalry and twenty guns.

Bonnet's movement, which only brought a reinforcement of six thousand infantry to Marmont, thus kept away Caffarelli's troops, twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole French line of communication and caused the siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonnet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont's retreat from the Tormes and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore not being ready to move with the army of the centre and fearing for Avila he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the partidas. In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait for Bonnet's and Caffarelli's troops, and meanwhile the king could operate against the allies' communications. The former because he

could not attack the French except at great disadvantage; for the fords were little known, and that of Pollos deep. To pass the river there and form within gun-shot of the enemy's left, without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, and the staff-officers sent to examine the course of the river reported the advantage of ground to be entirely on the enemy's side, except at Castro Nuño, half-way between Pollos and Toro.

While the French commanded the bridge at Tordesillas no attempt to force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on the allies' front and rear if the operation was within his reach; if beyond his reach, that is to say near Zamora, he could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, or the combined operations of the Gallicians and partidas should compel Marmont to detach men or dislodge for want of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege of Astorga vigorously, and send every man he could spare down the Esla. An intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender on the 7th, but this seems to have been a device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter, for it was in no danger, and Santocildes, expecting its fall, would not detach men. However the vicinity of d'Urban's cavalry so incommoded the French right that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla, whereupon general Pakenham crossed the ford of Pollos with some of the third division which quickly brought Foy back, and Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thousand horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.

On the 8th Bonnet arrived, and the French marshal extending his right to Toro commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trabancos and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some days. Graham and Picton had gone to England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with

hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred. The weather was fine, the country rich, the troops received full rations, and wine was so plentiful it was hard to keep the soldiers sober: the caves of Rueda, either natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards of two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides the soldiers, entering the river to bathe, held amicable intercourse, rallying each other about the battles yet to be fought, and the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army: so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other. The officers of the allies were anxious to receive the signal of battle, they were discontented at its being delayed, and many amongst them murmured that the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Hence had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal his reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own people, for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective and overlooked the enormous French armies close at hand: their general's mind was however filled with care and mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him.

The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, under circumstances which left no doubt that English influence was powerless and French influence increasing in the Cortes. Soult had twenty-seven gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into the city and the people were alarmed; two thousand French had marched from Santa Maria to Seville, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and French troops were assembling to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness might alone bring Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain Mina's defeats and their influence upon the other partidas were known, the effect of Popham's operations unknown, or at least doubtful, but Bonnet's division had arrived and the Gallicians before Astorga wanted ammunition. In Castille the activity of the partidas diminished when the army crossed the Tormes, the

chiefs seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war to the allies, and this feeling was not confined to them. It had been arranged that fresh forces should be raised as the enemy receded in this campaign, and clothing and equipments supplied by England were placed at the disposal of Wellington, who to avoid the burthen of carriage had directed them to Coruña; yet now when Leon and the Asturias were in a manner recovered no man would serve voluntarily. There was great enthusiasm in words, there had always been so, but the fighting men were not increased, and even the *juramentados*, many of whom deserted at this time from the king, well clothed and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks.

Now also came news that lord William Bentinck's plans were altered, and intercepted despatches showed that the king had again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus; Soult's resistance to this order was not known, and Wellington therefore saw Marmont's army increase, heard that the king's army, reinforced by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field,—that the troops from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain and even to turn the king's attention that way, were to be sent to Italy,—and that two millions of dollars which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar had been swept off by lord William for this Italian expedition, which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the most serious blow, the promised remittances from England had not arrived, the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, and to venture further into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Galicia, where no credit was given, came the supply of meat and a stoppage there would have made the war itself stop: no greater error had been committed by the enemy than delaying to conquer Galicia, which could many times have been done.

A credit of half a million had been obtained from the Treasury to answer certain certificates or notes of hand, which the secret Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but this resource was now suddenly stopped by the English ministers, who objected to the irregular form of the certifi-

cates, because Wellington with his usual sagacity had adapted them to the habits of the people he was to deal with! His troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt everywhere, and for everything. The Portuguese government was clamorous for the subsidy. Mr. Stuart acknowledged that its distress was great, and desertion from the Portuguese troops, augmenting in an alarming manner, was seemingly increased by severity, showing the misery of the soldiers. Wellington alone maintained the army in its forward position at this time; for he had extended his commercial speculations into Galicia, and had persuaded the Spanish authorities of Castille to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals.

‘The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase we cannot go on; we have only here two brigades of infantry fed by our own commissariat, and we are now reduced to one of them, having barely bread for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on!’


Such were Beresford’s words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th Wellington wrote even more forcibly.

‘I have never, said he, been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the government do not attend seriously to the subject and supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don’t find means to pay our bills for butcher’s meat there will be an end to the war at once.’

Thus stript as it were to the skin the English general was going once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill and perhaps from the experience of San Christoval undervaluing his adversary’s tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy’s strength.

CHAPTER III.

WHEN Wellington found by the intercepted letters that the king's orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus were imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops in the same proportion; and as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king's power. For some money long expected from England had at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the Gallicians though inert must soon be felt by the enemy: moreover the harvest on the ground, however abundant, could not long feed the French multitudes if Drouet and the king should together join Marmont. Fearing the action of Joseph's cavalry, he now ordered D'Urban's horsemen to join the army on the Duero; but to understand the remarkable movements about to commence the reader must bear in mind, that the French army from its peculiar organization could while the ground harvest lasted operate without any regard to lines of communication; it had supports on all sides and procured its food everywhere; the troops were taught to reap the standing corn and grind it themselves if their cavalry could not seize flour in the villages. This organization, approaching the ancient Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages; it baffled the irregular and threw the regular force of the allies entirely upon the defensive; for if their flanks were turned a retreat only could save the communications, but the French offered no point for retaliation. Wherefore, with a force composed of four different nations, Wellington was to execute difficult evolutions in an open country, his chances of success being to arise only from the casual errors of his adversary, who was an able general, knew the country perfectly, and led an army, brave, excellently disciplined, and of one



Battle of SALAMANCA, WITH OPERATIONS before and after the Action.



nation: the game would have been quite unequal if the English had not been so strong in cavalry.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO.

In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija river. Intercepted letters, peasants, deserters, and public talk had all for several days assigned the former place as his point of passage. On the morning of the 16th the English exploring officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison there, and the evening reports said two French divisions had already passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington then united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena during the night, intending to attack those who had passed at Toro; but as he had still some doubts of the enemy's real object he left Cotton on the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson's cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, recalling his troops from the left bank of the Duero, returned to Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river at those points and occupied Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the 17th, some of his divisions having marched forty miles and some fifty miles without a halt. The English cavalry posts were driven over the Trabancos, and advice of the enemy's movement was instantly sent to Wellington, but he was then near Toro, it was midnight ere the information reached him, and the troops under Cotton remained near Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th without orders, in a bad position, close to the whole French army. Wellington hastening to their aid in person ordered Bock's Le Marchant's and Alten's brigades of cavalry to follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torrecilla de la Orden six miles in rear of Castrejon.

At daybreak Cotton's outposts were again driven in by the enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, the fourth division on the left, the light

division on the right, but at a considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide ravine. The country was like the open downs of England, with here and there water-gulleys dry hollows and bold naked heads of land; and behind the most prominent of these last, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton seeing only horsemen advanced with his cavalry again towards the river, but cautiously, by his right, along some high table-land and his troops were lost to the view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick on the stream and nothing could be descried beyond. Soon however the deep tones of the artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was heard in the mist, and the forty-third regiment passed hastily through Castrejon to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which separated the fourth from the light division, there was another ravine with a marshy bottom between the latter and the cavalry, and the village of Castrejon was the only good point of passage.

Now the cannonade became heavy and the spectacle surprisingly beautiful. The lighter smoke and mist curling up in fantastic pillars formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours by the rising sun; and through the grosser vapour below the restless horsemen were seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the guns, while the high bluff head of land beyond the Trabancos, covered with French troops, appeared by an optical deception close at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst of the smoke towards the line of infantry with a gait peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart; but that which seemed a cloth was a broad and dreadful wound, a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away part of his ribs, his heart was bared and its movement plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered: this unyielding man's name was Williams. He died a short dis-

tance from the field of battle, and it was said in the arms of his son, a youth of fourteen who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a commission, for they were not affluent.

Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and resolution from daylight until seven o'clock, at which time Wellington arrived in company with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the enemy's movements. At this moment some French horsemen, not many, broke suddenly away from the head-land beyond the Trabancos and came galloping on as if deserting, but soon with headlong course they mounted the table-land on which Cotton's left was posted, and drove a whole line of cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The English reserves on that side then advanced from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen, scattered by their own charge, were in turn driven back or cut down; yet thirty or forty, led by a noble officer, brought up their right shoulders and came over the edge of the table-land, above the hollow which separated the British wings, at the instant when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. Infantry piquets were in the bottom, and higher up near the French were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry disposed in perfect order. When the French officer first saw this squadron he reined in his horse with difficulty, his troopers gathered in a confused body round him seemingly as lost men, and the British instantly charged; but with a shout the gallant Frenchmen soused down upon the squadron and the latter turning galloped through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away lord Wellington and Beresford, who with drawn swords and some difficulty got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen, when quite exhausted, were attacked by a reserve squadron and most of them were killed, but their indomitable leader, when assailed by three enemies at once struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the other two, though they rode hewing at him for a quarter of a mile.

Marmont having ascertained that a part only of Wellington's army was before him, now crossed the Trabancos in two

columns, turned the left of the allies, and marched straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division in one column on the left, the fourth division on the right, the light division on an intermediate line nearer the enemy, and the cavalry on the flanks and rear. The air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds and the close order of the troops rendered it oppressive, but the military spectacle was strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of infantry, at only half-musket shot from each other, marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords touching their caps and waving their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men on huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times the loud tones of command to hasten the march were heard passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns whose violent pace was continually accelerated. Thus moving for ten miles and keeping the most perfect order both parties approached the Guarena, when the enemy seeing the light division, although more in their power than the others, outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. The German cavalry instantly drew close round a hollow dip of ground on the left, which offered the means of baffling the enemy's aim, the column then plunged down and ten minutes after was in the stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo: the fifth division entered the river at the same time but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented by thirst yet long used to their enemy's mode of warfare, drank as they marched, but the fifth division stopped in the river for a few moments and on the instant forty French guns, gathered on the heights above, sent a tempest of bullets amongst them: so nicely timed was the operation.

The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which unite below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, but Marmont hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage and seize the table-land of Vallesa, brought up his artillery to

the front, and to distract the allies' attention he directed Clausel to push the head of the right column over the river at Castrillo. But Wellington, expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches of the river, and they reached the table-land of Vallesa before Marmont's infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other branch. Clausel sent Carier's brigade of cavalry across the stream at Castrillo, supporting it with a column of infantry, and the fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal when Carier's horsemen entered the valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the river would have been difficult to force, but Victor Alten, a very bold man in action, was slow to seize an advantage; he suffered the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable numbers without opposition, and then assailed them feebly with successive squadrons instead of by regiments. The result was unfavourable at first. The fourteenth and the German hussars were hard-pressed, the third dragoons came up in support but were immediately driven back again by the fire of some French infantry, and the fight waxed hot with the others, many fell, but finally Carier was wounded and taken and the French cavalry retired. During this action the twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments, coming down the hill, broke the enemy's infantry also with an impetuous bayonet charge, and Alten's horsemen sabred some of the fugitives.

This combat cost the French, who had advanced too far without support, a general and five hundred soldiers; but Marmont, though baffled at Vallesa and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena. Wellington then recalled his troops from Vallesa, and as the whole loss of the allies was not more than six hundred, nor that of the French more than eight hundred, and both sides were highly excited, the day still young and the positions although strong open and within cannon-shot, a battle was expected. Marmont's troops had however been marching for two days and nights inces-

santly, Wellington's plan did not admit of fighting unless forced to it, or under such circumstances as would enable him to crush his opponent and yet keep the field afterwards against the king.

By this series of signal operations, the French marshal had passed a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the allies and pushed it back above ten miles. The advantages are however to be traced to the peculiarities of the English general's situation which have been already noticed, and his tactical skill was manifested by extricating his troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. He appears to have erred only in extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above Toro. Nor should he have risked his right wing so far from his main body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th; he could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss if Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forwards at once to the Guarena had attacked him on the march. On the other hand the security of the French general's movement from the Trabancos to the Guarena depended entirely on rapidity; for as his columns crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on his flank, while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met them in front.

On the 16th Marmont failed in a glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back and strike some decisive blow during their retreat. Now on the evening of the 16th he had passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day's march, and was then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies were; had he persisted Wellington must have fought him to disadvantage or have given up Salamanca, and passed the Tormes at Huerta to regain the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont relinquished, to

make a forced march of eighty miles in forty-eight hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men by the sword or by fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the 18th still facing him in the very position which he had turned on the evening of the 16th!

The 19th the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on his left near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington, fearing for his right, again passed the second branch of the Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo and took post on the table-land above those villages. The light division being in front, advanced to the edge of the table-land overlooking the enemy's main body, which was at rest round the bivouac fires and the piquets would have been quietly posted, if Sir Stapleton Cotton coming up at the moment had not turned a battery of six-pounders upon a group of French officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, at the second their gunners run to their pieces and in a few moments a reply from twelve eight-pounders showed the folly of provoking a useless combat; an artillery officer was wounded in the head, several British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and the division had to withdraw several hundred yards in a mortifying manner to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood.

Formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa the allies offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy, and Wellington expected a battle. For the range of heights which he occupied trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line, and as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes he thought Marmont could not turn his right, or if he attempted it he would be shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. The French general was more perfectly acquainted with the ground and moved his army with a wonderful facility. On the 20th as the day broke instead of crossing the Guarena to dispute the high land of Vallesa, he marched rapidly in several columns covered by a powerful rear-guard up the river to Santa la Piedra, and crossed the stream there though the banks

were difficult before any disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right flank of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending towards the Tormes, and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately made a corresponding movement, and then commenced an evolution similar to that of the 18th but on a greater scale both as to numbers and length of way. The allies moving in two lines of battle within musket-shot of the French endeavoured to cross their march at Cantalpino, the guns on both sides again exchanged their rough salutations as the accidents of ground favoured their play, and again the officers, like gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes for an opening to charge; but the French moving as one man along the crest of the heights preserved the lead and made no mistake.

At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, and all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that he furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington therefore fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça Velloso and Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth division and Alten's cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, because his own march had been long and as the French had passed over nearly twice as much ground he thought they would not attempt to reach the Tormes that day. However, when night approached, although his second line had got possession of the heights of Velloso, his first line was heaped up without much order in the low ground between that place and Hornillos, the French army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, and their fires, stretching in a half circle from Villaruela to Babila Fuente, showed that they commanded the ford of Huerta: they could even have attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light for the battle. The English general then ordered fires to be made, and under cover of the smoke filed the troops off in succession with celerity towards Velloso and Aldea Rubia, but during the movement the Portuguese cavalry coming in from the front

were mistaken for French and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised.

Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this day's operations, which had been entirely to the advantage of the French. Marmont had shown himself perfectly acquainted with the country, he had outflanked and outmarched the allies and gained the command of the Tormes; and as his junction with the king's army was thus secured he might fight or wait for reinforcements or continue his operations as it seemed good to himself. But the scope of Wellington's campaign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage were stronger than before, because Caffarelli's cavalry was now known to be in march and the army of the centre was on the point of taking the field; hence though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it was decisive his object would not be advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be done by a long course of solid operations incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by anything but hope; wherefore yielding to the force of circumstances he prepared to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with a bitter spirit, not soothed by the recollection that he had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage exactly one month before, and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless that steadfast temper which then prevented him from seizing an adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the lion's stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold his ground was however sent to Castaños, but was intercepted by Marmont, who thereupon exultingly pushed forwards with so little regard to the king's movements, that Joseph King's Correspondence, MSS. imagined the letter a subtlety of Wellington's to draw the French general into a premature battle.

On the 21st while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval, the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos d'España without the knowledge of the English general, a

matter soon to prove of infinite importance. Marmont then passed the Tormes by the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of Machacon encamped behind Calvariza Ariba, at the edge of a forest which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed the Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges and by the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division and d'Urban's cavalry remained on the right bank and entrenched themselves at Cabrerizos lest the French who had left a division on the heights of Babila Fuente should re-cross the Tormes in the night and overwhelm them. It was late when the light division descended the rough side of the Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly down with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, the lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the column or played upon the points of the bayonets, and a flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards near Santa Marta killed many men and horses; hundreds of frightened animals then breaking loose from their piquet ropes and galloping wildly about were supposed to be the enemy's cavalry charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their patrols were at hand. But to a military eye there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light division were seen by the fiery gleams to step from the river to the bank and pursue their march amidst this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy.

Wellington's position was nearly the same as that occupied by Graham a month before when the forts of Salamanca were invested. The left rested in the low ground on the Tormes near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards Calvariza de Abaxa. The right wing extended along a range of heights which ended also in low ground half a mile from the village of Arapiles; this line, perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta to Salamanca, covered that city. But Marmont extending his left along the edge of the forest still

menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and in the night advice came that general Chauvel, with two thousand of Caffarelli's northern horsemen and twenty guns, had reached Pollos on the 20th and would surely be up the 22nd or 23rd. A final retreat was rendered imperative by this accession of cavalry, and Wellington, to avoid the action of the latter while retiring, resolved unless the enemy should commit some flagrant error by attacking him to go back to Portugal before Chauvel arrived. But at daybreak Marmont, who had called his troops from Babila Fuente over the Tormes by the ford of Encina, brought Bonnet's and Maucune's divisions up from the forest and occupied Calvariza de Ariba; he also took possession of a wooded height close to the allies on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena, thus showing his resolution to force on a battle.

At a little distance from the French left and close to the English right, were two isolated hills called the *Arapiles* or *Hermanitos*, about half cannon-shot from each other. Steep and savagely rugged they were, and had the French general gained them he could have formed across Wellington's right and compelled him to fight on bad ground with his back to the Tormes. They were however neglected by the English until colonel Waters observing French troops stealing towards them told Beresford, who treated it lightly; then he told Wellington, who instantly sent the seventh caçadores to seize the most distant. Now ensued a combat similar to that between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida, for the French seeing the caçadores approaching, broke their own ranks, and running to the encounter gained the first Hermanito and kept it but were repulsed from the second; at the same time a detachment from the seventh division, flanked by a squadron of German hussars under Victor Alten, assailed the Señora de la Pena height and won back half of it, yet the French kept the other half and Alten was wounded.

This dispute for the Hermanitos rendered a retreat difficult to the allies during daylight; for though the rock gained by the English was like a fortress in the way of the French army, Marmont, by extending his left and gathering a force behind his own Hermanito, could still frame a dangerous

battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement. Wellington therefore extended his right into the low ground and placed the light companies of the guards in the village of Arapiles, while the fourth division, with exception of the twenty-seventh regiment which remained on the Hermanito, took post on a gentle ridge behind the village. The fifth and sixth divisions were massed on the internal slope of the English Hermanito where a great scoop in the ground hid them from the enemy; but a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of those hills, on whose crowning rocks the contending generals stood like ravenous vultures watching for their quarry.

Marmont's project was however not yet sufficiently developed. His troops coming from Babila Fuente were still in the forest several miles distant, he had only two divisions up, and the occupation of Calvariza and the Señora de la Pena were daring strokes to cover the concentration of his army; they were well calculated to deceive, for he could even then recross the Tormes, and so act on the right bank. Nevertheless the seizure of the Hermanito seemed to fix his operations on the left of that river, wherefore the first and light divisions were brought up to confront the force on Calvariza, and the third division and D'Urban's horsemen, passing the Tormes by the fords of Santa Marta, were posted near Aldea Tejada, entirely hidden yet so placed as to command the main road to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allies' position was thus suddenly reversed. The left rested on the English Hermanito the right on Aldea Tejada. The rear had become the front, and the interval between the third and fourth divisions was instantly filled by a simple counter-march with Bradford's Portuguese infantry, the Spaniards and the British cavalry, all massed about the village of Las Torres.

This new position had breaks and hollows which concealed most of the troops, and those exposed to view seemed and were indeed pointing towards the Rodrigo road in retreat; the dust of the commissariat and baggage retiring could be seen for miles, and, save the proximity of the armies, nothing indicated an approaching battle. This could not last long. About twelve o'clock Marmont, fearing that his menacing position on the Hermanito would induce Wellington to assail

it in force, hastily brought up Foy's and Ferey's divisions in support, placing the first with some guns on a wooded height lying between the Hermanitos and the Señora de la Pena; the second, reinforced with Boyer's dragoons, he posted behind Foy on the Calvariza ridge. His fear was not ill founded. Wellington, thinking he could not retreat safely by day without holding both the hills, had actually ordered the seventh division to attack when Marmont's disposition induced him to stop lest he should thus bring on a battle disadvantageously: he preferred waiting on events, certain that by night he could retire, and thinking Marmont's rash vanity might lead him to assail the position of the allies.

He was not mistaken. Although the French division coming from Babila Fuente had not yet come out of the forest, the French marshal, fearing the allies would retreat before he could form his order of battle, suddenly directed Maucune with two divisions, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry to move by their left and menace the Rodrigo road, designing if his adversary moved in opposition to fall on him by the village of Arapiles with six divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons, who were taking fresh ground to their left of the French Hermanito, leaving only one regiment of cavalry on Foy's right. The positions of the two armies now embraced an oval basin formed by ridges enclosing it like an amphitheatre, the Hermanitos being the door-posts. It was about a mile and a half broad from north to south, and more than two miles long from east to west. On the northern and western ridges stood the allies, their line running from Wellington's Hermanito by Las Torres towards Aldea Tejada. The eastern side was held by the French, and their left under Maucune was moving along the southern ridges; but his march was wide and loose, there was a long interval between him and the troops about the Hermanitos, and the divisions destined to fill this gap were still in the forest. The mass of artillery covering this march was however very imposing, and it opened its fire grandly, taking ground to its left by guns in succession as the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually contracting their distance from the allies and bringing up

their left shoulders as if to envelope Wellington's position and embrace it with fire. At this time also Bonnet's troops, one regiment of which held the French Hermanito, carried the village of Arapiles, and though driven from part of it again maintained a fierce struggle.

Marmont's first arrangements had occupied several hours without giving positive indication of his designs, and Wellington, ceasing to watch him, had retired from the Hermanito, and was lying down when, about three o'clock, a report came that the French left was rapidly pointing towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Starting up he repaired to the high ground and observed their movements for some time with a stern contentment, for their left wing was then entirely separated from the centre; the fault was flagrant and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunder-bolt. A few orders issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English Hermanito seemed agitated by some mighty spirit; rushing violently down the interior slope of the mountain they entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which appeared to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which they were moving. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford's Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time from the right of the army, and then Le Marchant's cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford closed this front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions, flanked on the right by Anson's light cavalry, were ranged on a second line, now prolonged by the Spanish troops in the direction of the third division, which, reinforced by Arentschild's German hussars and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, closed the extreme right at Aldea Tejada. A reserve composed of the light divisions, Pack's Portuguese, Bock's and Alten's cavalry, remained in heavy masses on the highest ground behind all.

When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy's line of march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the cavalry, was

directed to advance whenever the attack of the third division should be developed; and as the fourth division must in this forward movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy's troops stationed on the French Hermanito, Pack's brigade was commanded to assail that rock the moment the left of the British line should pass it. Thus, after long coiling and winding like angry serpents, the armies suddenly fastened together in deadly strife.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Marmont from the French Hermanito saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution, and when by the rash advance of his left his troops were separated into three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other and those nearest the enemy neither strong enough to hold their ground nor knowing what they had to encounter. The third division was however still hidden from him by the western heights, and he hoped the tempest of bullets under which the British line was moving in the basin beneath would check it until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and assail by the Arapiles village and the English Hermanito. But this his only resource was weak; the village was well disputed, the English Hermanito offered a strong bastion of defence, and behind it stood the reserve, twelve thousand strong with thirty guns. In this crisis, despatching officer after officer to hasten up his troops from the forest, others to stop the progress of his left wing, he with fierce and sanguine expectation still looked for victory until he saw Pakenham with the third division shoot like a meteor across Maucune's path; then pride and hope alike died with him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep wounds in his side—confusion ensued, and his troops, distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not where to move, who to fight, or who to avoid.

It was about five o'clock when Pakenham fell on Maucune's first division under Thomieres, who had then just reached an

isolated open hill at the extremity of the southern range of heights, expecting to see the allies in full retreat to the Rodrigo road closely followed by Marmont from the Hermanitos. The counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, Pakenham's mass of infantry supported by cavalry and guns was bearing full on his front, and two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood where they could hear but could not see the storm which was bursting: from the chief to the lowest soldier all felt they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham the most frank and gallant of men commenced the battle. Forming lines as they marched his columns pressed to the fight, while the French gunners, standing up manfully, sent showers of grape into the approaching masses and a crowd of light troops poured in their musketry, under cover of which the main body strove to open a front of battle. But bearing onwards with the might of a giant Pakenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments and sent the whole in confusion upon the supporting columns: one only officer, standing alone with unyielding spirit, fired the last gun at the distance of a few yards, and whether he lived or died could not be seen for the smoke.

Some French squadrons now fell on the flank of the third division; the fifth regiment repulsed a part, and the remainder were charged by D'Urban and Arentschild's horsemen; in the tumult the Oporto regiment under major Watson assailed

Appendix 8. a square of infantry unsuccessfully, for Watson fell wounded and his men retired. Meanwhile Pakenham continuing his tempestuous course found the remainder of Thomieres' division very imperfectly arrayed on the wooded heights behind the first hill, offering two fronts; the one opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, Bradford's Portuguese, and the great masses of cavalry and artillery which were now moving across the basin. At this time Bonnet's troops had been repulsed from the Arapiles village, and were in turn assailed by the fourth division; but the French still kept their menacing position

at the Hermanito, for Clausel's division had arrived from the forest, and the connexion between the centre and left was in some measure restored. Two divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons were indeed still in march from Calvariza, Thomieres was killed, Bonnet who had succeeded Marmont was disabled, and hence more confusion; but the chief command had devolved on Clausel and he was of a capacity equal to the crisis. The scene was however terrible. He saw the fourth and fifth divisions and Bradford's brigade hotly engaged and steadily gaining ground, Le Marchant's heavy cavalry, Anson's light dragoons, and Bull's troop of artillery advancing at a trot on Pakenham's left, and on that general's right D'Urban's horsemen overlapping the disordered masses of his left wing. Half an hour only had elapsed since the battle commenced and already the French had lost their commander and two other generals, and their left turned and thrown into confusion was enveloped. And though Clausel's own division reinforced Maucune and a front was spread along the southern heights of the basin the array was loose, it was in lines, in columns, in squares, without unity; a powerful sun played in the men's eyes, and the light soil, stirred up and driven by a breeze from the west, came mingled with smoke full upon them in such stifling clouds, that scarcely able to breathe and unable to see they delivered their fire at random.

In this oppressed state, while Pakenham was pressing their left with a conquering violence, while the fifth division was wasting their ranks with fire, the interval between those divisions was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust which moved swiftly forward carrying within it the trampling sound of a charging multitude; it passed the left of the third division in a chaotic mass, but then opening, Anson's light cavalry and Le Marchant's heavy horsemen were seen to break forth at full speed, and the next moment twelve hundred French infantry were trampled down with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded they cast away their arms and crowded through the intervals of the squadrons, stooping and crying out for quarter, while the dragoons, big men and on big horses, rode onwards smiting with their long

glittering swords in uncontrollable power, and the third division following at speed, shouted as the French lines fell in succession before this dreadful charge.

Nor were these valiant horsemen yet exhausted. Le Marchant and many other officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff were at their head, and with ranks confused and blended in one mass they still galloped on against a fresh column from whence a stream of fire emptied a hundred saddles, but with fine courage and might they broke through this the strongest body yet encountered, and lord Edward Somerset with a happy perseverance continuing the charge at the head of one squadron captured five guns. The left was thus entirely broken, two thousand prisoners were taken, the French light cavalry forsook that part of the field, and the three divisions under Maucune no longer existed as a military body. Anson's cavalry had suffered little in the charge, and now passing quite over the ridge were joined by D'Urban's horsemen and took the place of Le Marchant's exhausted men. United with the third and fifth divisions and the guns, they formed one formidable line more than a mile in advance of where Pakenham had commenced the battle, and that impetuous officer with unmitigable fury was still pressing forward spreading terror and confusion.

While these signal events which occupied about forty minutes were passing on the allies' right, a terrible battle raged also in the centre. For the fourth division moving in a line with the fifth and under the same cannonade had driven Bonnet's troops step by step back to the south-eastern part of the basin, where they got mixed with the disordered masses of Maucune's and Clausel's divisions then retreating before Pakenham and the cavalry; and the French Hermanito being thus apparently isolated was assailed by Pack's Portuguese about the time of Le Marchant's charge. The French front of battle was now however fully developed and connected, for Foy had commenced a distant cannonade against the British reserves, while on his left Pack was mounting the Hermanito; further on Bonnet's troops were still strongly fighting, and the broken troops of the left wing were rallying upon them. Clausel had indeed made a surprising effort beyond all men's

expectations, and a great change was already visible. Drawing Ferey's division from Calvariza, he had placed it in the centre behind Bonnet's troops, and at the same time united there the light cavalry, Boyer's dragoons, and the two divisions so long expected from the forest. By this able disposition he offered a mass for the broken left wing to rally upon, and made Sarut's, Brennier's, and Ferey's unbroken divisions, supported by the whole of the cavalry, cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while another division was in mass close behind Marmont's Hermanito, and Foy remained untouched on the right. It was a great stroke, but not content with restoring an order of battle and saving his retreat Clausel attempted to stem the tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength and roughness. His hopes were founded on Pack's failure, for that officer having ascended the French Hermanito in one column was within thirty paces of the top and believed himself victorious, when suddenly the hidden French reserves leaped forward from the rocks upon his front and left flank, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and then the side of the hill was covered with the killed the wounded and the flying Portuguese: they were scoffed at for the failure, but unjustly, no troops could have withstood that crash upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was actually on the summit, when twelve hundred fresh adversaries arrayed on the reverse slope charged up hill; the British fire was straggling and ineffectual the soldiers being breathless and disordered by the previous fighting, and the French, who came up resolutely and without firing, won the crest: they were even pursuing, when two regiments placed in line below checked them with a destructive volley.

This vigorous counter-blow happening simultaneously with Pack's defeat, permitted Clausel, no longer fearing for the Hermanito, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but the fortieth regiment wheeling about with a rough charge cleared the rear and the French did not engage

more deeply in that quarter. Ferey however pressed the front of the division, Brennier did the same by the first line of the fifth division, and Boyer's dragoons came on at a trot; the allies were outflanked, overmatched, lost ground, and fiercely the French followed and the fight once more raged in the basin below. Cole had fallen deeply wounded, Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford promptly drew Spry's Portuguese brigade from the second line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing columns of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and then Boyer's dragoons came freely into action because Anson's cavalry had been checked by a heavy fire of artillery. The crisis of the battle had now arrived, and victory was for the general who had the strongest reserves in hand.

Wellington, who was seen that day at every point precisely when his presence was most required, brought the sixth division up from the second line, and its charge, vehement and sustained, was successful, but the struggle was not slight; Hulse's brigade on the left went down by hundreds, and the sixty-first and eleventh regiments won their way through such a fire as British soldiers only can sustain. Some of Boyer's dragoons also, breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions, slew many men and disordered the fifty-third, yet that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did Clausel's impetuous counter-attack avail at any point after the first burst. The allies retook the southern ridge, the French general Menne was severely and Ferey mortally wounded, Clausel himself was hurt, and when Boyer's reserve of horse came on at a canter for a redeeming charge they were broken by the fire of Hulse's noble brigade. Then the changing current of battle once more set for the British. Pakenham continued to outflank the French left, the Hermanito was abandoned, Foy retired from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host, righting itself like a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom. For though the air purified by the storm of the night was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin and within it was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror.

When the English general had restored the fight in the

centre he directed the first division to push between Foy and the rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy's division and that which had just descended from the French Hermanito were skilfully used by Clausel to protect the retreat. The first, posted on undulating ground and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina—the second, now added to Maucune's command and reinforced with fifteen guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front of the forest covering the road to Alba de Tormes,—and behind this ridge the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third fifth and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, against Foy, supporting it with the first division in columns, and flanking that again on the right with two brigades of the fourth division which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division restored the fight: the seventh division and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the country was covered with troops and a new army seemed to have risen out of the earth.

Foy, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, retired slowly by wings, turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot save by its skirmishers, and for two miles this march continued under musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, yet very few men were lost, the French aim being baffled by the twilight and by the even order and rapid gliding of the lines. The French general Desgraviers was however killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth division having now penetrated between Maucune and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his troops from the action, nevertheless he did it and with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers on the last defensible ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his fire of musketry and made a menacing demonstration with his horsemen just as the darkness fell, whereupon the British guns immediately opened, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards from the left, the infantry crossing the marshy stream

with an impetuous pace gained the summit of the hill and a rough shock seemed at hand; but the main body of the French had gone into the thick forest on their own left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the darkness.

Maucune was maintaining meanwhile a noble battle. He was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his courage; he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold deameanour, advised Clinton who was immediately in his front not to assail him until the third division should have turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth division was plunged afresh into action and under great disadvantage; for after being kept by its commander a long time close under Maucune's batteries, which ploughed heavily through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade of the fourth division the troops then rushed up, but in the darkness of the night the fire showed from afar how the battle went. On the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even front sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, now falling back in waving lines and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual summit of the mountain,—the French musketry in opposition, rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with what destructive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly. But when Pakenham had again turned the enemy's left and Foys's division had glided into the forest Maucune's task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent and the whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness.

During this combat Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light division, turned towards the ford of Huerta, leaving the forest to his right; for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in the castle of Alba de Tormes and that the enemy must of necessity be found in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he disabused of his error by marching through standing corn where no enemy

could have preceded him,—nor by Foy's retreat into the forest, because it pointed at first towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo which that general might be endeavouring to gain, and the right wing of the allies would find him there: a squadron of French dragoons also, bursting from the woods in front of the advancing troops soon after dark fired their pistols and then passed at full gallop towards the ford of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the defeated army, and confirming the notion that its final retreat would be in that direction. Had the castle of Alba been held the French could not have carried off a third of their army,—nor would they have been in much better plight if Carlos d'España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it, and dishonourably suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured. The left wing therefore continued their march to the ford without meeting any enemy, and the night being far spent were there halted; the right wing, exhausted by long fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action with Maucune and thus the French gained Alba unmolested, but the action did not terminate without two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the forty-third regiment Wellington was struck in the thigh by a musket-ball which first passed through his holster. Afterwards, when the night piquets had been set at Huerta, sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford and returned a different road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These were the last events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the general was worthily seconded by troops whose ardour may be appreciated by the following anecdotes.

Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, fighting on the 18th at the Guarena amongst the foremost as he was always wont to do, had a sword thrust through his side, yet he was again on horseback the 22nd, and being denied leave to remain in that condition with his own regiment secretly joined Pack's Portuguese in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Hermanito. Such were the officers. A man of the forty-third, one by no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and

lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream, but refusing to quit the fight limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet and streaming with blood from his wound marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp flints. Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of a woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.

The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers and endured the privations of two campaigns with that patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex. In this battle, forgetful of everything but the strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death.

CHAPTER IV.

DURING the few hours of darkness succeeding the battle Clausel passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and at daylight was in full retreat upon Peneranda covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington having brought up the German dragoons and Anson's cavalry, also crossed the river with his left wing at daylight, and moving up the stream came about ten o'clock upon the French rear, then winding without much order along the Almar a small stream at the foot of a height near the village of La Serna. He launched his cavalry against them, and the French squadrons flying from Anson's troopers towards their own left abandoned three battalions of infantry who in separate columns were making up a hollow lope on their right, hoping to gain the crest of the heights before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost reached the higher ground and formed squares, Foy being in the one and general Chemineau in the other. The last regiment, when half-way up, seeing Bock's dragoons galloping hard on faced about in column and commenced a disorderly fire; the squares above also plied their muskets with far greater effect, and the Germans after crossing the Almar stream dropped fast, for they had under fire to pass a turn of narrow road and clear some rough ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging front. By twos, by threes, by tens, by twenties they fell, yet the rest keeping together surmounted the difficulties of the ground and hurtling on the column went clean through it: then the squares above retreated and several hundred prisoners were taken by these able and daring horsemen. ●

This charge was successful even to wonder, the joyous victors standing in the midst of their captives and of

thousands of admiring friends seemed invincible ; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay the actors themselves remained with the conviction of this military truth, that cavalry alone are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprise. The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted and above a hundred had fallen, fifty-one were killed outright, and in several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly that falling together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse's legs stretched out as in movement the rider's feet in the stirrup his bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike and the large hat fastened under the chin giving to the grim but undistorted countenance a supernatural and terrible expression.

When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked they turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up re-commenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Setroval. Near that place Chauvel's horsemen joined them from the Duero, and covered the rear with such a resolute countenance that the allied cavalry, reduced in numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose to meddle again. Thus Clausel carried his army clear off without further loss, and with such celerity that his headquarters were that night at Flores de Avila forty miles from the field of battle. After remaining a few hours there he crossed the Zapardiel and would have halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered Cisla and his march was then continued to Arevalo. This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturally expected the French army would have made for Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat slack. The British left wing, being quite fresh, could have ascended the Tormes on the night of the battle and reached the Almar before daylight, or passing at Huerta have marched by Ventosa to Peneranda ; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy was not a prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington's warfare. On the 25th he halted on the Zapar-

diel and Adaja rivers, to let the commissariat which had been sent to the rear the morning of the battle come up.

Meanwhile the king, having quitted Madrid with fourteen thousand men on the 21st, reached the Adaja and pushed his cavalry towards Fontiveros; he was at Blasco

See Plan 9.

Sancho the 24th, within a few hours' march of Arevalo, and consequently able to effect a junction with Clausel; yet he did not hurry his march for he knew only of the advance upon Salamanca not of the defeat, and having sent many messengers to inform Marmont of his approach concluded he would await the junction. The next day he

received letters from him and Clausel, dated Arevalo, describing the battle, and saying the defeated army must pass the Duero immediately

King's Correspondence, MSS.

to save the depôt of Valladolid and establish new communications with the army of the north: they promised however to halt behind that river if possible until the king could receive reinforcements from Suchet and Soult.

Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could still have effected a junction, but he immediately made a forced march to Espinar, leaving in Blasco Sancho two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who were surprised and taken on the 25th by eight troopers under corporal Henley of the 14th dragoons. Clausel made for Valladolid by Olmedo, thus abandoning the garrisons of Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas to the allies. Wellington then brought Santocildes, who was now on the Esla with eight thousand Gallicians, to the right of the Duero, across which river he communicated by Castro Nuño with the left of the allies on the Zapardiel. The 27th the army entered Olmedo. General Ferey had died there of his wounds and the Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse; they re-made his grave and heaped rocks upon it for more security, yet with little need, for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honour is always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions, immediately applauded the action.

On the 26th Clausel finding the pursuit had slackened, sent

colonel Fabvier to advise the king of it, and then passing his right wing across the Duero by the ford near Boecillo to cover the evacuation of Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he remained however still on the left bank in the hope that Fabvier's mission would bring the king back. Joseph had then passed the Puerta de Guadarama, but immediately repassed it and made a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th and pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. There he remained until the 31st expecting Clausel would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his communication with Valencia and Andalusia. During these movements Wellington had brought Santocildes across the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma and Ciga with the 1st and light divisions and the cavalry, compelled Clausel to go over the Duero in the night of the 29th. And that general, fearing the British would then gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three columns up the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero and the Esquiva, towards Burgos, in great disorder; for the soldiers, encouraged even by

Clausel's
Letter to the
Minister of
War, 18th
August, 1812.

officers of high rank, spread over the whole country pillaging and assassinating the country people: Clausel was forced to shoot fifty marauders ere the wide spreading anarchy could be checked.

Valladolid was occupied by the allies amidst the rejoicings of the inhabitants, and eight hundred sick and wounded men were captured there with seventeen pieces of artillery and large stores. Three hundred other prisoners were taken by the guerilla chief Martinez, and a large convoy on its way to Soult was forced to retrograde to Burgos. The left wing of the allies then pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, while the right wing moving against the king reached Cuellar the 1st of August. On the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph having first dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a contribution of money and church plate retreated through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus

the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from the army of Portugal, the operations against the latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of affairs ; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula.

In Estremadura, after Drouet's retreat to Azagua, general Hill had placed a strong division of infantry at Merida ready to cross the Tagus, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when general Lallemand made a fresh incursion with three regiments of cavalry. The third and fourth Portuguese dragoons under colonel John Campbell retired before him in good order, skirmishing, to the high ground between Ribera and Villa Franca, and being there supported by Long's British cavalry and Wynyate's horse artillery, turned and charged with success. Lallemand then repassed the defile of Hinojosa under fire of the guns, and being menaced on both flanks by Long and Slade was driven with a loss of fifty men to Llera. Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march towards Merida and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a corresponding movement, whereupon the French general returned to the Serena ; but though he received positive orders from Soult to Intercepted
Correspond-
ence. give battle no action followed and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula remained balanced.

In Andalusia Ballesteros had surprised colonel Beauvais at Ossuna, taking three hundred prisoners and ruining the French dépôt there, after which he moved against Malaga. He was opposed by Laval in front, and Villatte being detached from the blockade of Cadiz cut off his retreat to San Roque ; the road to Murcia was still open to him and he escaped, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that Joseph O'Donnel had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicante. This disaster, to be described in a more fitting place, was counterbalanced by information that the revived expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, had been joined by Whittingham's division, and had received the stores and guns sent from Portugal. In the north, Popham's arma-

ment had drawn Caffarelli's troops to the coast, and although this littoral warfare was not followed up the diversion was effectual.

In Castille the siege of Astorga lingered, but Santocildes was now in full communication with Wellington, and Silveira was on the Duero; Clausel remained at Burgos, and the king being joined by two thousand men from Suchet's army could concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the king in preference to following Clausel. For the latter could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but that monarch might be assailed without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clausel could not soon renew the campaign, and the immediate fall of Astorga was expected which would let loose eight thousand additional men. A strong British division could also be spared to co-operate with Santocildes, Silveira, and the partidas, to watch Clausel while Wellington gave the king a blow or forced him to abandon Madrid; and it seemed probable the moral effect of regaining the capital would excite the Spaniards' energy everywhere, and prevent Soult from attacking Hill: if he did attack him the allies, choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succour.

These reasons being weighed, Clinton was left at Cuellar with the sixth division increased to eight thousand men by the addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson's cavalry, Santocildes was put in communication with him, and the partidas of Marquinez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus, exclusive of Silveira's militia and the Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the Duero, and the English general was still able to march against Joseph with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos d'España's Spaniards. He had also assurance from lord Castlereagh that a considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance,

because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of bringing it up from Portugal.

When the king regained Madrid he expected to hear that ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, instead of which he received letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from Clausel saying the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos. This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if the allies marched upon

King's Correspondence,
MSS.

Madrid; but Joseph, unable to appreciate Wellington's military combinations, did not perceive that before he marched against Madrid the English general had forced Clausel to seek a distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the king's perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid and marched upon Zaragoza, Valencia or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions. Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march by their right to the Tagus and so intercept his communication with the south, he resolved to march towards the Morena; and from Segovia he had ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia and meet him on the frontier of La Mancha. But to avoid the disgrace of seeming to fly before a detachment he occupied the Escorial mountain, and placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position, Wellington's advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese, a troop of horse artillery and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th the whole army was over the mountains. Then the king, retaining only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day with two or three thousand carriages of different kinds and nearly twenty thousand persons of all ages and sexes.

On the 11th D'Urban drove back Trielhard's cavalry posts and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock's heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, occupied

Las Rozas about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg returned, and D'Urban having called up the horse artillery would have charged the enemy's leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled, and three of the guns being overturned on the rough ground were taken. The victorious cavalry then passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted and stopped the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti's Italians came up, when the fight would have ended badly if Ponsonby's cavalry and the seventh division had not arrived, whereupon Trielhard abandoned Majadahonda leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away the Portuguese general Barbacena, the colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies was above two hundred, and when the infantry passed through Rozas a few hours after the combat the German dead were then lying thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers were stretched on the sills of the doors, furnishing proof at once of the suddenness of the action and of their own bravery. Had the king been prepared to follow up the blow with his whole force the allies must have suffered severely, for Wellington trusting to the advanced guard had not kept his divisions very close together.

After this combat the king retired to Valdemoro, where he met his convoy from Madrid and when the troops of the three different nations forming his army thus came together a horrible confusion arose; the convoy was plundered and the miserable people who followed the court were made prey of by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief and succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjuez. The procession was however lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of march was broken by crowds of weeping women and children and despairing men: courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the pos-

session of even the animals on which they were endeavouring to save their families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole before them into the Tagus, yet Wellington did not molest them, either from ignorance of their situation or what is more probable compassionating their misery; he knew that the troops by abandoning the convoy could easily escape over the river and he would not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people without affecting the military operations: perhaps also he thought it wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.

In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjuez and Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the king received letters from Soult and Suchet. The first opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicant and a considerable army was forming there. Irritated with Soult and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the king then relinquished his march towards the Morena and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded who were heaped on country cars, the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and left, endeavoured to collect provisions. But the people, remembering the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun's troops on their return from Alicant, fled with their property; and as it was the hottest time of the year and the deserted country was sandy and without shade, this march of one hundred and fifty miles to Almanza was one of continual suffering. The partida chief Chaleco hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; and while this disastrous journey was in progress another misfortune befel the French on the side of Requena. For the hussars and infantry belonging to Suchet's army, having left Madrid to succour Cuenca before the king returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of that place in despite of the Empeinado and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the passage of a river near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, and three hun-

dred men. And then the Empecinado invested Guadalaxara, which had a garrison of seven hundred men.

Wellington seeing that the king had crossed the Tagus in retreat entered Madrid, a very memorable event were it only from the affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner, marching at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude who before that hour had never seen him came forth to hail his approach, not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear of a conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous exultation; famine was amongst them and long-endured misery had subdued their spirits; but with tears and every other sign of deep emotion they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, touched his clothes, and throwing themselves upon the earth blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure and glorious as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.

Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French regiments; it had a garrison of two thousand fighting men besides invalids and followers, but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called La China, with an exterior entrenchment; but the fort was too small, the entrenchment, too large, and easily deprived of water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was found an order directing the commandant to confine his real defence to the fort; and accordingly, in the night of the 13th, he abandoned the entrenchment, and next day accepted honourable terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible buildings that his fine troops would with only a little firing have been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that many broke their arms and their commander was like to have fallen a victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French writers with too much truth assert that the escort basely robbed and murdered

many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action was perpetrated on the frontier of Portugal by the Spanish garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the first day's march from Madrid, are guiltless, and lord Wellington made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to have the Spanish criminals punished.

Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalajara, which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army and its resources, was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the king and by Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six thousand men had been delivered as it were bound to the allies; and with them stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. These forts had been designed by the emperor to resist the partidas, but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled.

Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2nd of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was carried by Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22nd of July at the Arapiles was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September! Marmont, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused himself with so little strength or clearness, that the emperor, contemptuously remarking that the despatch contained more complicate stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand why Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the king? why he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry which he knew were close at hand? "From personal vanity," said the emperor with seeming sternness, "the duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country and the good of my service, he is guilty of the crime of insubordination and is the author of all this misfortune."

But Napoleon's wrath so just, and apparently so dangerous, could not even in its first violence overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, the recollection of which should now pierce Marmont's inmost soul, twice in the same letter he desired that these questions might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous feeling shaken by the arrival of the king's agent, colonel Désprez, who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle at

Appendixes,
11, 12, 13.

the outposts and when all hopes of peace with Russia were at end. Joseph's despatches, bitter against all the generals, were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the battle, the latter because of his resistance to the royal plan. Soult's recall was demanded imperatively, because he had written a letter to the emperor extremely offensive to the king; and it was also hinted that he designed to make himself king of Andalusia. Idle stories of that marshal's ambition seem always to have been resorted to when his skilful plans were beyond the military judgment of his accusers; but Marmont was deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the king's complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington's despatch, which was more favourable to the duke of Ragusa than Joseph's report; for the latter was founded on a belief that the unfortunate general knew the army of the centre was close at hand and would not wait for it; whereas the partidas had intercepted so many of Joseph's letters it is doubtful if any reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in vain therefore that Désprez pressed the king's discontent on the emperor; that great man, with unerring sagacity, had already disentangled the truth and Désprez was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master:

Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to succour Marmont? Why was the emperor's example, when in a like case he marched from Madrid against sir John Moore, forgotten? Why, after the battle, was not the Duero passed and the beaten troops rallied on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the Tagus crossed so soon? Finally

why were not stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro burned, the eagles and the garrison carried off?

To these questions the king's agent could only reply by excuses which must have made the energetic emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, Désprez harped upon Soult's demeanour, his designs in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive to the king, which shall be more noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he was at the head of five hundred thousand men and occupied with such immense operations. With respect to Soult's letter, he said he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural and partaken by the other generals; wherefore he would not by recalling him deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head they possessed. And then in ridicule of Soult's supposed treachery he observed, that the king's fears on that head must have subsided as the English newspapers said the duke of Dalmatia was evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army of the centre to retake the offensive. Nevertheless the emperor without hesitation admitted all the evils arising from these disputes between the generals and the king, but said, at such a distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen the mischief, and regretted more than ever that Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811; thus saying he finished the conversation, but this expression about Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known fact, yet Joseph's letters show that he not only desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and live a private man in France! Did the emperor mean that he wished his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. *Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own, and be ready to concentrate on the important points :*

This maxim contains the spirit of Napoleon's instructions to his generals after Badajos was succoured in 1811. At that time he had ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered Madrid and could readily march to aid either the army of the south or the army of the north. Dorsenne who commanded the latter could bring twenty-six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his flank ; he could not move against Marmont without having the others on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent's flanks save from the ocean. He took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos notwithstanding, but by surprise and because the French did not concentrate on the important points: this proved his superiority, but in no manner affected the principle of Napoleon's plan.

When the exigency of the Russian war had weakened the army of the north, the emperor, giving Marmont two additional divisions, ordered him to occupy Castille, not as a defensive position but as a central offensive one from whence he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements bar Wellington from serious operations elsewhere. Marmont was forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier of Beira, that is when he could not assail him in flank ; and he was directed to guard the Asturias carefully as a protection to the great line of communication with France. In May also he was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonnet from Oviedo, and for delaying to re-occupy the Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither then nor afterwards did he comprehend the spirit of the emperor's views, and that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his lieutenant's want of perception, that all

the pomp and vast political and military combinations of Dresden could not put it from his thoughts.

‘Twice,’ said he, ‘has the duke of Ragusa placed an interval of thirty leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the English general goes where he will, the French general loses the initial movements and is of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation of the Asturias, Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and the guerillas communicate freely with the coast. If the duke of Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda he cannot know what Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead of operating so as to make the English general concentrate his whole army. The false direction already given to affairs makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong corps always in hand; that the commander of the reserve at Bayonne should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand men always ready to march; finally that the provisional battalions and dépôts of the interior should reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrenees, exercised and formed for service. *If Marmont’s oversights continue, these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme.*’

Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been recorded in praise of Cæsar’s generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. This letter was written by the French emperor on the 28th of May, before the allies were collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred thousand French troops were between the English general and Bayonne, and its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October!

2°. To meet the emperor’s views, Marmont should as Scult advised, have left one or two divisions on the Tormes, have encamped near Baños and on the upper Agueda to watch the allies. Caffarelli’s divisions could have joined those on the Tormes, and then Napoleon’s plan for 1811 would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the king secured, and Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond the Agueda. Marmont, apparently because he

would not have the king in his camp, run counter to the emperor and to Soult. He kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excusable if to feed them there was difficult; but then he did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did he abandon his forts when he abandoned Salamanca; thus eight hundred men were sacrificed merely to secure his concentration behind the Duero. His line of operations was perpendicular to the allies' front, instead of lying on their flank—he abandoned sixty miles of country between the Tormes and the Agueda—he suffered Wellington to take the initial movement—he withdrew Bonnet from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli's support and realized the emperor's fears. He regained the initial however by passing the Duero on the 18th, and had he deferred the passage until the king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have gone back upon Portugal with some show of dishonour. But if Castaños, instead of keeping fifteen thousand Gallicians before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with three or four thousand, and detached Santocildes with eleven thousand down the Esla to co-operate with Silveira and D'Urban, sixteen thousand men would have been acting upon Marmont's right flank in June: and as Bonnet did not join until the 8th of July he could scarcely have kept the line of the Duero.

3°. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the extent of country occupied by the French armies and the impediments to their military communication, while from Portugal, an impregnable central position, he could rush out unexpectedly against any point. This strong post was however of his own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it, knew its full value and availed himself of all its advantages. The battle of Salamanca was accidental in itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington's combinations must be estimated from the general result. He had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and one hundred thousand were especially appointed to watch and control him; yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others from

Madrid in confusion, without risking a single strategic point. His campaign up to the conquest of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his means and resources have been shown to be precarious, shifting and uncertain; want of money alone would have prevented him from following up his victory if he had not persuaded the Spanish authorities in the Salamanca country to yield him the revenues of the government in kind, under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever more entitled to the honours of victory.

4°. The allies' success indicates a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of approved valour and well commanded, was of so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true line of operations. Its conquest in 1811 was the king's plan, and it was not liked by Napoleon though he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a grave one. While the English held Portugal and Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen rather than a gain. Had the communication with France been first established by the southern line of invasion, to attack Andalusia would have been methodical; or to have held it partially by detachments for the sake of the resources, keeping the base of the army in Estremadura, would have been regularly within the northern system of invasion. For in Estremadura Soult would have covered the capital, been more connected with the army of the centre, and his co-operation with Massena in 1810 would probably have compelled the English to quit Portugal. Reinforcing the army of the south with thirty or forty thousand men would have had the same effect if Soult could have fed such a number. And in favour of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of Spain, and the English without abandoning Portugal might have been located in strength at Cadiz, which would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon: finally the English ministers were not then determined to defend Portugal.

5°. When the emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military head in the Peninsula, he referred to a scheme by that marshal to be noticed in the next chapter; but having

regard merely to the disputes between him Marmont and the king, Suchet's talents not being in question, the justice of the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced the military principle of concentration on the important points; but the king and marshals, though harping continually upon this maxim, desired to apply each in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point is to hurt yourself with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated. The failure of the campaign was attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled the king to act before Palombini's division arrived. But it has been shown that Hill could have brought Wellington an equal or superior reinforcement in less time, whereby the latter could have made head until the French dispersed for want of provisions, or by a rapid counter-movement have fallen upon Andalusia. If the king had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo it would have been no diversion, for he had no battering-train; still less could he have marched on Lisbon, for Wellington would then have overpowered Soult and entered Cadiz before such an operation could become dangerous. Oporto might have been taken, but Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid for that city. The ten thousand men required of Soult by the king on the 19th of June could have been at Madrid before August, and the passes of the Guadarama thus defended until Marmont's army was re-organized! Ay! but Hill could have entered the valley of the Tagus, or being reinforced could have invaded Andalusia while Wellington kept the king in check. Joseph's plan of operations, if exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington's progress on some points; but then the French would have been concentrated in large masses without striking any decisive blow, which it was the pith and marrow of the English general's policy to make them do. It follows that Soult made a true, Joseph a false application of the principle of concentration.

6°. If the king had judged well he would have merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent. Holding only the Retiro and a few posts near Madrid, he

would have organized a pontoon train, established magazines at Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera, kept his army constantly united, and employed to open roads through the mountains and chase the partidas while Wellington remained quiet. Thus acting he would have been ready to succour any menaced point. By enforcing discipline in his own army he would have given a useful example, and by vigilance and activity have insured the preponderance of force wherever he marched: he would have acquired the esteem of the French, and the Spaniards would more readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man can wear an inherited crown, it is of gold, the people support it: it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of a usurped diadem, it is of iron.

7°. If Marmont and the king were at fault in the general plan of operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the campaign. On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Duero in advance. On the 30th it re-passed that river in retreat, having in twelve days marched two hundred miles, fought three combats and a general battle. One marshal, seven generals, Appendixes 10, 11. Vol. V. twelve thousand five hundred men and officers, had been killed wounded or taken; and two eagles, besides those captured in the Retiro, several standards, twelve guns and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores found at Valladolid, fell into the victors' hands. In the same period, the allies marched one hundred and sixty miles and had one field-marshal, four generals, and nearly six thousand officers and soldiers killed or wounded.

This comparison proves Wellington's sagacity when he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French army, although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded six thousand of the allies,—the eleventh and sixty-first regiments of the sixth division, had not together more than one hundred and sixty men and officers left standing at the end of the battle; twice six thousand then would have fallen in a more equal contest, and as Chauvel's cavalry and the king's army were both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would have followed

a less perfect victory. The battle ought not, and would not have been fought but for Marmont's false movement on the 22nd. Yet it is certain, if Wellington had retired, the murmurs of his army already louder than was seemly would have been heard in England; and if an accidental shot had terminated his career all would have been terminated. The Cortes, ripe for a change, would have accepted the intrusive king, and the American war just declared against England would have so complicated affairs that no new man could have continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would have been raised. It would have been said that Wellington desponding and distrusting his brave troops dared not venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would have been made, as sir John Moore's was, a butt for the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been measured by the ignorance of his detractors.

8°. In the battle Marmont had forty-two thousand sabres and bayonets; Wellington, who had received some detachments on the 19th, had above forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally Spanish. The French had seventy-four guns, the allies, including a Spanish battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus Marmont, over-matched in cavalry and infantry was superior in artillery, and the fight would have been most bloody if the generals had been equal, for courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington's genius struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marchant's charge, brought up to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions and keep off Boyer's dragoons; but it would seem ill to cavil at an action which was described at the time by a French officer, as the '*beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.*'

9°. In the description of the battle, Marmont's own account of his views and the time when he was wounded has been adopted; but there are other versions which tend to place his errors in a stronger light. It is affirmed he twice sent

orders to Maucune, once by Fabvier, once by colonel Richemont his aide-de-camp, to assemble four divisions and press the English army, which was, he said, in full retreat by the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Maucune replied that he was more likely to be attacked himself, and in fact Pakenham fell upon him very soon afterwards. That so far from wishing or ordering his left wing to fall back on their centre Marmont was satisfied the allies were retiring; that being at dinner and in the act of holding his plate, he was struck by a shell just before Pakenham's attack commenced. That after the battle he had a violent altercation with Maucune, who he reproached for having extended the left so rashly, and when the latter pleaded the orders received by Fabvier Marmont exclaimed against that officer and denied that he had sent any orders to pursue the allies. However that may be, the battle of Salamanca remarkable in many points of view was not least so in this, that it was the first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty wind without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. Joseph's secret negotiations with the Cortes were crushed, his partisans were everywhere abashed, the sinking spirit of the Catalans revived, the clamours of the opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon's power to its very base.

Declarations
by colonel
Girard, chief
of Maucune's
staff, and
Mercier,
engineer
of Bonnet's
division,
MSS.

10°. Great battles are often accidental; few generals are able, or indeed willing to fix the place and hour where they shall fight. Salamanca was an accident seized with astonishing vigour and quickness, but still an accident. Even its results were accidental; for the French could never have repassed the Tormes if Carlos d'España had not withdrawn the garri-son from Alba, hiding the fact from Wellington; and this would have ruined the latter's campaign but for another of those chances which, recurring so frequently in war, make bad generals timid, and great generals trust fortune in adverse

circumstances. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry the army of Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of a few miles without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction with Clausel. On the 25th this junction could still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the king's generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; but Joseph retreated towards the Guadarama, wrathful that Clausel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must march it was for him to join Clausel. But the true causes of these errors were the secret inclinations of the generals. Joseph, determined to keep his communication with the capital and with Andalusia, wished to draw the beaten army to Madrid, and Marmont was willing to do so; but Clausel desired to have the king behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the result may be thus traced.

Clausel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand men could be re-organized; this certainly did not include stragglers and marauders; for a reference to the French loss shows nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact Clausel did in a fortnight re-organize twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five thousand stragglers and marauders. No soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the French, and as Joseph brought to Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men, two thousand being horsemen, forty thousand infantry and more than six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery might have been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli's divisions. Nor would Madrid have been exposed to an insurrection, nor to the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington's army; for two thousand men sent by Suchet had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity six or seven thousand more, who could have been united at the Retiro to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the intrusive court.

Wellington would then have found a more powerful army than Marmont's again on the Duero. But his own army

would have been less powerful than before, for the reinforcements from England had not sufficed to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and wounded, was above eight thousand, and the sick were rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington the king poisoned the wound. The English general had fore-calculated all these superior resources of the enemy, and it was only Marmont's flagrant fault on the 22nd that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry stretching as far as the eye could command showed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater generals than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things.

BOOK THE NINETEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

WELLINGTON'S operations deeply affected the French in the distant provinces, and it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north, and when Clausel led back his vanquished troops to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza, instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army, and though his central position gave him the initial power, his lines of communication were long and weak and the enemy powerful at either flank. On his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy's rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn.

EASTERN OPERATIONS.

The narrative of Catalonian affairs was interrupted when the French general Decaen, after fortifying the coast line and opening some new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy was then confined to the mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains of Lerida, and from the Cerdaña; and the insurrectionary spirit was only

upheld by Wellington's successes and the hope of succour from Sicily. Lacy, devoted to the republican party in Spain, had now been made captain-general as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet to the English naval officers avowed his wish to repress the patriotism of the somatenes. Not ashamed to boast of his assassination plots, he received with honour a man who had murdered the aide-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions amongst his own generals, intriguing against all of them in turn; and when Eroles and Manso, the people's favourites, raised any soldiers, he transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarsfield's division, at the same time calumniating that general to depress his influence. He quarrelled incessantly with Codrington, and had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia, lest a general insurrection should take place; for he feared the multitude, once gathered and armed, would drive him from the province and declare for the opponents of the Cortes. And in this view the constitution itself, although emanating from the Cortes, was long withheld from the Catalans, because the newly declared popular rights might have interfered with the arbitrary power of the chief.

Codrington,
MSS.

History of
the con-
spiracies
against the
French
army in
Catalonia,
published
at Barce-
lona, 1813.

When the Anglo-Sicilian expedition reached Mahon, the hopes of the Spaniards and the fears of the French were alike excited and the coast became the object of interest to both. The Catalans opened a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and sought to collect the grain of the Campo de Taragona; but Decaen, then coming to meet Suchet who had arrived at Reus, drove them to the hills again. The Lerida district was however open to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period Reille had detached general Paris from Zaragoza to succour the Italians under Palombini; and that Severoli's division was broken up to reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. When the army of the Ebro was dissolved, Lacy

resolved to march upon Lerida, where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious scheme, which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarsfield. Their divisions were incorporated with other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp. Lacy having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at mid-day, intending to attack next morning at dawn, but the men were without food and so exhausted that fifteen hundred had fallen behind. A council of war was held and Sarsfield would have returned, observing that all communication with the sea was abandoned, that the harvests

Sarsfield's
Vindication,
MSS. of the Campo de Taragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality.

Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy sent him back to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check, but in the night of the 16th made him return to Limiana on the Noguera. Lacy himself had meanwhile advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, two hundred inhabitants and one hundred and fifty soldiers were destroyed, two bastions fell and the place was laid open.

Henriod the governor, though ignorant of the vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer hearing the explosion marched to the succour, and when the Catalan troops appeared, the citizens, enraged by the destruction of their habitations, aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his country's advantage. To lessen the odium thus incurred he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarsfield's disobedience; and as that general, to punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the French and killing twenty of

Codrington,
MSS. his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so hateful, that some time after, when seeking to raise soldiers in

those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the windows as he passed.

Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Dacaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against Green, who was entrenched in the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso raised the somatenes to aid him, he had provisions, and the inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy capture; yet he surrendered in twenty-four hours, and when the enemy despairing of success was going to relinquish the attack. He was he said forced by his own people, yet he signed the capitulation. Decaen set fire to the convent and the flames seen for miles around was the signal that the warfare on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French general marched to Lerida to gather corn, and Lacy again spread his troops in the mountains.

Lafaille.

During his absence Eroles had secretly prepared a general insurrection, to break out when the British army should arrive, and it was supposed he designed to change the government of the province. Lacy himself again spoke of embodying the somatenes if arms were given to him by sir Edward Pellew, but there was really no want of arms, the demand was a deceit to prevent the muskets being given to the people. A general desire for the arrival of the British troops was now prevalent. The miserable people turned anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval commanders, who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All eyes were now turned towards the ocean, the French looked in fear, the Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, but after three days spread its sails again and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality stupified with grief and disappointment.

This unexpected event was the natural result of previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings when not directed by a superior genius, and even then not always avoided. It has been shown how ministerial

vacillation marred lord William Bentinck's first intention of landing in person with ten or twelve thousand men on the Catalonian coast; and how, after much delay, Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of six thousand men, Calabrians, Sicilians and others, troops of no likelihood save that some three thousand British and Germans were amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by vessels from Portugal, having engineers and artillery officers on board, and the honoured battering-train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos. Wellington hoped much from this expedition; he had himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign was conceived in the expectation that lord William, a general of rank and reputation having ten thousand good troops, aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers disciplined under the two British officers Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen on Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be disembarked of strength sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan army, to take Taragona.

Roche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government hesitated to place it under Maitland; it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of Maitland's arrival off Palamos was, under the command of Joseph O'Donnel, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham's levy remained, but when inspected

General
Donkin's
Papers,
MSS.

by the quarter-master-general Donkin was found in a raw state, scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham's and Roche's men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure or the delivery of stores; and Roche's conduct in this last matter, justly or unjustly, was generally and severely impugned. Whittingham acknowledged that he

could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops, and though the captain-general Coupigny desired their departure his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so strongly that he finally assented, and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff-officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs.

Maitland's first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once, and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it; the other generals showed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy's disposable troops at fifteen thousand, his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, which he could with difficulty feed or provide with ammunition. Sarsfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet's moveable column, eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including Suchet's column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet's column and of the garrisons and migueletes in the enemy's service.

Notes by
general
Maitland,
MSS.

Donkin,
MSS.

No insurrection of the somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance of such an event; the French were descried conducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Taragona after investment. Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good troops, and could double them in a few days: the Catalans could not so soon join Maitland's force, and

there was a general, apparently an unjust notion, abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus the battering-train and even the safety of the army would be involved in an enterprise promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed by Codrington to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland also was further swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the somatenes had not voluntarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore, as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia to attack that place on a plan furnished by the quarter-master-general Donkin, in unison also with Wellington's scheme of operations, but Maitland during the voyage changed his mind and proceeded at once to Alicant.

The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval commanders at seeing the principality thus shaken off; yet the judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from having given stronger hopes of assistance than circumstances warranted, partly from that confidence, which, inspired by continual success, is strength on their own element but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington from

Codrington,
MSS. the great interest he took in the struggle was peculiarly discontented; yet his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time shows his

hopes rested more on vague notions of the somatenes' enthusiasm, than on facts which a general could calculate upon. Lord Wellington indeed said, he could see no reason why the plan he had recommended should not have been successful; an observation made however when he was angrily excited by the prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of the forts at Salamanca although close to them; and as he had only just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, he might have been deceived as to Taragona, which if not strong in regular

works was well provided, commanded by a very bold active governor, and offered very great resources for interior retrenchments.

Wellington's information as to the strength of the Catalans came indeed chiefly from sir E. Pellew, and his from Eroles, who exaggerated. Maitland could scarcely be called a commander-in-chief, for lord William forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest Sicily should be endangered; and to avoid mischief from the winter season he was instructed to quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William and lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast as secondary to the wants of Sicily. Wellington looked only to the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. Desiring vigorous combined efforts of military and naval forces, his plan was that Taragona should be attacked,—if it fell the warfare he said would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia,—if it was succoured by a concentration of French troops Valencia would necessarily be weak; the armament could then proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful could return to assail Taragona again.

This was a shrewd plan, but Napoleon never lost sight of that great principle of war so concisely expressed by Sertorius, when he told Pompey a good general should look behind him rather than before. The emperor, acting on the proverb that fortune favours the brave, often urged his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few men in front, but he invariably covered their communications with heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were neglected. His armies made what are called points, such as Massena's invasion of Portugal, Moncey's attack on Valencia, Dupont's on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his instructions sent from Dresden been strictly obeyed, the walls of Lerida and Taragona would have been destroyed, and the citadels of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The field

army would thus have been increased by at least three thousand men, the moveable columns spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a descent.

But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland's troops were too few and ill-composed to invest Taragona. The imperial muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, including Reille's divisions at Zaragosa, for the armies of Aragon and Catalonia; twenty-seven thousand of the first, thirty-seven thousand of the second were actually under arms with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once ten thousand men to the succour of Taragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as many more in a very short time is not to overrate his power; and this without counting Paris' brigade, three thousand strong, which belonged to Reille's division and was disposable. Suchet had just before come to Reus with two thousand select men of all arms, and as O'Donnel's army had since been defeated near Alicant, he could have returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland. Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some eight thousand disposable men were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say two marches from Taragona; Lamarque with four or five thousand was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Taragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdaña, seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons and minor posts smaller succours might have been drawn: Tortoza alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarsfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles' divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milans' in the Grao d'Olot; they required five days to assemble, they would not have exceeded seven thousand and with their disputing captious generals would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting, when their defeat would have been almost certain.

Sarsfield judged ten days necessary to reduce Taragona,

and said the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian troops alone. Maitland therefore would have had to land his men, battering-train and stores, and form his investment in the face of Decaen's power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated that general first. But Decaen's troops, numerically equal without reckoning the garrison of Taragona, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only the British and German troops, three thousand, were to be depended upon in battle: neither does it appear that platforms, sand-bags, fascines and other materials were on board the vessels. Maitland indeed would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion and Wellington's object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that it was not so. The soundness of this opinion has however been disputed by many seamen well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that even in winter the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, gives facility for re-embarking on one or other of its sides in any weather. To Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.

OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.

The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O'Donnel, brother to the regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army after Blake's surrender at Valencia. Having Alicant and Carthagena as a base he was independent of a division under Freire, which always hung on the frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Suchet and Soult were paralysed in some degree by the neighbourhood of these armies, which were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed

by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of general Ross with British troops at Carthagea.

O'Donnel had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men for Catalonia, leaving Harispe with four thousand men beyond the Xucar. Ross immediately advised O'Donnel to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequence of Palombini's and Maupoint's departure for Madrid

Plan 2. came down from their haunts in the mountains
Vol. V. of Albaracin upon the right flank and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet with his usual celerity returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament, he recalled them again, and sent for Paris' brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast and meanwhile O'Donnel's operations brought on the

FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla and Onil on his right; at Ibi and Alcoy on his left. This line was not more than one march from Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort was at Castalla with a regiment of

infantry, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons with three companies of foot at Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited O'Donnel, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand infantry seven hundred cavalry and eight guns, against Delort; Roche with three thousand men was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla. O'Donnel hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena on the right flank of Delort. Roche marched the night of the 19th, remained the 20th in the mountains, next night threaded a difficult pass eight miles long, reached Ibi at daybreak on the 21st, and sent notice of his arrival to O'Donnel; and when that general appeared in front of Delort the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi and about five miles distant from it. But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi; this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succour, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry two guns and his cuirassiers to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche finding only a few men before him got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.

Plan 1.
Vol. V.

Suchet's Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

Roche's Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

Delort's
Report,
MSS.

O'Donnel, advancing beyond Castalla, only skirmished with the French, for he had detached the Spanish cavalry by the plains of Villena to turn their right and communicate with Bassecour. While expecting the effects of this movement he was astonished to see the French dragoons come trotting through the pass of Biar on his left flank; they were followed by some companies of infantry and only separated from him by a stream, over which was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had not

Appendix 6. interrupted this march from Biar, nor followed it
Vcl. V. through the defile, nor made any effort. O'Donnel turned two guns against the bridge, supporting them with a battalion of infantry, but the French dragoons observing this battalion to be unsteady braved the fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge seized the battery and then broke the infantry. Delort's line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the town of Castalla and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought refuge in an old castle and there surrendered; of the others three thousand were killed wounded or taken, yet the victors had scarcely fifteen hundred men engaged and did not lose two hundred. O'Donnel attributed his defeat to the disobedience and inactivity of St. Estevan who commanded his cavalry, but the great fault was the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar instead of keeping it in hand for the battle.

This part of the action over, Mesclop, who had not taken any share in it, was reinforced and returned to succour Ibi, to which place also Harispe was now approaching from Alcoy; but Roche favoured by the strength of the passes escaped and reached Alicant with little hurt, while the remains of O'Donnel's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. Bassecour who had advanced to Almanza was then driven back to his mountain-haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that Maitland's armament disembarked and the remnants of the Spanish force rallied. The king, then flying from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, giving one more proof that England, not Spain, resisted the French; for Alicant would have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of this defeat yet surely when the king's army had joined Suchet. That general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, the approach of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable force in the positions of San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, which he entrenched as well as the road to Almanza with a view to secure his junction with the king. At the

same time he established a new bridge and bridge-head at Alberique in addition to that at Alcira on the Xúcar; and having called up Paris from Teruel and Maupoint from Cuenca, resolved to abide a battle for which the slowness of his adversaries gave him full time to prepare.

Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them over the Xúcar and perhaps from Valencia itself; but he had scarcely set foot on shore when the usual Spanish vexations overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards the enemy. One on the left passed through Yecla and Fuente La Higuera, and by it the remnant of O'Donnel's army was coming up from Murcia; another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera; the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. O'Donnel, whose existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw nothing by purchase or requisition save wine and straw from any of these lines, nor from the country between them: the English general assented and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus created. He had designed to attack Harispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from Alicant so late as the 16th, and could not attack before the 18th, but that day Suchet had concentrated his army at Xativa. This delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O'Donnel. For Maitland's commissariat being inefficient, and his field-artillery so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily as to be nearly useless, he had hired mules at a great expense for the transport of his guns and provisions from Alicant, but the owners soon declared they could not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, and this was barred by O'Donnel's restrictions as to the roads. Many of the muleteers also after receiving their money deserted with mules and provisions; and a convoy with six days' supply being attacked by a partida was plundered dispersed and lost.

Maitland having no habitude of command and suffering from illness, disgusted and fearing for his troops, would have

retired at once, perhaps have re-embarked if Suchet had not gone back to Xativa; then however he advanced to Elda and Roche entered Alcoy, both apparently without an object; for there was no intention of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona and Maitland retreated to Alicant. To cover this retreat Donkin pushed forward with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of five thousand British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet kept his camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe to meet the king who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the junction of the two armies was effected; at the same time Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa's assault, arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of his brigade. When Joseph arrived Suchet pushed his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy; but, naturally a courtier, he was so much occupied with royalty as to neglect the allies when he might have seriously hurt them. Meantime O'Donnel having drawn off Freire's division from Lorca came to Yecla with five or six thousand men, and Maitland, reinforced with detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicant; but his health was quite broken and he earnestly desired to resign, being filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next chapter, for it was a great event, leading to great results and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms may depend.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

SUCHET found resources in Valencia to support the king's court and army without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies if the French commanders had been of one mind and looked well to the state of affairs. Joseph, exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals and troubled by the distress of numerous Spanish families attached to him, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle; he had in this view demanded from the French minister of war, money, stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and imperatively commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia.

Appendix 10.

That clear-sighted commander could not however understand why the king, who had given him no accurate details of Marmont's misfortunes or of his own operations, should yet order him to abandon at once all the results and all the interests springing from three years' possession of the south of Spain. He thought it a great question not to be treated lightly, and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of operations, he concluded that rumour had exaggerated the catastrophe at Salamanca, and to abandon Andalusia would be the ruin of the French cause.

'To march on Madrid,' he said, 'would probably produce another pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing the whole frame-work of the French invasion was disjointed and no resource would remain after a defeat. Andalusia, hitherto a burthen, now offered means to remedy the present disasters, and to

Joseph's
Papers,
MSS.

sacrifice that province with all its resources for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain appeared a folly: it was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the emperor's policy though it might be something for a king of Spain; yet Philip the Fifth had thrice lost it and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand duel which might be fought again with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia with all its stores and establishments,—to raise the blockade of Cadiz,—to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals and the magazines and render null the labours of three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in check sixty thousand enemies disposed on a circuit round it; but the moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo those sixty thousand men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on the Tagus in its front. On that line the army of the south could not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why retreat at all? Where,' exclaimed this able warrior, 'where is the harm though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?'

'Your majesty,' he continued, 'should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia even though to do so should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If Marmont's army comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself that army can keep on the right of the Ebro and the emperor will take measures for its succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled in that province the theatre of war is changed! The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may fol-

low him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive battle may be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March then with the army of the centre upon the Despeñas Peros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro, and famine will drive you thence before the emperor can from distant Russia provide a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, and America dismayed by our misfortunes will perhaps make peace with England.'

Neither the king's genius nor his passions would permit him to understand the grandeur and vigour of this conception. To change even simple lines of operations suddenly is at all times a nice affair, but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the initial movements after a defeat belongs only to master spirits in war. Now the emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France, as if Wellington could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced Lisbon! in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one side a disobedient lieutenant on the other and peremptorily repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing his plan could only be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with anger at such a termination to all his political and military labours, his feelings overmastered his judgment. Instead of tracing the king's rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness of the monarch's military genius, he judged it part of a design to secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother. Joseph had after Ocaña, when irritated at being restricted in his plan of governing Spain as a Spaniard, indicated to Soult a vague design of making himself independent, but to betray his brother deliberately was quite foreign to his honest passionate nature. Soult gave more weight to the matter, and making known his opinion to

six generals sworn to secrecy unless interrogated by the emperor, expressed his doubts of the king's good faith to the minister of war, founding them on the following facts.

1°. That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been made known to him only by the reports of the enemy, and the king, after remaining for twenty-three days without sending any detailed information of the operations in the north of Spain although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even in the Castilles.

2°. This operation, ruinous in itself, was insisted upon when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed that Joseph's ambassador at the court of Petersburg had joined the Prussian army in the field,—that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in the Isla de Leon,—that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortes a guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce to the English admiral: finally Moreau and Blucher were at Stockholm and the aide-de-camp of the former in London.

Reflecting upon all these circumstances he feared the object of the king's false movements might be to force the French army over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain separate from France; fears, which might be chimerical, but in such a crisis better be too fearful than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, but the vessel having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph's arrival there the despatch was opened; it was then in the first burst of his anger the king despatched Désprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of which has been already related. Soult's proceedings, offensive to the king and founded in error, because Joseph's letters, containing the information required, were intercepted not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his

master's service and cannot be justly condemned, yet Joseph's indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind and calm sagacity with which Napoleon treated this thorny affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his minister of war,—for the duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity and intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph's suspicions that Soult designed to make himself king of Andalusia,—could disturb the temper or judgment of the emperor; and it was then, struck with the vigour of Soult's plan, he called him the only military head in Spain.

Appendix 12.

Wellington was attentive to the effect of these transactions. Anxiously he watched Soult's reluctant motions in Andalusia, and while seemingly enjoying his own triumph amidst feasts and rejoicings at Madrid his eyes were fixed on Seville: the balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and apprehensions of the consummate captain. Before the allies crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed to keep close to Drouet and be ready to move into the valley of the Tagus if that general should hasten to the succour of the king. But when Joseph's retreat upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; at the same time general Cooke was directed to prepare an attack, even though it should be an open assault, on the French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any succour to the king, and even to force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of marching there himself; yet if these measures failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand men from Madrid, unite with Hill, and drive the French from that province.

Previous to these instructions being given, Laval and Villatte had, as before narrated, pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, where he was in such danger of capture, that the maritime expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz to carry him off. News of the battle of Salamanca then arrested the French, the Spanish general regained San Roque, the fleet went on to Valencia, and Soult, hoping the king

would transfer the seat of war to Andalusia caused Drouet to show a bold front against Hill, sending scouting parties towards Merida. Large magazines were also formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by Estremadura a march to La Mancha or a retreat by Grenada, and Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on the defensive. Nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, although his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied that Joseph did not mean to join Soult and that the latter meant to abandon Andalusia. The king finally forced this unwise measure, but the execution required extensive arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march wild, the journey long. And it was important to present the imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement and not the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.

All the minor posts in the Condado de Niebla and other places were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the king's first order, designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident and indirectly that he heard of Joseph's retreat to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct orders from the king, was going to Toledo, and it was not without difficulty and only through the medium of his brother who commanded Drouet's cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive isolated movement. The Murcian line was then adopted, but everything was hurried, because the works at the Isla were already broken up in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville when the safe assembling of the army at Grenada required another arrangement. However on the 25th of August, a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero had been destroyed; the long blockade was thus broken when the bombardment had become serious and the opposition to English influence taking a dangerous direction;—when the French intrigues were nearly ripe, the Cortes alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the church—when the executive government was weaker than ever, because Henry

O'Donnel the only active regent had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio and censured in the Cortes for the defeat at Castalla. This siege or rather defence, for Cadiz was never strictly speaking besieged, was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards could have defended it without the aid of British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that notwithstanding Graham's glorious action at Barosa Cadiz was always a heavy burthen upon Wellington; the forces there employed would have done better service under his immediate command, and many severe financial difficulties to say nothing of political crosses would have been spared.

In the night of the 26th Soult quitted Seville, to commence his march towards Grenada; but now Wellington's orders had set all the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet—Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains to hang on the retiring enemy's flanks,—the sea armament sent to succour him returned from Valencia,—Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with four thousand English and Spanish troops at Huelva, and on the 24th drove the French from St. Lucar. The 27th they fell upon the rear-guard at Seville, when the suburb of Triana the bridge and the streets beyond were carried by the English guards and Downie's legion, and two hundred prisoners several guns and many stores were captured. Downie, wounded and taken, was treated harshly, because the populace, rising in aid of the allies, had mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely was this action over when seven thousand French infantry came up from Chiclana, yet thinking all Hill's troops were before them hastily followed their own army, leaving the allies masters of the city. This enterprise though successful was isolated and contrary to Wellington's desire. A direct and vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison was his plan, and such an assault when the French were abandoning their works there would have been a far heavier blow to Soult, who was now too strong to be meddled with.

Having issued eight days' bread to his army he marched leisurely, picking up the garrisons and troops who came

into him from the Ronda and the coast. At Grenada he halted eleven days for Drouet, who had quitted Estremadura and was marching by Jaen to Huescar. Ballesteros harassed Soult's march, yet with an insignificant loss the latter finally united seventy-two guns and forty-five thousand soldiers under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. He was however still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank was Hill, on his right flank Ballesteros,—Wellington himself might come down by the Despeñas Perros,—the Murcians were in his front, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon behind him; and he was clogged with enormous convoys, for his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly nine thousand,—his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families attached to the French interests. To march upon the city of Murcia was the direct and the best route for Valencia, but the yellow fever raged there and at Carthage; moreover, S. Bracco, the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his intention to inundate the country if the French advanced. Wherefore he marched by the mountain ways leading from Huescar to Cehejin and Calasparra, and then moving by Hellin gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered by a detachment from Suchet's army, which skirmished with Maitland's advanced posts at San Vicente close to Alicant. At Hellin he met the advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3rd of October the military junction of all the French forces was effected.

Soult's difficult task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great a commander. For it must be recollected that besides the drawing together of the different divisions the march itself was three hundred miles, great part through mountain roads, and the population everywhere hostile. Hill had menaced him with twenty-five thousand men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur's forces,—Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz and by deserters, had nearly twenty thousand,—there were fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla,—Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the *partidas* were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these multitudes he had carried off his army his convoys and his sick

without any disasters. In this manner Andalusia, which had once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march made by Moore from Salamanca, was now, after three years' subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle delivered by Wellington close to the same city.

Maitland's proceedings had been a source of uneasiness to Wellington; for though the recovery of Andalusia was politically and militarily a great gain, the result he saw must necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet as a littoral warfare; yet he was content that Maitland should try his own plan, and he advised him to march by the coast and have constant communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. But the coast roads were difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same obstacles, and the latter in a greater degree, had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, still more that of the generals, was a bar to like proceedings in Valencia. Maitland desired to quit his command, and the time appointed by lord William for the return of the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but Wellington forbade their departure, and even asked the ministers to place them under his own command. And with gentleness and delicacy he showed to Maitland, who was a man of high honour courage and feeling although inexperienced in command, that his situation was not dangerous;—that the entrenched camp of Alicant might be safely defended,—that he was comparatively better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of Torres Vedras; and that it was even desirable the enemy should attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined with English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He also desired that Carthagená should be well looked to by Ross lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage of Elio's fear of Soult, he drew him with the army that had been O'Donnel's towards Madrid, and so got some control over his operations.

If Wellington had been well furnished with money and the

yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered Spanish forces and Sicilian armament on his own army, have endeavoured to crush the king and Suchet before Soult could arrive. Or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despeñas Perros and so have fallen on Soult himself during his march, although such an operation would have endangered his line of communication on the Duero. But the fever and want of money induced him to avoid operations in the south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the enemy in the south. He could not however stir from Madrid unless assured that Soult would march on Valencia and not on La Mancha; and that was not clear until Cordoba was abandoned. Hence Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded the passes leading to Cordoba in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; he could thus at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and Madrid, if the latter turned towards the Despeñas Perros: meanwhile Skerrett's troops were marching to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations.

During these transactions the allies' affairs in Old Castille had been greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not the French warfare generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños conducted the siege of Astorga with so little vigour it appeared rather a blockade than a siege; but the forts at Toro and Zamora had been invested, the first by the partidas, the second by Silveira's militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, although well aware they could not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clausel's retreat were endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess final success seemed certain. For Clinton was at Cuellar, Santocildes occu-

pied Valladolid, Anson's cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rear the line of communication as far as the frontier of Portugal was in disorder, the discipline of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than a thousand strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel to Salamanca, that as an example five were executed and many others severely punished by stripes; yet even this did not check the growing evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the licence at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.

All the hospitals in the rear were crowded. Salamanca, in which there were six thousand sick and wounded besides French prisoners, was the abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior officers' sufferings were still more heavy and protracted. They had no money and many sold their horses and other property to sustain life; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, gave orders they should be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. It is a common yet erroneous notion, that the English system of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable and the French hospitals neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon's attention than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, Larrey, justly celebrated were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the hospital '*Ambulance*,' that is to say, waggons of a peculiar construction, well horsed and served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, who being rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march,

ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded men. The astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of this institution.

In the British army, the carrying off the wounded depended partly upon the casual assistance of a weak waggon train very badly disciplined, furnishing only three waggons to a division and not originally appropriated to that service; partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the country whether of bullock carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle or when an hospital was to be evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded as the war enlarged pressed on the limited number of regular medical officers, and Wellington complained, that when he demanded more the military medical board in London neglected his demands and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war and their own profession; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, baffled the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well-educated surgeons sent out were for some time of little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in military organization; where one soldier dies from the want of a delicate operation hundreds perish from the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the military frame-work; it is in peace the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world. A perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether.

Such was the state of affairs on the allies' line of communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clausel suddenly came

down the Pisuerga. Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela, Santocildes, following Wellington's instructions, fell back to Torrelobaton, but left behind four hundred prisoners and all the guns and stores which had been captured there by the allies. On the 18th the French assembled at Valladolid to the number of twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns well provided with ammunition; and five thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vitoria, were also collected and in march to join. Clausel's design was to be at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of Avila himself and harass the English general's flank. While awaiting this opportunity, Foy proposed with two divisions of infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry to succour the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga; and Clausel consented, though he was somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment and did not believe Astorga near its fall. His hesitation ruined the scheme. Foy wished to march the 15th by Plasencia, but was not despatched until the evening of the 17th and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The 19th he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo on the Esla; the 20th, at three o'clock in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was mortified to learn that Castaños had by artful negotiation persuaded the garrison of Astorga, twelve hundred good troops, to surrender although there was no breach. The Gallicians had then retired to their mountains, and Foy marched upon Carvajales, hoping to enclose Silveira's militia between the Duero and the Esla, to sweep them off in his course, and then relieving Zamora, to penetrate to Salamanca and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this would infallibly have happened but for the judicious activity of Douglas, who divining Foy's object sent Silveira with timeful notice into Portugal; yet so critical was the movement that Foy's cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near Constantin at daybreak

Clausel's Correspondence,
MSS.

Foy's Correspondence,
MSS.

Sir H.
Douglas's
MSS.

on the 24th. The 25th the French entered Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clausel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry was actually in march upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by Ledesma to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was Clinton's error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily expected Astorga to fall and the French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before Clausel returned, but Clinton alone had eight thousand good troops, and might with the aid of Santocildes and the partidas have baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid after Foy's departure, which would have certainly brought that general back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following his instructions, have regulated his movements along the left of the Duero so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clausel first occupied Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance. The mere escape of the garrisons, from Toro and Zamora was thought no misfortune. It would have cost a long march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, which was more than they were worth; yet to use Wellington's words, '*it was not very encouraging to find that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains of Marmont's beaten troops; that in more than two months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important operations must still be performed by the British troops.*' The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by sir John Moore, '*without an army, without a government, without a general!*'

While these events were passing in Castille Popham's armament remained on the Biscay coast, and the partidas thus encouraged became so active, that with exception of Santona and Gueteria all the littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli. Porlier, Renovalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal com-

manders of all the bands, immediately took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao. Rouget, who came from Vitoria to recover the last, was after some sharp fighting compelled to retire again to Durango; and Reille, deluded by a rumour that Wellington was marching through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts: Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, then became unquiet and all the northern provinces were ripe for insurrection.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE the various military combinations described in the foregoing chapter were thickening, Wellington watched very eagerly the right moment for striking; the problem to be solved was one of time, which to be turned to account depended upon the activity of the Spaniards in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. The manner in which Suchet and Caffarelli were paralysed by the Anglo-Sicilian armies and by Popham's armament has been shown; but Clausel's force though re-organized was still little more than a wreck, and to render it powerless by taking Burgos was the English general's design. Meanwhile to oppose Soult and the king required extensive arrangements. Hence when it was known that Andalusia was absolutely abandoned, Hill was directed upon Toledo by the bridge of Almaraz; for Sturgeon's genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, also passable for artillery. Elio was then induced to bring the Murcian army to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was ordered to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz and guard the neighbouring fortress of Chinchilla, which, being situated on the confines of Murcia and La Mancha and perched on a rugged isolated hill in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong both from construction and site, and was the knot of all the great lines of communication. Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado were desired to enter La Mancha with their bands, Hill could bring up twenty thousand men, and the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry and Carlos d'España's troops, were to remain near Madrid while the rest of the army marched into Old Castille. Thus sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops well commanded, and having the Chinchilla fortress in front, would have been

assembled before Soult could unite with the king. And there was still the army of Estremadura, eight thousand strong, lying about Badajos in reserve.

The British troops at Carthagená were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave small garrisons in the forts there and join the army at Alicant, which with the reinforcements from Sicily would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand being British troops; and while this force was at Alicant Wellington judged the French could not bring more than fifty thousand against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected to resist on a fair field the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them; but he calculated that ere the French generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground long enough for the army to come back from Burgos: indeed he had little doubt of reducing that place and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.

By these dispositions the allies had several lines of operation. Ballesteros from the mountains of Alcaraz could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and when they passed could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet. Hill could retire if pressed by Madrid or by Toledo, and could gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus. Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado could act by Cuenca and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. And besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for clothing and arms, which under the recent treaty were to come from England. The English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succours to Wellington, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business they also gave Mr. Stuart a control without Wellington's knowledge; hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English general had no secure communication: moreover there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential

person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, were also experienced, but it will suffice here to say the want of money was now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears, those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most cruel privations, those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money-broker; and it was grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary: the soldiers, equally tempted and having no such resource plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained at Madrid.

The city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it was first entered a violent cruel and unjust persecution of those who were called '*Afrancesados*' was commenced, and continued until the English general interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture there were neither purchasers nor lenders, even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, showed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character, not many begged, none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the *Madriileños* discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the British officers who contributed, not much for they had it not, but enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were succoured. It was in the third division the example was set, and by the forty-fifth regiment, and it was not the


least of the many honourable distinctions those brave men have earned.

Wellington desirous of sheltering his troops from the extreme heat had early sent four divisions and the cavalry to the Escorial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew the king's retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba and Clinton was falling back before Clausel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby's light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the first of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town. He could scarcely feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped, and their government instead of transmitting money and stores endeavoured to throw off the burthen by an ingenious device. For having always a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops and check off the expense on the national account, which was then in favour of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. To stop this shameful expedient he refused payment of the subsidy from the chest of aids, whereupon the old discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force, the regency became intractable and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.

On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-

Portuguese army. Clausel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Berecal on that river. The 8th the allies halted for rest and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during the war did a Spanish general deviate into activity, and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people he had not met with an able man, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Gallicians came not, Santocildes even avoided a junction, and the French retreated slowly up the beautiful Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil. Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clausel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, yet on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas in the Pisuerga valley,—at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.

But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight guns had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clausel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli who had come



Sketch
of the
SIEGE OF BURGOS
1812.

down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrenees in anticipation of Marmont's disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and the partidas who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness and not unused to scenes of war, thus describes their proceedings, 'What with the flames and the plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava.'

Clausel's beautiful movements merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English general's marches were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton's retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clausel's advance to Valladolid, it was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English general might have had his army, Clinton's troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clausel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third and light divisions by the Somosierra from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda or Lerma have fallen upon Clausel while in march. That general, having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear and Wellington reinforced by the divisions from Madrid on his front or flank, would then have had to

fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine the object was to crush Clausel, and this should have been effected though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.

SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillerymen in this place, and the governor Dubreton was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works enclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks

Jones's
Sieges.

constructed by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed and contained the two most elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle: this last was the highest point, entrenched and surmounted with a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five separate enclosures, and the Napoleon battery commanded everything around it, save to the north, where at the distance of three hundred yards there was a second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. This point, called the hill of San Michael, was defended by a large horn-work with a hard sloping scarp forty-five feet high, and a counterscarp not less than ten feet high; it was unfinished and only closed by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight entrenchments for the out piquets. Nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers were mounted in the fortress, Clausel's reserve artillery and stores were also deposited there, and the armament could therefore be increased.

FIRST ASSAULT.

All the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan were commanded by the batteries, and two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th the passage of the river being effected above the town by the first division, major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack's Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed that horn-work and the conflict was murderous.

The highlanders who bore the ladders under the command of the engineer Pitt, placed them very well, splicing them together to meet the great height of the scarp, yet the stormers were beaten back with great loss, and would have failed if the gallant Cocks had not forced an entrance by the gorge with the seventy-ninth. The garrison was thus cut off, and must have surrendered if Cocks had been well supported; but he was only followed by the second battalion of the forty-second, and the French, being still five hundred, broke through and escaped. The affair was censured, the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above four hundred, whilst that of the enemy did not exceed one hundred and fifty.

Memoir
by colonel
Reid, R.E.

Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant he relied more upon the enemy's weakness than his own power; for it was said the garrison wanted water, and that their provision magazines could be burned. Upon this information he adopted the following plan of attack.

Twelve thousand men composing the first and sixth divisions and the two Portuguese brigades were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, twenty thousand exclusive of the partidas, were to form the covering army. The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael. A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured horn-work. A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the

Jones's
Sieges

first wall as possible without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.

When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgment was formed the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery. Head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro, colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the engineers, Robe and Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.

When the horn-work fell, a lodgment was commenced in the interior, and continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at daylight endeavour to retake the work by the gorge: good cover was however obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.

The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape and shells on the workmen who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery. The 22nd the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced. Wellington, deviating from his first plan, then resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence, and selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the horn-work. At midnight four hundred men provided with

ladders marched from under the hill on which the horn-work stood to the attack of the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high but had no flanks; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos to make a combined flank attack on that side.

SECOND ASSAULT.

It was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone; and the principal escalading party, composed of detachments from different regiments under major Lawrie, seventy-ninth regiment, although acting with great resolution got disordered in passing a hollow way fifty yards from the wall and had no success. The ladders were indeed placed and the troops entered the ditch, yet confusedly, Lawrie was killed, the bravest soldiers who first mounted were met hand to hand and bayoneted, and the ladders were reared and overturned several times; combustibles were also cast down in abundance and the British giving way left half their number behind. The wounded were brought off next day under a truce, and it was said the French found on a dead officer a plan of the siege; certain it is that this disastrous attack augmented the enemy's courage and produced a bad effect on the allies, some of whom had been also greatly dispirited by the previous assault on the horn-work.

The hollow way which had disordered the escaladers, and which at fifty yards' distance run along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel and connected with the suburb of San Pedro; the trenches were made deep and narrow to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were planted to keep down the enemy's fire; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn. In the night a flying sap was commenced from the right of the parallel, and was

pushed within twenty yards of the enemy's first line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet trench added to the height of the gabion above scarcely protected the workmen: the gallery of the mine was therefore opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.

A concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below to drive the French marksmen from that point; when they had fired one hundred and forty rounds without success this project was abandoned, for ammunition was so scarce the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy's bullets. This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy's defences below: and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.

On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet and the soil was found favourable, yet the men in passing the sap were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the enemy's ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy's marksmen and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.

On the 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step along the edge of the counterscarp for a covered way, and had palisaded the

communication. The besiegers likewise finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed by stones, grenades, and small shells which the French threw into the trenches by hand: the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast that the troops were withdrawn during the day.

In the night a trench of communication, forming a second parallel behind the first, was begun and nearly completed from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened. Next day an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire became heavy, and the shells which passed over came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll of the shells continued to gall the troops, yet the whole of this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the right of the parallel below were filled with men whose fire was incessant; and as the first mine was now loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay and all ready for explosion, Wellington ordered the

THIRD ASSAULT.

At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred stormers were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgment when the breach should be carried: the mine was then exploded, the wall fell and an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The explosion was not so efficacious as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupified, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of

fifty and those by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark and finding the wall unbroken retired and reported there was no breach; the main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale the enemy was reinforced. Scarcity of ammunition stopped the artillery practice against the breach during the night and the French raised a parapet behind it, placing obstacles sufficient to deter the besiegers from renewing the assault at daylight.

This failure arose from the darkness and the want of a conducting engineer; out of four regular officers of that branch engaged in the siege one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick; wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed; twelve hundred men had been killed or wounded, little progress made, and the troops generally showed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men, insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honourable exception. In this state it was essential to make some change in the operations, and as the French marksmen in the advanced palisadoed work below were now so expert as to hit everything seen, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. The gallery of the second mine was also pushed forward, and a new breaching-battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy's defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof, because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.

In the night the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at

daylight, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the upper works and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall he thrust out a light gun, which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply the allies were driven from their pieces without firing. More French cannon being now brought from the upper works the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. It was in vain the besiegers' marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy's fire, the French being on a height were too well covered and remained masters of the fight.

In the night a second and more solid battery being formed a little to the left of the ruined one, the French observed it at daylight, and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly off so rapidly that it was relinquished. Recourse was then again had to the galleries and mine and to the breaching battery on the hill of San Michael; the two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of the 3rd, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at daylight the guns were still short of their destination and nothing more could be done until the following night.

On the 4th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two eighteen-pounders and three iron howitzers again opened from San Michael's, and at four o'clock in the evening, the old breach being cleared of all incumbrances and the second mine strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment under captain Hedderwick being selected, was formed in the

hollow way, having one advanced party under lieutenant Holmes pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party under lieutenant Frazer in like manner pushed towards the old breach.

FOURTH ASSAULT.

At five o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, blowing many of the French into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Frazer as quick and daring was already fighting on the summit of the old breach; opposed with spears he was seen to tear one from the hands of an enemy and leap into the midst of the hostile mass followed by his men. The supports followed closely and both breaches were carried with a loss to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, seven of the latter being officers and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgments were formed in advance of the old and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly and under a destructive fire from the upper defences. This happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, a supply of ammunition sent by sir Home Popham reached the camp, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael's was directed to open a third breach, at a point where the first line of defence was joined to the second.

This promising state of affairs was of short duration.

On the 5th, at five o'clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgments, three hundred French came swiftly down the hill and sweeping away the labourers and guards from the trenches killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works and carried off all the tools. In the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank, to meet in the centre near the second French line

Memoir
by colonel
Reid, R.E.

and serve as a parallel to check future sallies; the howitzers also continued their fire from San Michael against the palisades, and the breaching in the horn-work opened, but the guns being unable to see the walls sufficiently low soon ceased to speak and the embrasures were masked. On the other hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle-hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgment at the breaches in the first line, but their musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.

On the 7th the besiegers got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces taken in the horn-work were substituted and did good service. The breaching-battery on San Michael's being altered also renewed its fire, and at five o'clock had broken fifty feet off the parapet of the second line, yet the enemy's return was heavy and another eighteen pounder lost a trunnion. In the night block-carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire with low charges. A constant rain now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgments, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight and repulsed the French, but fell dead on the ground he had recovered: he was a young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful and enterprising, he lived and died as a good soldier.

After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked. The battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel at the old breach of the first line was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to

fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked, because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines; and without a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery on the other side of the castle against the church of San Roman, which was pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.

On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had been produced upon the White Church and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had compelled the besiegers again to withdraw their battering-guns within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.

On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however overmatched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, the besiegers being principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church: the mine was therefore formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.

On the 17th the battery of the horn-work was renewed, the fire of the eighteen pounders cleared away the enemy's temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart

on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches: it was successful and a lodgment was effected, yet the enemy returned in force and compelled the besiegers to abandon it again. On the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal, the church was also to be assaulted, and at the same time a third detachment was to escalate the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect the attacks.

FIFTH ASSAULT.

At half-past four o'clock the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was however resolutely attacked by colonel Browne at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought the building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line and escalated the second line, beyond which, in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion under major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach on the left of the guards so vigorously that it was carried in a moment, and some men mounted the hill above and actually gained the third line. Unhappily, at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely, the Germans, cramped on their left by the enemy's stockade, extended their right towards the guards, and at that moment Dubreton came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and the French, gathering round the guards who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line: more than two hundred men and officers were

killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.

The siege was thus virtually terminated. The French were indeed beaten out of St. Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; but these were mere demonstrations, and the contemporary events which compelled a victorious army to abandon the siege of a small fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers, shall now be related.



CHAPTER IV.

AT Valencia Joseph obtained three millions of francs from Suchet, but the pecuniary distress of the French generally was so great that Wellington at one time supposed it would drive them from Spain. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, the French armies of the south, the centre, and Portugal, were a whole year behindhand; and the salaries of the ministers and civil servants were two years in arrears. Suchet's army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was however through his excellent management regularly paid; its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves and repressed some excesses of Joseph's and Soult's men so vigorously as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. Soldiers without pay must become robbers. Napoleon knew the king's necessity to be extreme, but the Russian war absorbed the resources of France: twenty thousand men, chiefly conscripts, and a little money were all he could send to Spain.

Clausel's army had during the siege been quartered at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroño, an advanced guard only remaining at Briviesca; there they were reorganized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command all the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to avenge the retreat from Torres Vedras was thus furnished to the old warrior; but he, doubting the issue of affairs or tamed by age, pleaded illness and sent Souham to command. Then arose contention, for Marmont designated Clausel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clausel's abilities were not inferior to those of any French general, and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war he added

Duke of
Feltre to
Joseph,
Oct. 1812,
MSS.

better knowledge of the enemy, was more known to the soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli, anxious to succour Burgos which belonged to his command, had at last united at Vitoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of the young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms organized in six divisions, and by Clausel's vigour restored to its former excellent discipline:

Souham's
Report,
MSS.

therefore ready in the beginning of October to succour the castle; and the two generals were eager to do so, but were forced to await Souham's arrival and news from the king. But here Wellington's arrangements with the partidas interfered; they had no direct tidings from

Appendix,
No. 15, B.

Duke of
Feltre's Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

Valencia, because the circuitous lines of correspondence were so beset by the bands that the most speedy and certain communication was through the minister of war at Paris; and he obtained his surest information from the English newspapers! For the latter, while deceiving the public with stories of victories never gained, battles never fought, enthusiasm and vigour which had no existence, did most assiduously enlighten the enemy as to the numbers, situation, movements and reinforcements of the allies.

Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last reinforcements from France, but he imagined Wellington had sixty thousand troops around Burgos exclusive of the partidas, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were near Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians scarcely so good as the partidas. The Anglo-Portuguese were not twenty thousand, and the sick were going to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were about Segovia, and other points north

Souham's
official Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent from England in September; but the former belonged to Hill's army, and of the latter the life-guards and blues had gone to Lisbon. One regiment of foot guards and some detachments for the line, in all three thousand, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English general seeing the French scattered along the Ebro and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any interruption, and the less so that Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate, he cared little for them and was resolved to give battle; for he thought Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed and felt himself a match for the army of Portugal: nor did the partidas fail to harass the enemy. Mina having obtained three thousand stand of English arms domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, Duran with four thousand men was uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villa Campa, and Bassecour descended from Cuenca against Requeña and Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortosa. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others were in La Mancha and Estremadura. Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia; and though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington's army.

Sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier and Renovales, again assailed Gueteria, but they were driven thence with the loss of some guns on the 30th of September, and the Empecinado was also defeated at Requeña. Duran likewise was beaten at Calatayud by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison of that place; but the Spanish chief next attacked Almunia one march from Zaragoza, and when again driven away by Severoli, who dismantled the place, he fell on Borja and took it. Zaragoza was thus deprived of outposts on the right of the Ebro; and on the left bank Mina hovered close to the gates, while his lieutenant, Chaplangara, falling on three hundred Italians, killed forty and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of some mounted gens-

d'armes. Reille, always thinking Wellington designed to march upon Zaragoza, had suffered these enterprises to avoid spreading his troops; now, better informed, he restored his outposts—but the whole chain of partidas was in activity, and Bassecour had united with Villa Campa to harass Joseph's quarters at Albacete.

While Soult was on the march to Valencia, Elio reduced a small French post left at Consuegra. Hill, who had left three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejos and Truxillo to protect his line of supply, then entered Toledo, spread his left to Aranjueez, and was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonsos and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult's arrival at Hellin he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and found in La Mancha as in Old Castille the stories of French devastation belied by the abundance of provisions. Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado then united on the road leading from Cuenca to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered in the Toledo mountains. The allies were thus extended from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near Jaca on the left, and were also in military communication with the coast; for Caffarelli's force was concentrated to relieve Burgos and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabel, Renovales and Popham.

Souham, overrating the allied force and dreading defeat as being the only barrier between Wellington and France, far from meditating an advance expected at first to be attacked; and as the want of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio his dispositions were

Duke of
Feltre's Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

made to fight on the Ebro. The minister of war had even desired him to detach a division against the partidas. But when by the English newspapers and by information sent from

Paris, he knew that Soult was in march from Grenada,—that the king intended to move upon Madrid,—that no English

Souham's
official
Report,
MSS.

troops had left that capital,—that Wellington's army was not very numerous, and the castle of Burgos sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli

from Vitoria, concentrated his own troops at Briviesca, and resolved to raise the siege.

On the 13th a skirmish took place at a stream beyond Monasterio, where captain Persse of the sixteenth dragoons was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, maintaining his post until F. Ponsonby who commanded the reserves arrived. Ponsonby and Persse were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united and the advanced guard captured a piquet of Brunswickers that had remained in St. Ollala against orders. This sudden movement prevented Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, and his outposts fell back the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, behind which he drew up his army in order of battle,—the right at Ibeas on the Arlanzan,—his centre at Riobena and Majarradas on the main road behind Olmos,—his left thrown back near Soto Palacio on a small river.

The 20th, Maucune, having two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended by the Chasseurs Britanniques, and Maucune, outflanked on the right, was forced back to Monasterio by two divisions under sir Edward Paget. There were now in position, including Pack's Portuguese blockading the castle, thirty-three thousand men, namely, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez; of these four thousand troopers only two thousand six hundred were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen, regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was forty-two, including twelve Spanish pieces ill equipped and scant of ammunition; for though Wellington, who had long felt the want of artillery, sent a memoir upon the subject to the British government in the beginning of the year, his ordnance establishment had not been augmented. Hence his siege difficulties, and instead of ninety British and Portuguese field-pieces, which was the just complement for his army, he had only fifty serviceable guns, of which twenty-four were

with Hill: and all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had from the abuses and the poverty of their government entirely melted away. Souham had forty-four thousand men, nearly five thousand being cavalry, and more than sixty guns; a matter of no small importance, for besides the actual power, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood at disadvantage in numbers composition position and real strength. In his rear was Dubreton's castle, whose guns commanded all the fords and bridges of the Arlanzan; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding and deteriorated in discipline. A victory could scarcely be expected, a defeat would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle; nor would he have done so had he known Caffarelli's troops were united to Souham's.

On the other hand Souham should have forced on an action, because his ground was strong his retreat open his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence; his lieutenant, Clausel, Maucune, and Foy, were of distinguished talent, able to second and able to succeed him in the chief command. The chances of victory and profit to be derived were great, the chances of defeat and dangers to be incurred comparatively small; and it was thus he judged the matter,

for Maucune's advance was intended to be the prelude to a great battle. But generals are not absolute masters of events, and as the extraneous influence which here restrained both sides, came from afar, it is fitting to show how in war, movements distant and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a general's eye will break his measures, and make him appear undecided or foolish when in truth he is both wise and firm.

While Wellington was still engaged with the siege the Cortes made him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed; for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, could not safely act except in connexion with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one

Official roll
of the army
given to
Massena,
MSS.

Appendix,
15, A.

head should direct. He therefore demanded leave of his own government to accept the offer, observing however, that the Spanish troops were not improved in discipline equipments or military spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government by leaving it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but that he might exercise his own power efficiently and to the profit of the troops under himself, he desired the English government vigorously to insist upon the strict application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise the care of the Spanish troops would only cramp his own operations.

To the Cortes his acceptance of the offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful to guard himself from a danger not unlikely to arise, namely, that the Cortes when he should finally accept the offer, would in virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the Spanish armies he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his suggestions had been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs and he expected no change: he was grievously mistaken.

Previous to this offer the Spanish government had, at his desire, directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena and place himself at Alcaraz in support of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz Murgeon, by Elio, and by the partidas, he would have had a corps of thirty thousand men: from thence, while supported by Hill and having the mountains behind him for a retreat, he could have safely menaced the enemy's flank and delayed the march against Madrid, or at least have compelled the king to leave a strong corps of observation to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never moved from Grenada; and when he found Wellington was created generalissimo, published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; he thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of

his country, but with a result he little expected,—for while he judged himself a man to sway the destinies of Spain he suddenly found himself a criminal and nothing more. The Cortes caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a prisoner to Ceuta. Abisbal was then declared captain-general of Andalusia, and Del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros' army, which general Verues immediately led by Jaen towards La Mancha, but the campaign was over then and Soult was on the Tormes.

That marshal had joined the king on the 3rd of October. His troops required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, for each had griefs and passions to exhale. Finally the monarch yielded to the mental power of his opponent and resolved to profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly and more from prudence than liking;

for Clarke the French minister of war, though secretly Soult's enemy and believing, or pretending to believe the foolish charges of disorderly ambition made against him, was yet opposed to a decided exercise of the king's authority until the emperor's will was known: this however would not have restrained the king if Jourdan and Suchet had not each declined accepting chief command when Joseph offered it to them.

Soult's first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed fort, which being in the midst of his quarters commanded the great roads so as to compel his army to move under its fire, or avoid it by circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it fell after a few hours' attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a clear sky and discharging itself upon the fort killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced it is said by superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first fruit of Ballesteros' disobedience. For neither could Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops as he did, at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if thirty thousand Spaniards had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, supported by thirty thousand Anglo-Port-

Appendix,
13, A.

Joseph's Correspondence,
MSS.



tuguese at Toledo under Hill. Those scattered quarters were required to feed the army of the south, which under cover of Chinchilla was thus safely cantoned while the great convoys of sick, of maimed men and Spanish families, proceeded leisurely to Valencia. The cavalry then scoured La Mancha and drove Bassecour and Villa Campa to Cuenca, but the great operations which succeeded belong to another place; it must here suffice to say that Joseph, having now seventy thousand men, was able to hold Valencia while he advanced towards the Tagus, and that he sent Souham urgent orders to act in concert without risking a battle. Hill also, being thus menaced and reduced by Ballesteros' defection to defend the Tagus when it was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of the danger to Wellington. Joseph's letter was despatched on the 1st of October, and six others followed in succession day by day, yet the last carried by colonel Lucotte first reached Souham; the advantages of the allies' central position and the value of the partidas were here made manifest. Hill's letter, only despatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph's reached Souham. The latter general was thus forced to relinquish his design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless, having but four days' provisions left, he designed when those should be consumed to attack notwithstanding the king's prohibition, if Wellington should still confront him. But the English general considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, would be quite isolated if the king should, as was probable, force the allies from the Tagus, resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure his junction with Hill.

Appendix,
15, A.

While the armies were in presence some fighting had place at Burgos, Dubreton again obtained possession of the San Roman church but was driven away next morning; and then, the retreat being decided, mines of destruction were formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the parc at Villa Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to Reynosa to meet the powder and artillery

coming from Santander, and hence the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off, nor from some error were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest of the stores and howitzers were sent by Villaton and Frandovinez to Celada del Camino, and the siege was raised after five assaults several sallies and thirty-three days' investment, during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand men and the besieged six hundred in killed or wounded: the French also suffered severely from continual labour want of water and bad weather, for the fortress was too small to shelter the garrison and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.

RETREAT FROM BURGOS.

This enforced and remarkable operation was commenced on the night of the 21st by a measure of great nicety and boldness; for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand and the bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington chose the latter, as being the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark, the artillery-wheels were muffled with straw, and defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of their march until the partidas failing in nerve commenced galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation the infantry gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham did not discover the retreat until the evening of the 22nd, and was fain to follow and by a forced march overtake the allies, whereas, if Wellington to avoid the fire of the castle had gone by Villaton and Frandovinez the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.

On the 23rd the infantry crossed the Pisuerga at Cordovillas and Torquemada, above and below its junction with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, the French, having passed Burgos in the night of the 22nd, vigorously attacked the rear-guard commanded by sir Staple-

ton Cotton. It was strongly composed of all the cavalry, two troops of horse artillery under Norman Ramsay and Downman, two German battalions under Colin Halket, and the partidas of Marquinez and Sanchez who were beyond the Arlanzan. The cavalry piquets were first vigorously driven from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o'clock, but they rallied on their reserves and disputed the Hormaza stream, where captain Persse of the sixteenth dragoons made a charge of distinguished bravery: finally however the passage was forced and the British took post in a plain behind Cellada Camino. On their left a range of hills was occupied by the partida of Marquinez, on their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was placed. Across the middle of the plain run a marshy rivulet, cutting the main road and only passable by a little bridge near a house called the Venta de Pozo; and half way between this stream and Cellada there was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small village. Cotton retired over the marshy rivulet, leaving Anson's horsemen and Halket's infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and Anson, to cover his own passage of that obstacle, left the eleventh dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.

COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.

When the French approached Cellada, major Money of the eleventh, galloping from the left of the village at the head of two squadrons overturned their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with shot; but the main body advancing at a trot along the road outflanked the British, compelling Money to fall back while the guns retired over the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meantime the French general Curto, ascending the hill on his right with a brigade of hussars followed by Boyer's dragoons, put Marquinez' partida to flight. A deep ravine run along the foot of these hills, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first of them the partidas galloped at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain were forming in front of Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. The latter charged

and drove the first line upon the second, but then both lines coming forward together the eleventh were pushed precipitately over the ditch in confusion, yet with small loss, being covered by the fire of Halket's Germans who were in the village behind the bridge. The ditch was now turned by Curto's cavalry on the hills and Anson fell back, designing to cross the bridge of Venta de Pozo; but then Marquinez' *partida* came pouring from the hills in flight pursued by the French hussars, who mixed with the fugitives and the whole mass dashed on the flank of the sixteenth dragoons then covering Anson's movements; and at the same moment the enemy's squadrons, who had meanwhile crossed the ditch, charged. The *partida* chief was wounded, colonel Pelly and another officer were taken with thirty of the eleventh, and the regiment was driven in disorder on the reserves. While the French were reforming after this charge Anson got over the rivulet and drew up beyond it on the left of the road, which was defended by Halket's infantry and the guns, which being supported by the German heavy cavalry presented an imposing mass.

Hitherto the action had been sustained by Clausel's cavalry, but now Caffarelli's horsemen, namely, the lancers of Berg the fifteenth dragoons and some squadrons of '*gens-d'armes*,' all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, finding it impassable, with a quick and daring decision they wheeled to their right and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery trotted over the bridge and formed line in opposition to the German dragoons. Their position was dangerous, but they were full of mettle and though the Germans, who had let too many come over, charged with a rough shock and broke the right, the French left had the advantage and the others rallied; then began a close and furious sword contest, yet the *gens-d'armes* fought so fiercely that the Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost ground and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson's brigade, outflanked and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer's dragoons having continued their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces had there crossed the ravine and now

came thundering in on the left: then the British ranks were broken, the regiments got intermixed and all went to the rear in confusion: finally however the Germans extricated themselves and formed a fresh line to the left of the road upon which the others rallied.

The *gens-d'armes* and lancers having suffered severely from the artillery and in the sword-fight now halted, but Boyer's dragoons, ten squadrons, again came to the charge, and though the German officers rode gallantly forward and their men followed a short way the enemy was too powerful and the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe. Some favourable ground enabled the line to re-form once more, yet it was only to be again broken, and Wellington, who was present, placed Halket's infantry and all the guns in a position to cover the disordered masses. These troops remained tranquil until the enemy came galloping down, when the power of the musket was quickly made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, after three fruitless attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and drew off to the hills. The British cavalry covered by the infantry then retreated to Quintana la Puente near the Pisuerga, and the bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadiego. The loss was considerable on both sides; the French suffered most; but they took a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and before the fight captured a small commissariat store near Burgos.

While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination the usual concomitants of an English retreat were exhibited at Torquemada, where the great wine-vaults were invaded and it is said twelve thousand men were at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. In this crisis the English general, who had now retreated some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit resolved to check his course, because the means of transport being scanty and the weather bad, the convoys of sick and wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having by a short march crossed the Carrion at its confluence with the Pisuerga, he halted behind it, and was there for-

tunately joined by a regiment of the guards, and by detachments coming from Coruña. His position, extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas below the meeting of the waters, was strong, being along a range of hills, lofty yet descending with an easy sweep to the Carrion which covered his left, while the Pisuerga secured his right wing. A detachment was employed to destroy the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga, a battalion of the royals was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; and some houses and convents beyond the rivers furnished good posts, behind which the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carrion and that of Dueñas on the Pisuerga could be broken.

Souham excited by his success cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada, passed the Pisuerga, directed Foy's division upon Palencia, and sent Maucune with an advanced-guard against the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself at Magoz; and if fame does not lie, because the number of French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of the British army.

COMBAT ON THE CARRION.

Before the enemy appeared the hills were crowned by the allies, the bridges ruined and that of San Isidro protected by a convent filled with troops. But in the divisional arrangements the advantage of a dry canal with high banks and parallel to the river was not sufficiently considered, nor was the village of Muriel occupied in sufficient strength. Foy soon reached Palencia, where, according to some French writers, under pretence of a parley a treacherous attempt was made to kill him; but he drove the allies from the town so hastily that all the bridges were abandoned undamaged, and the French cavalry crossing gathered up baggage and prisoners. This untoward event compelled Wellington to throw back his left, composed of the fifth division and Spaniards at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, one facing Palencia the other the Carrion. Meanwhile Maucune, first dispersing the 8th caçadores at a ford between San Isidro and Muriel, came with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the latter place just as a mine

was fired to destroy the bridge. The explosion checked the French, but suddenly a horseman darting out at full speed rode down under a flight of bullets calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm, violently checked his foaming horse, held up his hands, and exclaiming that he was a lost man with hurried accents asked if there was no ford. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one and the gallant fellow looked earnestly for a few moments as if to fix the exact point, but then wheeling his horse, kissed his hand in derision and bending over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own comrades amidst showers of shot and shouts of laughter on both sides. The next moment Maucune protected by a concentrated fire of guns passed the river at the ford thus discovered, and at the bridge by means of ladders; he also made some prisoners in the village and lined the dry bed of the canal.

But just then Wellington coming up turned some guns on the enemy, and desired general Oswald commanding the 5th division to retake the village and canal. Oswald expressed a doubt if they could be held when retaken. Wellington whose retreat was endangered by the enemy's presence was peremptory; he directed general Barnes with one brigade against the main body, and another under general Pringle to clear the canal. The first body was reinforced with Spaniards and Brunswickers and a sharp fire of artillery and musketry ensued, but the cannon-shot from the other side of the river plumped heavily into the reserves, the Spaniards got into confusion and were falling back, when their fiery countryman, Miguel Alava, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the fight. Finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was re-occupied in force and the canal was strongly lined. Other troops had attempted without success to seize the bridge of San Isidro; there the mine was exploded; but at the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga the mine failed, and the French cavalry galloping over made both the working and covering party prisoners. This sapped the strength of the position. Souham could assemble his army on the allies' left by Palencia and force them to action with their back upon the Pisuerga, or he

could pass that river by his own left and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If Wellington passed the Pisuerga by the bridge of Duenas, Souham having the initial move might be first on the ground in front while Foy's division came down on the rear. If by a rapid movement along the right bank of the Pisuerga he sought to gain the Duero by Cabezon, which was the next bridge on his rear, Souham, moving along the left bank of the former river, might fall upon him in march and while hampered between the Duero the Pisuerga and the Esquivilla: and once cut off from the Duero he must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to Tordesillas or Toro, giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs, keeping good watch upon the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing the ground there was rugged the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and wide, he sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing the troops before daybreak on the 26th made a clean march of sixteen miles to Cabezon, passed to the left of the Pisuerga and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero behind him, he caused the seventh division under lord Dalhousie to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. The Duero was in full water, and being thus assured of a retreat he again halted, partly because the ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary-general Kennedy time for indispensable arrangements.

This functionary had gone to England sick in the latter end of 1811 and returned to the army only the day before the siege of Burgos was raised. On his way from Lisbon he found the inexperience of the gentleman acting during his absence had caused serious mischief. The magazines established between Lisbon and Badajos and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed when the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full if his march had been made rapidly on that side: on the other hand the magazines on the line of operations between Lisbon and Salamanca were nearly empty. He had therefore to remove the magazines south of the Tagus and bring up stores upon

the line of the present retreat. His dispositions were not completed when Wellington desired him to remove the sick and wounded and every other incumbrance from Salamanca, promising to hold his position until the operation was effected. The means were indeed sufficient, but the negligence of many medical and escorting officers conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, for where the officers are careless the soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst effects. Outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march, terror was everywhere predominant, the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with some without their cattle, and Kennedy's operation was disastrous. The commissariat lost nearly all the animals and carriages employed, the villages were abandoned, and the under commissaries were bewildered or paralysed by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line.

Souham repaired the bridges and resumed pursuit the 26th by the right of the Pisuerga, deterred probably from taking the left bank by the rugged nature of the ground and the king's orders not to risk a serious action. Early on the 27th he was in front of Cabezon, but contented himself with a cannonade and display of his force. The first cost the allies colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the second enabled the English general, for the first time, to count the numbers he had to contend with and to discover that he could hold neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. However, his object being to gain time, he still held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in front of Cabezon extended their right by Cigales and Valladolid to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be destroyed in succession. Happy that he had not fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army he now resolved to go behind the Duero and finally over the Tormes; but as Hill would then be exposed to a flank attack and the more certainly if ill-fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered him to retreat, giving a discretion as to the line but desiring him if possible to come by the Guadarama passes; for he designed to unite on the Adaja river, and from that

central position, if occasion offered, to keep Souham in check with a part of his army and with the remainder fall upon Soult.

On the 28th Souham, always intent to dislodge the allies from their position by turning their left, endeavoured to force the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was defended by lord Dalhousie, but colonel Halket finding the French strong and eager at the second destroyed it, and detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas, which was done and a tower behind the ruins occupied. The remainder of the Brunswickers entered a pine wood some distance off, and when the French arrived, sixty officers and sub-officers headed by captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes and plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade they crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side naked as they were stormed the tower: the Brunswick regiment then abandoned the wood and the gallant Frenchmen remained masters of the bridge.

When Wellington heard of the attack at Simancas, and had seen the whole French army in march by its right along the hills beyond the Pisuerga the evening of the 28th, he destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabeçon and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de Duero on the 29th. But scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence of Guingret's splendid action at Tordesillas reached him, and with the decision of a great captain he instantly marched by his left until he reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas; there on the 30th he fronted the enemy, forbidding further progress; for though the bridge had been already repaired by the French, Souham's main body had not arrived, and Wellington's menacing position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French commenced repairing the former the junction with Hill's army was

insured. The English general, thinking the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, expecting that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3rd of November.

CHAPTER V.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS.—RETREAT FROM MADRID.

JOSEPH designed to unite great part of Suchet's forces to his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted. He said Valencia must be well defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicant, because until the French army could open a new line of communication with Zaragoza Valencia would be the only base. Joseph then resolved to incorporate part of Soult's army with his own and give the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus. This arrangement dictated by a desire to advance Drouet's authority was displeasing to Soult; he urged that his army, so constituted physically and morally as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there good reason for the change; for if Joseph only wished to be strong on the Cuenca road, his own army could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the south. Better he said to incorporate the king's army with his and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving a few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king's desire was to march in person with a large body he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south on the main line of operations. Joseph's reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca.

Soult had thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand excellent cavalry and seventy-two guns, making with the artillerymen a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. The king's army including the guards was twelve thousand, two thousand being cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eight thousand fighting men and eighty-four pieces of artillery were in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus.

Imperial
Muster rolls,
MSS.

Joseph's Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

Joseph designed to pass that river and operate against Wellington's rear if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was to menace his rear by Aranda de Duero and the Somosierra; sending detachments towards Guadalupe, to be met by other detachments coming from the king through Sacedon. Finally if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal.

Official
Papers.
French
Bureau de
la Guerre,
MSS.

The march of Soult's sick convoys to Valencia, and other difficulties, retarded the movement and the king became uneasy for his supplies; because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun's devastations, were again flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such however is the great advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolate from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia. Joseph marched on the 18th upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult's infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded by Tarancon, the only artillery road on that side leading to the Tagus, while Soult moved by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. Hill immediately sent that notice to Wellington which caused the retreat from Burgos, and concentrated his own forces on the Tagus; his right was at Toledo his left at Fuente Dueñas; and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable from its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez upwards; and this line could not easily be supported, as the troops

would have been too distant from the point of action if the French operated against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna, which is a branch of the Jarama running nearly parallel to the Tagus; his right occupied strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio's troops, on the extreme left, then marched upon Arganda, Skerrett's brigade arrived from Cadiz, and including the Spanish regulars forty thousand men were in line, while a multitude of partidas hovered about. The lateral communications were easy, the scouts, passing over the bridge of Toledo, covered all the country beyond the Tagus, and the bridges at each end of the line furnished means to sally upon the flanks of a force attacking the front: it required several marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarama with its marshy banks and many confluent offered positions for interposing between the enemy and Madrid.

Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique; the king went with his guards to Zarza de la Cruz; and Soult, whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked Cole at the Puente Larga; the mines failed and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet but were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh under Skerrett; after a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the allies sixty men the attempt was relinquished. Had the

Soult's Correspondence with the king, MSS.

Puente Larga been forced the fourth division which was at Añover would have been cut off from Madrid; but the weather being thick and rainy Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge, and was afraid to push forward too fast. Discontented with this caution Joseph designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, still in doubt of Hill's real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing

bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill's movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga, for the order to retreat had reached him when Soult first appeared on the Tagus; and the affair was so sudden, that the light division which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left, was compelled to return again without halting in the night, a march of forty miles.

Hill had a discretionary power to retire by the valley of the Tagus or the Guadarama; a position in the former taken on the flank of the enemy would have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama and at the same time have covered Lisbon; a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon; but thinking the valley of the Tagus in that advanced season would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces, he chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be blowed up in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads and united his army the 31st near Majadahonda. This movement uncovered the magazines, so negligently left along the line of communication to Badajos; the enemy could have sent men to seize them; nor were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature. The municipality demanded all the provision remaining there, as if for the enemy, and when refused excited a mob to attack the magazines; firing even took place and the fourth division was called in to restore order. Some wheat being finally given to the poorest of the people Madrid was abandoned, and it was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men women and children, crowding around the troops bewailed their departure, and moving with them in one vast mass for more than two miles left their houses empty when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid, and among the causes of wailing, the return of the plundering and

cruel partidas unchecked by the presence of the British was very loudly proclaimed. The Madrileños have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people, the British army found them patient, gentle, generous and loyal. Nor is this fact to be disputed because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines; for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited as they were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back rather than have it destroyed when they were starving.

With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Ville-mur, Morillo and Carlos d'España; and it was Wellington's wish that Elio, Bassecour and Villa Campa should throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, cross the bridge of Arzobispo and join Ballesteros's army under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon; and if the enemy neglected this line the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñion near Sacedon and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado. Soult meanwhile brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, and his information as to Hill's real force was becoming more distinct; but there was also a rumour that Wellington was close at hand with three British divisions, and the French marshal's movements were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle before his whole force was collected; for his rear was still at Ocaña and the army of the centre had not yet passed the Tajuña. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional to prevent the king from fighting; for Soult did not think this a fitting time to fight a battle unless upon great advantage. In the disjointed state of their affairs a defeat would have been more injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial; the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.

On the 1st of November, the bulk of the army being assembled at Getafé, Soult sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the allies and to ascertain the direction of their march; the next day the army of the centre joined him not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama, covered by a powerful rear-guard under Cole. Soult pursued on the 3rd, and the king entering Madrid placed a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the Spanish families attached to his cause: hitherto moving in one great convoy they had impeded all the movements of the army of the centre, but being now disposed of Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body. He had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of Cuenca, but some dragoons sent towards Huete were surprised by the partidas and lost forty men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.

Hill was moving upon Arevalo, when fresh orders founded on new combinations changed the direction of his march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro the 4th, several days sooner than was expected, and thus Wellington, while watching to join Hill on the Adaja, was again baffled; that movement could not then be made lest Souham should from Toro and Tordesillas follow the rear. Nor, if Hill came up, could Souham be attacked for want of means to pass the Duero, and Soult would then reach the Tormes. In fine, the allies' central position being no longer available, general Hill was ordered to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the way of Fontiveros, and on the 6th Wellington also fell back to San Christoval in front of Salamanca.

Joseph, thinking to prevent the junction of the allies, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia road the 5th, Souham's scouts were met with at Medina del Campo the 8th, and for the first time since he had quitted Valencia the king obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, twelve thousand being cavalry with a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three months before Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own destruction. Soult, then expelled from

Andalusia by Marmont's defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal that very army whose victory had driven him from the south; and as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, the recovery of Andalusia, politically important and useful as it was, proved injurious to himself; it had concentrated a mighty power to escape from which both skill and fortune were necessary; and the Spanish armies, let loose by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid were found a burthen.

On the 7th Hill passed the Tormes at Alba and mined the bridge, the light division and Long's cavalry remaining on the right bank during the night. Wellington held San Christoval, and the king, even at this late period, was doubtful if Ballesteros's troops had or had not joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also was uncertain of the king's numbers, but designed to maintain the Tormes permanently and give his troops repose. He had retreated two hundred miles, and Hill had retired the same distance besides his march from Estremadura. Skerrett had come from Cadiz, and all required rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field with scarcely an interval of repose since January; the infantry were barefooted, their equipments spoiled, the cavalry weak, the horses out of condition, the discipline of all failing. The excesses committed on the Burgos line have been shown, and during the first day's march from the Tagus, five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled according to custom whichever side was approaching, broke open the houses plundered and got drunk: a multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro and two hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being unmolested was made with more regularity, but the excesses still committed furnished glaring evidence that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by following in the wake of a retreating army. There was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet the author of this history counted on the first day's march from Madrid seventeen bodies of murdered

Joseph's Correspondence, MSS.

peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by English or Germans, by Spaniards or Portuguese, in dispute, in robbery or in wanton villany was unknown; but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have drawn foul and false conclusions against the English general and nation.

Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with the staff officers. The assembling of the sick men at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys was punctually attended to by the regimental officers,—not so by the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means of transport,—hence delay and great suffering to the sick, and the wearing out of healthy men's strength by waiting with their knapsacks on for the negligent. When the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or other impediments should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that place without halting on the enemy's side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted as to deprive the troops of their ration bullocks and flour mules at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied food, had the farther mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers know that discontent thus created is most hurtful to discipline, and it is in these particulars the value of a good and experienced staff is found.

Wellington's position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river to the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was garrisoned by Howard's brigade of the second division. Hamilton's Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them the third and fourth divisions occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes; covering all the front. The heights of Christoval were strong and compact, the position of the Arapiles on the

other side of the Tormes glorious as well as strong ; and the bridge of Salamanca and the fords furnished the power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon.

However, while desirous to fight the English general looked also to retreat ; he sending his sick to the rear, brought up small magazines from Rodrigo to intermediate points, caused the surplus ammunition at Salamanca to be destroyed by small explosions, and delivered large stores of clothing arms and equipments to the Spaniards, who were thus completely furnished ; but in an hour after they were selling their accoutrement under his own windows ! Salamanca presented indeed an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, evinced hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse led by an English soldier being frightened backed against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house and there bayoneted him in cold blood ; and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence which was not long withheld. A Spanish officer while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter ; and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword-fight, the troops of both nations looking on.

The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than the military, treating every English person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the prince of Orange was like to have lost his life ; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him ; and he would have been killed had not lieutenant Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab ; yet both the prince and his defender were forced to fly from the soldier's comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to serious mischief when the enemy's movements gave another direction to the soldiers' passions.

On the 9th Long's cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and next day Soult sent some skirmishers forward and opened

eighteen guns against that place. The castle, crowning a bare rocky knoll hastily entrenched, scarcely gave shelter from this tempest, and for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry; but finally it was aided by four pieces from the left bank of the river, and the post was defended with such vigour the enemy dared not assault. During the night Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged walls and formed barricades, and in the morning after a short cannonade the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies a hundred men.

On the 11th the king re-organized the army, giving Soult command of the whole and removing Souham to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli then returned to Burgos with his divisions and guns, and as Souham had left garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid, and the king one in the Retiro, only ninety thousand combatants remained on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idling. The country was exhausted, the soldiers wanted bread, and Joseph, eager to fight for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother's greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver battle with most advantage. Jourdan with a martial fire unquenched by age was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He observed that Wellington's position was composed of three parts, the right at Alba, the centre at Calvariza Ariba, the left separated by the Tormes from the centre at San Christoval. The whole distance was about fifteen miles, and the Tormes was fordable in many places above Salamanca; wherefore he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at daybreak, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force on a decisive battle.

Soult objected to attack Wellington in a position he was so well acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and where the army must fight its way even from the fords to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to move by the

Appendix 16.

French
official Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

left to certain fords, three in number, between Exéme and Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes; easy in themselves, they were suited from the conformation of the banks for forcing a passage if it should be disputed, and by a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen by the enemy. Passing there the French army would gain two marches upon the allies, be placed on their flank and rear, and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals instead of delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and the effect, military and political, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent and might be successful if Wellington accepted battle, but he could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo; and it was supposed by some of the generals he would retreat to Almeida at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.

Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though he urged his own plan, offered to yield if the king was so inclined. Jourdan's proposition was supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal except Clausel who leaned to Soult's opinion; but as that marshal commanded two-thirds of the army while Jourdan had no ostensible command the question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan's reasons were strong and the result was conformable to his views and contradictory of Soult's, the failure was in the execution. Nevertheless it would seem that so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly demanded battle, should have grappled in the shortest way: a rapid development of Jourdan's plan would probably have cut off Hamilton's Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba from Calvariza Ariba. On the other hand, Wellington desired a battle on either side of the

Letter to the
king, MS.

Tormes. His hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of provisions, or to engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants, fifty-two thousand of which, including four thousand British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. This force was so disposed, that besides Hamilton's Portuguese, three divisions guarded the fords which were also defended by entrenchments, and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the ridges of Calvariza Ariba and the two Arapiles, where the superiority of fifteen thousand men would not have availed the French much. A defeat would only have sent the British to Portugal, a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton's Portuguese and the troops from the Alba in time would have been the vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought up from the river this danger might have proved less than it seemed. In fine the general was Wellington and he knew his ground.

Letter to lord
Liverpool,
MS.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES.—RETREAT TO CIUDAD
RODRIGO.

Soult's plan being adopted, the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of the artillery. The united armies of the south and centre were to pass at Galisancho, and if the allies withdrew from Alba de Tormes, Drouet was to pass there by the bridge and by the fords, and assail their rear; but if they maintained Alba he was to follow Soult's movement.

At daybreak on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies' outposts were driven back and Soult took a position at Mozarbes,

having the road from Alba to Tamames under his left flank. Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report said the enemy were over the Tormes made the caustic observation, that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon however other reports convinced him of his mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles and having ascertained the direction of Soult's march drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton's Portuguese remained at Alba to protect this movement; the third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San Christoval should arrive,—and he was still so confident to drive the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not quit San Christoval that day. But when he reached Mozarbes the French were already too strong to be seriously meddled with; and when under cover of a cannonade he examined their position, extending from Mozarbes to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Utiero, he found it so good there was no remedy; wherefore drawing off the troops from Alba and destroying the bridge, he left three hundred Spaniards in the castle with orders if the army retired the next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could.

During the night and following morning the allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, and it was still hoped the French would give battle there; but the first division was placed at Aldea Tejada on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in case of retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo. Drouet finding the bridge of Alba broken and the castle occupied had meantime crossed at Galisancho and taken post on the ridge of Señora de Utiera; and Soult, who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same time to the height of Señora de la Buena near the Rodrigo road; yet slowly, for the ground was heavy and the many sources of the Junguen and Valmusa being filled by rain impeded his march. This evolution was nearly the same as that practised by Marmont, but it was on a wider circle, by a second range of heights enclosing as it were those by which the duke of Ragusa moved and beyond the reach of such a sudden attack

and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey lost it altogether.

About two o'clock Wellington, too weak to attack and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, thought the king wished to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies' communication with Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his army into three columns he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled in order of battle before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields by which the enemy moved nearly impassable while the allies had the use of the high roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river and halted at night in rear of those who had been threatening him in front a few hours before. This exploit, foretold by Jourdan, was certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either side; for first it may be asked why the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement necessary,—a movement which bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on the other side rendered possible and no more.

It has been said the drawback to Soult's genius is want of promptness in seizing the decisive moment. It is a great thing to fight a great battle, and against such a general as Wellington and such troops as the British, a man may well be excused if he thinks twice ere he puts his life and fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event which may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other circumstance however trivial. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or the hatred of nations, univer-

sal glory, or universal, perhaps eternal contempt waits on an action the object of which may be more safely gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. And here Soult certainly vacillated after passing the Tormes, purposely perhaps to avoid an action; holding it unwise in the disjointed state of French affairs and when without any fixed base or reserves in case of defeat to fight a decisive battle. Nor is this prudence blameable, for though he who would be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is but a portion of the general plan; neither is it wise in monarch or general to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won by victory. The king, more unfettered than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous the latter's prudence seems misplaced; he should have grappled with his enemy, for once engaged at any point the allies could not have retreated, and there were ninety thousand good men to fight less than seventy thousand.

On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads which lead across the Matilla stream through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio; the light division and the cavalry closed the rear, and the country was a forest penetrable in all directions. The troops bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream and the march was only twelve miles, yet the stragglers were numerous; for the soldiers meeting with vast herds of swine quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest it was thought the French were attacking. It was in vain the staff officers endeavoured to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced the evening before; in vain that two offenders were hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke from the columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy. The latter however were contented to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two thousand; they did not press the rear until near Matilla, where their lancers fell on but were checked by the light companies of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged by the fourteenth dragoons.

On the 17th a different yet a not less curious scene occurred. During the night the cavalry in front of the light division had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear without giving any intimation to the infantry, who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their piquets at a very short distance in front. At daybreak the soldiers were putting on their accoutrements when some strange horsemen being seen in the rear of the bivouac were mistaken for Spaniards; but very soon their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures, showed them to be French; the troops then run to arms, and in good time, for five hundred yards in front the wood opened on to a large plain where, in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand French horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting the vicinity of the allies. The division was immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez' cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell back the French, though fearing to approach them in the wood, sent squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy wit in the Spanish tongue with the English soldiers, who marched without firing. Very soon however the signs of mischief appeared, the road was strewn with baggage, the *bât-men* came running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled the French to pass along unperceived on the flanks of the line of march; and as opportunity offered they galloped from side to side sweeping away the baggage and sabring the conductors and guards; they even menaced one of the columns but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges general Paget was carried off from the midst of his own men, and it might have been Wellington's fortune, for he also was continually riding between the columns and without an escort.

Soon however the main body passed the Huebra and took position, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the

centre at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and Gallego de Huebra. But when the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land which overhangs the fords at the last-named place, the French cavalry suddenly thickened and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the splintering of branches on the left showed that their infantry was also up. Soult in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had pushed his columns towards that place by a road leading from Salamanca through Vecinos; but finding Hill's troops in his front he turned short to his right in hopes to cut off Wellington's rear-guard, which led to the

COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.

Warned by the musketry the cavalry crossed the fords in time, and the light division should have followed without delay, because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land and the descent from thence to the river, eight hundred yards, was open and the fords of the Huebra deep. Instead of this an order was given to form squares, and the officers looked at each other in amazement; but at that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies of the forty-third and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were assailed in front and both flanks with a fire showing that a large force was before them; moreover a driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed closer each moment they gathered by degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour; then seeing the division was beyond the river they swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill and passed the fords under a sharp musketry. Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest beating in the Frenchmen's faces baffled their aim, and Ross's guns playing from the low ground with grape checked the pursuit; but the deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how critically timed was the passage.

Steep and broken were the banks of the Huebra, and the enemy spread his infantry to the right and left along the

edge of the forest making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese defended those below, Ross's guns supported by the riflemen and forty-third defended those above, and behind the right on higher ground was the seventh division. The second division, Hamilton's Portuguese and a brigade of cavalry, were in front of Tamames and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging the Pena de Francia and covering the roads leading to Ciudad as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills. In this situation an attempt to force the fords guarded by the fifty-second was vigorously repulsed, yet the skirmishing and cannonade continued until dark, and heavily the French guns played upon the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords in column lest a sudden rush of cavalry should take the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the saturated clayey soil swallowed the shot and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division kept in one huge mass by lord Dalhousie on open and hard ground, thus tempting havoc for several hours, when, only a hundred yards in its rear, the rise of the hill and the thick forest would have sheltered it without at all weakening the position.

On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before daylight, and the English general was disquieted, because the position though good for defence was difficult to remove from at that season. The roads, hollow and narrow, led up a steep bank to a table-land which was open flat marshy and scored with water-gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence to bring the columns off in time without jostling, and without being attacked, required nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo; but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile in them.

In a former part of this work it has been stated that even

the successes and long confirmed reputation of Wellington could not protect him from the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing the direct road was impassable, he ordered the movement by another road longer and apparently more difficult; this seemed so extraordinary to some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! He had before daylight placed himself at an important point on his own road, and waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn; then suspecting what had happened he galloped to the other road and found the would-be commanders stopped by water. The insubordination and the danger to the army were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete and so deeply felt, that with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces safely. Some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even on his road one water-gully was so deep that the light division, bringing up the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops, stopped on the Huebra and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. The retreat was unmolested, but whether from necessity or negligence in the subordinates many wounded men, most of them hurt by cannon-shot, were left behind, the enemy never passed the Huebra and the miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death.

The marshy plains now to be passed exhausted the strength of the tired soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the army generally prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be continued. This was however the last day of trial, the weather cleared up, some hills afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribution of good rations restored the strength and spirits of the men, and the next day Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided

by Julian Sanchez' partidas, brought in from a thousand to fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but colonel Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the 27th and then carried off his garrison in the night.

Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good spoil of baggage but the loss of the allies in men cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An approximation may however be easily made. According to the muster-rolls, about a thousand Anglo-Portuguese were killed wounded and missing between the 21st and 29th of October, the period of their crossing the Duero, but this only refers to loss in action; Hill's loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, four hundred, and the defence of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. If the Spanish regulars and partidas marching with the two armies be reckoned to have lost a thousand, which considering their want of discipline is not exaggerated, the whole loss previous to the French passage of the Tormes will amount perhaps to three thousand men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly three hundred were killed and wounded at the Huebra; many stragglers died in the woods, and Jourdan said the prisoners, Spanish Portuguese and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November were three thousand five hundred and twenty. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore be set down at less than nine thousand, including the loss in the siege. Appendix 16.

Some French writers have spoken of ten thousand being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and Souham estimated the previous loss, including the siege of Burgos, at seven thousand. But the king in his despatches called the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla; and he observed that if the cavalry generals, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamanca the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the army was so little pressed that none would have

supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds.

Although the French halted on the Huebra the English troops were kept together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños; and it was rumoured he designed to march that way with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumour but could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the Cortes, which compelled every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy; hence to avoid persecution those who used to transmit information had fled from their homes. Hill's division was therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow and the fifth Spanish army occupied Coria.

Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south or the army of Portugal in Castille, finally ordered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid and the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Esla; the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus as far as the Tietar with its centre, Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the king joined it with his guards, and when these movements were known the allies took the following winter quarters. The fifth Spanish army, crossing the Tagus at Alcantara, entered Estremadura. Hill occupied Coria and Placentia, holding the town of Bejar by a detachment. Two divisions were quartered behind Hill about Castello Branco and in the upper Beira. The light division remained on the Agueda, the rest of the infantry was distributed along the Douro from Lamego downwards. The Portuguese cavalry quartered in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with exception of Victor Alten's brigade which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego. Carlos d'España's troops garrisoned Ciudad

Rodrigo. The Gallicians marched through the *Tras os Montes* to their own country.

In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus the Douro and the Mondego, furnished water-carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda; the second line run by Penamacor and Guinaldo and both were direct, but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill's quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed. A double and direct communication across the Gredos mountain was also made by the French. On their first line they had now completely restored the Roman road, leading from Horcajada on the upper Tormes by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran and Talavera. To ease their second line they finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications were in winter so difficult, that Laval in crossing the mountains from Avila was forced to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover the allies having the interior and shorter lines had a more menacing position, and a more easy one for defence. Wellington had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, and the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared the other would move, yet there was no desire to continue the campaign; the allies wanted rest and more than one-third were in the hospitals! the French could not feed, and had to refix their general base of operations, which had been broken up by the guerillas.

Wellington was however most at ease. He knew the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain unless the British army was first mastered; Soult's intercepted letters showed indeed how that marshal desired to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful

force on the frontier; but Badajos, Rodrigo and Almeida blocked the principal entrances; and though the two former were ill provided they were in little danger, because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid, and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal until new establishments were formed. The Anglo-Portuguese could therefore take tranquil quarters to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments and recover strength. It was not so with the French. Their secondary warfare now to be again noticed, would have made the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon had enlarged the measure of glory; for when quit of their most formidable enemy, they had to chase the partidas, to form sieges, recover posts lost by concentration, and to send moveable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent, seeking food, fighting for what they got, and living hard because the magazines were reserved for operations against the Anglo-Portuguese. Certainly it was a great and terrible war for them, and formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION OF THE PARTISAN WARFARE.

IN the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Burgos, some of Mendizabel's bands had blockaded Santona by land, and Popham after his failure at Gueteria blockaded it by sea. It was not well provisioned, but Napoleon had sent an especial governor, Lameth, and a chosen engineer, D'Abadie, from Paris to complete the works. By their activity a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and, including the crew of a corvette, the garrison was eighteen hundred strong. Lameth had to fight his way into the place in September, but he soon formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a large convoy with its escort near Burgos, and all the bands increased in numbers and boldness.

When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took command of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham returned to France. Reille then spread his troops over the country, Avila was occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and Salazar were beaten, and Foy marching to seize Astorga surprised and captured ninety men employed to dismantle that fortress; but twenty breaches had been opened and the place ceased to be of importance. Caffarelli, troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one of which under general Frimont although strongly escorted and having two pieces of cannon fell into Longa's hands the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until

the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succour and provision Santona and Gueteria and to re-establish his other posts along the coasts; but while near Santona the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroño. Popham had however quitted the Bay of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli to succour Santona and important events followed, but the relation must be deferred as belonging to the transactions of 1813.

Tracing the chain of guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé who commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at times successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after Chaplangarra's exploit near Jaca, Mina intercepted all communication with France, and on the 22nd of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza with loss a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable force coming from Zaragoza forced him to desist he re-appeared at Barbastro. Finally in a severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed by colonel Colbert; yet the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field again with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded.

About this time Villa Campa, who had entrenched himself near Segorbé to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence by Panetier, but being afterwards joined by Gayan invested the castle of Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli succoured the place, but Villa Campa re-assembled near Carineña behind Severoli, who was forced to fight his way back to Zaragoza. The Spaniards re-appeared at Almunia, and on the 22nd of December another battle was fought, when Villa Campa, defeated with considerable slaughter, retired to New Castille and there soon repaired his losses. In the centre of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit of Hill, came down upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca, expected this

would draw troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph to follow the great army, which it rejoined between the Duero and the Tormes with a great encumbrance of civil servants and families: the partidas then entered Madrid and committed great excesses, treating the people as enemies.

Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong division by Cuenca as a protection for Madrid, and that marshal did move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requeña on the 28th of November; but being in fear for his line towards Alicant soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Requeña. He had been reinforced by three thousand fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation until he knew something of the king's progress, and at Requeña he had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all directions.

Del Parque advanced with Ballesteros' army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered the plains and some new levies from Grenada came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the partidas, marched to Albacete without hindrance from Suchet, and re-opened the communication with Alicant; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian army, nearly thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However, on the 3rd of December Joseph drove the partidas from the capital, and re-occupied Guadalaxara and the neighbouring posts; Soult then entered Toledo and his cavalry advanced towards Del Parque who immediately recrossed the Morena, whereupon the French horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and fill the magazines at Toledo.

By these operations Del Parque, now joined by the Grenadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio; Suchet was thus relieved from a danger which he had dreaded too much and by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men belonging to the king's and to Soult's

army on his hands, but he had also many effective men of those armies. The yellow fever had shown itself in some of his hospitals, and he was also uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon where the partida warfare was reviving; yet with fifteen thousand infantry and a fine division of cavalry disposable he should not have permitted Elio to pass his flank. He was afraid of the Sicilian army, and it had a great influence on all the preceding operations; for it is certain Suchet would otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuenca road, and then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the position of the Alicant army, not from its operations which were feeble and vacillating.

Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October. His successor, Mackenzie, pushed some troops to the front and there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy; but there was no plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the eighty-first regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, they were found high and strong, the garrison had been unexpectedly doubled that morning and in the evening a second reinforcement arrived, whereupon the British re-embarked. The water was however full of pointed rocks and it was by great exertions lieutenant Penruddocke of the *Fame* got the boats in, when the soldiers, wading and fighting, got on board with little loss but in confusion.

Soon after this general William Clinton came from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would weaken his army to help the king, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia either by a coast attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. This was not very difficult because the land was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having possession of the citadel of Alicant, and thus all things fell into disorder and weakness. For the Spanish governor avowing that he hated the English more than the French, would not suffer them to hold even a gate; and he

sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only twenty men, that he might retain two battalions to resist the attempt which he pretended to believe Clinton would make on the citadel. The latter, leaving Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet's cavalry, but the marshal, estimating the allied armies at more than fifty thousand men, would undertake no serious enterprise while ignorant of the king's progress in the north. He however diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the Xucar, entrenched the passes in his front, covered Denia with a detachment, compelled Whittingham to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.

Suchet's Correspondence,
MS.

In this state Elio came down to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. But he exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del Parque's force was under his command, pretended he could bring forty thousand men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. The two Spanish armies united would however scarcely have produced twenty thousand effective infantry; moreover Del Parque, a sickly unwieldy incapable person with mutinous soldiers, had no intention of moving beyond Alcaraz. With such allies it was difficult for the English general to co-operate, yet something might have been effected while Suchet was at Requena before Elio arrived, and more surely after he had reached Albacete. Clinton had twelve thousand men, five thousand being British, there was a fleet to aid and Elio had ten thousand infantry. Nothing was attempted, and Napoleon assured Suchet, that however difficult his position was from the extent of country the enemy in his front was not really formidable. Events justified this observation. The French works were soon completed and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards with sarcastic malice affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.

General Donkin,
MS.

Duke of Feltre,
MS.

Roche's and Whittingham's division continued to excite the

utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked very reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England
 Appendix 8. paid and clothed them, the Spaniards were bound
 Vol. V. to feed them; they did not do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, said he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicant, which were twice plundered by the governor: yet the other Spanish troops were worse off. But on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, weakness were visible, and if England was the stay of the Peninsula Wellington alone supported the war.

On the 22nd of November the obstinacy of the governor being overcome he gave up the citadel to the British, yet no offensive operations followed, though Suchet on the 26th drove Roche's troops out of Alcoy with loss and defeated the Spanish cavalry at Yecla. On the 2nd of December general Campbell came from Sicily with four thousand men, principally British, and assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence that lord William was to follow with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, and Elio desired the British to occupy the enemy on the lower Xucar while he attacked Requena; but Campbell after some feeble demonstrations declared he would await lord William's arrival. Then Elio, who had hitherto abstained from disputes with the British, became discontented and dispersed his army for subsistence, and Campbell complained that he was abandoned.

Suchet expecting an attack had withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa; but when he found Campbell as inactive as his predecessors and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and re-occupied all his former offensive positions in front of Alicant. Soult's detachments were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, and Del Parque went over the Morena. Thus the storm menacing the French was dissipated, for Campbell, following his instruction, refused rations to Whittingham's corps and desired it to separate for subsistence; and as the

rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving no danger was to be apprehended from them: Habert even marched up to Alicant, killing and wounding men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered.

Suchet feared nothing in front, but was unquiet for his rear, where, besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually vexed his communications with Tortosa. Fifty men had been surprised near Segorbe the 22nd of November by Villa Campa, and Panetier though he destroyed that chief's entrenched camp could not hinder him attacking Daroca as before shown. The Frayle surprised an ordnance convoy, took several guns and four hundred horses, and killed in cold blood after the action a hundred artillerymen and officers. A moveable column destroyed his depôts and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon, and to use Suchet's expression a battle would have cost him less.

Suchet to
the king,
MSS.

Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the departure of Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether.

The army was indeed called twenty thousand, and the tercios of reserve forty-five thousand; yet a column of nine hundred French controlled the sea-line and cut off all supplies landed for the interior. Lacy being about Vich with seven thousand men affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast; Codrington said that nineteen feluccas laden with flour had, in two nights, landed their cargoes between Mattaro and Barcelona for the supply of the latter city, and these and many other ventures of the same kind might have been captured without difficulty,—that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of French convoys,—that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade, when he was only disturbing a treasonable com-

Codrington,
MS.

merce so openly followed that he had to declare a blockade of the whole coast.

A plot to deliver the Medas islands was also discovered, and Lacy, when pressed to call out the somatenes, a favourite project with the English naval officers, said he could scarcely feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed that the efforts of that nature hitherto made and under more favourable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places. But so bitter were party dissensions that sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles and Codrington continued their old disputes, and Sarsfield, then in Aragon, had also quarrelled with Mina,—Lacy demanded Codrington's recal, and the junta demanded Lacy's removal,—and such was the misery of the soldiers, the officers of one regiment actually begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men and were denied! A few isolated efforts by some of the partisans were the only signs of war when the victory of Salamanca again raised the public spirit. Then for the first time the new constitution was proclaimed in Catalonia, the junta was suppressed, Eroles obtained greater powers and had hope of becoming captain-general, for the regency agreed to recal Lacy. Many thousand English muskets and other weapons were by sir Edward Pellew then given to the partisans as well as to the regular troops, which enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships, instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets.

The effect of these happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles who had raised a new division of three thousand men, contrived in concert with Codrington a combined movement in September against Taragona. Marching in the night of the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli he was met by the boats of the squadron, and repulsing a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans in the French service from the ruins of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole taking five vessels. After this affair he encamped on the hills separating

Lerida, Taragona, and Tortosa, meaning to intercept the communication between those places and keep up an intercourse with the fleet; the more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had come from Lerida to Arbeca, upon which, making a forced march over the mountains he destroyed the greatest part on the 2nd of October and then returned to his former quarters. Meanwhile Lacy, embarking scaling-ladders and battering-guns on board the English ships, made a pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich; but he kept no secrecy the enemy obtained succour and he returned to Vich. Manso defeated two hundred French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantages over one Pelligri, a French miguelete partisan, and captured some French boats at Mattaro after Lacy's departure; but Sarsfield's mission to raise an army in Aragon failed, and Decaen, desiring to check the reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined movement against Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country about Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Taragona, which had been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3rd of November one division of the French forced the main body of the Spaniards under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto; and though the other divisions were less successful against Eroles and Manso at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich the 4th. The Catalans, who had lost altogether above five hundred men, then separated: Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and Rovira towards Olot, Manso to Montserrat.

Eroles returned to Reus and was like to have surprised the Col de Balaguer; for he sent a detachment under Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with sixteen men placed outside were taken, and

this loss was magnified so much to Eroles that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him Codrington brought up the Blake and landed some marines; yet no impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the 17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from Tortosa. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, supplied Taragona and then marched to Barcelona.

These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army. But an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet and Joseph, were retiring with their armies in one body to France by Catalonia; and Lacy to cover his inactivity pretended a design to raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch this retreat and act as a flanking corps to Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza. Such rumours served to amuse the Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December Bertolotti, the governor of Taragona, marched upon Reus and defeated some hundred men who had re-assembled there; and at the same time a French convoy for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, passed safely in the face of six thousand Catalan soldiers desirous to attack, yet prevented by Lacy. On this occasion the anger of the people and of the troops was loudly expressed, he was accused of treachery and soon after recalled. Eroles who had come to Cape Salou to obtain succour from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, now acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misconduct, and the army, reduced to less than seven thousand men, was naked and famishing. Affairs were indeed so bad that he was reluctant to accept the office of captain-general, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for Sarsfield was now acting as a partisan on the Ebro. But at this time the French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was weakened by drafts to fill up the ranks of Napoleon's new army, and the partida warfare continued; especially along the banks of the Ebro, where Sarsfield at the head of Eroles,

Codrington,
MSS.

ancient division acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia and other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet's communication between Tortosa and Valencia.

As Aragon was now unquiet, Navarre and Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, their rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her succours thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to enter Aragon while Wellington drew the great masses of the French towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which, notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, gave life and activity to the partidas of the south. It was the army from Sicily which induced Suchet to keep his forces together instead of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the troops of England who had shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, the money and stores of England which had supported the partidas. Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence or her warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the French wherever their armies were not united in masses.

Such then were the various military events of the year 1812, and the English general taking a view of the whole, judged that however anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But those reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man had been vanquished by the elements. The fires and the snows of Moscow combined had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness, nations and rulers rejoiced that an enterprise, at once the grandest the most provident the most beneficial ever

attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been foiled—they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny that has ever menaced and disgraced European civilization.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

WHEN the campaign terminated, Wellington, exasperated by the conduct of the army and the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter addressed to the superior officers, which, being ill-received by the army at the time has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, ‘that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign *in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army*, and this without any disaster, any unusual privation or hardship save that of inclement weather,—that the officers had lost all command over their men, and excesses outrages of all kinds and inexcusable losses had occurred,—that no army had ever made shorter marches in retreat or had longer rests,—no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and this unhappy state of affairs was to be traced to the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers.’

These severe reproaches were partially unjust, and the statements on which they were founded were in some particulars inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance after quitting the Tormes were long as to time; and it is the time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some regiments had come from Cadiz without halting, and as long garrison duty had weakened their bodies their constitutions and inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca was through a flooded clayey country, not much easier to the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were

to Hannibal's army; and mounted officers, as that great man well knew when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exertions: they measure his strength by their horses' powers. On this occasion the troops, stepping ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes and with strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two rations in five days. Their general thought otherwise. He knew not that the commissariat stores which he had ordered up did not arrive regularly, because of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those that did arrive were not available for the troops, because, as the rear of an army and especially a retreating army is at once the birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries and conductors of the temporary dépôts were alarmed with rumours that the enemy's cavalry had carried off or destroyed the field-stores: the soldiers were actually feeding on acorns when supposed to have good rations!

The destruction of the swine may be thus in some measure palliated, but there is neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers' habitual inattention to their duty. Intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, and great part of the sufferings arose from these and previous disorders; for it is too common with soldiers to break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and then complain of the misery which those arrangements were designed to obviate. Nevertheless this circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation Wellington admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division nor to the guards. With respect to the former indeed the proof of its discipline was easy, though so much had not been said; for how could those troops be upbraided, who held together so closely with their colours that, exclusive of the killed in action they did not leave thirty men behind. Never did the extraordinary vigour and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of lord Wellington's character, that while capable of repressing insubordi-

nation by firmness or dexterity as the case may require; capable also of magnanimously disregarding or dangerously resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are yet bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partisans and personal friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other great generals and statesmen, but he thereby failed to influence masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which Hannibal in ancient and Napoleon in modern times commanded the admiration of the world. But it is only by such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an example.

It has been by English writers called his easy and triumphant march to Madrid, yet nothing happened according to the original plan; the operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordination of the troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the different governments. For first the design was to menace the French in Spain so as to bring their forces from other parts, and then retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. Wellington was not without hope indeed to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content if the occasion came not to wear out the French by continual marching, and trusted the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy from the first too powerful for him, even without drawing succour from distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once were it not for Marmont's rashness. Nor would the victory of the Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate effect but for the errors of the king, and his rejection of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the evacuation of Andalusia, but only to concentrate an overwhelming force with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal.

Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern provinces, and circumstances compelled him to remain in the northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos and he could not; he would have rested longer on the Carrion and his flanks were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Baños; he would have rested behind the Duero to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro forced him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last river also he desired either to take his winter quarters or to deliver a great battle with a view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. Finally he endeavoured to make an orderly and an easy retreat to Rodrigo, but his army was like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking advantage of particular opportunities were conspicuous: these are the distinguishing characteristics of real genius.

Passing over that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the reader would do well to mark how this great commander after that event separated the king's army from Marmont's, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos and driving the other from Madrid,—how he thus broke up the French combinations, which it required many weeks to restore,—how he posted Clinton's division and the Gallicians to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of Portugal,—how, foreseeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, he was prepared to drive Soult himself from that province,—how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed and his combinations were ruined by the fault of others, he commenced his retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished even with more splendour than it had commenced.

If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak English division and the reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, covered by

Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in check, and Popham's armament would have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese and fifteen thousand Spaniards on the Tagus, would have marched towards Murcia; Ballesteros' army and the sixteen thousand men composing the Alicant army could there have joined him; and then with a hundred thousand soldiers he would have given such battle to the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with the martial clangor. To exchange this glorious vision for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter retreat was for Wellington but a momentary mental struggle; and it was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle.

Let him be traced then in retreat. Pursued by a superior army and seeing his cavalry defeated he turned as a savage lion at the Carrion; nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked; for when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños,—nor did the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of operations escape him. His march to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain.

When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he on the instant formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and though the splendid exploit of captain Guingret at Tordesillas baffled this intent, he in return baffled Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not

maintain the line of the Duero nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior forces; and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical illustration, namely, the movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa. A movement made not in confusion and half flight but in close order of battle, the columns ready for action, the artillery and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing along the front of and winding into the rear of a French force the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, an army having twice as many guns as the allies and twelve thousand able horsemen to boot! And all these great and skilful actions were executed with an army composed of different nations; soldiers, fierce indeed and valiant, terrible in battle, but characterised by himself as more deficient in good discipline than any army of which he had ever read!

Men engaged only in civil affairs, especially book-men, are apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification of a general; and they have another mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, Wellington sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful if not the most glorious of Wellington's campaigns, Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, lord Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as quartermaster-general after the battle of Salamanca, he was inexperienced, and some bodily suffering impeded his personal exertions.

Such then were the principal points of skill displayed; yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apophthegm of Turenne will always be found applicable: '*he who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war.*' Some military writers, amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English general, that with a conquering army and an insurgent nation at his back he should in three months after his

victory have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded, the king certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. The want of money, progressively increasing, had become almost intolerable. The army was partly fed from Rodrigo, partly from the valley of the Pisuerga; Hill's troops were fed from Lisbon; the Portuguese in their own country the Spaniards always, lived like the French by requisition; the British professed to avoid that mode and made it a national boast; the movements were therefore subservient to this principle and must be judged accordingly: want of money was want of motion.

Now four modes of operation were open.

1°. *After the victory of Salamanca to follow the king to Valencia, and unite with the Alicant army, then, having separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet to act according to events.*

To have thus moved without money into Valencia or Murcia, new countries where he had no assured connexions and which were scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was probable, the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. Then the distance between him and the troops left in the north being considered, the latter must have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south unless the army of Portugal joined the king, whereby the allies would have been over-matched in Valencia: that is, if Soult also joined the king, and if not he would have placed the army between two fires. If a force was not left in the north, the army of Portugal could march to the king's assistance by Zaragoza, or relieve Astorga, seize Salamanca, recover the prisoners and trophies of the Arapiles, and destroy all the great lines of magazines and dépôts even to the Tagus. Moreover the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the English general to depend upon the contracted base of operations offered by Alicant; because Clausel could have rendered it

impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time therefore was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way.

2°. *To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.*

This project Wellington was prepared to execute when the king's orders rendered it unnecessary; but if Joseph had adopted Soult's plan a grand field for the display of military art would have been opened. The king going by the Despeñas Perros and having the advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult with the army of the centre before the English general could have joined Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united could have kept the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also; and hence the error of Wellington seems to have been, that he did not make an effort to overtake the king either upon or beyond the Tagus—for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despeñas Perros if Maitland had not at the moment landed at Alicant.

3°. *To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca.*

The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of adopting this line of operations need not be here repeated; yet it may be added, that the destruction of the great arsenal and dépôt of the Retiro was no small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.

4°. *The plan actually followed.*

The English general's stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development of the French operations in the south was of such importance. It only remains therefore to trace him after he quitted Madrid. The choice of the line by Valladolid appears common-place and deficient in vigour, but was probably decided by the want of money and means of transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual military communication with them and covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clausel's retreating army up the valley of

the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come up if that general had been defeated, nor would the want of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable loss would no doubt have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of a victory would have amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clausel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest French dépôt in this part of Spain. A victory therefore would have entirely disarranged the enemy's means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice-broken and defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript reinforcements nor the junction of Caffarelli's troops would have enabled Clausel to re-appear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would probably have yielded at once, and the English general might have returned to the Tagus, perhaps in time to meet Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from Andalusia.

It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield it would not have yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain, the effect of a defeat would have been very different from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clausel's retreat; and the prolonged defence of the castle was due to some errors of detail in the attack as well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington's judgment on the spot and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries' situation, is of more weight than Jomini's, however able and acute, for he knew nothing of the difficulties.

In the details of the siege there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said sir Howard Douglas on being consulted, objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward a middle and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult enterprises, which even if successful would still leave the White Church and the upper castle to be carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a

powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from which it could be breached; and until it was breached the governor, a gallant man, would certainly not surrender. It could not however be breached without a larger battering-train than the allies possessed, and would not as he supposed be effected by mines; wherefore proposing to take the guns from two frigates then lying at Santander he proffered to bring them up in time. In this reasoning Wellington partly acquiesced, but he expected success from the scarcity of water in the castle, and the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was he without hope from his fortune. Towards the end of the siege he too late got the guns from Santander; but while Douglas counselled him on the spot sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of this history that he also, foreseeing the artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra twelve fine Russian battering-guns from the Retiro, pledging himself to procure by an appeal to the officers in the capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer was not accepted.

Something also may be objected to the field operations; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, that the enemy's active army should first be beaten or driven beyond some strong line, such as a river or chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had

General
Souham,
MSS.

masked the castle after the horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clausel, the French generals admitted they would have gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. Then all the minor dépôts must have been broken up, and the re-organization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month, during which the guns from Santander would have arrived and the castle of Burgos have fallen. In Souham's secret despatches, it is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; and it is not unlikely, because to advance continually and surround an enemy constituted with Spanish generals the whole art of war. Howbeit on this occasion

the advice if given was not unreasonable; and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up from Madrid; still leaving two of the finest in the army and a brigade of cavalry at that capital, which was sufficient, because Hill was coming to Toledo, Ballesteros' disobedience was unknown, and the king in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.

A last error was stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the error was brilliantly redeemed; but the remedy does not efface the original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration of some speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the French fed their large army, did not order everything in his rear to take refuge in Rodrigo and Almeida and entrench himself on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted and having a bridge-head on the left bank by which to operate on either side, he might have waited until famine compelled the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few days: perhaps the answer would be that the Spaniards had left Rodrigo in a defenceless state.

Turning now to the French side they also will be found in error.

Souham's pursuit after the cavalry combat at Venta de Pozo was feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, 'no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy.' The king's orders were however positive not to fight, and as the English general continually offered Souham battle in strong positions the man had no power to do mischief. Soult's too cautious pursuit of Hill had other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, and until the Guadarama was passed Hill had the larger force, for then only was the whole French army united. Soult wished to march in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a small corps or a detachment of Suchet's army on the Cuenca road; but the king united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guards and seven thousand men of the army of the south on the

Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications except by Tarancon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only thirty-five thousand men, and from commissariat difficulties and other obstacles was compelled to move by successive divisions, at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro his rear-guard was two marches distant. Hill might then have turned and driven him over the Tagus; or, after leaving a small corps on the upper Tagus to watch the king, have passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning his line by the valley of the Tagus have attacked Soult while on the march towards Ocaña: the latter, in despite of his numerous cavalry must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged the whole campaign.

Soult thinking Ballesteros was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the French army; neither could that disposition be changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads, and because Souham had been told that the king would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine Soult had learned to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp embraced all the machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle when a defeat would, from the unsettled state of the French affairs have lost the whole Peninsula. The allies had Portugal to fall back upon, the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.

These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between Wellington's retreat and that of sir John Moore. This last-named general marched to the north of Spain with the political object of saving Andalusia by drawing on himself the French power; having beforehand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. Wellington moved into the same country to deliver Andalusia and thus drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; like Moore declaring also beforehand that the political object being gained his own military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana's Spanish

army and he found it a burthen; Wellington was impeded, not assisted by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.

Moore having approached Soult and menaced Burgos was forced to retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos was compelled to raise the siege and retire, lest the king, coming through Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed by Souham to the Duero. The first general looked to the mountains of Galicia for positions which he could maintain; but the apathy of the Spanish people in the south permitted Napoleon to bring up an overwhelming force so rapidly that this plan could not be sustained. Wellington had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a power that further retreat became necessary.

Moore's soldiers at the commencement of the operation evinced want of discipline, they committed great excesses at Valderas and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bemibre and Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid, and committed excesses everywhere. Moore stopped behind the Esla to check the enemy, restore order, and enable his commissariat to remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. The one general was immediately turned on his left because the bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other general was also turned on his left because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy. Moore's retreat was little short of three hundred miles; Wellington's was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the one was in the last marches between Lugo and Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other was in the last marches between the

Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore's generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington's generals, as we have seen, went further: the first were checked by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally both generals reproached their armies with want of discipline, both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The reserve and the foot-guards in Moore's campaign, the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington's, gave signal proof that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not that it can be said, only those regiments preserved order; many others were eminently well conducted, but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time, and two regiments of the light division had been of Moore's reserve.

Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences were, that Moore had only twenty-three thousand men in the first part of his retreat, and nineteen thousand in the latter part, having detached four thousand to Vigo. Wellington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of his retreat, sixty-eight thousand in the latter part. Moore's army were all of one nation and young soldiers, Wellington's were of different nations but veterans. The first marched through mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in the plains over which the second moved; and until he reached the Esla Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington's flank was covered by Hill's army until he gained the Tormes. Wellington with veteran troops was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the king, and to Jourdan, men not agreeing in their views; and their whole army when united did not exceed the allies by more than twenty thousand men. Moore with young soldiers was at first opposed to four times, and latterly to three times his own numbers; for it is remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga was above eighty thousand, including ten thousand cavalry; which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had little more than twenty thousand men to oppose to this overwhelming mass and Wellington

had nearly seventy thousand. The partidas, abounding at the time of Wellington's retreat, were unknown in the time of Moore; and this general was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill in genius and in vigour. Wellington was not pressed by the enemy and he made short marches; yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle in which he died most honourably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle; but he also was vilified at the time with equal injustice; and if he had then died it would have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors or converted censure into praise, for it is the nature of mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to fortune.

Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards, his friends charged them on the incapacity of the English government. Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the previous contracted policy of Perceval's government, which had crippled the general's means: and certainly Wellington's reasoning relative to Ballesteros was not quite sound. That general he said, might have forced Soult to take the circuitous route of Valencia, Requeña and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and Souham altogether: for as the latter's operations were prescribed by the king and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington thought he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. This was the error. Souham's despatches clearly show, that the king's instructions checked instead of forwarding his movements; that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end of four days without regard to Joseph's orders; and so great was his force Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the field. Ballesteros'

Appendix,
No. 15, A.

defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of all further investigation. But whatever failures there were, and however imposing the height to which the English general's reputation has since attained, this campaign, including the sieges of Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz and the fight of Salamanca, will probably be considered his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit because of the great man who was there vanquished; Assye may be deemed a more wonderful action, one indeed to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes; but Salamanca will always be referred to as the most skilful of Wellington's battles.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

SECTION I.

CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

EXTRACT FROM MR. CANNING'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART AND
MR. DUFF, 1808.

To Mr. Stuart.

'You are to enter into no political engagements.'

To James Duff, Esq.

'July 26, 1808.

'You will embark on board his majesty's ship, Stately; on board of that ship are embarked to the amount of one million of Spanish dollars, three fourths in dollars and one fourth in bars, which sum is consigned to your care, and is destined by his majesty for the use of the kingdom of Andalusia and the provinces of Spain connected with them.

'His majesty has no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnishes to Spain.'

'Military stores to a considerable amount are now actually shipping for Cadiz, and the articles required for the clothing of the Andalusian army will follow.'

'It was only by a direct but secret understanding with the government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars has been collected in England.'

'Each province of Spain made its own application with reference to the full amount of its own immediate necessities, and to the full measure of its own intended exertions, but without taking into consideration that similar necessities and similar exertions lead to similar demands from other parts, and that though each separate demand might in itself be reasonably supposed to come within the limits of the means of Great Britain, yet that the whole together occasion a call for *specie*, such as never before was made upon this country at any period of its existence.'

'In the course of the present year it is publicly notorious that a subsidy is paid by Great Britain to Sweden of one million two hundred thousand pounds, the whole of which, or nearly the whole, must be remitted in *specie*, amounting to at least seven

million dollars. One million of dollars has already been sent to Gihon, another to Coruña *in part* of the respective demands of the principality of Asturias and the kingdom of Galicia, and the remainder of these demands as already brought forward would require not less than eight million dollars more to satisfy them.—‘An application from Portugal has also been received for an aid, which will amount to about twelve or thirteen hundred thousand dollars; one million, as has been stated, goes in the ship with you to Cadiz, and the remainder of the Andalusian demand would require between three and four millions of dollars more. Here, therefore, there are not less than three and twenty millions of dollars, of which near sixteen millions for Spain and Portugal required to be suddenly drawn from the British treasury.’

‘In addition to this drain it is also to be considered that the British armies are at the same moment sent forth in aid of the same cause, and that every article of expense to be incurred by them on foreign service in whatever country they may be employed, must be defrayed by remittances in silver.*—‘You will be particularly careful in entering upon the explanation with the junta in Seville, to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions now making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay the ground for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which are prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country.’

Mr. Canning to Mr. Stuart.

‘July 27, 1808.

‘Already the deputy from Coruña has added to his original demand for two millions of dollars, a further demand for three millions on learning from the Asturian deputies that the demand from Asturias had amounted to five millions in the first instance. Both profess in conversation to include a provision for the interests of Leon and of Old Castille in the demand. But this has not prevented a direct application from Leon.’

‘It is besides of no small disadvantage that the deputies from the Asturias and Galicia having left Spain at so early a period are really not competent to furnish information or advice upon the more advanced state of things in that country.’—‘I have already

* Note by Editor.—Nevertheless sir John Moore had only £25,000 in his military chest, and sir David Baird only £8000, which were given him by sir John Moore.

Admiral De Courcy to Mr. Stuart, October 21, 1808.

‘Mr. Frere will have told you that the Semiramis has brought a million of dollars in order to lie at his disposal, besides £50,000 in dollars, which are to be presented to the army of the marquis of Romana.’—‘In the meantime the British troops remain in their transports at Coruña, uncertain whether they shall be invited to the war, and without a shilling to defray their expenses.’

stated to you that in applications for succours, there is an underground appearance of rivalry, which with every disposition to do everything that can be done for Spain, imposes a necessity of perpetual caution with respect to the particular demands of each province. The Asturians having been rebuked by their constituents for not having applied for pecuniary aid as quickly as the Gallicians are bent upon repairing this fault, and the Gallician having been commended for promptitude, is ambitious of acquiring new credit by increasing the amount of his demand. Whatever the ulterior demands these several provinces have to make, will be made with infinitely more effect through you and Mr. Hunter respectively, as they will then come accompanied with some detailed and intelligible exposition of the grounds and objects of each particular application.

Mr. Stuart's despatches to Mr. Canning.

'Coruña, July 22, 1808.

'Accounts of advantages in the quarters, which from the present state of things can have little or no communication with this place, appear to be numerous in proportion as the north of Spain is barren of events agreeable to the existing government; and I am disposed to consider unauthenticated reports of success in Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, to be a mode of concealing or palliating disasters in Leon, Castille, and the Montana.

'July 24, 1808.

'One thousand men, under De Ponte, is the utmost force the Asturias have yet organized or sent into the field, and the contingents of Leon are very trifling.'

'Thirty thousand men, of which twenty thousand are regular troops under Blake, were united to ten thousand Castillian recruits under Cuesta. They went to Rio Seco to march against Burgos, and cut off Bessières' retreat to France, but they lost seven thousand men at Rio Seco.'

'The Estremadura army under Gallegos is at Almaraz, consisting of twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but the battle of Rio Seco has cut the communication which had been before kept up to Andalusia.'

Abstract of information sent to Mr. Canning by Mr. Stuart.

'July 26, 1808.

'The 29th of May the inhabitants of Coruña appointed a provisional junta of forty members taken from the notables of the place, and this junta despatched circulars to the seven provinces of St. Jago, Betanços, Coruña, Mondonedo, Orense, Lugo, and Tuy, desiring that deputies from each should come to Coruña to form a junta for Galicia entire. Seven persons came and immediately seized the government and dissolved the local junta; the troops marched to the frontier, deputies went to England, and all

seemed to proceed well until contributions were demanded. Then the provinces demurred, saying, their deputies were empowered only to signify their approbation of what had passed, but not to seize the government, and St. Jago insisted upon sending more deputies, and having additional votes as being of more consequence. It was then arranged that two deputies from each province should be sent to Coruña with more power. The archbishop and a Mr. Freire came from St. Jago, and others were arriving when the first deputation resolved not to submit, and declared the second to be an ordinary junta, chosen for the mere purpose of raising money, and subordinate to themselves. The archbishop and the bishop of Orense refused to act in such a capacity; but a letter from the latter painting the true state of things being intercepted, he was arrested and confined in the citadel. A body of troops was sent to St. Jago, it was uncertain whether to seize the archbishop or to awe the people; but Mr. Stuart was secretly assured it was for the former purpose. The archbishop thought so also and came immediately to Coruña. This transaction was studiously concealed from the English envoy, but he penetrated the secret. The people were discontented at this usurpation of the junta of seven, but the lavish succours sent to them by Mr. Canning and the presence of Mr. Stuart induced them to submit, as thinking the junta were supported by England.

‘This junta of seven adopted no measures in common with any neighbouring province, but willingly entered into close alliance with the insurgents of Portugal as one independent state with another; and they withheld any share of the English supplies for the armies of Asturias and Leon.

‘The archbishop was an intriguing dangerous man, and secretly wrote to Blake to march with the army against the junta, his letter being intercepted six voted to arrest him, but the seventh, with the assistance of Mr. Stuart, persuaded them to avoid so violent a measure, as tending towards a civil commotion. Tumults, however, did take place, and the English naval officers were requested and consented to quell a riot, and it proved that they had more influence over the people than the junta.

‘In August the archbishop was commanded to leave Coruña, he obeyed, and the bishop of Orense was after some resistance made a member of the junta.’

Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning.

‘August 7.

‘There is no common plan and consequently no concert in their proceedings. No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain with its neighbour, although that advantage may not be useful to themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Andero on the coast of Biscay, and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts of Galicia.

‘The stores landed at Gihon and not used by the Asturians,

have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of Blake.

'The money brought by the Pluto for that province of Leon, which has not raised a man and was till this moment in the hands of the French, remains unemployed in the port where it was landed. Estremadura is said to have nine thousand cavalry, which are of little service since the French quitted that province. Yet they have not sent a man to Blake, who cannot prudently stir from his present position without cavalry. General Cuesta also has deprived him of six hundred horse and his flying artillery, with which he has actually quitted Salamanca on his way to join the Estremadura army.'

Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning.

[Abstract.]

' *August 12.*

'The duke of Infantado reached Blake's quarters after escaping from France. Blake gave him his confidence, and sent him to Madrid to form a council of war, and to persuade Cuesta to send two thousand cavalry to the army of Galicia. The junta did not approve of this; they suspected Infantado as a double dealer and in the French interest.

'After Baylen, the juntas of Seville and Murcia wished to establish a despotism differing in nothing from that of Charles III. and Charles IV., save that Florida Blanca was to be the head of a regency. But in the north they were all for liberty and put forward the British constitution as a model. The army spoke of Infantado as regent, but the civilians disliked him. All the English guns sent out for Galicia went by mistake to the Asturias, the succours were absurdly distributed and everything was in confusion.'

Ditto to Ditto.

' *Coruña, August 9.*

'I am placed at the very extremity of the kingdom where I cannot possibly obtain any sort of information respecting other provinces, and my presence has very materially contributed to cherish the project of separation from the rest of the peninsula in the minds of the Galicians.

'Besides the constant communication of the navy with the junta, a military mission is placed here, consisting of several persons who communicate regularly with the government and the admiralty, and whose correspondence with England being a mere duplicate of my own renders the one or the other perfectly useless.

'The packet, instead of coming weekly, only arrived every fortnight, being sent to Gihon to carry home Mr. Hunter's letters, who I understand has no order to report to me!

'The admiral having no official notice of my situation here on the part of government, cannot be expected to detach vessels

for the purpose of sending my despatches, at a time when he is occupied in sending his own accounts of the events taking place in Spain to the Admiralty.'

SECTION II.—LORD WELLESLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART.

[Extracts.]

'January 5, 1810.

'In return for these liberal supplies, his majesty is entitled to claim from the Portuguese government every assistance which can be afforded to the British commander and troops, a faithful and judicious application of the funds granted for the support of so large a portion of the Portuguese force, which must otherwise be supplied from the exclusive resources of Portugal.'

'I am commanded to signify to you the expectation that the extraordinary efforts of his majesty's government for the aid of Portugal, and the consequent pressure upon British resources, will be met by corresponding exertions on the part of the regency, and that all local and temporary prejudices will be submitted to the urgent necessity of placing the finances of the kingdom in that state which may render them available for its defence in the approaching danger. You will direct your immediate and vigilant attention to this most important object, nor will you refrain from offering, or even from urging your advice on any occasion which may open the prospect of effecting any useful reduction in the civil charges, or augmentation in the revenues or military resources of the country.'

'In addition to these arrangements, his majesty will expect to receive regular monthly accounts of the expenditure of the sums applicable to the military charges of Portugal, under the orders issued to lord Wellington, as well as accurate returns of the state and condition of the several corps receiving British pay.'——'It is also desirable that his majesty should be acquainted with the state and condition of that part of the Portuguese force which is to be maintained from the revenues of Portugal.'——'The crisis demands the most unreserved confidence and communication between his majesty's ministers and the local government of the prince regent. No jealousy or suspicion should be harboured under such a pressure of common danger; the great sacrifices which we have made for the interests of our ally must not be frustrated by any consideration inferior to the main purpose of our mutual security, nor must we now hesitate to take the lead in any measures necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share of their own efforts and resources for the accomplishment of their own safety.'

'The governing power in Spain does not derive its authority from the appointment of the sovereign, the disposition of some of its leading members is at least equivocal, and his conduct has not satisfied any expectations either of the Spanish nation or of the allies.'——'In Spain the assembly of the Cortes is the only remedy to which that country can resort for the purpose of

investing the government with a regular force, or a national spirit, nor can any hope be entertained of a sufficient exertion of the military resources of Spain, until a governing power shall be so framed as to unite a due representation of the crown with a just security for the interests and welfare of all the estates of the realm.'——

SECTION III.—CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.

'Viseu, March 30, 1810.

'I don't understand the arrangements which government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as part of this army, and, from the arrangements which I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all the money procured at Cadiz for bills was applicable to the service in this country. Their instructions to general Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that they should feed our troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be, that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much part of my army that I had written to my brother to desire to have his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal at least the troops which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be out of the question.'

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

'Isla, May 22, 1810.

'I add this note merely as a postscript to my last, to tell you that lord Liverpool has decided the doubt, by declaring this a part of Lord Wellington's army, but saying it is the wish of government that though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the present. This is odd enough. I mean that it should not have been left to his judgment to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than people in England.'

No. II.

SECTION I.

MARMONT AND DORSENNE'S OPERATIONS.

Intercepted letter from Foy to Girard, translated from the cipher.

'Truxillo, 20 Août, 1811.

'MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,—Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec quarante mille hommes; son avant garde occupe la Sierra de

Francia. On assure que l'artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette place. C'est approvisionnée pour trois mois. Marmont va se porter vers le nord pour se réunir avec l'armée commandée par le général Dorsenne et attaquer l'ennemi. Ma division partira le vingt-six pour passer le Tage et suivre le mouvement de Marmont. Huit mille hommes de l'armée du centre nous remplaceront à Placentia et au Pont d'Almaraz.

'Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse me charge de vous écrire que c'est à vous à contenir quatre mille Espagnols qui sont en ce moment réunis devant Truxillo,' &c. &c.

'Foy.'

Intercepted letter from general Wattier to the general commanding at Ciudad Rodrigo.

[Extract.]

'Salamanca, Septembre 1, 1811.

'L'armée Espagnol de Galice, honteusement chassée de ses positions de la Baneza et de Puente de Orvigo et poursuivie par l'avant garde au delà de Villa Franca, s'est retirée en grand hâte sur la Coruñe. Le général-en-chef après avoir nettoye ces parages, vient ici sous six jours avec vingt-cinq mille hommes de la garde, et nous irons tous ensemble voir s'il plait à ces illustres Anglais de nous attendre, et de nous permettre de rompre quelques lances avec eux. Le duc de Raguse à qui j'envoie de vos nouvelles est autour de vous à Baños, Val de Fuentes, Placentia, &c., et nous agirons de concert avec lui.'

Intercepted letter from Marmont to Girard.

'Placencia, 7embre, 1811.

'GÉNÉRAL,—Je vous ai écrit pour vous prier de faire passer une lettre que j'adressai au maréchal duc de Dalmatie. Les Anglais ont réuni toutes leurs forces auprès de Rodrigo, les corps Espagnols même qui étoient sur la rive gauche du Tage passent en ce moment cette rivière; vous n'avez presque personne devant vous. Il serait extrêmement important que pendant que la presque totalité de l'armée va se porter sur Rodrigo vous puissiez faire un mouvement pour opérer une diversion utile et rapeller un portion de la force ennemie de votre côté. J'ignore quelles sont vos instructions, mais je ne doute pas que ce mouvement n'entre dans les intentions du duc de Dalmatie.'

Du maréchal Marmont au général de division Foy.

'Talavera, Octobre 21, 1811.

'GÉNÉRAL,—Je reçois seulement dans ce moment votre lettre du 18^{me} avec la copie de celle du général d'Aultanne. Pour instruction générale vous ne devez obéir à aucun ordre qui vous serait donné au nom du roi lorsqu'elles sont contraires à mes intentions particulières. Ne vous départez jamais de ces dispositions. L'armée du Portugal ne doit point servir aux escortes, ni à la communication de l'armée du midi,—nos troupes auront

bien assez de courses à faire pour assurer la rentrée de nos approvisionnemens. Le roi a paru désirer que je n'occupe point Illescas, à cause de son voisinage de Madrid; par ce motif et plus encore en raison de l'éloignement et du service pénible des troupes, je ne veux point l'occuper. Mon intention était de ne point occuper Aranjuez; mais puisque les ministres du roi ont pris la mesure inconsidérée d'ordonner la vente des magasins, ne perdez pas un seul instant pour envoyer un détachement occuper Aranjuez, où le préfet de Toledo fera faire le plus de biscuit possible. Prenez la même mesure pour tous les points où il y a des magasins.—Emparez-vous en,—et que personne n'y touche.—L'empereur a indiqué la province de Toledo et non la préfecture; ainsi ce sont les ressources de toute la province qui nous sont affectées.—Emparez-vous en,—et que le préfet administre tous le pays. Dites bien au préfet qu'à quelque titre que ce soit aucun des ressources en blé, argent de quelque source qu'elles proviennent ne doit être distraits pour Madrid, et qu'elles doivent toutes être conservés pour l'armée de Portugal. A la fin du mois la division de dragons arrivera dans les environs de Toledo.—J'espère qu'elle éloignera les guerillas. Dans les cas où ils resteroient dans le voisinage on leur donnera la chasse. Voyez à obtenir du préfet de Toledo qu'il fasse un effort extraordinaire pour envoyer à Talavera le blé et l'orge qui lui ont été demandés, attendu que comme ici on est obligé de faire des expéditions en avant, nous sommes dans un besoin très pressant. Je désirerois rentrer dans la possession de tout le blé qui a été vendu. On renverroit les acheteurs par devant le gouvernement Espagnol pour être indemnisés,—s'il y a possibilité engagez le préfet à prendre des mesures conservatoires en attendant que je prenne un arrêté à cet égard sur le rapport que vous me ferez. Je me rends à Madrid où je passerai deux jours dans l'espérance d'éclairer le roi sur la conduite que ses véritables intérêts lui commandent de tenir envers l'armée Française. De là je me rends à Toledo. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander, général, d'envoyer à Aranjuez un officier sage et ferme, qui exécute ponctuellement les ordres qui lui seroient donnés, qui se fasse obéir et qui mette le plus grand soin à faire respecter l'habitation du roi.

Intercepted letter in cipher from general Montbrun to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

' Val de Fuentes, Septembre, 1811.

' Je reçu le — du courant, mon cher général, votre réponse du — à la lettre que je vous écrivis le —, et je m'empressai d'en communiquer le contenu à S. E. le maréchal duc de Raguse, qui me charge de me mettre en communication avec vous. Je m'en acquitterai avec plaisir puisque c'en est toujours un nouveau pour moi de recevoir de vos nouvelles. Je vous annonce qu'un approvisionnement très considérable se prépare à Salamanque par les soins du général-en-chef Dorsenne, le maréchal, sur lequel vous pouvez compter aussi fait des préparatifs pour vous envoyer des

vivres. Tous les convois partiront sous bonne escorte, et ne mettront en marche d'après ce que je presume du courant au plus tard. Dans tous les cas ne vous impatientez pas. Nous sommes prêts à venir à votre secours de toutes les manières. Vous ne sauriez trop de votre côté nous mettre au courant de la force de la position et enfin vous ne pourriez nous donner trop de détails sur l'armée Anglo-Portugaise.

‘ Je reçois à l'instant le billet que vous avez écrit hier au général Boyer, par lequel vous nous faites connoître que d'après tous les renseignemens que vous avez obtenus, vous croyez que les sept divisions Anglaises sont dans vos parages. Il importe de s'en assurer positivement de connoître leur position, et, s'il est possible, leur composition. Il paraît que vous n'avez pas beaucoup de monde dans votre place sur qui vous puissiez compter. Proposez à l'homme que je vous envoie d'aller reconnoître les Anglais à Gallegos et Fuente Guinaldo, et de révenir par El Bodon, et vous me le renverriez ensuite. Dites lui que je le paierai bien s'il veut faire cette tournée, mais s'il s'y refuse je vous prie de ne pas l'y contraindre, &c. &c.’

General Walker to lord Wellington.

‘ Coruña, September 4, 1811.

‘ I saw the whole of the troops with him (general Abadia) in and about a league in front of Astorga, having their advanced posts on the Esla, the whole not amounting to above seven thousand men, independent of a reserve of about fifteen hundred near Foncebadon and Bemibre or on the road from Lugo. The force of the enemy in his front when collected being estimated at about thirteen thousand men. The wretched situation of the Gallician troops, in want almost of everything, one third part at least without shoes, and dependent on the precarious subsistence that can day by day be collected, certainly does credit to their patience and good inclination.’

— ‘ In consequence of this movement, (Abadia's retreat,) the great road by Manzanal and Bemibre being left open or nearly so, the French pushed forward on it so rapidly that shortly after my arrival here (Coruña), intelligence was received of their having got possession of the important pass of Villa Franca, and that the Gallician troops thus cut off from it, had been obliged to make their retreat by the Val des Orres. Without any correct information of the force of the enemy, and the entrance of Galicia thus left entirely in his hands, a very considerable alarm was for some time occasioned here, of which I took every advantage to urge upon the junta the necessity of a full compliance with the recommendation and wishes of the general to enable him to put the troops in such a state of equipment as might render them, either for defence or attack, in every way disposable in his hands; and at the same time to put Coruña into temporary security, by withdrawing to it all the guns (amounting to no less than fifteen hundred) of the indefensible arsenal of Ferrol, which would otherwise become a sure dépôt for

the enemy in any attack he might contemplate on this place, and who might not otherwise venture to bring with him heavy artillery on so distant an excursion.'

SECTION II.

Official letters from the prince of Neufchatel to marshal Marmont, extracted from the duke of Rovigo's Memoirs.

'Paris, le 21 Novembre, 1811.

'L'empereur me charge de vous faire connaître, monsieur le maréchal, que l'objet le plus important en ce moment est la prise de Valence. L'empereur ordonne que vous fassiez partir un corps de troupes qui, réuni aux forces que le roi détachera de l'armée du centre, se dirige sur Valence pour appuyer l'armée du maréchal Suchet jusqu'à ce qu'on soit maître de cette place.

'Faites exécuter sans délai cette disposition de concert avec S. M. le roi d'Espagne, et instruisez-moi de ce que vous aurez fait à cet égard. Nous sommes instruits que les Anglais ont vingt mille malades, et qu'ils n'ont pas vingt mille hommes sous les armes, en sorte qu'ils ne peuvent rien entreprendre; l'intention de l'empereur est donc que douze mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie et sapeurs, marchent de suite sur Valence, que vous détachiez même trois à quatre mille hommes sur les derrières, et que vous, monsieur le maréchal, soyez en mesure de soutenir la prise de Valence. Cette place prise, le Portugal sera près de sa chute, parcequ'alors, dans la bonne saison, l'armée de Portugal sera augmentée de vingt-cinq mille hommes de l'armée du midi et de quinze mille du corps du général Reille, de manière à réunir plus de quatre-vingt mille hommes. Dans cette situation, vous recevriez l'ordre de vous porter sur Elvas, et de vous emparer de tout l'Alemtejo dans le même temps que l'armée du nord se porterait sur la Coa avec une armée de quarante mille hommes. L'équipage de pont qui existe à Badajoz servirait à jeter des ponts sur le Tage; l'ennemi serait hors d'état de rien opposer à une pareille force, qui offre toutes les chances de succès sans présenter aucun danger. C'est donc Valence qu'il faut prendre. Le 6 Novembre nous étions maîtres d'un faubourg; il y a lieu d'espérer que la place prise en Décembre, ce qui vous mettrait, monsieur le duc, à portée de vous trouver devant Elvas dans le courant de Janvier. Envoyez moi votre avis sur ce plan d'opérations, afin qu'après avoir reçu l'avis de la prise de Valence, l'empereur puisse vous donner des ordres positifs.

'Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général.'

(Signé) 'ALEXANDRE.'

'Paris, le 15 Février, 1812.

'Sa majesté n'est pas satisfaite de la direction que vous donnez à la guerre. Vous avez la supériorité sur l'ennemi, et au lieu de prendre l'initiative, vous ne cessez de la recevoir. Quand le général Hill marche sur l'armée du midi avec quinze mille hommes c'est ce qui peut vous arriver de plus heureux; cette armée est

assez forte et assez bien organisée pour ne rien craindre d'armée Anglaise, aurait-elle quatre ou cinq divisions réunies.

‘Aujourd’hui l’ennemi suppose que vous allez faire le siège de Rodrigo; il approche le général Hill de sa droite afin de pouvoir le faire venir à lui à grandes marches, et vous livrer bataille réunis, si vous voulez reprendre Rodrigo. C’est donc au duc de Dalmatie à tenir vingt mille hommes pour le contenir et l’empêcher de faire ce mouvement, et si général Hill passe le Tage, de se porter à sa suite, ou dans l’Alemtejo. Vous avez le double de la lettre que l’empereur m’a ordonné d’écrire au duc de Dalmatie le 10 de ce mois, en réponse à la demande qu’il vous avait faite de porter des troupes dans le midi; c’est vous, monsieur le maréchal, qui deviez lui écrire pour lui demander de porter un grand corps de troupes vers la Guadiana, pour maintenir le général Hill dans le midi et l’empêcher de se réunir à lord Wellington. . . Les Anglais connaissent assez l’honneur Français pour comprendre que ce succès (la prise de Rodrigo) peut devenir un affront pour eux, et qu’au lieu d’améliorer leur position, l’occupation de Ciudad Rodrigo les met dans l’obligation de défendre cette place. Ils nous rendent maîtres du choix du champ de bataille, puisque vous les forcez à venir au secours de cette place et à combattre dans une position si loin de la mer Je ne puis que vous répéter les ordres de l’empereur. Prenez votre quartier-général à Salamanque, travaillez avec activité à fortifier cette ville, réunissez-y un nouvel équipage du siège pour servir à armer la ville, formez-y des approvisionnemens, faite faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les Anglais, placez deux fortes avant gardes qui menacent, l’une Rodrigo, et l’autre Almeida; menacez les autres directions sur la frontière de Portugal, envoyez des partis qui ravagent quelques villages, enfin employez tout ce qui peut tenir l’ennemi sur le qui-vive. Faites réparer les routes de Porto et d’Almeida. Tenez votre armée vers Toro, Benavente. La province d’Avila a même de bonnes parties où l’on trouverait des ressources. Dans cette situation qui est aussi simple que formidable, vous reposez vos troupes, vous formez des magasins, et avec de simples démonstrations bien combinées, qui mettent vos avant-postes à même de tirer journellement des coups de fusil avec l’ennemi, vous aurez barre sur les Anglais, qui ne pourront vous observer . . . Ce n’est donc pas à vous, monsieur le duc, à vous disséminer en faveur de l’armée du midi. Lorsque vous avez été prendre le commandement de votre armée elle venait d’éprouver un échec par sa retraite de Portugal; ce pays était ravagé, les hôpitaux et les magasins de l’ennemi étaient à Lisbonne; vos troupes étaient fatiguées, dégoutées par les marches forcées, sans artillerie, sans train d’équipages. Badajoz était attaqué depuis long temps; une bataille dans le midi n’avait pu faire lever le siège de cette place. Que deviez vous faire alors? Vous portez sur Almeida pour menacer Lisbonne? Non, parceque votre armée n’avait pas d’artillerie, pas de train d’équipages, et qu’elle était fatiguée. L’ennemi à cette position, n’aurait pas cru à cette menace; il aurait laissé approcher jusqu’à Coïmbre, aurait

pris Badajoz, et ensuite serait venu sur vous. Vous avez donc fait à cette époque ce qu'il fallait faire; vous avez marché rapidement au secours de Badajoz; l'ennemi avait barre sur vous, et l'art de la guerre était de vous y commettre. La siège a été levé, et l'ennemi est rentré en Portugal; c'est ce qu'il y avait à faire. . . . Dans ce moment, monsieur le duc, votre position est simple et claire, et ne demande pas de combinaisons d'esprit. Placez vos troupes de manière qu'en quatre marches elles puissent se réunir et se grouper sur Salamanque; ayez-y votre quartier-général; que vos ordres, vos dispositions annocent à l'ennemi que le grosse artillerie arrive à Salamanque, que vous y former des magasins Si Wellington se dirige sur Badajoz, laissez le aller; réunissez aussitôt votre armée, et marcher droit sur Almeida; poussez des partis sur Coïmbre, et soyez persuadé que Wellington reviendra bien vite sur vous.

‘Ecrivez au duc de Dalmatie et sollicitez le roi de lui écrire également, pour qu'il exécute les ordres impératifs que je lui donne, de porter un corps de vingt mille hommes pour forcer le général Hill à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage. Ne pensez donc plus, monsieur le maréchal, à aller dans le midi et marchez droit sur le Portugal, si lord Wellington fait la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage Profitez du moment où vos troupes se réunissent pour bien organiser et mettre de l'ordre dans le nord. Qu'on travaille jour et nuit à fortifier Salamanque, qu'on y fasse venir de grosses pièces, qu'on fasse l'équipage de siège; enfin qu'on forme des magasins de subsistances. Vous sentirez, monsieur le maréchal, qu'en suivant ces directions et en mettant pour les exécuter toute l'activité convenable, vous tiendrez l'ennemi en échec En recevant l'initiative au lieu de la donner, en ne songeant qu'à l'armée du midi qui n'a pas besoin de vous, puisqu'elle est forte de quatre-vingt mille hommes des meilleures troupes de l'Europe, en ayant des sollicitudes pour les pays qui ne sont pas sous votre commandement et abandonnant les Asturies et les provinces qui vous regardent, un combat que vous éprouveriez serait une calamité qui se ferait sentir dans toute l'Espagne. Un échec de l'armée du midi la conduirait sur Madrid ou sur Valence et ne serait pas de même nature.

‘Je vous le répète, vous êtes le maître de conserver barre sur lord Wellington, en plaçant votre quartier-général à Salamanque, en occupant en force cette position, et poussant de fortes reconnaissances sur les débouches. Je ne pourrais que vous redire ce que je vous ai déjà expliqué ci-dessus. Si Badajoz était cerné seulement par deux ou trois divisions Anglaises, le duc de Dalmatie le débloquerait; mais alors lord Wellington, affaibli, vous mettrait à même de vous porter dans l'intérieur du Portugal, ce qui secourrait plus efficacement Badajoz que toute autre opération Je donne l'ordre que tout ce qu'il sera possible de fournir vous soit fourni pour compléter votre artillerie et pour armer Salamanque. Vingt-quatre heures après la réception de cette lettre l'empereur pense que vous partirez pour Salamanque, à moins d'événemens inattendus; que vous changerez une avant-

garde d'occuper les débouchés sur Rodrigo, et une autre sur Almeida; que vous aurez dans la main au moins la valeur d'une division; que vous ferez revenir la cavalerie et artillerie qui sont à la division du Tage Réunissez surtout votre cavalerie, dont vous n'avez pas de trop et donc vous avez tant de besoin

Au Prince de Neufchâtel.

Valladolid, le 23 Février, 1812.

‘MONSIEUR, — J'ignore si sa majesté aura daigné accueillir d'une manière favorable la demande que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre altesse pour supplier l'empereur de me permettre de faire sous ses yeux la campagne qui va s'ouvrir; mais qu'elle que soit sa décision, je regarde comme mon devoir de lui faire connaître, au moment où il semble prêt à s'éloigner, la situation des choses dans cette partie de l'Espagne.

‘D'après les derniers arrangemens arrêtés par sa majesté, l'armée de Portugal n'a plus le moyen de remplir la tâche qui lui est imposée, et je serais coupable, si, en ce moment, je cachais la vérité. La frontière se trouve très affaiblie par le départ des troupes qui ont été rappelées par la prise de Rodrigo, qui met l'ennemi à même d'entrer dans le cœur de la Castille en commençant un mouvement offensif; ensuite par l'immense étendue de pays que l'armée est dans le devoir d'occuper, ce qui rend toujours son rassemblement lent et difficile, tandis qu'il y a peu de temps elle était toute réunie et disponible.

‘Les sept divisions qui la composent s'élèveront, lorsqu'elles auront reçu les régimens de marche annoncés, à quarante-quatre milles hommes d'infanterie environ; il faut au moins cinq mille hommes pour occuper les points fortifiés et les communications qui ne peuvent être abandonnés; il faut à peu près pareille force pour observer l'Escla et la couvrir contre l'armée de Galice, qui évidemment, dans le cas d'un mouvement offensif des Anglais, se porterait à Bénavente et à Astorga. Ainsi, à supposer que toute l'armée soit réunie entre le Duero et la Tormes, sa force ne peut s'élever qu'à trente-trois ou trente-quatre mille hommes, tandis que l'ennemi peut présenter aujourd'hui une masse de plus de soixante mille hommes, dont plus de moitié Anglais, bien outillés et bien pourvus de toutes choses: et cependant que de chances pour que les divisions du Tage se trouvent en arrière! Qu'elles n'aient pu être ralliées promptement, et soient séparées de l'armée pendant les momens les plus importants de la campagne; alors la masse de nos forces réunies ne s'élèverait pas à plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes. Sa majesté suppose, il est vrai, que, dans ce cas l'armée du nord soutiendrait celle de Portugal par deux divisions: mais l'empereur peut-il être persuadé que, dans l'ordre de chose actuel, ces troupes arriveront promptement et à temps?

‘L'ennemi paraît en offensive: celui qui doit le combattre prépare ses moyens; celui qui doit agir hypothétiquement attend sans inquiétude, et laisse écouler en pure perte un temps précieux; l'ennemi marche à moi, je réunis mes troupes d'une manière

méthodique et précise, je sais à un jour près le moment où le plus grand nombre au moins sera en ligne, à quelle époque les autres seront en liaison avec moi, et, d'après cet état de choses, je me détermine à agir ou à temporiser; mais ces calculs, je ne puis le faire que pour des troupes qui sont purement et simplement à mes ordres. Pour celles qui n'y sont pas, que de lenteurs! que d'incertitudes et de temps perdu. J'annonce la marche de l'ennemi et je demande des secours, on me répond par des observations; ma lettre n'est parvenue que lentement parceque les communications sont difficiles dans ce pays; la réponse et ma réplique vient de même, et l'ennemi sera sur moi. Mais comment pourrai-je même d'avance faire des calculs raisonnables sur le mouvemens de troupes dont je ne connais ni la force ni l'emplacement? Lorsque je ne sais rien de la situation du pays ni des besoins de troupes qu'on y éprouve. Je ne puis raisonner que sur ce qui est à mes ordres, et puisque les troupes qui n'y sont pas me sont cependant nécessaires pour combattre, et sont comptées comme partie de la force que je dois opposer à l'ennemi, je suis en fausse position, et je n'ai les moyens de rien faire méthodiquement et avec connaissance de cause.

‘ Si l'on considère combien il faut de prévoyance pour exécuter le plus petit mouvement en Espagne, on doit se convaincre de la nécessité qu'il y a de donner d'avance mille ordres préparatoires sans lesquels les mouvemens rapides sont impossibles. Ainsi les troupes du nord m'étant étrangères habituellement, et m'étant cependant indispensables pour combattre, le succès de toutes mes opérations est dépendant du plus ou du moins de prévoyance et d'activité d'un autre chef: je ne puis donc pas être responsable des événemens.

‘ Mais il ne faut pas seulement considérer l'état des choses pour la défensive du nord, il faut la considérer pour celle du midi. Si lord Wellington porte six divisions sur la rive gauche de Tage le duc de Dalmatie a besoin d'un puissant secours; si dans ce cas, l'armée du nord ne fournit pas de troupes pour reléver une partie d'armée de Portugal dans quelques-uns des postes qu'elle doit évacuer alors momentanément, mais qu'il est important de tenir, et pour la sûreté du pays et pour maintenir la Galice et observer les deux divisions ennemies qui seraient sur l'Agueda, et qui feraient sans doute quelques démonstrations offensives; si dis-je l'armée du nord ne vient pas à son aide, l'armée de Portugal, trop faible, ne pourra pas faire un détachement d'une force convenable, et Badajoz tombera. Certes, il faut des ordres pour obtenir de l'armée du nord un mouvement dans cette hypothèse, et le temps utile pour agir; si on s'en tenait à des propositions et à des négociations, ce temps, qu'on ne pourrait remplacer, serait perdu en vaines discussions. Je suis autorisé à croire ce résultat.

‘ L'armée de Portugal est en ce moment la principale armée d'Espagne; c'est à elle à couvrir l'Espagne contre les entreprises des Anglais; pour pouvoir manœuvrer, il faut qu'elle ait des points d'appui, des places, des forts, des têtes-de-pont, etc.

‘ Il faut pour cela du matériel d’artillerie, et je n’ai ni canons ni munitions à y appliquer, tandis que les établissemens de l’armée du nord en sont tout remplis; j’en demanderai, on m’en promettra, mais en résultat je n’obtiendrai rien.

‘ Après avoir discuté la question militaire, je dirai un mot de l’administration. Le pays donné à l’armée de Portugal a des produits présumés le tiers de ceux des cinq gouvernemens.

‘ L’armée de Portugal est beaucoup plus nombreuse que l’armée du nord; le pays qu’elle occupe est insoumis; on n’arrache rien qu’avec la force, et les troupes de l’armée du nord ont semblé prendre à tâche, en l’évacuant, d’en enlever toutes les ressources. Les autres gouvernemens, malgré les guérillas, sont encore dans la soumission, et acquittent les contributions sans qu’il soit besoin de contrainte. D’après cela il y a une immense différence dans le sort de l’une et de l’autre et comme tout doit tendre au même but, que partout ce sont les soldats de l’empereur que tous les efforts doivent avoir pour objet le succès des opérations, ne serait-il pas juste que les ressources de tous ces pays fussent partagées proportionnellement aux besoins de chacun; et comment y parvenir sans une autorité unique?

‘ Je crois avoir démontré que, pour une bonne défensive du nord, le général de l’armée de Portugal doit avoir toujours à ses ordres les troupes et le territoire de l’armée du nord, puisque ces troupes sont appelées à combattre avec les siennes, et que les ressources de ce territoire doivent être en partie consacrées à les entretenir.

‘ Je passe maintenant à ce qui regarde le midi de l’Espagne. Une des tâches de l’armée de Portugal est de soutenir l’armée du midi, d’avoir l’œil sur Badajoz et de couvrir Madrid; et pour cela, il faut qu’un corps assez nombreux occupe la vallée du Tage; mais ce corps ne pourra subsister et ne pourra préparer des ressources pour d’autres troupes qui s’y rendraient pour le soutenir, s’il n’a pas un territoire productif, et ce territoire, quel autre peut-il être que l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre? Quelle ville peut offrir des ressources et des moyens dans la vallée du Tage si ce n’est Madrid? Cependant aujourd’hui l’armée de Portugal ne possède sur le nord du Tage, qu’un désert qui ne lui offre aucune espèce de moyens, ni pour les hommes ni pour les chevaux, et elle ne rencontre de la part des autorités de Madrid, que haine, qu’animosité. L’armée du centre, qui n’est rien, possède à elle seule un territoire plus fertile, plus étendu que celui qui est accordé pour toute l’armée de Portugal; cette vallée ne peut s’exploiter faute de troupes, et tout le monde s’oppose à ce que nous en tirions des ressources. Cependant si les bords du Tage étaient évacués par suite de la disette, personne à Madrid ne voudrait en apprécier la véritable raison, et tout le monde accuserait l’armée de Portugal de découvrir cette ville.

‘ Il existe, il faut le dire, une haine, une animosité envers les Français, qu’il est impossible d’exprimer, dans le gouvernement Espagnol. Il existe un desordre à Madrid qui présente le spec-

tacle le plus révoltant. Si les subsistances employés en de fausses consommations dans cette ville eussent été consacrées à former un magasin de ressources pour l'armée de Portugal, les troupes qui sont sur le Tage seraient dans l'abondance et pourvues pour long-temps; on consomme 22 mille rations par jour à Madrid, et il n'y a pas 3000 hommes: c'est qu'on donne et laisse prendre à tout le monde, excepté à ceux qui servent. Mais bien plus, je le répète, c'est un crime que d'aller prendre ce que l'armée du centre ne peut elle-même ramasser. Il est vrai qu'il paraît assez conséquent que ceux qui, depuis deux ans, trompent le roi, habillent et arment chaque jour des soldats qui, au bout de deux jours, vont se joindre à nos ennemis, et semblent en vérité avoir ainsi consacré un mode régulier de recrutement des bandes que nous avons sur les bras, s'occupent de leur réserver des moyens de subsistances à nos dépens.

‘La seule communication carrossable entre le gauche et le reste de l'armée de Portugal est par la province de Ségovie, et le mouvement des troupes et des convois ne peut avoir lieu avec facilité, parceque, quoique ce pays soit excellent et plein de ressources, les autorités de l'armée du centre refusent de prendre aucune disposition pour assurer leur subsistances.

‘Si l'armée de Portugal peut être affranchie du devoir de secourir le midi, de couvrir Madrid, elle peut se concentrer dans la Vieille-Castille, et elle s'en trouvera bien: alors tout lui devient facile; mais si elle doit au contraire remplir cette double tâche, elle ne le peut qu'en occupant la vallée du Tage, et dans cette vallée elle ne peut avoir les ressources nécessaires pour y vivre, pour y manœuvrer, pour y préparer des moyens suffisans pour toutes les troupes qu'il faudra y envoyer, qu'en possédant tout l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre et Madrid. Ce territoire doit conserver les troupes qui l'occupent à présent, afin qu'en marchant à l'ennemi, l'armée ne soit obligée de laisser personne en arrière, mais qu'au contraire elle en tire quelque secours pour sa communication. Elle a besoin surtout d'être délivrée des obstacles que fait naître sans cesse un gouvernement véritablement ennemi des armes Françaises; quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du roi, il paraît qu'il ne peut rien contre l'intérêt et les passions de ceux qui l'environnent; il semble également que jusqu'à présent il n'a rien pu contre les désordres qui ont lieu à Madrid, contre l'anarchie qui règne à l'armée du centre. Il peut y avoir de grandes raisons en politique pour que le roi réside à Madrid, mais il y a mille raisons positives et de sûreté pour les armes Françaises, qui sembleraient devoir lui faire choisir un autre séjour. Et en effet, ou le roi est général et commandant des armées, et dans ce cas il doit être au milieu des troupes, voir leurs besoins, pourvoir à tout, et être responsable; ou il est étranger à toutes les opérations, et alors, autant pour sa tranquillité personnelle que pour laisser plus de liberté dans les opérations, il doit s'éloigner du pays qui en est le théâtre et des lieux qui servent de points d'appui aux mouvemens de l'armée.

‘La guerre d’Espagne est difficile dans son essence, mais cette difficulté est augmentée de beaucoup par la division des commandemens et par la grande diminution des troupes que cette division rend encore plus funeste. Si cette division a déjà fait tant de mal, lorsque l’empereur, étant à Paris, s’occupant sans cesse de ses armées de la Péninsule, pouvait en partie remédier à tout, on doit fremir du résultat infallible de ce système, suivi avec diminution de moyens, lorsque l’empereur s’éloigne de trois cents lieues.

‘Monseigneur, je vous ai exposé toutes les raisons qui me semblent démontrer jusqu’à l’évidence la nécessité de réunir sous la même autorité toutes les troupes et tout le pays, depuis Bayonne jusques et y compris Madrid et la Manche; en cela, je n’ai été guidé que par mon amour ardent pour la gloire de nos armes et par ma conscience. Si l’empereur ne trouvait pas convenable d’adopter ce système j’ose le supplier de me donner un successeur dans le commandement qu’il m’avait confié. J’ai la confiance et le sentiment de pouvoir faire autant qu’un autre, mais tout restant dans la situation actuelle la charge est au-dessus de mes forces. De quelques difficultés que soit le commandement général, quelque imposante que soit la responsabilité qui l’accompagne, elles me paraissent beaucoup moindres que celles que ma position entraîne en ce moment.

‘Quelque flatteur que soit un grand commandement, il n’a de prix à mes yeux que lorsqu’il est accompagné des moyens de bien faire: lorsque ceux-ci me sont enlevés, alors tout me paraît préférable, et mon ambition se réduit à servir en soldat. Je donnerai ma vie sans regret, mais je ne puis rester dans la cruelle position de n’avoir pour résultat de mes efforts et de mes soins de tous les momens, que la triste perspective d’attacher mon nom à des événemens facheux et peu dignes de la gloire de nos armes.

‘(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE RAGUSE.’

Joseph to Napoleon.

Madrid, Mai 18, 1812.

‘SIRE,—Il y a aujourd’hui un mois et demi que j’ai reçu la lettre du prince de Neufchâtel en date du 16 Mars dernier, qui m’annonce que votre majesté impériale et royale me confiait le commandement de ses armées en Espagne, et me prevenait que les généraux-en-chef des armées du nord, de Portugal, du midi et de l’Arragon recevaient les ordres convenables.

‘Depuis cette époque il m’a été impossible de remplir les intentions de V. M. impériale et royale. Le général-en-chef de l’armée du nord s’est refusé à m’envoyer aucune rapport disant et écrivant qu’il n’avait aucun ordre à cet égard. M. le maréchal commandant en chef l’armée du midi n’a encore répondu à aucune des lettres que je lui ai écrites ou fait écrire depuis cette époque. M. le maréchal commandant en chef l’armée d’Arragon ne m’envoie aucune rapport, et reste entièrement isolé de moi.

M. le maréchal commandant en chef l'armée de Portugal m'a fait beaucoup de demandes auxquelles il savait parfaitement que je ne pouvais satisfaire, comme celles de troupes de l'armée du nord, des vivres, &c. Sa conduite est tellement indécente qu'elle n'est pas concevable. V. M. I. et R. pourra en juger par mes dépêches au prince de Neufchâtel.——Sire, en acceptant le commandement des armées Françaises à l'époque où je l'ai reçu, j'ai cru remplir un devoir que tous les liens qui m'attachent à V. M. I. et R. à la France m'imposaient parceque j'ai pensé pouvoir être utile, mais j'étais persuadé que V. M. I. et R. me confiant un dépôt si précieux les généraux-en-chef s'empresseraient d'obéir à la volonté de V. M. Il n'en est pas ainsi; je m'adresse donc à elle pour qu'elle veuille bien écrire ou faire écrire aux généraux-en-chef qu'elle est sa volonté pour qu'elle leur fasse déclarer que leur désobéissance à mes ordres les mettrait dans le cas d'être renvoyés en France où ils trouveraient un juge juste mais sévère dans V. M. I. et R. Si V. majesté ne trouve pas le moyen de persuader à ces messieurs que sa volonté est que je sois obéi, je la supplie de considérer que le rôle auquel je suis exposé est indigne de mon caractère et du nom de V. M. Si la guerre du nord a lieu, je ne puis être utile ici qu'autant que je suis obéi, et je ne puis être obéi qu'autant que ces messieurs sauront que j'ai le droit de les remplacer; je ne puis infliger, moi, d'autre punition que celle là à un général-en-chef. Si je ne suis pas obéi, et que V. M. aille au nord, l'Espagne sera évacuée honteusement par les troupes imperiales, et le nom que je porte aura présidé inutilement à cette époque désastreuse.

'Le mal est grand, mais il n'est au-dessus ni de mon devouement ni de mon courage. C'est à votre majesté à les rendre efficaces par la force dont il est indispensable qu'elle m'entoure; le salut des armées impériales et de l'Espagne indépendant.'

No. III.

T A R I F A.

[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION I.

Number and conduct of the French.

A.

'As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact, concurred in stating that the troops employed *exceeded nine thousand men*'

Extracts from colonel Skerrett's despatch.

'The enemy's force employed in the siege is stated at *ten thousand*, probably this is in some degree exaggerated.'

B.

'The fact of the enemy, with *eleven thousand experienced soldiers*, not having made another effort after his assault of the 31st, &c.'

Lord Wellington's despatch.

'January 19, 1812.

'By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th December, I learn that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of *about five thousand men* on the 20th December, covering their operation against that place by another corps at Vejer.'

Conduct of the French.

A.

'There was not on the part of the leading French officer (an old lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followers, any appearance of panic or perturbation. Their advance was serene, steady, and silent, worthy of the 5th corps, of their Austrian laurels, of their *'vieilles moustaches.'*

SECTION II.

Conduct of the Spanish soldiers.

B.

'At the assault general Copons himself was the only person who showed his head above the parapet. The precaution of out-flanking him by three companies of the 47th regiment remedied the chance of evil, which so lamentable a want of chivalry might have occasioned, but the knights of older times were probably better fed than were our poor distressed friends.'

SECTION III.

Conduct of colonel Skerrett.

A.

'It is necessary to advert to the 18-pounder mounted on the Gusmans' tower, as Southey's History contains some strange misrepresentation on the subject.'—'The French made the 18-pounder an early object of attack, but they did not succeed in crushing it. Unfortunately one of the spherical case shot, not precisely fitting its old and worn calibre, burst in passing over the town, and killed or wounded a person in the street. This produced some alarm and complaint amongst the inhabitants for a moment, and in the first feeling of that moment, Skerrett, with characteristic impetuosity, directed the gun to be placed *'hors de service.'* There was no ambiguity in his command,

‘*Let it be spiked.*’—‘Had he referred the case to the commanding officer of artillery, the order would not have been executed, means would have been found to remove the first impression and tranquillize the people, without the sacrifice of the gun, which might have added materially to the offensive powers of the garrison, particularly if the siege had been prolonged.’

B.

‘On the 29th of December, colonel Skerrett, with a rare activity, dismounted a 32-pound carronade that looked into the enemy’s batteries at the distance of about four hundred yards, and he succeeded in spiking and knocking off the trunnion of an 18-pounder, borrowed from the Stately. This gun was mounted on the tower of the Gusmans.’

General Campbell to lord Liverpool.

‘January 3, 1812.

‘Annexed is a letter received last night from colonel Skerrett; and, notwithstanding the despondency therein expressed, which has been equally so in other letters that I have received from him, my opinion remains the same as formerly.’

A.

‘At the crisis produced by Skerrett’s desire to retire from the town, and desire to leave the island also, general Campbell sent express instructions that the town should not be abandoned without the concurrence of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers; and accompanied these instructions with a positive command that every officer and soldier belonging to Gibraltar should, in future, be stationed in the island, to insure at all events the preservation of that port.’

SECTION IV.

Sir C. Smith’s conduct.

‘Smith never tolerated the idea of surrender—never admitted the possibility of defeat.’

‘Comprehending from the first the resources and capabilities of his post, and with a sort of intuition anticipating his assailant, he covered the weak points while he concealed his strength; and so conducted the skirmish which preceded the investment, that he, as it were, dictated the whole plan of attack, and in reality pointed out with his finger the position of the breaching-battery.’

‘Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and more brilliant.’

SECTION V.

[Extracts.]

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool.‘ *January 9, 1812.*

‘ From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett’s detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighbourhood to protect them.’

Lord Wellington to major-general Cooke.‘ *February 1, 1812.*

‘ SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of state, with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recall colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From the report of colonel Skerrett and lord Proby, and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right to expect that his majesty’s officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely cannon-proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace, infinitely to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under colonel Skerrett.’

Ditto to ditto.‘ *February 25, 1812.*

‘ I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith’s

letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide, only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring, and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government; it is better not to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the rules of his majesty's service, the senior officer should command the whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the governor of Gibraltar.'

Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege.

'Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his characteristic and never failing sagacity seems to have suggested to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed. A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island, but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity, in fact, of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter, half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution, and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that, had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian coast would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the struggle in the south of Spain was over.'

*General Campbell to lord Liverpool.**' Gibraltar, April 2, 1812.*

' MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of what remained in the town: the enemy's batteries being completely kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when he authorized him to abandon his post, for the major-general was unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost my lord by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon me, as having taken up the position: I am happy however, that its capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this additional force.

' After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers, they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty's arms must have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on that occasion, I have only to observe that considering the post of Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances added to what I have seen on

similar occasions put it past a doubt in my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for 'precise orders,' shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord, I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter, unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not, according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington who was of the same opinion. This however, I only take the liberty to advance in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I trust therefore I shall be excused in the eyes of government in declaring without reserve, that if I had not retained the command the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report that I have made the necessary communication with major-general Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington, as he has not received orders to that effect nor has he the means at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case of need,' &c. &c.—P.S. 'Should your lordship wish any further information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me.'

Extract from captain C. F. Smith's report.

'Tarifa, December 14, 1811.

'I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the resources of the place, and consider them such as ought to make a good and ultimately successful defence.'

Ditto, ditto.

'December 24, 1811.

'My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable, and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an outwork.'

Extract of a letter from colonel King, the senior officer of the troops detached from Gibraltar for the defence of Tarifa.

'August 6, 1834.

'I probably had better mention a circumstance which occurred two days before the assault of the breach at Tarifa; colonel Skerrett assembled the commanding officers of corps on the evening of the 29th Dec. 1811, and asked their opinion as to the

possibility of defending Tarifa. I think they were all of his opinion, inclined to abandon it, except myself and his engineer captain Smith, now colonel sir C. F. Smith. We both urged in strong language our capability of defending it; when he ordered us to retire to our quarters, and the commanding officers to give him their opinion in writing as soon as possible. I immediately wrote, and gave in the following opinion:—

'Tarifa, December 29, 1811.

'I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honour, and it ought to be defended to the last extremity.

'H. KING, major, 82nd regt.

'Commandant of Tarifa.'

'On the morning of the 30th, colonel Skerrett called upon me to say he had determined to embark with his force of 1200 men and wished to know what I meant to do. I expressed my regret, and told him I was resolved to defend the place, and if he did embark I hoped he would do it at night when he could not be seen by the enemy. Captain Smith soon after called on me to offer his services, which I gladly accepted if Skerrett would allow him to remain as he belonged to his command. I immediately sent an express to general Campbell at Gibraltar, informing him of Skerrett's determination and my wish that he should send me two or three companies as soon as possible, and that he might depend upon my defending Tarifa to the very last extremity. Late in the evening, a naval officer from Gibraltar arrived with an order for the transports to proceed to the Rock and not take a soldier on board.'

Note.—Major King is mistaken in thinking that all the commanding officers of regiments were in favour of abandoning the place. Colonel Gough was as decidedly averse to it as major King himself was.]

No. IV.

STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.

[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION I.—CIUDAD RODRIGO.

A.

'The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and

to major Napier,* commanding the storming-party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, '*Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?*' He was answered, '*Yes, perfectly.*' Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, '*Why don't you load?*' He answered, '*No, if we can't do the business without loading we shall not do it at all.*' The duke of Wellington immediately said, '*Leave him alone.*'

— 'The caçadores under colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given and the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait for the hay-bags, which from some confusion in the orders delivered had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to anything they were ordered to do.

'The troops jumped into the ditch; the '*fausse braye*' was faced with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of the ditch; it was scaled and the foot of the breach was attained. Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn hope and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with a wound on the head but sprang up again and joined major Napier captain Jones 52nd regt. Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43rd and some other officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the breach together.'

— 'Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart and led them against the enemy.'

'The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended, that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when colonel M'Leod of the forty-third poured a heavy flank fire upon the enemy defending it.'

B.

'The third division having commenced firing we were obliged to hurry to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin under a heavy fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face of the work and our party turned towards them, when the engineer officer called out, '*You are wrong, this is the way to the breach or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack.*''

— 'We ascended the breach of the *fausse braye*, and then the breach of the body of the place without the aid of ladders.'

— 'We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance but did not impede our march. Near it some of the enemy were

* Brother to the author of this work.

bayoneted, amongst the number some deserters who were found in arms defending the breach.'

—'Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting they were not loaded as the major had not permitted them, snapped all their firelocks.'

—'No individual could claim being the first that entered the breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for the point of attack.'

'Upon carrying the breach the parties moved as before, directed by major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left the forty-third to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend until it arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy's defences were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses bearing on it were loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible to force it without some other aid than a front attack.'

—'The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on the rampart near the great breach. It was, in my opinion, next to impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a front attack, as long as the enemy held their defences; but the moment the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly carried.'

Abstract of the Journal of general Harvey, Portuguese service.

'I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division opened their fire heavily and it was returned heavily; but there was a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the ramparts.'

SECTION II.—BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

C.

'An engineer officer who led the attack told me two days after, 'that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the intelligence of these men (a detachment from the

light division) in absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate.'

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

[Note.—The account of major-general Shaw Kennedy's intrepidity and coolness on the third breach was derived from his heroic companion, captain Nicholas, who related it with admiration when dying himself of his wounds.]

D.

'For the descent of the light and fourth divisions into the ditch, only *five ladders* were placed, and those five ladders were close to each other. The *advance* (or storming party) of the eighth division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that explosion took place; but observe, that although the *advance* of the light division preceded the *advance* of the fourth division, I only mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch sooner than the *head* of the fourth division, for the main bodies of the two divisions joined at the ladders and were descending into the ditch at the same time.

'I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault, therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it, and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the approach to it was made extremely difficult by *deep cuts*, and I think it passed unobserved except by a straggling few.'

—'I consider that '*chevaux de frise*' were placed upon the summit of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at daybreak. The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field, where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the curtain.'

*Extract from a memoir by captain Barney, Chasseurs
Britanniques, acting engineer at the siege.*

'The explosion of the '*Barriques foudroyantes*' resembled '*fougasses*,' and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire, who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in

an offensive position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On examining this breach at daylight, I found a Portuguese grenadier, whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this breach.'

—'Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to the attack of general Picton, and found but *two ladders*, one only just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had the enemy thrown shells among them I do not think it could have been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from the castle I met general Picton and told him the castle was full of men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be kept towards Christoval.'—'Passing in front of the battery where lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the breach. The enemy's fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible, and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them.'

'Here I also found but *three ladders*, one broken so as to render it useless. On arriving at the *curtain-breach*, some men of the light division assisted me in removing from the top *the chevaux de frise of sword-blades and pikes*.'

Letter from major Squire, of the Engineers.

[Extract.]

'April 8, 1812.

The enemy made a most obstinate resistance, and had prepared the breaches in such a manner with *chevaux de frise*, planks with tenter-hooks, shells and barrels of gunpowder, that to enter them became impossible.'

Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by captain Ellers P. Hopkins, fourth regiment.

'The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a stockade and a *chevaux de frise* concealing a guard-house on the covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place, followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. 'That is at the breaches,' was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French soldiers talking

in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said, '*now is the time;*' the column instantly moved to the face of the gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us, and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down, and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow of two men entering abreast.'— 'The engineer officer was by this time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.'

— 'The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too short.'— 'The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, &c., together with an *enfilading* fire.

'We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure.'— 'Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker, at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the right, &c. &c.

'The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable, not a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buzz and whisper around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors. We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made several prisoners leading some mules laden

with loose ball-cartridges in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners, ammunition, &c., we moved from the square with the intention of forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss. We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter. He said our troops had attacked the castle and had failed, but that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French officers of rank, their wives and children, ran into the square in a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed all that can be imagined: drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the loss of many lives; and great destruction of property, was one boon for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned round and said, Damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman. An officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for the possession of a canary-bird, was shot dead by one of these insane drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we have forgotten the distressing part of the scene never was there a more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money, plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the soldiers.'

No. V.

SECTION I.

ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT'S AND MARMONT'S OPERATIONS.

Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general Trant.

'Almeida, March 28, 1812.

'When I took possession of the fortress, ten days since, I found not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to

the want of side arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened in any part of the newly-repaired fronts. My powder was partly in an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only one front of my covered way pallisaded, and the face of one of my ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout the whole of the nearly-repaired fronts not being more than one-third or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts, the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot piles, and with a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb-proofs; we have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with palisades, but the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops.'

Extract from a memoir of general Trant.

'Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted, had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room door in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case on the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without their firing a shot, and had he only dashed headlong into the town, must have captured Wilson's and my militia divisions without losing probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace. I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant, Marmont drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he expected infantry.'

Lord Wellington to sir N. Trant.

'Castello Branco, April 17, 1812.

'DEAR SIR,—I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that of the 12th from general Bacellar this morning. We shall move on as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose a letter for the commissary there, and one for Don Carlos d'Espagna. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celerico. Show this letter to general Bacellar: I don't write to him as I have no Portuguese with me,' &c. &c.

'WELLINGTON.'

Ditto to ditto.

'Pedrogao, April 21, 1812.

'DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and that of general Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened, and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which you made for the retreat from it.

'As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt to put it in execution and it is useless to say anything about it. I would observe however upon one of your principles, viz., that the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in particular command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost your division and that of general Wilson. I give you my opinion very freely upon your plans and operations, as you have written me upon them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that both you and general Wilson did everything that officers should do with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each other,' &c. &c.

'WELLINGTON.'

SECTION II.

FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT'S AND MARMONT'S OPERATIONS.

Translated. Extracts from Soult's intercepted despatches.

' Seville, April 14, 1812.

'I enclose copies of a letter from the duke of Ragusa, dated 22nd February, and another from general Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards, marched into Old Castille at the moment when they knew that all the English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I, in virtue of your highness's (Berthier's) orders, had sent five regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained in the valley of the Tagus, the enemy would not have attacked Badajos, where they could have been fought to advantage.

'The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which have been reduced by fifteen thousand men as I have stated above, and not even a military demonstration has been made much less succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege and did not.'—'Badajos fell by a *'coup de fortune,'* because it was not in human foresight to think that five thousand men defending the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with twenty-four thousand men strongly organized.

'If I had received your highness's letter when I was before the English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened my communications with New Castille, Grenada, or Malaga. I have however prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own ground—Andalusia.

'The emperor of course cannot foresee all things, and in his orders naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition.

'General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton's cavalry two thousand five hundred strong, with thirty guns. This corps pushed my right wing to Granja and Azagua, at the '*debouche*' of Fuente Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, twelve hundred cavalry under Erskine and twelve guns, moved on my extreme right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer.

'Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps, and I am assured he has also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made round the place eighteen thousand men.

'The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington thirty thousand men, and some make him as high as forty thousand, at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of Portugal had joined me with twenty-five thousand men, Badajos would have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and besides the loss I should have suffered I could not have got back in time to save my troops in Andalusia.

'The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into Portugal. So measured indeed were their operations, that it is to be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont.'

'Your highness tells me I 'should not have left Hill after his last movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take my magazines: I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La Lerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain which would not let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for on the 22nd February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those three divisions under Foy which he destined to send to the aid of Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat the enemy's projects.'

'If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February, forty thousand men; I had only thirty-five thousand, including the garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me twenty-four thousand, the rest being employed before

Cadiz at Seville, in Grenada and Murcia, and against Ballesteros. You must consider that fifteen days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in all fifteen thousand men; and since two years I have sent many other skeleton regiments to France, being more than fifteen thousand men changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are borne on the states; besides which, I have four thousand men unfit for the field who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ them in the posts. Ballesteros has, besides the arm of Murcia, ten thousand men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicant and Carthage, they had fifteen thousand men. Suchet's operations have certainly produced great results, but for *one moment* have hurt me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a moment when I have only three battalions and four hundred cavalry to oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz, Gibraltar, and on the ocean could also at any time descend with ten or twelve thousand men on any part of my line, and I want at least as many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army was not strong enough, though excellent in quality.

'I cannot hold twenty thousand men, as your highness desires, on the Guadiana unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river, all my right under D'Erlon, *i. e.* nine regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, and twelve guns, shall march into the interior of Estremadura and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and, if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English corps left in Alemtejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the valley of the Tagus against Madrid.

'Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear directed to invade Andalusia so far as to have obliged me to unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz; Graham has come to Llerona, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an affair, and lost sixty men.'—'I have ordered D'Erlon to repass the Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!'

No. VI.

SECTION I.

SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE
ARMY AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUM-
MERS AND ARTILLERYMEN.

October 1, 1811.—Cavalry.

	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Prisoners.	Total.
British	3571	1114	947	298	5930
Portuguese	1373	256	1140	—	2769
Total Cavalry ...	4944	1370	2087	298	8699

Infantry.

British	29,530	17,974	2663	1684	51,851
Portuguese	23,689	6,009	1707	75	31,480
Total Infantry ...	53,219	23,983	4370	1759	83,331

General Total, including serjeants, 58,263 sabres and bayonets in the field.

January 8, 1812. — Cavalry.

British	4949	841	741	—	6531
Portuguese	613	43	275	—	931
Total Cavalry ...	5562	884	1016	—	7462

Infantry.

British	30,222	11,414	2827	—	44,463
Portuguese	20,455	4,849	2360	51	27,715
Total Infantry ...	50,677	16,263	5187	51	72,178

General Total, including serjeants, 56,239 sabres and bayonets in the field.

Note.—The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so great that one division was suppressed.

April 5, 1812.—Cavalry.

British	4299	564	755	3	6048
Portuguese	347	9	492	—	848
Total Cavalry ...	4646	573	1247	3	6896

Infantry.

	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Prisoners	Total
British	26,897	11,452	2779	2	40,703
Portuguese	20,224	5,532	1507	18	27,281
Total Infantry ...	47,121	16,984	4286	20	67,984

Sabres and bayonets.....	51,767
Field artillerymen	1,980
Gunners in the batteries	900

General Total ... 54,647

Note.—The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes.

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS,
APRIL, 1812.

British.

Light division.....	2679
Third division.....	2882
Fourth division	2579
Fifth division	2896
	— 11,036

Portuguese.

Hamilton's division	4685
Light division.....	858
Third division.....	976
Fourth division	2384
Fifth division	1845
	— 10,748

Total 21,784

ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812.

Cavalry under general Hill.—Left Wing.

British.....	783
Portuguese	347
	— 1130

Infantry ditto.

British.....	6156
Portuguese	2385
	— 8541

Total under general Hill 9671

Cavalry under general Graham.—Right Wing.

British.....	3517
Portuguese	—
	— 3,517

Infantry ditto.

British	10,154
Portuguese	5,896
	— 16,050

Total under general Graham ... 19,567

General Total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillerymen and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos, 29,238 sabres and bayonets.

SECTION II.

SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT BADAJOS, 1812.

ASSAULT.

British Loss.

	Killed.	Wounded.
Generals	—	5
Staff	1	11
	Officers.	Soldiers.
Artillery	2	20
Engineers	5	5
Total	7	25

Light division.—*Line.*

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Total.
43rd	18	329	347
52nd	18	305	323
95th, 1st bat.	14	179	193
95th, 3rd bat.	8	56	64
Total ...	58	869	927

} 670

Third division.

5th	4	41	45
45th	14	83	97
74th	7	47	54
77th	3	10	13
83rd	8	62	70
88th	10	135	145
94th	2	154	156
Total ...	48	532	580

} 580

Fourth division.

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Total
7th	17	163	180
23rd	17	134	151
27th	15	170	185
40th	16	124	140
48th	19	154	173
	<hr/> 84	<hr/> 745	<hr/> 829

Fifth division.

1st	2	—	2
4th	17	213	230
9th	—	—	—
30th	6	126	132
38th	5	37	42
44th	9	95	104
	<hr/> 39	<hr/> 471	<hr/> 510
60th*	4	30	34
Brunswick Oels* ...	2	30	32

Total British loss at the assault.

Officers.	Sergeants.	Soldiers.	Total.
51 ...	40 ...	560 killed	} 3022
213 ...	153 ...	1983 wounded	
— ...	1 ...	21 missing	

Total Portuguese loss at the assault.

8 ...	6 ...	141 killed	} 730
45 ...	32 ...	468 wounded	
— ...	— ...	30 missing	

Grand Total	317	232	3203	3752
-------------------	-----	-----	------	------

British loss during the whole siege.

60 ...	45 ...	715 killed	} 3860
251 ...	178 ...	2578 wounded	
— ...	1 ...	32 missing	

Portuguese loss during the whole siege.

12 ...	6 ...	137 killed	} 965
55 ...	38 ...	687 wounded	
— ...	— ...	30 missing	

General Total.....	378	268	4179	4825
--------------------	-----	-----	------	------

* These regiments were attached by companies to the third, fourth, and fifth divisions.

SECTION III.

SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hosp.	Pris.	Men.	Horses.
August, 1811 ..	262,276	37,669	50,502	10,869	41,452	„	354,418	35,548
Reinforcements in March	17,361	3,929	81	„	981	„	18,423	13,190 train 3,929
Total....	279,637	41,598	50,583	10,869	42,433	„	372,841	52,467
January, 1812..	258,156	41,049	22,805	5,434	42,056	„	324,933	42,348
April, 1812	240,654	36,590	12,224	3,814	33,504	„	286,440	40,461
Reserve at Bayonne	4,038	157	36	35	865	„	4,939	192
Total....	244,692	36,747	12,260	3,849	34,369	„	291,379	40,653

Observation.—In September, 1811, an army of reserve, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all 20,287 under arms, was formed for the *armée du midi*.

1st August, 1811.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.	
Armée du Midi	50,597	10,008	32,043	5,359	11,836	94,508	1,195 3,413	} 4,608
							3,236	
du Centre ..	16,540	3,729	391	64	1,781	18,712	557	} 3,793
							6,692	
de Portugal	38,392	5,826	7,901	3,100	10,424	56,733	2,234	} 8,926
							3,667	
d'Aragon ..	45,102	5,718	1,397	388	5,458	51,957	2,439	} 6,106
							3,531	
du Nord	88,092	11,020	7,617	1,805	6,654	102,413	4,294	} 12,825
							1,268	
de Catalogne	23,553	1,368	1,158	153	5,305	30,095	253	} 1,521
Total	262,276	37,669	50,502	10,869	41,452	354,418	35,348 13,190	} 48,538
Reinforcements	17,361	3,929	81	„	981	18,423	2,929	
General Total	279,637	41,508	50,583	10,869	42,443	372,841	39,277 13,190	} 52,467

STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS.

15th August, 1811.

<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
12,797	8193	3944	14	1189	17,613	3179

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS.

16th May, 1811.—Five battalions.

<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
2897	239	361	„	380	3725	239

1st March, 1812.

4393	44	„	„	473	5034	44
------	----	---	---	-----	------	----

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

15th December, 1811.

1764	19	„	„	130	1956	19
------	----	---	---	-----	------	----

Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Pris.	Men.	Horses.
Armée du Midi	66,912	11,757	7,539	2232	13,398	„	88,033	9251
							train	3393
du centre ..	19,125	6,262	511	84	1,685	„	21,321	5196
								553
de Portugal	50,167	11,662	1,283	858	10,012	„	61,462	6909
								4706
d'Aragon....	28,966	5,303	6,583	308	4,424	„	39,953	3322
								1960
du Nord	87,913	10,821	6,201	1069	9,414	„	10,528	6769
								4186
de Catalogne	26,954	1,365	993	168	11,186	„	39,241	1150
								289
Total	280,047	47,270	23,110	4717	50,119	„	353,538	37,684
Reinforcements	9,232	689			1,226		10,458	516
General Total	289,249	47,959	23,110	4717	51,345	„	363,996	38,200

15th April, 1812.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Armée du Midi..	55,797	11,014	2,498	700	6,065	64,360	11,714
du Centre	19,148	3,293	144	51	624	19,916	4,044
de Portugal ..	56,937	8,108	4,394	2278	7,706	69,037	10,386
d'Aragon.....	14,786	3,269	2,695	658	1,467	18,948	3,927
de l'Ebre.....	16,830	1,873	21	6	3,425	20,276	1,879
de Catalogne..	28,924	1,259	1,163	49	5,540	35,627	1,308
du Nord	48,232	7,074	1,309	72	8,677	58,276	7,213
Total	240,654	36,590	12,224	3814	33,534	286,440	40,461
Reserve at Bayonne	4,038	157	36	35	865	4,939	192
Grand Total	244,692	36,747	12,260	3849	34,369	291,379	40,653

No. VII.

MR. TUPPER'S REPORT TO SIR H. WELLESLEY.

[Extract.]

'January 27, 1812.

'The scandalous behaviour of the members of the junta will have more influence upon the public mind, will dishearten the people even more than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of the army. For seeing their representatives return to their respective districts, it will give an example to follow, that all is lost; and having no authority to protect them or to look to, the people have no other resource left than to submit to the yoke of the enemy.'

Extracts from Mr. Tupper's report to sir Henry Wellesley, from 22 to 27 January, 1812.

'Blake with his immense resources remained altogether inactive, and contented himself with observing the movements of the enemy and his progress in fortifying himself under the walls of the city.'

'With Blake's approbation I had raised a corps of about one hundred and eighty men to act as guerillas, and by beginning a plan of offensive operations I expected to see the example followed. I also demanded the direction of the chief battery, that of Santa Catalina, from whence the French camp might be much annoyed, and for the space of thirty successive days caused the French considerable damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this battery, that of St. Joseph contiguous to it, and that of the Puente del Mar, everything else remained in a state of complete inactivity. Blake, lulled into a state of confidence that the enemy would not attack without reinforcements, had taken no measures whatever.'

'The junta of Valencia was composed of members, as per list enclosed, of which only the first remained, the others having before retired and shamefully gone to their respective homes; but upon the fall of the capital where they had their property, those remaining sent in their resignation to Mahi, and without being competent to do so, gave up the only representative authority of the province which had been confided to them, and have thus thrown the whole country into a state of anarchy, abandoning it altogether to the will of the enemy; yet I am persuaded the spirit of the people is the same, great resources are left in the province, immense riches still remain in the churches, convents, diezmos, &c., &c.'——'I am however sorry to say that since the fall of the capital, nay, since the battle of the 26th ultimo, not a single step has been taken, and at this moment outside the walls of Alicant the province does not exist.—Mahi has objected to Padre Rico, the only man in my opinion, and in

that of everybody, capable of giving activity and soul to the resources of the country.'

..... 'I am sorry to inform your excellency that after repeated interviews with Mahi and the intendant Rivas, on the subject of the commission I had proposed, I am now clearly of the opinion from the repeated delays and studied objections that no authority will be established.'——'In short nothing has been done, and nothing will be done.'——

'I am firmly of opinion that the people now in authority are disposed, by leaving public affairs in their present abandoned state, to submit to the French yoke.'——'On the 16th ultimo, when Montbrun made his appearance, the Ayuntamiento desired the Syndico Personeso to give a petition in the name of the people to enter into a capitulation; he refused; but I am informed there was some arrangement between the governor and the Ayuntamiento, the members whereof remain in office notwithstanding their traitorous conduct on the 16th.'

No. VIII.

[The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to show how difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.]

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Extract of a memoir by sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of Le Marchant's brigade of heavy cavalry.

'Throughout these charges upon the enemy the heavy brigade was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever; but was followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by the third division which had so gloriously led the attack in the first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy's extreme left.'

Extract from a memoir by colonel Money, who was one of general Anson's brigade of light cavalry.

'The third division moved to the right, and the cavalry, *Le Marchand's* and *Anson's*, were ordered to charge as soon as the *tirailleurs* of the third division began to ascend the right flank of the hill.'——'The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they ran into the wood which separated them from the army; *we* (Anson's light cavalry) charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from another height; near two thousand threw down their arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued our charge through the wood until our brigade came

into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing and halted; when it cleared away we found ourselves within three hundred yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery, formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order and without any loss.'

Extract of a letter from sir Henry Watson, commanding the first regiment of Portuguese cavalry under general D'Urban.

'When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, lord Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the first and tenth Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under captain Townsend, now lieutenant-colonel Townsend, formed a part under sir B. D'Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground, which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up and charge the front in line. *The enemy had formed a square and gave us a volley as we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained en potence. In this charge we completely succeeded and the enemy appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces, levelled his musket at me and shot me through the shoulder, which knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of our infantry had passed over.'*

Extract from a letter of colonel Townsend, 14th Dragoons.

'At the battle of Salamanca I perfectly recollect seeing D'Urban's cavalry advance up the hill and charge the French infantry. *They were repulsed, and left Watson (now sir Henry), who led his regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field.*'—'*I am almost positive the French were not in square but in line, waiting to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division, which gallantly carried everything before it.*'

No. IX.

Copies de deux dépêches de l'empereur au ministre de la guerre relatives au duc de Raguse.

Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,—Je vous renvoie la correspondance d'Espagne. Ecrivez au duc de Raguse que c'est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que je suppose qu'il s'est

retiré devant lord Wellington selon les règles de la guerre, en l'obligeant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa cavalerie légère : qu'il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l'Agueda, ce qui peut seul lui permettre d'avoir des nouvelles de l'ennemi tous les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au contraire il a mis trente lieues d'intervalle entre lui et l'ennemi, comme il l'a déjà fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la guerre, il laisse le général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, il perd constamment l'initiative, et n'est plus d'aucun poids dans les affaires d'Espagne ; que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des dispositions facheuses par les suites de l'évacuation des Asturies par la division Bonnet ; que la réoccupation de cette province n'a pas encore eu lieu, que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, que Santona et St. Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications des guerillas avec la Galice et les Asturies par la mer les rendront formidables, que s'il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement les Asturies, sa position ne peut s'améliorer.

Recommandez au général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses troupes, et d'avoir toujours une colonne dans la main.

Ecrivez au général L'Huillier d'avoir l'œil sur St. Sebastian, et d'avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur cette place si elle avoit besoin d'être secourue.

En général, pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise direction que le duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires, il est nécessaire d'avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche du 3^e et du 106^{me} et de la 5^e demi brigade provisoire sur cette place. Tenez y deux généraux de brigade afin que le général L'Huillier puisse toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure d'agir selon les circonstances.

Réunissez un millier d'hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l'armée d'Espagne, et dirigez les en régimens de marche sur Bayonne.

Prescrivez au général L'Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la vallée de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les munissant bien, les barraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce sera au moyen de cette ressource que si le duc de Raguse continue à faire des bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir extrême.

Sur ce, je prie Dieu, &c.

(Signé)

NAPOLÉON.

[For second despatch, see Appendix No. XIV.]

No. X.

Lettre de M. le duc de Dalmatie au roi.

Seville, 12 Août, 1812.

Je n'avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur m'écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin je viens de recevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même

mois. Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m'avaient déjà instruit des événemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes idées. Je déplore les pertes que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvées. Dans l'état où étaient les affaires d'Espagne une bataille ne devait se donner qu'à la dernière extrémité, mais tout n'est pas perdu. V. M. après m'avoir communiqué les dispositions qu'elle a faites depuis le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet m'ordonne comme une ressource d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède. Je ne puis dissimuler que cette disposition me paraît fort extraordinaire. J'étais loin de penser que V. M. s'y serait déterminée. Le sort de l'Espagne est il donc décidé? V. M. veut elle sacrifier le royaume à la capitale? et a-t-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant ce parti? Enfin l'évacuation de l'Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolède sont elles l'unique ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer à cette disposition que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour l'honneur des armes impériales, le bien du service de l'empereur et l'intérêt de V. M. dans l'espoir qu'avant qu'elle s'exécute V. M. l'aura changée ou modifiée suivant les propositions que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui faire le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le colonel Desprez.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre majesté triplicata de ma lettre du 8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions qu'elle renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence, je considère que l'évacuation de toute l'Espagne est décidée, car il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que mon mouvement sera commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille ennemis lesquels ne me donneront pas le tems ni la liberté de prendre la direction que V. M. m'indique et qui se réuniront à ceux qui ont pénétré en Castille et m'empêcheront de séjourner sur le Tage encore moins d'arriver à Madrid. Il n'y a qu'un moyen pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M. vienne en Andalousie et qu'elle y amène toutes les troupes de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Portugal, de l'armée d'Arragon auxquelles ses ordres pourront parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de Valence devrait être évacué. Qu'importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid si elle perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y rentra en souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français réunis dans le midi de l'Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé; l'armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter successivement jusqu'au Tage. D'ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient qu'elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l'Ebre et que tout l'espace compris entre elle et le Sierra Morena fut à la disposition des ennemis jusqu'à ce que des renforts vinsent de France et que l'empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une fois fait il n'y a plus de moyen d'y remédier. Les armées impériales en Espagne repassent l'Ebre d'où peut-être la famine les chassera, les affaires de l'empereur dans le nord de l'Europe peuvent s'en ressentir, l'Amerique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l'Angleterre fera peut-être la paix

V. M. a sans doute réfléchi à toutes les conséquences d'un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de Madrid et des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l'empereur, elle peut se réparer en plus ou moins de tems. La perte d'une bataille par l'armée de Portugal n'est qu'un grand duel qui se répare également, mais la perte de l'Andalousie et la levée du siège de Cadix sont des événemens dont les effets seront ressentis dans toute l'Europe et dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet de l'empereur je dois déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les affaires d'Espagne assez désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi violent. J'entrevois encore du remède si V. M. veut prendre les dispositions que j'ai proposées; tout en me préparant à l'exécution de ses ordres je me permets de lui demander de nouvelles instructions. J'ai sur-tout l'honneur de prier V. M. d'ordonner que les communications de l'Andalousie avec Tolède soient rétablies et quelque événement qui survienne de vouloir bien faire prendre à l'armée du centre, la direction de Despeña Perros ou d'Almaden pour se joindre à l'armée du midi. Alors je reponds de tout, et j'exécuterai les dispositions que j'ai énoncées dans ma lettre 8 de ce mois,

Je, &c. &c. &c.

No. XI.

Lettre de M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre de la guerre à Paris.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,—Toute communication de l'Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue et n'ayant rien reçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j'entreprends de faire parvenir mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marseille, l'empereur sera plutôt instruit de ce qui se passe dans le midi de l'Espagne et de la position de son armée.

A ce sujet j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre excellence copie des derniers rapports que j'ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les représentations que j'ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le bien du service de l'empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et l'honneur des armées impériales.

Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvés que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l'ennemi; car le roi en m'écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m'en a donné aucun détail. Je dois donc m'imaginer que les pertes que nous avons faites en Castile sont beaucoup exagérées et j'en tire la conséquence que les affaires de l'empereur en Espagne ne sont pas aussi désespérées que le roi parait en être persuadé. Cependant sa majesté après être resté 23 jours sans m'écrire, lorsque les en-

nemis étoient en plein mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit avec 14,000 hommes de l'armée du centre à la rencontre du duc de Raguse qui sans l'attendre s'étoit engagé précipitamment et éprouvait une défaite; le roi dis-je en me faisant part le 29 Juillet de ses mouvemens me donna l'ordre formel d'évacuer l'Andalousie et me diriger sur Tolède, et il me dit expressément que c'est l'unique ressource qui nous reste.

Je suis loin de partager l'avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement qu'il est possible de mieux faire, et que tout peut s'arranger en attendant que d'après les ordres de l'empereur V. E. ait pû mettre les armées qui sont dans le nord de l'Espagne à même de reprendre les opérations, ainsi que j'en fais la proposition à sa majesté dans les lettres dont je mets ci-joint copies. Mais mon devoir est d'obéir, et je me chargerais d'une trop grande responsabilité si j'éluais l'exécution de l'ordre formel d'évacuer que le roi m'a donné.

Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que je regarde comme funeste, puisqu'elle me force à livrer aux ennemis des places de guerre susceptibles d'une bonne défense, tout approvisionnées, les établissemens et un matériel d'artillerie immense, et de laisser dans les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que leur situation et le manque de transport ne permettent point d'emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon mouvement que progressivement, et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour qu'il ne reste en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l'armée.

Je ne puis encore assurer que je ne ferai ce mouvement par Tolède, car du moment qu'il sera entrepris je serai suivi par 60,000 ennemis qui se joindront aux divisions que lord Wellington aura déjà portées sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que je me dirige par Murcie sur Valence suivant ce que j'apprendrai, ou les nouveaux ordres que je recevrai du roi.

Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je regarde l'évacuation de l'Espagne au moins jusqu'à l'Ebre comme décidée du moment que le roi m'ordonna d'évacuer l'Andalousie et me diriger sur Tolède, car il est bien certain qu'il ne sera pas possible de rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles, et que dès-lors les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont l'empereur avait ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées.

A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réfléchir sur d'autres événemens qui se passent. J'ai lu dans les journaux de Cadix que l'ambassadeur du roi en Russie avait joint l'armée Russe, que le roi avait fait des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent de Cadix, que la Suède avait fait un traité avec l'Angleterre, et que le prince héréditaire avait demandé à la regence de Cadix 250 Espagnols pour sa garde personnelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire que le général Semélé avait envoyé à l'escadre Anglaise pour réclamer des prisonniers, resta pendant quelques instans à bord de l'amiral, lequel lui montra une frégate, qui, dit il, est destinée à porter en Angleterre et ensuite en Suède les 250 Espagnols que le prince Bernadotte demande pour sa garde personnelle.) Enfin j'ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau, et

Blucher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence de tous ces faits, mais j'en serai plus attentif. Cependant j'ai cru devoir déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux de l'armée, après avoir exigé d'eux le serment qu'ils ne révéleront ce que je leur ai dit qu'à l'empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que S. M. aura spécialement déléguées pour en recevoir la déclaration, si auparavant je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est pourtant de mon devoir de manifester à V. E. que je crains que le bût de toutes les fausses dispositions que l'on a prises et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu, ne soient de forcer les armées impériales qui sont en Espagne à repasser au moins l'Ebre, et ensuite de présenter cet événement comme l'unique ressource (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l'espérance d'en profiter par quelque arrangement.

Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation il vaut mieux les pousser à l'extrémité que d'être négligent, d'autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien du service de l'empereur, et à la sûreté de l'armée dont le commandement m'est confié.

J'ai l'honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien si ma lettre lui parvient, la mettre le plutôt possible sous les yeux de l'empereur et d'assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours dignes de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que V. E. puisse me faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues et surtout recevoir par elle les ordres de sa majesté.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé)

DALMATIE.

Seville, 12 Août, 1812.

No. XII.

SIRE,—Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le champ présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m'a questionné sur les affaires d'Espagne, mais sans me demander mes dépêches pour l'empereur. Elle m'a, suivant les intentions de V. M., pourvu des ordres dont j'ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec célérité.

Ce matin le ministre m'a fait appeler et j'ai eu avec lui une longue conférence. Il m'a pressé de m'expliquer avec franchise sur ce que j'avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, m'a témoigné quelque inquiétude sur l'influence que pouvoit exercer le maréchal tant sur l'armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé les intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu'il dépouillait devant moi le caractère de ministre pour causer avec un homme de votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus à l'époque de sa disgrâce devaient être pour V. M. une garantie du désir qu'il avait d'agir suivant ses

intentions. Quelque franches que m'aient parus ces ouvertures, je n'ai pas cru devoir parler de la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J'ai seulement répondu que l'armée du midi serait toujours celle de l'empereur, que lorsque S. M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, et que tout ce que j'avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait à ce sujet aucun doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le duc de Feltre m'a prouvé qu'aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je suis porteur ne lui était encore parvenue, et cela est pour ma mission une circonstance favorable.

J'ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l'armée Française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de V. M. Il a déclaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et sans aucune restriction, qu'avant son départ l'empereur avait témoigné son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet égard les lettres de V. M. et qu'il avait ordonné que l'on fit connaître ses intentions d'une manière encore plus positive. J'ai cité la lettre où le maréchal Suchet s'autorise d'une phrase du prince de Neuchâtel, celles du général Dorsenne et du général Caffarelli, il paraît que tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l'exécution de vos ordres ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement aux généraux en chef. Quant à la désobéissance formelle du maréchal Soult S. E. a dit d'abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu'une démarche semblable ne pouvait être faite que par l'ordre exprès de l'empereur.

Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires militaires, les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le maréchal Jourdan aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m'a-t-il dit, l'approbation générale et ce qu'a écrit l'empereur, depuis qu'il a appris la bataille de Salamanque, prouve qu'il donne entièrement droit à V. M. L'opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que celle des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec quelle rigueur sont jugés en France les maréchaux Soult et Marmont.

Le duc de Feltre m'a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. Peut-être, a-t-il dit, l'empereur reprochera un peu d'hésitation; exécuté deux jours plutôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. V. M. se rappelle que j'avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai point embarrassé pour y répondre.

S. E. a cru que j'allais auprès de l'empereur pour solliciter de nouveaux renforts; elle m'a dit que la guerre de Russie avait jusqu'à présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu'il était loin de pouvoir envoyer les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le maréchal Jourdan, que l'on pourrait seulement pouvoir à la perte matérielle faite par l'armée de Portugal. Il paraît que les nouvelles troupes envoyées en Espagne ne s'élèvent pas au-delà de vingt mille hommes, au reste la grande victoire remportée par l'empereur fera probablement prendre des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires de la Péninsule.

Le duc de Feltre a reçu des nouvelles du général Clauzel.

Ce général annonce que l'armée Anglaise marche vers le nord, que lord Wellington s'est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que l'armée de Portugal s'est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup moindres qu'on ne l'avait cru, que le général Foy avait fait un mouvement pour délivrer Astorga et Tordesillas, mais que déjà ces deux places s'étaient rendues, que l'on pourrait accuser de faiblesse les deux gouverneurs et que peut-être la conduite de celui de Tordesillas devait être jugée plus sévèrement encore.

J'ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle me mettait le décret du 26 Août; il a répondu que je pouvais sans inconvénient me présenter à l'empereur avec les décorations du grade que m'a donné V. M., que ce n'était point contre les officiers à votre service que le décret avait été dirigé, et qu'il serait modifié en leur faveur.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris, je poursuivrai sans m'arrêter ma route jusqu'au quartier général de l'empereur.

J'ai l'honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l'hommage de mon profond respect et de mon entier dévouement.

(Signé)

LE COLONEL DESPRES.

Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812.

No. XIII. A.

Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de Feltre.

Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812.

SIRE,—La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m'a écrite de Requeña le 18 Octobre, m'est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l'ai sur le champ transmise à l'empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que 19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance où l'empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux : du moins momentanément. Si la conduite de monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et cauteleuse ; si ses démarches présentent la même aspect que celles qu'il paroît avoir faites et qui ont précédé l'abandon du Portugal après la prise d'Oporto, il viendra un moment où l'empereur pourra l'en punir s'il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins dangereux où il est qu'il ne le serait ici, où quelques factieux ont pu du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient, méditer en l'absence de l'empereur une révolution contre l'empereur et sa dynastie, et presque l'exécuter, le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc, sire, qu'il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses qu'il pourrait tenter, et en s'assurant de la fidélité des principaux officiers de l'armée du midi envers l'empereur et même de celle des Espagnols qu'il traîne à sa suite. L'arme du ridicule qu'il est facile de manier

en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour déjouer ses coupables projets s'ils existent, et le ramener à son devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu'il ne s'en écarte jamais.

Quoiqu'il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité d'attendre les ordres de l'empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de V. M. datée de Requeña le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que je partage ses sentimens sur l'objet dont elle traite ; je viens d'être assez heureux pour donner à l'empereur et à sa famille de nouvelles preuves de ma fidélité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Octobre, elle la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je me suis fait un plaisir de lui exprimer en faveur de l'empereur et de sa famille au moment où j'ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville il y a quelques années, &c. &c.

Note.—It is only necessary to add to this letter that notwithstanding the duke of Feltre's professions of attachment he was soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons and the most bitter enemy of the emperor.

The constancy with which the duke of Dalmatia served that great man is well known.

No. XIII. B.

Colonel Desprez to the king.

Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813.

SIRE,—J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais j'ai dû en me servant de la voie de l'estafette user d'une extrême discrétion. La reine m'ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque détail, et ayant daigné m'offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le premier courier qu'elle expédierait, j'en profite pour rendre compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des événemens dont j'ai été témoin.

Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L'empereur venait d'apprendre que l'avant garde commandée par le roi de Naples avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de son artillerie. Déjà le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient en mouvement. On m'annonça à S. M. qui répondit d'abord d'une manière peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la nuit on me fit appeler. Je remis à l'empereur les dépêches dont V. M. m'avait chargé, et sans les ouvrir, il me questionna sur leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les opérations de la campagne une partie des objections qu'avait prévues V. M.

Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l'armée de Portugal avait été commencé trop tard, qu'il aurait pu être fait un mois plutôt, que lui-même avait daté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance lorsqu'en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher aux Anglais qui s'étaient avancés jusqu'à Valladolid. Je répondis que V. M. s'était mise en marche peu d'heures après la division

Palombini, qu'elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire vers l'armée de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne pût être douteux; qu'elle avait d'autant moins cru devoir précipiter son mouvement, que M. le maréchal Marmont avait écrit plusieurs fois qu'il se croyait trop faible pour lutter seul contre l'armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal avait été maître du tems, qu'il n'avait point été battu dans sa position sur le Duero, mais bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel rien ne l'avait forcé de s'engager. L'empereur prétendit ensuite que V. M. après avoir appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait dû se porter sur le Duero et rallier l'armée de Portugal. Je rappelai alors le mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position critique dans laquelle vous avez laissé la duc de Raguse qui avait lui-même proposé ce mouvement. L'empereur dit qu'il connaissait très bien tous les reproches qu'à cet égard on pouvait faire au maréchal Marmont. Il ajouta que l'armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite sur Madrid elle aurait dû garder plus longtems les défilés du Guadarama, qu'on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce mouvement ayant été résolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison au Retiro, briser tous les affûts, emporter les aigles et brûler les effets d'habillement; qu'il n'avait jamais considéré ce poste que comme propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l'ennemi étant maître de la campagne, on devait l'abandonner et que de toutes les fautes de la campagne c'était celle qu'il avait le moins conçue. Je répondis à cette objection ainsi que j'en étais convenu avec V. M. L'empereur en venant ensuite à la lettre du duc de Dalmatie me dit qu'elle lui était déjà parvenue par une autre voie, mais qu'il n'y avait attaché aucune importance; que le maréchal Soult s'était trompé, qu'il ne pouvait s'occuper de semblables *pauvretés* dans un moment où il *était à la tête de cinq cent mille hommes et faisait des choses immenses*. Ce sont ses expressions, qu'au reste les soupçons du duc de Dalmatie ne l'étonnaient que faiblement; que beaucoup de généraux de l'armée d'Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que V. M. préférerait l'Espagne à la France; qu'il savait parfaitement qu'elle avait le cœur François mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par ses discours devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le maréchal Soult était la seule tête militaire qu'il eut en Espagne, qu'il ne pouvait l'en retirer sans compromettre l'armée, que d'ailleurs il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions puisqu'il venait d'apprendre par les journaux Anglais qu'il évacuait l'Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et d'Aragon, que cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force pour reprendre l'offensive; que d'ailleurs il n'avait point d'ordres à envoyer, qu'il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu'il ne se dissimulait point l'étendue du mal et qu'il regrettait plus que jamais que V. M. n'ait point suivi le conseil qu'il lui avait donné de ne pas retourner en Espagne; qu'il était inutile que je repar-tisse, que je resterai à l'armée où l'on m'emploierait. J'insistai alors pour être renvoyé à V. M. d'une manière qui parut faire sur l'empereur quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je

serai expédié mais que je ne pouvais l'être dans ce moment, qu'ayant besoin de repos je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque j'étais officier du génie, je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres du duc de Treviso les travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je reçus en conséquence un ordre écrit du prince de Neufchatel. Lorsqu'après l'entière évacuation de Moscou le corps de M. le M. Mortier eut rejoint l'armée, je demandai et j'obtins d'y rester attaché jusqu'à ce que je fusse expédié. Je craignais que si je restais au quartier général on ne m'y désignât des fonctions qui seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je pensai que peut-être on éviterait d'envoyer à V. M. un témoin des événemens qui se passaient, et je préférai attendre qu'une occasion favorable se présentât. Etant arrivé à Wilna peu de tems après le départ de l'empereur, je demandai au duc de Bassano, et il me donna l'autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. dans une autre lettre que l'altération de ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne.

L'armée au moment où je la quittai était dans la plus affreuse détresse. Depuis longtems déjà la désorganisation et les pertes étaient effrayantes, l'artillerie et la cavalerie n'existaient plus. Tous les corps étaient confondus. Les soldats marchaient pêle-mêle et ne songaient qu'à prolonger machinalement leur existence; quoique l'ennemi fut sur nos flancs, chaque jour des milliers d'hommes isolés se répandaient dans les villages voisins de la route et tombaient dans les mains des Cosaques. Cependant quelque grand que soit le nombre des prisonniers, celui des morts l'est incomparablement davantage. Il est impossible de peindre jusqu'à quel point la disette s'est fait sentir pendant plus d'un mois; il n'y eut point de distributions; les chevaux morts étaient la seule ressource, et bien souvent les maréchaux mêmes manquaient de pain. La rigueur du climat rendait la disette plus meurtrière, chaque nuit nous laissions au bivouac plusieurs centaines de morts. Je crois pouvoir sans exagérer porter à cent mille le nombre qu'on a perdu ainsi, et peindre avec assez de vérité la situation des choses en disant que l'armée est morte: la jeune garde qui faisait partie du corps auquel j'étais attaché était forte de 8000 hommes lorsque nous avons quitté Moscou, à Wilna elle en comptait à peine quatre cents. Tous les autres corps d'armée sont réduits dans la même proportion, et la retraite ayant dû se prolonger au-delà du Niemen, je suis convaincu que vingt mille hommes n'auront pas atteints la Vistule. On croyait à l'armée que beaucoup de soldats avaient pris les devants et qu'ils se rallieraient lorsqu'on pourrait suspendre le mouvement rétrograde. Je me suis assuré du contraire; à cinq lieues du quartier général, je ne rencontrai plus d'hommes isolés et je connus bien alors la profondeur de la plaie. Une phrase pourrait donner à V. M. une idée de l'état des choses, depuis le passage du Niemen un corps de 800 Napolitains, le seul corps qui eût conservé quelque consistance, faisait l'arrière garde d'une armée Française, forte n'a guère de trois cents mille hommes. Il est impossible d'exprimer jusqu'à quel point le désordre était contagieux; les corps réunis

des ducs de Bellune et de Reggio comptaient 30,000 hommes au passage de la Beresina, deux jours après ils étaient dissous comme le reste de l'armée. Envoyer des renforts c'était augmenter les pertes, et l'on reconnut enfin qu'il fallait empêcher les troupes neuves de se mettre en contact avec cette multitude en désordre à laquelle on ne peut plus donner le nom d'armée. Le roi de Naples disait hautement qu'en lui laissant le commandement l'empereur avait exigé le plus grand sacrifice qu'il pût attendre de son dévouement. Les forces physiques et morales du prince de Neufchâtel étaient entièrement épuisées. Si maintenant V. M. me demandait quel doit être le terme du mouvement rétrograde, je lui répondrais que l'ennemi est maître de le fixer. Je ne crois pas que les Prussiens fassent de grands efforts pour défendre leur territoire. M. de Narbonne que j'ai vu à Berlin et qui était chargé de lettres de l'empereur pour le roi de Prusse, m'a dit que les dispositions de ce prince et de son premier ministre étaient favorables, mais il ne se dissimulait pas que celles de la nation ne sont pas les mêmes. Déjà plusieurs rixes s'étaient engagées entre les habitans de Berlin et des soldats de la garnison Française ; et en traversant la Prusse j'ai eu lieu de m'assurer que l'on ne pouvait guère compter sur cette alliée de nouvelle date.

Il paraît aussi que dans l'armée Autrichienne les officiers déclamaient publiquement contre la guerre.

Quel triste que soit ce tableau, je crois l'avoir peint sans exagération et l'avoir observé de sang froid. Mon opinion sur l'étendue du mal est la même que lorsque j'étais plus voisin du théâtre.

No. XIV.

Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,—J'ai reçu le rapport du duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant: il y a plus de fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l'état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir sur cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous attendrez que le duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu'il soit remis de sa blessure, et à-peu-près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui demanderez alors de répondre catégoriquement à ces questions. Pourquoi a-t-il livré bataille sans les ordres de son général-en-chef? Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas pris des ordres sur le parti qu'il devoit suivre, subordonné au système général sur mes armées d'Espagne? Il y a là *un crime d'insubordination* qui est la cause de tous les malheurs de cette affaire, et quand même il n'eût pas été dans l'obligation de se mettre en communication avec son général-en-chef pour exécuter les ordres qu'il en recevait, comment a-t-il pu sortir de sa défensive sur le Duero, lorsque, sans un grand effort d'imagination, il étoit facile de concevoir qu'il pouvoit être secouru par l'arrivée de la division de dragons,

d'une trentaine de pièces de canon, et de plus de 15 mille hommes de troupes Françaises que le roi avoit dans la main? Et comment pouvoit il sortir de la défensive pour prendre l'offensive sans attendre la réunion et le secours d'un corps de 15 à 17 mille hommes?

Le roi avoit ordonné à l'armée du nord d'envoyer sa cavalerie à son secours; elle étoit en marche. Le duc de Raguse ne pouvoit l'ignorer, puisque cette cavalerie est arrivée le soir de la bataille. De Salamanque à Burgos il y a bien des marches. Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas retardé de deux jours pour avoir le secours de cette cavalerie, qui lui étoit si importante? Il faudroit avoir une explication sur les raisons qui ont porté le duc de Raguse à ne pas attendre les ordres de son général-en-chef pour livrer bataille sans attendre les renforts que le roi, comme commandant supérieur de mes armées en Espagne, pouvoit retirer de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Valence et de l'Andalousie. Le seul fonds de l'armée du centre fournissoit 15 mille hommes de pied, et 2500 chevaux, lesquels pouvoient être rendus dans le même temps que le duc de Raguse faisoit battre son corps, et en prenant dans ses deux armées, le roi pouvoit lui amener 40 mille hommes. Enfin le duc de Raguse sachant que 1500 chevaux étoient partis de Burgos pour le rejoindre, comment ne les a-t-il pas attendus?

En faisant coïncider ces deux circonstances d'avoir pris l'offensive sans l'ordre de son général-en-chef et de ne pas avoir retardé la bataille de deux jours pour ne pas recevoir 15,000 hommes d'infanterie que lui amenoit le roi, et 1500 chevaux de l'armée du nord, on est fondé à penser que ce maréchal a craint que le roi ne participe au succès de la bataille, et qu'il a sacrifié à la vanité la gloire de la patrie et l'avantage de mon service.

Donnez ordre aux généraux divisionnaires d'envoyer les états de leurs pertes. Il est intolérable qu'on rende des comptes faux et qu'on me dissimule la vérité.

Prescrivez au général Clausel, qui commande l'armée, d'envoyer la situation avant et après la bataille. Demandez également aux chefs de corps des situations exactes. Finalement, vous ferez connoître au duc de Raguse en temps opportun combien je suis indigné de la conduite inexplicable qu'il a tenue, en n'attendant pas deux jours que les secours de l'armée du centre et de l'armée du nord le rejoignissent. J'attends avec impatience l'arrivée du général aide-de-camp du roi pour avoir des renseignemens précis. Ce qu'il a écrit ne signifie pas grande chose.

(Signé)

NAPOLÉON.

No. XV. A.

Extract from general Souham's despatch to the minister of war, Briviesca, 2nd October, 1812.

Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m'annoncez que le duc de Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que

le roi alloit se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En consequence de ces mouvemens je resolus de marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les positions ainsi qu'il suit. La droite à Termino, le centre sur les hauteurs de Monasterio, et la gauche à Villa Escuso la Solano et Villa Escuso la Sombria. La journée du 20 devait être celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à l'instant, à deux heures du matin, par un aide-de-camp, une lettre de S. M. C. qui m'ordonne de ne point engager d'affaire générale, et d'attendre que par ses manœuvres lord Wellington soit forcé d'évacuer sa position de Burgos; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, et non sans un violent chagrin, car je puis assurer V. E. que mon armée était parfaitement disposée, et que j'aurais pu combattre l'ennemi avec avantage. Cependant l'armée n'a des vivres que pour quatre jours, et à cette époque, si lord Wellington n'est point en retraite, je serai forcé de l'attaquer. J'entrevois moins de peril de marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le moral du soldat commence à se raffermir tout mouvement en arrière produit le plus mauvais effet.

(Signé)

COMTE SOUHAM.

No. XV. B.

Extracts from two letters written by the duke of Feltre to king Joseph, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov. 1812.

On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the duke of Wellington. '*Advantage of English newspapers.*'

'SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à votre majesté quelques extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j'ai choisi ce qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances actuels.'

'SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs extraits des journaux Anglais contenant quelques faits utiles ou intéressans à connaître.'

These extracts taken from the Courier, Morning Post, Times, Alfred, Statesman, and Morning Chronicle, contain minute details upon the numbers, situation, and destination of the Sicilian, Spanish, and Anglo-Portuguese armies, and the most exact account of the reinforcements sent from England. In fine, a complete system of intelligence for the enemy.

No. XVI.

Extract of a letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier.

Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1829.

‘Le 10 Novembre, 1812. Les armées du midi, du Portugal, et du centre se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez la position qu’occupait l’armée des alliés. Cette position ayant été bien reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, accompagné du duc de Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux, et de moi, je proposai de passer la Tormes, guéable presque partout entre Villa-Gonzala et Huerta, et de nous porter rapidement sur Calvarissa de Ariba, qui se trouvait au centre de la ligne des ennemis. J’espérais que lord Wellington ne pourrait éviter la bataille; et j’étais d’avis que nous devions faire tous nos efforts pour le forcer à l’accepter; me flattant qu’avec une armée de 80 milles hommes, dont 10 milles de cavalerie et 120 pièces de canon,* nous étions en état de remporter un brillant succès, sur le même champ de bataille où quelques mois avant nous avions essuyé un revers.

‘Le duc de Dalmatie, n’étant pas de mon avis, proposa d’aller passer le Tormes, à des guës qu’il avait reconnus à deux lieues au-dessus d’Alba; ce parti était sans doute plus prudent; mais il avoit, suivant moi, l’inconvénient que je voulais éviter, c’est-à-dire, qu’il laissait à nos adversaires la facilité de se retirer sans combattre. Cependant comme je n’étais revêtu d’aucun commandement, tandis que le duc de Dalmatie avait sous ses ordres les deux tiers de l’armée, le roi jugea convenable d’adopter son plan, et lui en confia l’exécution : vous en connaissez le resultat : il fut tel que je l’avais prévu.

‘Permettez moi, Monsieur, d’ajouter une reflexion. Il me semble que lord Wellington décidé à battre en retraite, aurait dû commencer à l’opérer le 14eme jour, où nous franchîmes la Tormes. En ne se mettant en mouvement que le 15, il se trouva dans la nécessité de défiler devant nous pendant une partie de la journée ; et sans les mauvais tems, et surtout sans beaucoup trop de circonspection de notre côté il eût peut-être couru quelque danger.

‘On a publié que pendant leur retraite les alliés ne perdirent que 50 ou 60 tués, 150 blessés, 170 prisonniers. Il est, cependant, certain que le nombre de prisonniers Anglais, Portugais, et

* These numbers are somewhat below those I have assigned to the French army ; my calculation was made from the imperial muster-rolls, but the difference may be easily accounted for by the length of time which elapsed when marshal Jourdan wrote this letter. His numbers are evidently from memory, and probably he did not mean to include the king’s guards and Spaniards.

Espagnols, conduits au quartier général à Salamanque, étoit, le 20 Novembre, de 3520.'

The justice of the marshal's opinion as to lord Wellington having stayed too long on the Tormes is confirmed by the following note of a conversation held with the duke of Wellington on the subject.

'Lord Wellington would have fought the French on the old position of the Arapiles 1812 notwithstanding their superior numbers, but he stayed too long at Salamanca.'

END OF VOL. IV.

858

46





PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

DC
231
N3
1900
v.4

Napier, W. P. F. (William
Francis Patrick)
[History of the war in
the peninsula and the south
of France]

History of the war in the
Peninsula and in the south
of France from the year 1807 to
the year 1814

